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ABSTRACT 	
 i 
Abstract 
 
Bernd Johann Sagemann 
Inserting Financial Instability in Strategic Management of  
Commercial Real Estate Companies  
A Corporate Perspective on the Meaning of the Phenomenon  
of Financial Instability 
 
Key Words: financial instability, financial crisis, strategic management, 
commercial real estate, phenomenology, sensemaking, lived experience, 
corporate meaning, qualitative indicators  
 
The global financial system was marked by several crises frequently 
connected to Commercial Real Estate (CRE). As a precursor to financial crisis 
events, the phase of Financial Instability (FI) is generally considered from a 
more macroeconomic perspective with a focus on systemic risk to better 
identify environmental dynamics in the run-up to such a crisis. However, there 
is no common understanding about FI on a corporate level that enables 
organisations to undertake such a strategic analysis. 
 
This study aims to explore the corporate meaning of the phenomenon from a 
managerial perspective. It emphasises executives` lived experience in FI and 
the underlying procedures in organizational sensemaking. 
 
The data was collected using semi-structured interviews with senior executives 
of German CRE companies with reference to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
2007/08. Within the social constructivist paradigm, the study adopts a 
hermeneutic phenomenological research approach using the theoretical lenses 
of van Manen's ‘lifeworld existentials' and Weick's ‘properties of sensemaking'. 
 
The corporate definition of FI that emerged from this study extends existing 
ones. The revealed procedures indicate that organisational sensemaking was 
underrepresented in such a phase. From this, qualitative indicators and 
implications are developed grounded in behavioural dynamics of the market 
participants.  
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	 ii 
The findings of this research contribute to theoretical and applied knowledge 
about FI. The study proposes the systematic incorporation of this definition and 
sensemaking procedures by executives and institutionalises the monitoring of 
the developed indicators in SM to better control a CRE company prior, during, 
or after a phase of FI.  
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Glossary 
 
Cognition - Cognition in the meaning of this study refers to executives` 
perceptions and understanding about the phenomenon, and their 
interpretative processes. The study allows a ‘cognitive view’ in executives` 
representation about the phenomenon. It is not considered as mental action 
in the meaning of “[…] individual psychological mechanisms […]” (Child 
1997: 51). 
Corporate Governance - Rules and practices by which the management of a 
company ensures accountability, fairness, and transparency in its business 
and protection of its clients and stakeholders. It is a framework of 
responsibilities, rights, and rewards, and comprises conflict of interest 
procedures and proceedings for proper supervision, control, and information 
flows (Tarantino 2008a). 
CRE - Commercial Real Estate. Real estate as commercial property has “[…] 
the express purpose of providing an income and/or a capital gain” (ESRB 
2015: 15). It includes all asset classes (office, retail, logistics, manufacturing, 
residential), excluding private uses (i.e. condominium) (ECB 2008; Falk 
2013; ESRB 2015).  
CRE Companies - Commercial Real Estate Companies. Also called firms and 
organisations throughout the thesis. This term means companies that are 
engaged in leasing, development, financing, realisation, and marketing of 
one or more real estate properties. Regardless of its legal form this may be 
closed or open-ended investment funds, special investment funds, REITs, 
or real estate corporations (ECB 2008).  
Executive Management Board Member - A representative of the executive 
management board or a senior executive embodying the highest 
management level of an organisation. In this position s/he is responsible for 
the day-to-day management and the implementation of an appropriate 
strategy to ensure organisational effectiveness and success by identifying 
opportunities for investment and return as well as competitive advantages 
and growth benefits. Where the sample is a mixture of executive 
management board members and senior executives, these descriptions are 
used interchangeably in the study or synonymously as ‘executive’.   
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Financial Economy Sector - For the purpose of this study, ECB`s definition of 
the financial sector has been adapted, referring to “[…] institutions, 
instruments, and the regulatory framework that permit transactions to be 
made by incurring and settling debts; that is, by extending credit“ (Alexander 
and Baden 2000: 12). 
Financial Institutions - Private or public organisations that channel money 
between savers and borrowers. In the context of this study, this includes 
depository banks and credit institutions that provide loans to third parties 
(borrowers) for financing RE investments whereby they earn interest. The 
necessary funds are collected from other third parties (savers) that, in turn, 
receive interest for their deposits.  
Implications - In the context of the study, implications are understood as 
potential risks together with resulting effects (risk-related events) of a phase 
of FI and an event of FC for CRE companies that may affect the corporate 
goals and strategies.  
Indicators - Indicators provide a signal of increasing risk exposures in the 
behaviour of decision-makers, investors, and financial institutions during a 
phase of FI and an event of FC. They represent dimensions for the 
developed QRIs, which senior executives can track as alerts of evolving 
potential risks that might affect the SM of a CRE company. 
Investor - A person or institution that invests capital in RE with the expectation 
of financial returns. In the CRE sector, investors take advantage of different 
local markets and RE asset classes to diversify and try to get favourable 
and stable long-term returns. For CRE companies, the term investor is 
synonymous with ‘client’ where the CRE companies invest on his behalf, 
thus making them clients from a corporate perspective.   
Macroeconomic Perspective - This angle deals with aggregate variables, 
e.g. level of the growth rate in GDP, interest rates, inflation (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2009). The macroeconomic perspective takes an analytic view on 
economic processes in an aggregate form (Bofinger 2011). 
Meaning - Meaning can be constructed differently due to people`s different 
opinions, interests, and settings (Brown 2004; Brown et al. 2008). In this 
study meaning is referred to as intentionality and consciousness about a 
given phenomenon “[…] distinguished not only from the act in which it is 
GLOSSARY 		
	 xix 
intended, but also from the characteristics of its ‘noematic sense’, its 
meaningfulness as an object” (Russell 2007: 85). 
Microeconomic Perspective - This angle looks at the behaviour of diverse 
economic units (e.g. consumer, corporates, employees, investors) as well 
as the markets formed by them (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2007; Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld 2009; Schumann et al. 2011).  
Phenomenon - The appearance of an event or thing in human consciousness, 
and people`s experience of it for which they create meaning (Sanders 1982; 
Moustakas 1994). Based on this, the phenomenon explicated in this thesis 
is the executive`s lived experience of a phase of FI and the event of a FC 
that provides a corporate meaning.  
Public Institutions - Public institutions in this study means organisations that 
are defined as being part of the public sector by a legal framework at any 
level, e.g. governmental organisations, public institutions by law, or central 
banks.  
QI - Qualitative Indicator. QIs are defined as indicators which “[…] measure 
change over time against specific, predetermined criteria” (Office of 
Democracy and Governance 2005: 1). Due to their usually non-numerical 
character, they “[…] surpass other measurements of analysis as well as 
provide specific and nuanced information […], best suited for measuring 
progress that are complex, multi-faceted or multi-dimensional […]” (Office of 
Democracy and Governance 2005: 1). In the context of the research, QIs 
include the developed QRIs and respective indicators.  
QRI - Qualitative Risk Indicator. Also referred to as qualitative key risk indictor 
in literature, these indicators are applied “[…] to alert the organization to 
critical changes in risk, especially early warning alerts to changes in the 
control environment” (Tarantino 2008b: 241). The developed QRIs are 
represented by different indicators and may alert CRE companies about 
changes to potential risks and resulting effects (risk related events) on SM 
while indicating the occurrence of a phase of FI or an event of FC.  
Real Economy Sector - In the context of the study, the term refers to the 
industries that are concerned with producing goods and services, instead of 
those related to financial markets.  
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Sensemaking - Sensemaking is described as “[t]he process through which 
individuals work to understand novel, unexpected, or confusing events […]” 
(Maitlis and Christianson 2014: 58). 
SM - Strategic Management. This embraces organisational initiatives to remain 
competitive and achieve corporate goals. It includes the objectives of the 
company and strategy planning, as well as the analysis of the internal 
organisation and external corporate environment to recognise opportunities 
and risks to the organisation while implementing appropriate responses is 
an ongoing task (Nag et al. 2007).  
Supervisors - In this study, supervisors are considered as state, 
governmental, or macroprudential supervision authorities (Hirtle et al. 2009; 
Schoenmaker and Wierts 2016).  
Systemic Financial Risk - Systemic financial risk is defined as “[…] the risk 
that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in, and 
attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the 
financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant 
adverse effects on the real economy” (Group of Ten 2001: 126). Such 
events, largely resulting from disturbances of payment systems or in asset 
values, likely occur suddenly and unexpectedly or gain increasing likelihood 
over time when policy measures fall short (Gerlach 2009). 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the topic of Financial Instability (FI) and outlines the 
outstanding connection to the Commercial Real Estate (CRE) sector. The 
research rationale and its significance are presented to justify the particular 
need for this study. Next, the aims and objectives of the investigation are 
induced and an overview about the scope and methodological approach is 
given. The chapter closes with a thesis outline.  
 
1.1 Introducing the Topic  
 
Financial crises have a long history and the global financial system is marked 
by several Financial Crisis (FC) events. Namely, early in the 17th century, the 
Netherlands suffered the tulip bulbs crises that evolved out of the speculation 
of a rare variety of these bulbs (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005).  
 
Since that time, numerous other major FCs (i.e. Japan Crisis, Asian Crisis, 
GFC) occurred, which, according to some scientists (Kindleberger and Aliber 
2005; Cooper 2008), share certain analogies: they emerged due to the 
development and burst of credit and asset bubbles of one local or multiple 
regional economies, with chronological intervals between each FC of 
approximately ten years (Boudebbous and Chichti 2013; Chu 2013), and the 
most severe ones occurring once in a generation. 
 
The experiences in this field have highlighted that the consequences of crises 
usually have a serious impact on the macroeconomic level and financially. 
These show up in great output losses, investment declines, reduced 
consumption, and lower production, though asset prices and credit volume 
follow this trend with different durations and severities (Claessens and Kose 
2013). Correspondingly, the GFC of 2007/08 had remarkable impacts 
especially on the growth and unemployment rates in the affected economies 
(EUROSTAT 2015; EUROSTAT 2016) and give concern to the market 
participants pertaining to the economy, and on the corporate level.   
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Despite the recognition of the reoccurrence and the adverse effects on the 
economy and on the corporate level, the GFC is commonly regarded as an 
unexpected event (Bezemer 2010). Although, it was widely discussed that 
there were warning signs that could have been recognised (Bezemer 2010) or 
opinions which one could have listened to. Hence, when the bubble burst, its 
effect was even worse.  
 
Even though, FI, as the preceding phase (Chant 2003; Alawode and Al Sadek 
2008), may apparently provide indications about an event of FC, there is 
subordinated uptake of this phenomenon in academic research. Hence, there 
are essential facts about the topic that was placed under investigation, which 
are relevant to know for understanding the setting in which the phenomenon of 
FI is grounded, as follows.  
 
1.1.1 Financial Instability and Episodes  
 
During the decade from 2007, the international financial system was affected 
by the thus far most severe crisis, coming up in the summer of that year (Lin 
and Treichel 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff 2013). In retrospect, three merging 
phases can be distinguished during this period: the Subprime Credit Crises 
(SCC), erupting from the epicentre of the United States (U.S.) and rapidly 
spreading to Europe. Next, a GFC developed in autumn 2008, and a 
Sovereign Debt Crisis (SDC) captured several European countries in 2010, 
subsequently distressing the whole Eurozone (De Santis 2012).  
 
Encouraged by low interest rates, the mortgage financing increased while at 
the same time spurring higher Real Estate (RE) pricing (Crouhy et al. 2010). 
To reach higher yields, other subprime mortgages and complex structured 
instruments were used with excessive leverage (Bianco 2008; Claessens and 
Kose 2013). Simultaneously, the availability of liquidity and investment 
pressure led to more opportunistic investments with higher leverage that 
forced banks to reach for alternative instruments to back the mortgages or they 
placed them off-balance-sheet (Crouhy et al. 2010). The SCC, in the first stage, 
is explained by inadequate supervision and regulation that could not avoid the 
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banks’ evasion of capital requirements and enabled them to reduce the capital 
collateral against their mortgages (Acharya and Richardson 2009). Additionally, 
global imbalances in capital flows and a weak monetary policy were 
responsible for this occurrence (Carmassi et al. 2009; Merrouche and Nier 
2010). 
 
The GFC evolved out of this SCC bringing Lehman Brothers, one of the largest 
U.S. banks at that time, to their knees (Riaz et al. 2011). Their bankruptcy was 
the changing point, initiating a global downturn and further financial 
imbalances through insecurities and distressed divestments that resulted in 
asset price erosions and liquidity dry-up (Mishkin 2011).  
 
Continuing, this global situation prompted the SDC in numerous economies 
that could not fulfil their payment obligations any longer and had to take on 
third-party support (Lane 2012). In autumn 2009, in the aftermath of the SCC 
in 2007/08, such a crisis also came up in Europe, caused by uncovering the 
thus far hidden alarming budgetary position of Greece (Featherstone 2011). 
After this, other Western European countries like Ireland, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain also encountered difficulties in obtaining refinancing on the capital 
market (Beirne and Fratzscher 2013). Only financial rescue packages by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF) (Huber and Scheytt 2013), consisting of political means (e.g. 
guarantees, substantial funds) prevented sovereign bankruptcies of the 
countries affected (Wittkowski 2011). Similarly, the ECB got involved to 
support bank lending to the real economy and salvage the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism to function effectively (ECB 2011; ECB 2013). 
 
Over the years, the SDC advanced to a banking and economic crisis (Lane 
2012; Brender et al. 2013). While originally only the sovereign debt, which was 
kept by financial institutions for refinancing by ECB, had given rise to concerns, 
equity backing and stricter bank capital adequacy requirements later put 
pressure on the financial industry (Hüfner 2011). With regards to capital 
markets, banks could not raise additional capital from shareholders and the 
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recognition of governments as such may not be regarded as proper 
refinancing instruments (De Santis 2012).  
 
Serious difficulties were caused in refinancing budget deficits, because the 
banks did not buy government bonds from new issues, or only seldom did so. 
Economic growth slowed down because banks put the brakes on lending to 
private clients, leading to a remarkable risk of a credit crunch and a recession 
in the Eurozone. (Hüfner 2011)  
 
Detrimental changes in the unemployment rate (ECB 2014a), for example, as 
well as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Gros and Alcidi 2010) were 
observed in the economies effected by GFC. As a consequence of this crisis, 
unemployment in Europe (EU-28) increased to 9.0% in 2009 and to 9.5% in 
the Euro Area. Similarly, at the beginning of the SDC in 2012, the 
unemployment rate in Europe (EU-28) increased to 10.5% and to 11.3% in the 
Euro Area (EUROSTAT 2015). As a result of the GFC, the real GDP growth in 
2009 in Europe (EU-28) decreased by -4.4% and by -4.5% in the Euro Area. 
Likewise, in the wake of the SDC the GDP growth in Europe (EU-28) 
decreased by -0.5% in 2012 and by -0.9% in the Euro Area. Also Germany 
could not escape these developments and showed a downturn of -5.6% in the 
crisis year 2009, but a slight growth of 0.4% in 2012 (EUROSTAT 2016). 
 
Beside the macroeconomic perspective on these FI and crises on the markets, 
companies reactively reconsidered their position on corporate objectives and 
strategies accordingly (Kunc and Bhandari 2011). Not only the decreasing 
demand for products, but as well declining funds for ongoing and future 
projects, innovation and change to remain competitive, and the necessity for a 
prolongation or raising of loans, in addition to liquidity requirements affected 
the operational business of the organisations and, accordingly, impaired the 
achievement of strategic objectives (Sternad 2012).  
 
During these phases, organisations had to learn again that an identification of 
the resulting risks with foresight linked with strategy is required (Frigo and 
Anderson 2011a; Frigo and Anderson 2011b). It falls within the scope of 
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Strategic Management (SM) (Mason 2007) together with (Enterprise) Risk 
Management (ERM) (Vanini 2012) to cope with change and highly uncertain 
environmental conditions and to manage the company successfully during 
these times, in order to keep the corporate objectives with appropriate 
strategic initiatives.  
 
SM can be seen as a mindset, which strives for planning, control, and 
coordination of the corporate development (Schierenbeck 1995) out of a 
conceptional overall vision (Welge and Al-Laham 1992). The core tasks of SM 
are the active and holistic creation of the firm and its relation to the 
environment, where the capabilities of the company are aligned to the 
requirements of the environment on an ongoing basis (Bea and Haas 1995; 
Gordon et al. 2009). Additionally, mastering strategic risks is a core function of 
the SM, with strategic planning and control respectively (Schinle 1987; Beasley 
and Frigo 2007), while it is paramount to reduce insecurities. According to 
Schinle (1987), Strategic Risk Management (SRM) serves to continuously 
detect and become aware of strategic risk as well as to comply with 
management responsibilities and the evaluation and determination of 
consequences, respectively. In the context of a FC that involves special 
conditions of unexpectedness, uncertainty, and respective limitations to short 
response times, decision-makers’ stress may cause detrimental effects on 
their business (Smart and Vertinsky 1977).  
 
As one specific sector in the global economy, the CRE industry plays a special 
role (ESRB 2015). This significance has also been demonstrated when the 
deterioration of the RE sector during the GFC 2007/08 impacted the whole 
world economy (Bezemer 2011). 
 
1.1.2 The Commercial Real Estate Sector  
 
CRE has not yet been defined internationally. Hence, this study follows the 
universally accepted description that includes RE properties with “[…] the 
express purpose of providing an income and/or a capital gain” (ESRB 2015: 
15). It covers all asset classes (office, retail, logistics, manufacturing, 
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residential) excluding private uses (i.e. condominium) (ECB 2008; Falk 2013; 
ESRB 2015).  
 
In terms of size, the commercial property markets seem difficult to approximate, 
which can be explained by the fragmented and opaque markets in several 
countries (Hobbs and Chin 2007). In order to get an impression, at the end of 
2006 prior to the outbreak of the crisis, figures were estimated at 9.8 trillion 
USD invested globally in CRE by professional investors, out of a total of 16.2 
trillion USD that was then owner-occupied but might become investable in the 
future. Europe had a share of approximately one third of the invested capital, 
which was 70% attributable to the German, UK, French, and Italian markets, 
whereas Germany was third largest RE market after the US and Japan in 
terms of investible stock (Hobbs and Chin 2007).  
 
Apart from their size, CRE markets have special structural features that have 
been emphasised by several authors (Hilbers et al. 2001; Zhu 2003; Ball et al. 
2008). CRE is a fixed asset. However, like almost all markets, supply is driven 
by capital costs, i.e. land, construction costs, or financing, while demand is 
fostered by economic activity and financing terms, these conditions are 
motivated by different tensions that may vary over even close locations (Zhu 
2003). Consequently, “[…] price discrimination and market power can have an 
impact on both the supply and the demand side” (ECB 2008: 11).  
 
Another specific of the sector is the generally long lifetime of RE assets. 
Construction usually takes several years, depending on size and local 
regulations, which leads to times of no income but high transactions costs (Zhu 
2003) and results in reduced market liquidity. This combination means that the 
CRE markets are usually slow to respond to demand (Zhu 2003) and supply 
and demand seldom match. This becomes apparent in demand-driven price 
fluctuations over time, and the CRE market has been deemed “[…] inelastic 
[…]” (ECB 2008: 11). This is also because of the fact, that CRE properties are 
not traded on a marketplace but between buyer and seller, and there is no 
price transparency or limited regulation on pricing (Hilbers et al. 2001).   
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Another particularity is that due to the long-term nature of lease contracts, 
there is usually no immediate effect on rents and they only adjust with delay. 
Harsh movements in CRE property prices can occur nevertheless, and some 
factors such as “[…] expected rates of growth in real cash flows and discount 
rates […] are often difficult to predict” (ECB 2008: 11) and while they may 
suddenly change, this results in immediate and severe decreases of income 
value (Zhu 2003; ECB 2008).  
 
On the financing side, CRE is historically characterised to being debt financed 
with sometimes high leverage or being used as collateral (Hilbers et al. 2001), 
which also marks its relation to the financial sector. What has been shown as 
special features of CRE markets, has in the past sometimes resulted in the 
situation of deviating prices, accelerating cycles and occasionally creating 
price bubbles (Hilbers et al. 2001; Zhu 2003; ECB 2008).  
 
Over time, CRE has gained importance as a financial asset for private and 
institutional investors, traded in various markets worldwide, and is no longer 
just a physical project (ECB 2008). Following the collapse of the global CRE 
market in the wake of the GFC and its consequences (Breslauer 2017), it has 
regained increasing importance, recovering after the GFC and respective 
recession in the markets (IBISWorld 2017). This is not only driven by low 
interest rates and remaining high return expectations of investors, but is also 
due to the general global macroeconomic conditions and foreign investors’ 
appetites which favour RE investments (Falk 2013; Gerrity 2017; Breheny 
2018) with growth rates of over 5% during the years from 2012-2017 
(IBISWorld 2017). Notably, this is also because RE offers steady cash flows 
with upside potentials, especially in recovering markets where these are more 
secure than equity yield returns (Szumilo and Wiegelmann 2018). 
 
These developments also apply to the national CRE market in Germany. 
Germany has a prominent location in Europe and its thus far stable economic 
environment has made it a popular market for RE investments (Allen & Overy 
2017). After the GFC, the trend in RE investments has seen only one direction, 
which was straight up (Szumilo and Wiegelmann 2018). While CRE markets 
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are closely linked with macroeconomic developments (ESRB 2015), the latest 
trends in this area were influenced by negative political tensions, regulations, 
and elections, but also positive movements in the labour market and 
historically favourable debt financing conditions. With such turbulent times of 
foreign affairs, the German economy is considered still stable, but with 
inestimable insecurities and risks (Feld et al. 2018). Others (DG Hyp 2017) 
name these developments ‘crises’ that the current good overall situation is 
faced with.  
 
However, at the same time, the CRE market is attributed with further positive 
developments and increasing growth rates for the year 2018 (DG Hyp 2017; 
Feld et al. 2018). After the GFC, statistics show a thus far irresistible increase 
of total returns and capital growth in the German RE market (Feld et al. 2018). 
Also, RE investment volumes in 2017 were almost back to the figures of 2007, 
close to the level of just before the GFC (BulwienGesa 2016), with offices 
having the largest proportional interest (JLL 2018). Demand for prime 
properties and locations is booming but supply is limited, which has led to 
explosive price increases over the last years up to 2017 (Kholodilin et al. 2014; 
Feld et al. 2018). The boom in CRE is driven by macroeconomic and 
demographic developments, investment pressures of institutional investors, as 
well as international ones stepping into the German market (Allen & Overy 
2017).  
 
In summary, CRE is a particularly appealing and increasingly eminent site, as 
it is one of the most favoured asset classes around the world and is thus 
critical to the global economy. The German market was, and in 2017/18 still is, 
a vital target for both local and foreign investors to invest in CRE with still-
rising tendencies in demand and returns. However, statistics prove that various 
uncertainties and risks are a constant companion in the market that challenge 
the CRE sector and its participants, which are a large number of RE brokers, 
banks, project development and asset management companies, as well as 
fund management and capital investment companies – nationally and 
internationally.   
INTRODUCTION 		
	 9 
At the same time, with such particulars, it looks like there is a considerable 
relation between the CRE sector and the financial system’s stability.   
 
1.1.3 Commercial Real Estate and Financial Instability 
 
It has been shown that property markets have, in general, a “[…] sizeable 
impact […] on macroeconomic activity” (Zhu 2003: 9). Hence “[…] disorderly 
adjustments in commercial property markets can play an important role in 
financial crises […]” (ECB 2008: 14). 
 
In the wake of the GFC, ECB (2008) has determined that developments in the 
CRE markets can have significant consequences for the FS of the financial 
system of an economy, and proposed four core channels to explain this link:  
 
The first one is banks’ substantial lending exposure to CRE properties. Already 
in the times prior to the GFC, banks have increased their exposure to RE 
assets through different types of lending - holding direct RE for collateralisation 
or loans to other financial intermediaries related to the CRE sector - and thus 
enlarged the dependence of their operations on this market. Changes in the 
CRE sector, especially deterioration in asset prices, quality, and income, may 
impact the banks’ standing when borrowers are then unable to meet their 
obligations towards the bank. (ECB 2008)  
 
Another channel that was determined is the volatility of banks’ commercial 
property loans, compared to other lending types. This is related to higher 
default rates of corporate borrowers and developers during financial stress and 
subsequent losses for the bank as well as more volatile CRE prices that are 
exposed to the economic cycle. History has shown that during an upturn, 
corporate borrowers minimise capital exposure and maximise leverage and 
risk while at the same time banks loosen lending terms and warranties, which 
makes them more vulnerable when the economic situation reverses. (ECB 
2008) 
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Further, ECB (2008: 18) considers a third channel to be made up through 
“indirect links between commercial property markets and banks”. Price 
adjustments in CRE markets may ultimately impact bank position with further 
negative consequences for the real economy. This has become relevant where 
the economic growth of the country is strongly dependent on construction and 
RE activities. Price adjustments and a slowdown in economic activity may 
negatively influence borrowers’ financial position and potentially the debt-
servicing capacity, as well as the value of the properties as their net worth and 
collateral decreases. Banks tighten their financing conditions when their risks 
correspondingly increase and borrowers will not be able to further invest, and 
others will not be able to further consume. This will finally then impact 
economic growth (GDP). (ECB 2008) 
 
A fourth channel is through “links between other financial institutions and 
commercial property markets” (ECB 2008: 19). FS is deemed affected by 
unfavourable developments in CRE markets, because of the great exposure of 
institutional investors to it, which is then at risk. These investors acquire 
properties with a long-term income target, but also provide loans with large 
amounts. The aforementioned may be further strengthened or relieved when 
additional risks from financial innovations arise, global markets become 
increasingly dependent and public policy initiatives fail. (ECB 2008)  
 
Occupying such a key source for the economic environment, i.e. the financial 
system of an economy, CRE generally seems to be a key influencing factor for 
the real economy sector and any related risk has to be detected early to 
control risks and preserve immanent threats. This applies to the economy, but 
also to the CRE companies which are the main actors in this field and, as such, 
have a certain degree of control about some developments. 
 
As a particular aspect, experts stress the specific relation between FC and the 
bursting bubbles in the RE sector (Claessens and Kose 2013). Kindleberger 
and Aliber (2005) found a correlation between stock market bubbles and RE 
bubbles. Both detected that, first, a considerable part of stock market valuation 
in newly industrialising countries originates from RE companies or other RE 
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related businesses; second, wealthy people who have gained from RE value 
diversify their money in stocks; and third, vice versa, with profitable stock 
market investments, people expand their assets to RE (Kindleberger and 
Aliber 2005).  
 
What typically follows, as direct consequences of a FC to the real economy, is 
a deterioration of the financing terms, loss of capital, and major insecurities. In 
addition to this comes a contraction of the financial as well as construction and 
housing sectors, when a bubble like the one in the RE and mortgage industry 
bursts (Dill and Lieven 2009).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, there emerged three crises that seemed related to 
CRE markets and accentuated the significant relation of the sector to FC, i.e. 
the crises in the Nordics, the US, and Asia (ECB 2008). Similarly, this has also 
been confirmed for the latest SCC, GFC, and SDC by several authors. The 
GFC is an explicit example, as it “[…] started with the default of the subprime 
housing loans in the United States when its housing market bubble burst” 
(Chin 2009: xix). These bubbles happen when values rapidly rise up to a level 
where they are no longer sustainable, and are then followed by a cut off in 
prices, and mortgages can no longer be covered (Baker 2008). Also, others 
(Mishkin 2011; Lane 2012; Lin and Treichel 2012) consider the housing bubble 
as the key driver for the FC in 2008. Mishkin (2011) describes the relation 
between the expansion of the U.S. housing bubble and the SCC additionally 
mentioning occurrences like runs on financial institutions and shadow banks. 
 
The implications on the global financial system were severe and the 
emergence of the global crisis was unstoppable (Claessens and Kose 2013). 
Researchers consider the extensive size of the asset class and related RE 
business as being responsible, especially the banks involved in the financing 
of RE (Mishkin 2011). 
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From the U.S. housing bubble that expanded to a global financial shock, 
asymmetric effects developed around Europe (Lane 2012). In the first phase, 
in 2008, countries with a high dependence on external funds were affected, i.e. 
Ireland (Honohan 2010; Lane 2011). It was clearly perceived that international 
investors adjusted their exposures and “[c]ross-border financial flows dried up 
[...] with investors repatriating funds to home markets […]“ (Milesi-Ferreti and 
Tille 2011, cited in Lane 2012: 55). Later, in a second phase at the end of 2009, 
many countries were faced with stronger and faster than anticipated impacts 
on key economic figures like GDP ratios and their fiscal deficits, as well as 
sovereign bonds (Lane 2012). 
 
In summary, it can be noted that there is a great dependence between the 
CRE sector and the conditions of the financial system in an economy, where 
imbalances and pertinent events in this industry have proven to provide 
adverse effects on both the national and the global economy, triggering FCs.  
 
1.2 Research Rationale 
 
Where global imbalances and crises take place in the world over time, the 
special occurrences have attracted increasing scholarly attention, looking at FI 
and systemic risks on the economy level.  
 
Several authors have analysed such crisis developments and market 
mechanisms (Mishkin 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011; Brunnermeier and 
Oehmke 2013). There are different definitions and varying degrees of detail.  
FI is seen as a consequence of shocks to the financial system, so that it can 
no longer perform its intermediating role (Mishkin 1999), or associated with a 
distortion of asset prices and credit availability (Ferguson 2003). Others 
specifically relate it to seriously negative consequences for the macroeconomy 
(Allen and Wood 2006) and therefore to systemic risk (Davis 2003). In addition, 
leading financial institutions, like ECB (Adrian et al. 2014; ECB 2014b) and 
other central banks (Deutsche Bundesbank 2014; Bank of Japan 2015), have 
constructed their definition of this phenomenon, basically a situational 
description, in the means of their objective to safeguard FS.   
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Mishkin (1999), Padoa-Schioppa (2002), and Schinasi (2004) have identified 
that FI is a macroeconomic irregular occurrence of financial disruption. 
Furthermore, others added that it could pose detrimental consequences to the 
economy (Chant 2003; Ferguson 2003; Schinasi 2004; Allen and Wood 2006). 
Essentially, FC has then been determined as the most severe form of FI 
(Chant 2003).  
 
Other researchers and institutions have attempted FS, and FI respectively, via 
indicators and quantitative variables on economy level that resulted in a great 
variety of such soundness indicators. These emphasise market pressures, 
external and banking system vulnerability, asset prices, and financial 
conditions (Hawkins and Klau 2000; Geršl and Hermánek 2007; Gray et al. 
2007; Nelson and Perli 2007; Gadanecz and Jayaram 2009). 
 
Despite all the attempts to define and explain FI, the occurrence of a FC is 
repeatedly emphasised as being unexpected and unpredictable (Agarwal et al. 
2009; Bezemer 2010). At the same time, researchers have asked why the 
alarm signals in the run-up to the GFC had been ignored and there was no 
proper reaction upon seemingly clear signs in pre-crisis times (Bezemer 2010; 
Mishkin 2011; Hindmoor and McConnell 2013; Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). 
Instead, market participants remained optimistic about the stability and 
robustness of the economies (Lin and Treichel 2012). 
 
In relation to the organisational environment, it became obvious that 
occurrences of environmental change outside the organisation may take 
different forms. When FC is specified as occurrences that are unexpected, 
non-controllable, or unusual to the market participants, its effect on the 
organisation may be even worse. Researchers derived this association from 
the significance of environmental change towards the organisation (Katz and 
Kahn 1966; Daft 2007; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). Based on the theoretical 
considerations of General Systems Theory (GST) and Contingency Theory 
(CT), organisations exist as open systems that are constantly engaging with 
their environment (Morgan 2006; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; Hatch and 
Cunliffe 2013). Then, organisations adapt to environmental contingencies in 
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order to remain competitive and achieve maximum performance (Daft 2007; 
Bess and Dee 2008; Scott and Davis 2016).  
 
Hence, it is one of the main tasks of the SM of a company to actively and 
comprehensively mediate the relation to its environment, to become or remain 
adaptable and to, consequently, pro-actively consider the potential effects of 
the environment on the organisation in a phase of FI. This is also stressed by 
Tsoukas and Shepherd (2004) who mention that the best organisations 
manage with foresight. Seidl (2004) also emphasises the importance of 
predictions and foreseeability of future situations through reaction to weak 
signs.  
 
To this end, much of the academic literature has been dedicated to how the 
environment is perceived and attached with meaning by those experiencing it. 
Several authors (Duncan 1972; Tosi et al. 1973; Downey et al. 1975; Lorenzi 
et al. 1981) have claimed that the environment is independent and tangible, 
and is subject to people`s interpretation. Ashill and Jobber (2010) related the 
theoretical model of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (PEU) to 
organisational interpretation through the same means. Also Resource 
Dependence Theory (RDT) stipulates that managerial perception and 
understanding leave room for establishing different meanings with regards to 
environmental conditions. This scrutinises whether those managerial 
perceptions and their constructed reality are superior to the real objective 
environment (Duncan 1972; Tosi et al. 1973; Downey et al. 1975; Lorenzi et al. 
1981), especially when facing environmental change.  
 
Regardless of whether environmental forces are selective or comprehensive, 
they are constitutive and immanent, and enforce organisational adaptation. 
Following this view, executives are required to identify and understand what 
constitutes their environment and make decisions about respective alignments 
(Cyert and March 1963; Starbuck 1976). This includes considering 
uncertainties that constitute risks to the organisational strategy where a 
reasonable and deliberate SM and related RM can offer great potential for an 
organisation in terms of existential security and competitiveness, when taken 
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as pro-active and coordinated management (Abrams et al. 2006; Beasley and 
Frigo 2007). With these considerations, it is remarkable that despite all the 
planning and SM, the event of FC still came unexpected and the preliminary 
phase of FI was obviously not recognised as such. 
 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007: 8) hereto argue that “[…] managing the unexpected 
often means […] to make strong responses to weak signals”, but when it 
comes to crises, the situation is often simplified and not taken seriously 
enough or misinterpreted. Deroy and Clegg (2011) contend that, in such 
situations, when unexpected events occur, plans and institutionalised 
behaviour are lacking. Moreover, little empirical research examines how this is 
actually done, and Brorström (2012) is one of the few exploring local actors` 
perceptions of crisis effects during the GFC. Organisational research generally 
misses pointing out events that alter an organisation’s context and how it is 
reacted to them, where habits and routines need to be replaced by adaptation 
and innovation (Deroy and Clegg 2011). At the same time, unexpected events 
are argued to create opportunities for changing the understanding of the 
meaning of an action, in what is known as sensemaking (Weick 1995). Weick 
(1993; 1995) argues that changes, interruption, or disruption make events that 
start the sensemaking process, specifically with reference to crises. Hernes 
(2008: 49) argues that there are no events “[…] unless we make sense of 
them.” FC can therefore be regarded as one such change, so can 
environmental change during FI; acknowledging that change is difficult to 
locate (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). 
 
However, actors are assumed to have implicit explanations and opinions about 
the occurrence of FI in their organisational context, as well as a sense about 
what actions they respectively needed to initiate, and what effects the situation 
implied.  
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1.3 Significance of the Study 
 
The Problem of the Unexpected Event 
It becomes obvious that the GFC and crises in the context of the financial 
system of an economy had a massive impact on the real economy and on 
organisations. In this regard, the CRE sector entails a specific role in the real 
economy but also provides for particular characteristics that make it 
outstanding to other sectors, macroeconomic developments, and the stability 
of a financial system. Thus, it is a vital task of the SM of a CRE organisation to 
monitor and recognise relevant changes in the corporate environment and to 
enforce according SM action. 
 
However, the FC is regarded as an unexpected event (Bezemer 2010) that 
could not be predicted (Agarwal et al. 2009). Institutionalised behaviour 
provides no guidance, and plans and routines are lacking (Deroy and Clegg 
2011).  
 
Against this background, a question arises pertaining to why the strategic 
decision-makers of a CRE organisation did not perceive a phase of FI as such 
before the outbreak of the GFC, and why they apparently did not take it into 
account in their SM. 
 
In general, a more macroeconomic perspective is at least traceable because 
FI is thus far associated with overarching systemic risks that may have an 
effect on the economy as a whole (Group of Ten 2001). However, it is 
remarkable that a translation or adaptation of macroeconomic definitions to the 
corporate level are missing, especially in consideration of people making 
decisions, and not economies or companies (Felin and Foss 2005, cited in 
Agarwal et al. 2009).  
 
Hence, it can be assumed that the existing definitions of the phenomenon of FI 
on the economy level are generally relevant for the real economy sector, but 
may not be directly applicable for controlling a CRE company prior to, or during 
an event of FC in terms of SM.   
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This means, it is supposed that existing definitions of FI on the economy level 
are not as much appropriate and insufficient for Strategic Decision-Making 
(SDM) and (financial) crisis management on the level of a CRE company. 
Hence, the executives are currently deemed to have only implicit means for 
meaningmaking and consideration in their SM. It appears questionable how 
much executives know about how to react to the situation, and how significant 
established routines or sensemaking procedures about the phenomenon are to 
their organisational behaviour. 
 
The consequences of the FCs on the economy show that companies failed to 
initiate measures and to manage the event of a crisis and the prelimary phase 
with foresight. From this, it can be assumed that existing definitions of risks 
and respective indicators and implications on the economy level might not 
substantiate the risk strategy and context for the SRM of a company and are 
either not known, not sophisticated, or not reasonably applied to the business 
on corporate level. Particular indicators and implications for the RM, based on 
the corporate meaning, are not available to identify and control the potential 
risks that arise for a CRE company from the preliminary phase of FI. 
 
In hindsight, the executives will be able to opine, explain and judge as to what 
happened in their contexts, what actions were necessary, and what effects the 
occurrence implied for their organisation. The role of the actors and their 
willingness to act in the phase of FI and the event of FC is therefore 
considered an important component to explore the phenomenon and a 
shortcoming in existing research.  
 
On these grounds, the study of the phenomenon of FI in SM unfolds 
significance to broaden the empirical knowledge and for practitioners to better 
manage their organisations. 
 
Significance for Knowledge 
Existing theory about the phenomenon of FI is currently not comprehensive 
and limited to a more macroeconomic perspective that does not include a 
corporate view. The existing definitions are mere descriptions of situational 
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stances of the financial system shaped by the perspective of researchers and 
public institutions, addressed to financial institutions and supposed to assist 
macroprudential supervision. At the same time, the complexity of the 
phenomenon and its different forms have led to a degree of controversy and 
disparity in evolved descriptions and no single definition of FI exists. 
Implications and indicators derived from these definitions are considered to 
identify systemic financial risk in an economy and are not adjusted to corporate 
ones.  
 
Hence, the study attains relevance where the actual definitions are insufficient 
and flawed, lacking a corporate perspective. Hence, SM and organisational 
theory cannot provide for a holistic understanding or capture the phenomenon 
in its entirety. At the same time, they cannot provide for indications about what 
characteristics should be monitored and how these are relevant to the possible 
implications following the occurrence of the phenomenon.  
 
It is important to extend the definition beyond a more macroeconomic 
perspective (economy level) with a more microeconomic one (corporate level) 
because the current angle is considered to offer a too limited view on such a 
massive, far-reaching incident, not including the angles of relevant market 
participants and key sectors. A corporate perspective and perception of the 
phenomenon by the strategic decision-makers has so far not been studied 
empirically, but is considered necessary to extend existing SM, RM, and 
organisational theory and insert its specifics as common ground. Extending the 
complex environment-organisation-relationships with the phenomenon of FI 
will add knowledge and bring transparency about individual characteristics and 
indicators, which currently are lacking. It will rebound to the benefit of 
academics as well as researchers in the field of organisational and SM 
considering the importance FC plays in sciences nowadays. 
 
Furthermore, beyond the pure descriptive and situational perspective on the 
phenomenon there is little empirical knowledge as to how executives make 
sense about the phenomenon or how they form their expectations about it. In 
this context it remains indeterminate why FC occurs apparently unexpected.  
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Thus far organisational and SM research fall short in giving sufficient attention 
to explaining the event and respective action (Deroy and Clegg 2011). The 
study though is significant to knowledge to derive an understanding about how 
corporate meaningmaking and sensemaking attempts about FI and FC 
situations that occur in the macroeconomic environment are accomplished in 
CRE companies.  
 
Significance for Practice  
FCs have accompanied the business world over and over again during the 
past decades, partly with tremendous impacts apparently also because 
executives were not able to manage these exceptional situations. The 
significance of the study for practice stems from recurring future comparable 
situations. 
 
The study unfolds significance for SM where executives are not able to identify 
relevant changes as well as to manage respective chances and risks resulting 
from these without an explicit corporate definition of FI. In this regard, there is 
also scarce research that studies what happened in organisations in the phase 
prior to a FC and what executives really accomplish when facing that situation. 
A corporate definition of and the transparency as regards the organisational 
sensemaking process about the phenomenon are necessary for executive 
management board members in supporting their efficient and orderly decision-
making in terms of SM and SRM to control a CRE company prior to, during, or 
after an event of FC. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of potential lack of strategic and operational decision-
making preparedness in SRM, it is not possible to make a proper risk 
assessment about the appearances of FI or FC. Specific indicators for the 
phenomenon of FI are important to develop, because increasing complexities 
in risks require more precise examination, up-to-date methods for their 
identification by senior executives, and mature approaches in continuous 
processing (Beasley and Frigo 2007). Without meaningful indicators, the SRM 
is deemed less comprehensive and executives are not put in a position to 
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identify, analyse, and evaluate potential resulting risks for the CRE company, 
as well as the emergence of an event of FC with foresight.  
 
It is important to provide executives with a profound basis for their SM and RM 
actions, for them not to fail to respond to the needs of the corporate 
environment. Using indicators in SRM to run corporations in changing 
environments may provide the opportunity to maintain governance of the 
actions of the executives and to early identify the main tasks for offsetting 
adverse effects, such as losses of assets or partners and the resulting demand 
and earning shortfalls or other risks to the existence of the company, as they 
develop during a phase of FI or an event of FC. 
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
Until today, the phenomenon of FI has been defined from a more 
macroeconomic perspective and a corporate one has remained implicit. As the 
literature review reveals, the environmental circumstances in a phase of FI 
account for a set of complexities that call for a more micro-level 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon. Thus, a separate investigation of the 
organisational meaning is considered crucial. Furthermore, investigations 
about FI, as well as FC, have not yet been conducted with focus on the CRE 
sector, which has been found relevant while strongly connected to the GFC 
(ECB 2008; Claessens and Kose 2013). Here, the management of CRE 
companies who have gained knowledgeable insights and faced lived 
experiences during the latest FCs, as well as during the phase of FI prior to 
their outbreak, could provide a realistic view and shed more light on this 
phenomenon.  
 
Thus, this research aims to extent existing definitions of the phenomenon of FI 
with a corporate perspective, from those who have to manage it - the senior 
executives. The phenomenon of FI shall be placed in the complex 
environment-organisation-relationships and bring transparency about specific 
characteristics and meaning, which are currently missing. With this, a more 
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holistic understanding about the phenomenon in organisational and SM theory 
shall be achieved. 
 
Research Objective 1 
Explore the meaning of FI from a senior executive perspective on 
the corporate level (corporate meaning) with the focus on CRE 
companies and create an (extended) definition of FI on the 
corporate level. 
 
For this purpose, the lived experiences of the senior executives that are 
investigated make the meaning explicit and shall contribute new insights for 
SM and organisational theory. From the then explicit meaning, an (extended) 
corporate definition can be created that will provide for new insights to the 
theory about the phenomenon. This definition complements existing 
descriptions of the phenomenon with a corporate perspective. Furthermore, 
such corporate meaning is intended to support the management in their SDM. 
They should be enabled to early detect and foresee the consequences of a 
phase of FI in a corporate context and initiate (counter-)strategies and 
measures in due time to be able to fulfil corporate aims and to control a 
company prior to, during, and after an event of FC. 
 
Based on the assumption that this constructed meaning of the phenomenon is 
so far unconsciously and implicitly applied in SM and decision-making, so any 
consequences of the phenomenon are deemed reflected in executive`s 
management.  
 
At the same time, FI and market turbulences make corporate environments 
more complex and provide companies with challenges but also with 
opportunities (Neill et al. 2007). To handle these complexities as well as the 
excess of available information and to cope with the environment, they engage 
tools or concepts as well as mental models or other cognitive procedures. 
Where management practises and meaningmaking is obviously more implicit 
than explicit, the resulting extended meaning is further advanced.  
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Departing from the situational descriptive view on the phenomenon in extant 
research, the objective of this study is to look into the senior executives` 
related sensemaking procedures and how they form their expectations 
regarding the phenomenon of FI given the meaning of it. This will provide for a 
reflection and also make implicit management procedures explicit. It accounts 
for information and behaviour that has been placed as a decision basis for the 
SM and that effects organisational interpretation. 
 
Research Objective 2 
Discover the way in which executive management board 
members form their expectations regarding FI based on their 
meaning and how sensemaking attempts are accomplished in 
CRE. 
 
Discovering the organisational sensemaking process in a phase of FI shows 
how meaningmaking takes places in CRE organisations during that time and 
which actions are taken, or not. Assuming the frame of meaning - consciously 
or unconsciously - in place, this objective is similarly considered related to 
invention (Sutcliffe 2013) beside discovery (Weick 1995). The explicit 
presentation of the executives` sensemaking process shall add to 
sensemaking and organisational theory, where a consideration of how 
executives make meaning in times of FI is underrepresented.  
 
Both aforementioned objectives make the by-now-implicit meaning of the 
phenomenon of FI constructed by the executive management board members 
explicit, both content- and process-wise, to establish a better understanding of 
the nature of this corporate environment. As such, the corporate meaning of FI 
might increase the awareness of the phenomenon as part of the changing 
corporate environment and shall initiate to enriching of the SM of CRE 
companies. It allows the decision-makers to reflect on how they perceive the 
phenomenon, and how they interpret and act. It can be a learning paradigm for 
senior executives to enhance their knowledge and sensemaking skills 
efficiently. The greater demand for SM with more foresight, especially in 
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challenging situations, might thus be complied with while enriching and 
adjusting the SM approach with the findings.  
 
As a complement, and for a better pro-active management, indicators of the 
phenomenon were considered a good source of evidence. Despite the 
prevailing quantitative factors in existing literature, this study attempts to 
develop qualitative ones. The prior results explored become relevant as they 
serve as a basis for the overall understanding and subsequent development of 
corporate Qualitative Risk Indicators (QRI).  
 
The study aims to demonstrate that the constructed meaning and 
sensemaking process allow a further assessment with the objective to provide 
CRE companies with meaningful indicators of the phenomenon, for a 
comprehensive and sophisticated SRM.  
 
Research Objective 3 
Develop QRIs of FI based on the corporate meaning and 
awareness of the respective expectations of FI to adjust and 
enrich the SRM of a CRE company. 
 
These QRIs are intended to complement the existing SRM approaches with 
qualitative measures and broaden RM theories with the additional risk 
components of FI and FC. Such indicators may serve as early signs to identify 
a phase of FI or an emerging event of FC with more foresight. The 
management shall be enabled to initiating measures at an early stage to 
effectively prevent risks to the company prior to an event of FC.  
 
Awareness of the implications of FI, in order to control risks and manage 
consequences originating from the phenomenon of FI, is in the responsibility of 
the executives due to a compliant SM. Hence, the investigation aims to 
establish further assessment to identify the potential resulting risks, and 
pertaining to risk-related events (implications) of the phenomenon for CRE 
companies, which may affect the corporate goals and strategies.  
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Research Objective 4 
Discover how the corporate meaning of FI and awareness of the 
respective expectations translates into different implications 
(potential risks and risk-related events) for SRM behaviour. 
 
The implications of the phenomenon of FI shall supplement and improve 
strategic RM practice and may lead to reconsider, adjust, and enrich the SRM 
of CRE companies accordingly. Executives who apply the recommended QRIs 
in consideration of the related risks, derived from the findings of this study, 
shall be enabled to consider the (downside) risks and (upside) chances 
resulting from the phenomenon prior to, during, or after an event of FC. Taking 
preventative measures will help to overcome adverse effects and increase the 
preservation of corporate existence, supporting to protect and enhance 
organisational value and growth.  
 
These objectives are all supported with the particular research strategy. By 
applying the phenomenological approach, the researcher aims to provide new 
experiential insights that were so far left aside in prevailing positivistic and 
quantitative studies. 
 
In summary, the purpose of this research is to make the thus far implicit 
meaning and sensemaking processes of the phenomenon explicit. This is 
done through revealing and interpreting the lived experience of German CRE 
executives for meaning and the sensemaking process while creating an 
understanding of the phenomenon of FI from a corporate perspective, 
exploiting respective indicators and implications for SRM. This study does not 
aim to predict future states of episodes of FI or look into psychological 
cognitive function, but to prepare the executives to handle FI in the future with 
adequate foresight on corporate level. The study intends to fill the 
contemplated research gaps and makes contributions to contemporary SM 
and organisational management literature, as well as methodologically. 
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1.5 Research Scope 
 
In favour of a focussed investigation on the research phenomenon, this work 
emphasises particular aspects and focuses on several prerequisites. 
 
As outlined above, the study is limited geographically and industry-wise to the 
German CRE sector. This is an essential part of the country`s activity with 
influential power on GDP (ESRB 2015). The recent FCs have also shown the 
high involvement of the CRE sector (ECB 2007; ECB 2008; Claessens and 
Kose 2013).  
 
Rather than focusing on a wide range of FCs, the thesis is looking at the most 
recent ones. Hence, the study includes a time horizon (period) of 10 years 
from 2005 to 2015, covering the GFC and the related SCC, and SDC that also 
affected the German economy.  
 
This investigation attempts to take a managerial perspective and does not 
include other organisational angles. The senior executives are the ones who 
make the decisions and it is assumed that they act under their position, i.e. in 
consideration of, and in compliance with, the owner’s expectations and notions. 
Other stakeholders that are possible addressees of the research (e.g. advisory 
board) are not included in this investigation, because they are generally only 
supervising the strategic business in German CRE companies.  
 
In this regard, the study places its attention focus on a corporate definition of 
the phenomenon of FI, taking an executives perspective to make the meaning 
and sensemaking processes about it explicit. It does not emphasise to analyse 
the individual psychological grounds and in-mind procedures of the decision-
makers or cognitive functions about why and how these influence their 
interpretation of the phenomenon or respective SDM behaviour. 
 
The study is based on selected theoretical approaches that are extended to 
the field of research. This study does not intend to generate new theory or 
provide for generalisability although the methodological approach supports to 
INTRODUCTION 		
	 26 
derive an outcome that holds for theoretical contributions and transferable 
results. If these results can also be applied in different settings remains up to 
the reader. Rather, phenomenological studies seek to provide for the current 
understanding about the phenomenon in order to broaden awareness, 
stimulate dialogue and reflection, as well as further research (van Manen 
1990; Finlay 2009). 
 
As a material peculiarity, it has become obvious during the progress of the 
study that a one-dimensional and limited view on the phenomenon of FI only 
may not be sufficient. Therefore, the study looks at both, the preliminary phase 
of FI as well as the event of FC. Only where the comparison of these two is 
possible can a distinctive meaning and sensemaking with all its differences 
during the two situations be made.  
 
Furthermore, due to the methodological approach applied to the research, a 
closer examination of the particular context and organisational environment in 
which CRE companies typically act became necessary to delimitate the usual 
circumstances for the CRE executives to those of a phase of FI and the event 
of FC. 
 
1.6 Introducing the Thesis Methodology 
 
Within the social constructivist paradigm, the study adopts a hermeneutic 
phenomenological research approach using the theoretical lenses of van 
Manen’s (1990) ‘lifeworld existentials’ and Weick’s (1995) ‘properties of 
sensemaking’. It focuses on the corporate meaning and the organisational 
sensemaking process of the phenomenon of FI. Although, or because 
phenomenological hermeneutics acknowledge the human factor based on 
peoples’ lived experiences, it was of limited interest in SM (Prasad 2002) and 
organisational management (Holt and Sandberg 2011) literature. On the 
methodological side, this study therefore attempts to show that empiricists can 
benefit from taking a hermeneutic phenomenological perspective in positivistic 
imprinted business settings for meeting the needs of executives in their 
business contexts.   
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The research design was implemented through qualitative methods and 
analysis to expand the understanding of FI using an interpretative 
phenomenological conversation with those who experienced it. Here, the 
management of CRE companies who have gained knowledgeable insights and 
faced lived experiences during the latest FCs, as well as during the phase prior 
to this event, could provide a representative view and shed more light on this 
phenomenon.  
 
The empirical data is collected using semi-structured interviews with ten 
German senior executives chosen for their expertise in the CRE sector, and all 
affected by the same event – the GFC. Further analysis focused on emerging 
themes using thematic analysis (TA). In consideration of the plural research 
objectives, existential analysis, and axial coding, as well as pattern coding 
provided useful additional results.  
 
1.7 Thesis Outline  
 
The structure of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Beside the introduction, 
literature review, and research methodology, it includes the presentation and 
discussion of the findings on the phenomenon of FI. The study closes with a 
conclusion and contributions.  
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the Thesis. Source: Author (2018).  
 
This chapter first introduces the study and provides an overview about the 
background of the investigation. The research rationale and the significance of 
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the study are outlined. Then, the research objectives and scope are presented 
briefly and an outline to the methodology is given. 
 
The following second chapter examines the existing literature and theories 
available in the field of research. The review develops along three relevant 
lines of research: FI and its classification in the corporate environment, 
environmental change and organisational SDM, and the concepts of 
organisational interpretation and sensemaking with regards to environmental 
change. Alignments throughout the chapter direct towards the research gaps 
that exist in SM about the phenomenon of FI. The chapter culminates in 
literary conclusions and an outline of the research gaps, and presents the 
Research Questions (RQs). 
 
Chapter three goes on to discuss and justify the applied research design and 
according methods. It presents the anti-positivistic, interpretive research 
paradigm and argues for a hermeneutic phenomenological research design 
that is contributing to such an empirical study in the field of SM. The applied 
qualitative methods are explained and the data collection as well as the 
analysis process are outlined. The chapter closes with a discussion about 
alternative research methods and why those have been deferred beyond 
others.    
 
Chapter four presents the findings of this investigation. It outlines the 
preliminary findings and themes that have been extracted from the interviews 
with German senior executives to explore the corporate meaning and discover 
the organisational sensemaking of the phenomenon. The final analysis and 
interpretation provide an explanation of the organisational context of CRE 
companies, the corporate meaning of FI and of FC, as well as an outline of the 
process of sensemaking in CRE companies during these times. It further 
provides for the developed QRIs and implications that have been compiled. 
 
Having analysed the interview data, the next chapter five discusses the 
findings in comparison to the literature review, but also with a distinction 
between the phenomenon of FI and the event of FC. It presents similarities 
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that were confirmed under the phenomenon of investigation, but also enriches 
existing research with additional insights from a corporate perspective. With 
these discussions, an attempt will be made to answer the RQs and close the 
research gaps.  
 
Chapter six closes with a conclusion to the study. It presents the novelties and 
contributions to theory as well as some implications for practitioners. 
Limitations of the investigation are laid out and where evidence has not been 
conclusive, recommendations are proposed for future research. Concluding 
remarks round up the thesis.  
 
The research occupies a yet-missing perspective on the phenomenon of FI. It 
thus provides new insights and extends its understanding by making the by-
now-implicit meaning and sensemaking procedures of CRE executives’ explicit 
and advancing Qualitative Indicators (QIs) for the SM and SRM of a CRE 
company. It offers a possible explanation to the question of why the outbreak 
of the FC came unexpectedly for the market participants and how they can 
better control a CRE company prior to, during, and after a FC when inserting 
the phenomenon of FI in their SM. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a review of the existing empirical literature that forms a 
knowledge base regarding FI within the corporate context. The phenomenon is 
introduced and classified in the corporate environment as well as in relation to 
theories and concepts of organisational adaptation and interpretation. The 
chapter closes with literary conclusions resulting in the research gaps and the 
corresponding RQs.  
 
2.1 Literature Review Strategy 
 
The literature review was a critical approach to extant empirical evidence 
about the phenomenon of FI in management and organisational theory. For 
extensive insights into the current state of research, the review developed 
along the following lines of research:  
 
It starts with a classification of FI, where different concepts of FI were 
discussed and distinguished with definitions of associated situations of 
Financial Stability (FS) and FC in the financial system of an economy. As the 
review shows, FI is located in the corporate environment as a predecessor to a 
FC and associated with environmental change.  
 
Given that classification, the subsequent section reviews the existing literature 
about organisational adaptation to environmental change. Elementary theories 
about the environment and its relation to the organisation are discussed and 
allied to SM and RM concepts, which suggest the importance of an emerging 
managerial perspective in their approaches.  
 
Next, the literature about the concept of organisational interpretation and 
sensemaking is discussed with regard to how change in the corporate 
environment is processed in the organisation and by executives within the 
means of SDM. 
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This study combines different research areas and extends these to the context 
of this investigation – the phenomenon of FI. The researcher identified and 
evaluated more than 1,100 journal articles and books, out of which around 650 
were cited. The literature is limited to German and English-speaking databases. 
The majority was gathered using academic online libraries, Google scholar, 
and archives of different publishers, but also from university libraries. 
 
Although a large proportion of the literature was published during the past ten 
to fifteen years, several older works have been included as they are seminal 
and form the foundations of organisational theory and concepts of SM relevant 
for this study. 
 
The review of these sources revealed much literature on the fundamentals of 
economic crises with a focus on systemic risk, FC events, and organisational 
theories which focus on the corporate environment, environmental change, 
and its organisational and managerial adaption, as well as on organisational 
interpretation of environmental change with a focus on sensemaking in 
organisations. Furthermore, research on economic crises with a focus on 
systemic risk in the financial system seem to appear cyclically, mostly in times 
of occurrence of FC situations. The research-specific focus on CRE, or the 
recent times prior to crises were seldom investigated. Thus the literature 
review also comprises empirical works from other streams of business and 
research, as existing models could only provide a theoretical basis, limited to 
some of their elements. Similarly, this investigation draws on other areas of 
research for the methodological approach, where phenomenology is more 
commonly used in i.e. nursing studies (Dowling 2007), but seldom in 
organisational studies. None of these embrace a comprehensive perspective 
on the environment-organisation relation in the context of FI. 
 
2.2 Financial Instability and its Classification in the Corporate 
Environment  
 
This section introduces and analyses the specifications of FI and related 
concepts of FS as well as FC in existing research. The term systemic risk for 
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the financial system and the respective indicators and implications are also 
discussed. Next, the role of the phenomenon of FI in the context of the 
corporate environment and for environmental change is outlined. 
 
2.2.1 The States of an Economy`s Financial System 
 
Two streams of thought are clearly recognisable in the literature: on the one 
hand, writers who choose to define ‘FS’, and on the other hand, those who 
endeavour a definition of ‘FI’. However, only few authors (Allen and Wood 
2006; Alawode and Al Sadek 2008) compiled and discussed these definitions 
more holistically. FC, instead, is often examined in connection with a 
corresponding event, but usually in its relationship to a phase of FI.  
 
2.2.1.1 Financial Stability 
 
In general, some authors have called for a definition of FS and regard it as an 
important basis for developing appropriate analytical tools, generating policies 
and operational frameworks, as well as decisive policy benchmarks (Chant 
2003; Issing 2003; Schinasi 2004). Despite its relevance, defining FS has so 
far been recognised as a demanding mission for those interested in it (Crocket 
1997; Alawode and Al Sadek 2008). This challenge is frequently excused by 
the short history of scientific interest in this phenomenon, when compared to 
price or monetary stability, which have been investigated for much longer 
(Crocket 1997). 
 
The literature review revealed that the definitions of FS stem from different 
perspectives of researchers or public institutions and are outlined in this 
distinction.  
 
Definitions from Researchers 
Allen and Wood (2006) define FS as a state characteristic of the financial 
system that is resistant to FIs, and highlight that the public policy interest 
related to FS shows the importance and suspected economic, but also social 
damage that instability can bring. They indirectly emphasise the mission of the 
central banks to maintain stability.  
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Crocket (1997) defines FS while looking at the degree of volatility in market 
conditions and the central financial institutions as well as at the level of 
confidence of the market participants. Changes and disturbances may lead to 
suspended stability and may also require the acceptance of foreign assistance 
when the economy can no longer help itself (Crocket 1997). Incidentally, he 
does not consider financial infrastructure but focuses on the conditions of 
financial markets and key institutions. Unlike other scientists (Davis 2003; 
Allen and Wood 2006), Crocket`s (1997) definition encompasses phases of 
asset price volatility as indications for instability. Further, and this is rather 
illuminating for the study, he argues that FS occurs in times when the financial 
system remains functional “[…] without interruption or outside assistance […]” 
(Crocket 1997: 6). Hence, it eliminates situations where FI is only avoided by 
regulatory or political authorities providing financial aid or likewise to financial 
institutions.  
 
Laker (1999: 2) defines the purpose of  
 
“[…] financial system stability […] as the avoidance of disruptions to 
the financial system that are likely to cause significant costs to real 
output.”  
 
The routes of such distractions may originate “[…] in difficulties facing financial 
institutions or in disturbances in financial markets” (Laker 1999: 2). He 
stresses the effect of FI on the real economy and associates it with 
turbulences in related organisations and financial markets. 
 
Similarly, Padoa-Schioppa (2002: 20) confirms FS to be 
 
“[...] a condition where the financial system is able to withstand 
shocks without giving way to cumulative processes, which impair 
the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the 
processing of payments in the economy.”  
 
He highlights the strength of the financial system to absorb jolts, allowing it to 
continue carrying out its main tasks of resource allocation and liquidity supply.  
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With the reference to payment services he also indicates that disturbances to 
these can impose adverse effects on the “[…] core economic functions of the 
financial system […]” (Padoa-Schioppa 2002: 20). 
 
The aforementioned researchers view FS as a single and mostly static 
condition. Differently and exceptionally, Schinasi (2004: 8) posits FS as a 
continuum, defined as a corridor in which  
 
“[a] financial system […] is capable of facilitating (rather than 
impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating 
financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of 
significant adverse and unanticipated events.”   
 
His statement suggests that both, exogenous shocks and endogenous 
imbalances in the financial system need to be taken into consideration as 
impacts on FS towards FI. 
 
Definitions from Public Institutions 
The literature review revealed that numerous central banks incorporated 
distinct FS departments and at the same time started their own publications 
about FS in particular reports, especially since the GFC. They also developed 
specific definitions that serve as a certain guidance pertaining their purpose of 
maintaining FS (Alawode and Al Sadek 2008). 
 
The ECB (2014b: 5) expresses FS  
 
“[…] as a condition in which the financial system – intermediaries, 
markets and market infrastructures – can withstand shocks without 
major disruption in financial intermediation and in the effective 
allocation of savings to productive investment.“ 
 
Looking at Germany, exemplarily for the EU, its central bank has largely 
adapted the aforementioned ECB definition and constitutes “[…] financial 
stability as the financial system`s ability to perform its key macroeconomic 
functions, especially in periods of stress and upheaval“ (Deutsche Bundesbank 
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2014: 5). It may be criticised that this definition as well as the one of ECB are 
more of a paraphrasing of FS as an essential characteristic of a functioning 
economy, rather then a precise and clear definition of it.  
 
As another example, the Czech National Bank (CNB) considers FS not only as 
a current status but also a condition of high resilience to future shocks, 
allowing the financial system to operate without any severe failures or 
detrimental effects on the development of the whole economy (CNB 2015). 
Furthermore, they raise analytical needs as pertains to the possible sources of 
systemic risk arising from the ties of vulnerabilities in the financial system and 
potential shocks imminent in various sectors of the economy, financial markets, 
and macroeconomic developments (De Bandt and Hartmann 2000).  
 
The Bank of Japan (BoJ), as a non-EU example, stresses the essential role of 
money for an economy and states that  
 
“ ‘[f]inancial system stability’ refers to a state in which the financial 
system functions properly, and participants, such as firms and 
individuals, have confidence in the system.“ (Bank of Japan 2015: 
n.p.)  
 
This institution considers maintenance of the financial system stability and 
price stability as its main mission. However, this does relate more to its 
functioning and is not necessarily a definition of FS. But, BoJ`s statement goes 
beyond the financial system functioning and includes market participants` trust 
in the system. Such trust, however, seems hard to measure and may be a less 
meaningful characteristic, even though it is expressive. 
 
It becomes obvious that definitions of FS from public institutions, particularly 
central banks, increasingly converge, while highlighting the key functionalities 
of the financial system. Notably, further specifications of FS however remain 
mostly vague, but indicate that the financial system stability is vulnerable to 
shocks, followed by a malfunctioning or even resilience that inevitably lead to 
instabilities.  
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2.2.1.2 Financial Instability and Systemic Risk 
 
The definitions of FI are also predominated by researchers and public 
institutions and usually also refer to the resulting systemic risks for the 
economy. From history, the phases of FI seem different, but the common 
features and generic patterns were attempted in typologies or for 
macroprudential supervision (Davis 2003).  
 
2.2.1.2.1 Financial Instability 
 
Definitions from Researchers 
Schinasi (2004) stresses that instability should be noticed when the financial 
system hinders the regular operations of the real economy, e.g. due to missing 
availability of liquidity. 
 
Equally, Mishkin (1999: 6) claims that  
 
“[f]inancial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system 
interfere with information flow so that the financial system can no 
longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive 
investment opportunities.”  
 
His characterisation highlights the function of the financial system as an 
intermediator of directing liquidity to the real economy sector. He attaches a 
significant appeal to information flows that trigger FI and suggests that FI 
arises when shocks tighten information asymmetries so that finally financial 
intermediation cannot be continued. 
 
Davis (2003: 2) goes even further and views FI as being related to a “[…] 
heightened risk of a financial crisis […]” and, as such, is systemic. Hence, he 
defines a FC as  “[…] a major collapse of the financial system, entailing 
inability to provide payments services or to allocate credit to productive 
investment opportunities” (Davis 2003: 2). Here, he also stresses the 
importance of the financial system in contributing to the real sector through 
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crediting liquidity and argues for the systemic risks of market liquidity and an 
interruption of market infrastructure (Davis 2003). Further, Davis (2003) 
concludes that managing systemic risk is as important as promoting FS in 
order to avoid or mitigate adverse effects on economic functions that an 
(upcoming) FC would bring.  
 
Likewise, Ferguson (2003) points out the missing availability of liquidity as an 
important factor of FI. While Davis (2003) explicitly excludes asset price 
volatility, Ferguson (2003: 2) incorporates this when describing FI  
 
“[…] as a situation characterized by […] three basic criteria: (1) 
some important set of financial asset prices seem to have diverged 
sharply from fundamentals; and/or (2) market functioning and credit 
availability, domestically and perhaps internationally, have been 
significantly distorted; with the result that (3) aggregate spending 
deviates (or is likely to deviate) significantly, either above or below, 
from the economy`s ability to produce.”  
 
Interestingly, Ferguson (2003) did not further specify the dimensions of 
amplitude of distortion or deviation. He just maintains that the normal 
functioning is no longer possible while there are significant abnormalities. 
Further, he goes beyond the characteristics and clearly mentions the decisive 
effect on the macroeconomy, i.e. the influence on the balance of production 
and total expenditures.  
 
Similarly, Allen and Wood (2006: 159-160) described  
 
“[…] financial instability as episodes in which a large number of 
parties, whether they are households, companies, or (individual) 
governments, experience financial crises which are not warranted 
by their previous behaviour, and where these crises collectively 
have seriously adverse macro-economic effects.”   
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Consequentially, they clarify that FS is then “[…] a state of affairs in which an 
episode of financial instability is unlikely to occur […]” (Allen and Wood 2006: 
160). Of particular importance for this study is that their definition considers 
the non-financial sector, stating that there are also other entities, beside 
financial institutions, that experience financial stress. Although this is a valid 
viewpoint, it has been criticised as a rather broad definition of FI, because the 
central bank should not assume that individuals and organisations, which are 
included here, directly effect or stimulate FI (Alawode and Al Sadek 2008).  
 
Definitions from Public Institutions 
In general, public institutions seem to avoid mentioning FI and focus on 
definitions of FS “[…] as a policy goal […]” (Chant 2003: 1). As an exception, 
even though not specifically naming FI, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
considers a systemic risk as a consequence of FI (Adrian et al. 2014), and is 
more specific in mentioning externalities that are considered as triggering 
events  
 
“[…] whether from corrections in asset valuations, asset fire sales, 
or other forms of contagion - to amplify financial shocks and in 
extreme cases disrupt financial intermediation.“ (Adrian et al. 2013: 
1) 
 
In conclusion, when FI is present, markets tumble and the real economy is at 
risk. This amplifies the damage to the financial system and may lead to a 
severe FC, which will be further discussed in section 2.2.1.3.  
 
2.2.1.2.2 Systemic Risk 
 
Where the definitions from researchers and public institutions point to the 
potential risks and risk-related events that arise from FI, the following will first 
turn towards further elaborating the respective systemic risks for the economy 
and then towards macroprudential supervision. 
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Definitions of Systemic Risk 
The considerations about how the financial system is constructed and how it 
shapes systemic risk have become a central point for researchers and public 
institutions since the outbreak of the GFC. The interplay of the financial 
markets has not only been used to explain “[…] the spread of risk throughout 
the system […]” (Acemoglu et al. 2015: 564), but has also encouraged several 
policy actions in times of crises and even afterwards (OECD 2009). 
 
There are different definitions available in the literature, but “[t]here is no 
consensus regarding the concept of […] systemic risk” (Smaga 2014: 2). The 
IMF, BIS, and FSB share an often-used classification by means of describing a 
systemic event on the economy level as 
 
“[…] the disruption to the flow of financial services that is (i) caused 
by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system; and (ii) has 
the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real 
economy.” (IMF, BIS and FSB 2009, cited in Zigrand 2014: 2) 
 
This definition is based on two related assumptions. First, existing negative 
externalities and spillover effects are linked to substantial disturbances in the 
financial system and may facilitate economic shocks to become systemic. 
Second, without an appropriate policy measure, such systemic financial 
occurrences will most likely stimulate undesirable consequences for the real 
economy, impacting output and employment (Funk 2012; ECB 2014a). 
 
Based on the same means, the Group of Ten identified a link between 
systemic financial risk and systemic risk events. They propose that,  
 
“[s]ystemic financial risk is the risk that an event will trigger a loss of 
economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in 
uncertainty about, a substantial portion of the financial system that 
is serious enough to quite probably have significant adverse effects 
on the real economy. Systemic risk events can be sudden and 
unexpected, or the likelihood of their occurrence can build up 
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 40 
through time in the absence of appropriate policy responses. The 
adverse real economic effects from systemic problems are generally 
seen as arising from disruptions to the payment system, to credit 
flows, and from the destruction of asset values.” (Group of Ten 
2001: 126)  
 
Here, three characteristics of systemic risk turn out to be important: (1) its 
impact on the whole financial system must be substantial, (2) it may be 
infected by risks or shocks of other institutions and thus intertwining between 
the institutions is essential, and (3) materialised systemic risk is linked to 
situations with strong macroeconomic effects, and without fast and solid policy 
measures.    
 
ECB, instead, directly relates systemic risks to FI, which, if widespread, “[…] 
impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic 
growth and welfare suffer materially” (ECB 2009: 134). In this context, ECB 
claims that “[c]urrent tools for financial risk measurement rely on relatively 
narrow definitions of a systemic event” (Schwaab et al. 2011: 11) and argues 
for “[a] more comprehensive framework […]” (Schwaab et al. 2011: 11). 
Hereto, it is proposed to consider the three triggers for systemic risk: 
 
“[…] (i) spillover dynamics at the financial industry level, (ii) shocks 
to the macroeconomic and financial markets environment, and 
implicitly (iii) the potential unraveling of widespread financial 
imbalances.” (Schwaab et al. 2011: 11)  
 
To include all of the mentioned risk sources in the assessment would 
circumvent incorrect risk attributions, as all the undertakings occur 
simultaneously (Schwaab et al. 2011). Therefore, the role of macroprudential 
supervision has been attached with greater importance in the financial system.  
 
Macroprudential Supervision  
Several FCs have exemplified that the banking system is an important pillar in 
the economy and thus a crux of the matter in financial turmoil (Crouhy et al. 
2008; Longstaff 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011; Eichengreen et al. 2012; 
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 41 
Lane 2012). Banks providing liquidity transformation and monitoring services 
are vital financial intermediaries, and any malfunctioning can have adverse 
effects on the economy (Huang and Zhou 2009).  
 
In the same vein, Lehar (2005) describes the concerns of regulators of 
supranational agencies regarding systemic risks in the banking sector. 
Because of the rapidly progressing integration of financial markets, the 
simultaneous failure of some banks would trigger a severe economic crisis, 
requiring a system-wide or macroprudential framework (Lehar 2005). 
 
Also Clement (2010) asserts such macroprudential framework, by which policy 
and supervision aim to avoid the establishment of systemic risk as well as 
shocks to the financial sector and the real economy as a whole, thus 
maintaining FS. Then again, to this end, macroprudential supervision takes a 
market-wide perception of the viability of the financial system in its entirety 
(Clement 2010). 
 
At the same time, the success of such macroprudential supervision stands and 
falls with the assessment of systemic risk (Weistroffer 2012; Cortes et al. 
2018). Weistroffer (2012) claims that relevant threats to FS must be precisely 
identified and ranked by supervisors. It requires a forward-looking risk 
assessment with sufficient time to act upon verifications created with robust, 
convincing evidence for policy makers and market participants (Weistroffer 
2012).  
 
During the latest FC, regulators had to learn that their policies and models 
could not prevent the crisis (Schwaab et al. 2011). Out of the various 
measures to assess the systemic risk proposed in the academic literature, 
several supervisors have adopted some, and additionally customised, others’ 
needs (Weistroffer 2012).  
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Jobst and Gray (2013: 4) for example, distinguished three essential areas for 
monitoring systemic risk:  
 
“(i) […] the build-up and unwinding of financial imbalances; (ii) 
shared exposures to macro-financial shocks, and (iii) possible 
contagion/spillover effects from individual institutions and markets 
due to direct or indirect connectedness.” 
 
Overall, the review shows that researchers and public institutions concentrated 
on diverse quantitative criterea to apprehend FS. Such soundness indicators 
or monitoring variables are mentioned in numerous works (Hawkins and Klau 
2000; Gray et al. 2007; Nelson and Perli 2007; Smaga 2014) focusing on 
market pressures, banking system and external vulnerability, asset prices and 
financial conditions etc. (Gadanecz and Jayaram 2009). The great variety of 
indicators are usually grouped under broader categories. The classifications of 
Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009) are taken exemplarily, while others (Kaminsky 
et al. 1998; Geršl and Hermánek 2007; Gray et al. 2007; Smaga 2014) have 
found similar ones in different levels of detail.  
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The focus is placed on six main sectors that are commonly used in the 
literature, their frequency, measurement, and their signalling properties: 
 
 
Sectors 1. Real Economy sector (e.g. GDP growth, fiscal position of 
government, inflation) 
2. Corporate sector`s riskiness (e.g. total debt to equity, earnings 
to interest and principal expenses, net foreign exchange 
exposure to equity, corporate defaults) 
3. Household sector`s health (e.g. household assets, household 
debt, household income, household consumption, household 
debt service and principal payments) 
4. External sector`s conditions (e.g. real exchange rates, foreign 
exchange reserves, current account and capital flows, maturity 
and currency mismatches) 
5. Financial sector (e.g. monetary aggregates, real interest rates, 
growth in bank credit, bank leverage ratios, liquidity ratio) 
6. Financial markets (e.g. change in equity indices, corporate 
bond spreads, market liquidity, volatility, house prices) 
 
Table 1:  Systemic Risk - Main Sectors and Indicators Used in the Literature;  
source: based on Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009: 367-369). 
 
Furthermore, Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009) emphasised that, in theory, 
composite indicators are preferred over individual variables, as these are more 
explicit for defining a threshold or benchmark values for signalling the degree 
of stability in the financial system. They also point out that these are better 
suited to measuring stress in the system, even if there are no extreme events. 
Referring to the complexity of the financial system and its various links to 
different sectors, it may even be difficult to develop single measures with 
expressiveness regarding financial system conditions (Gadanecz and Jayaram 
2009). 
 
Notably, whether individual or composite indicators, these cover all levels of 
market participants but only take care of quantifiable factors with the aim of 
“[…] safeguarding the financial system as a whole” (Schwaab et al. 2011: 6). 
While they may well echo the financial system conditions post fact, there is yet 
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no evidence of how meaningful these would be in forecasting financial stress 
and the related risks signalling the onset of a FC. 
 
2.2.1.3 Financial Crises  
 
For an appropriate classification of the existing theory of the phenomenon of FI, 
the general relation between FI and FC in the financial system of an economy 
is scrutinised in first instance. 
 
Allen and Wood (2006: 159) have proposed a FC as an episode of FI. The 
authors explain that  
 
“[i]t is perhaps easiest initially to approach this issue at the micro 
level. If a household encounters financial pressures which mean 
that its access to money is sharply and unexpectedly reduced, so 
that it has to reduce its spending abruptly and by a large amount, 
then that could be described as a financial crisis, or an episode of 
financial instability, for that household. A company financial crisis, or 
a financial crisis affecting a national government, such as that of 
Argentina, could be similarly defined.“ 
 
For Allen and Wood (2006) a FC may also originate outside the financial 
sector and any other unforeseen restraints in an industry are capable to disrupt 
organisational productivity which foster economic instability. Consequently, this 
would stress the financial situation and in this context, the authors conclude 
that FS is not a microeconomic phenomenon, but a macroeconomic one (Allen 
and Wood 2006).  
 
Ultimately Allen and Wood (2006: 159-160) describe  
 
“[…] episodes of financial instability as episodes in which a large 
number of parties, whether they are households, companies, or 
(individual) governments, experience financial crises which are not 
warranted by their previous behaviour, and where these crises 
collectively have seriously adverse macro-economic effects.”  
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 45 
Other definitions of the relationship between FC and FI remain more general 
and are also on the macro-level. Chant (2003: 8), for example, considers FC 
as    
 
“[…] an extreme degree of financial instability, where the pressures 
on the financial system are sufficient to impair its function 
significantly over a prolonged period.”  
 
Likewise, but from a different angle of FS, Lai (2003: 29-30) explains the 
relation between FI and FC by  
 
“[…] the ability of a financial system to resist a crisis following a 
given shock to the system. A financial crisis is the occurrence of a 
systemic event in the financial system “that will trigger a loss in 
economic value or confidence in a substantial portion of the 
financial system that is serious enough to […] have significant 
adverse effects on the real economy” (Group of Ten 2001: 126). 
Hence, financial crises are manifestations of instability in the 
financial system that impose significant costs on the real economy. 
Systemic risk is the probability of such a crisis occurring.“  
 
In this context, Alawode and Al Sadek (2008: 19) are more specific and define 
the relation between FI and FC, where FCs are ultimately “[…] extreme cases 
or the culmination of instability“. Similarly, Chant (2003) and Lai (2003) 
scrutinise the development as advancing along a range from FS via a phase of 
financial fragility, to a phase of FI und finally to an event of FC, where the 
normal function of the system ceases.  
 
Consequently, a FC is only considered as such, if there are adverse effects on 
the real economy (Group of Ten 2001; Allen and Wood 2006). Based on the 
literature review, a FC can basically be defined as an event emerging from a 
phase of FI in the financial system in an economy. Hence, FC is considered 
the most severe appearance of FI (Chant 2003). 
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With the objective of attempting a differential definition of FC, the literature 
review shows that FCs share similarities but often develop in different 
occurrences. According to Claessens and Kose (2013) a FC is seen as being 
related to considerable fluctuations in asset prices and credit volume, 
remarkable disruptions in financial intermediation, and the availability of third-
party financing to numerous economic sectors, large-scale balance sheet 
problems of corporations, private financial intermediaries and sovereigns, and 
large scale government liquidity, as well as recapitalisation support.  
 
Despite the fact that several theories (Mishkin 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff 
2011; Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2013) recognise that asset or credit booms 
preceed a FC and turn into busts, the explanation of their continuance and 
outburst have been thought-provoking. 
 
The multi-dimensionality of FCs is also expressed from researchers in its 
different typology. Claessens and Kose (2013) mentioned that FCs include 
currency crises that evolve from currency speculations and result in a 
depreciation of the currency or governmental defence by utilising enormous 
amounts of global reserves, increasing interest rates, or executing capital 
controls. They add that instances where international capital inflows decrease, 
reverse, or come to a full stop suddenly and unexpectedly are defined as a 
capital account or balance of payment crises. Oftentimes, this comes together 
with a rise in credit spreads. (Claessens and Kose 2013)  
 
Another type of FC goes together with turbulences in the banking and debt 
market (Davis 1999). Hence, in a foreign debt crisis, either sovereignty or 
privates, or both, cannot comply with its foreign debt obligations. The domestic 
public debt crisis develops by defaulting or inflating the local currency, or other 
financial repression. In a sovereign banking crisis, banks are forced to stop the 
conversion of their liabilities or ask for large-scale government intervention in 
terms of liquidity subvention or capital assistance (van Rixtel and Gasperini 
2013).  
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Even though there exist definitions of the types of FCs, and though their 
duration and severity may differ, their qualitative characteristics and 
occurrence practically overlap (Claessens and Kose 2013). Beside the 
common classification as an adverse or extreme event, there is a large 
consensus among scholars that a FC occurs suddenly and unexpectedly 
(Allen and Wood 2006; Lin and Treichel 2012) and is not predicted by anyone 
(Bezemer 2010). 
 
Meanwhile, the predominant macroeconomic perspective on the phenomenon 
of FI leaves questions regarding its systematic categorisation in the corporate 
environment and characterisation in the respective context of environmental 
change, which will be examined further. 
 
2.2.2 The Corporate Environment and Change 
 
The term ‘environment’ and the forms it can assume is frequently used in 
organisational theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Bourgeois 1985; Rajagopalan 
and Spreitzer 1997; Pettus et al. 2007). Although simple, its meaning is hard to 
comprehend and to demarcate. 
  
2.2.2.1 The Corporate Environment  
 
The external environment of organisations is characterised by social and 
physical elements or dynamics that exist outside of the organisation and that 
directly or indirectly impact its operations, as well as potential decisions 
respectively (Duncan 1972; Zhang et al. 2012).  
 
The environment that directly influences the organisations is defined as the 
task environment, while the one with indirect effects is usually referred to as 
the remote environment (Dill 1958; Myburgh 2004; Carpenter and Sanders 
2009). While the former is more specific and distinctive to the respective 
organisation (i.e. costumers, resources), the latter is marked by political, 
economic, technological, natural, legal, and socio-cultural factors (Zhang et al. 
2012). Essentially, the assessment of these single factors may vary due to 
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their differing importance for each company, even where those are objectively 
equivalent i.e. for a region or industry.  
 
Within the remote environment, all business sectors attribute a particular 
significance to the (macro-)economic environment (Keats and Hitt 1988; 
Scherer 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), especially because companies 
cannot control it but at the same time their business strongly depends on 
macroeconomic dynamics and trends (Oxelheim and Wihlborg 2008). As such, 
macroeconomic particulars, like (economic) recession or exchange rate 
fluctuations, go beyond the competitive situation and take an overarching 
standing in the field (Schreyögg and Koch 2015).  
 
To analyse the global environment and define the organisation's scope for 
action, researchers have identified aggregate influencing factors (Welge and 
Al-Laham 2012). Staehle (1999) found growth and fiscal policy to be significant 
influences. Others (Macharzina and Wolf 2012) mention stock exchanges and 
money markets, as well as unemployment rates. In addition, Diederichs (2010) 
has identified GDP, inflation, central bank lending rates, and currency 
exchange rates as relevant factors of the macroeconomic environment for a 
corporate firm. Likewise, Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008) consider a 
combination of different factors when those represent overarching 
macroeconomic variables like GDP and demand figures or monetary policy. 
 
Consequently, the macroeconomic environment seems to consist of a 
reticulation of components that affect a companies` business. All of these 
factors are commonly known as non-stable and may fluctuate in different 
amplitudes over time (Dabla-Norris and Srivisal 2013). The classification and 
relevance of such environmental change will be reflected further.  
 
2.2.2.2 Environmental Change 
 
The literature review reveals that environmental changes are often considered 
when they are radical and profound (Ginsberg and Buchholz 1990; Heugens 
and Lander 2009). Others make a distinction between turbulent and stable 
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environments (Caldart and Ricart 2006; Farjoun 2010). In a longitudinal study, 
Wholey and Brittain (1989) found frequency, amplitude, and predictability to be 
characteristics of environmental change. For all of these characteristics, 
however, a precise definition is missing.  
 
A different stream of literature has applied a more quantitative and measurable 
approach. Dess and Beard (1984) have translated environmental change into 
instability using the coefficient of variation in sales. Others (Johnson 1987; 
Anderson and Tushman 1990; Clark 2000) defined the level of environmental 
change by its effect on the company to depart from its core competencies and 
strategy.  
 
Moreover, multi-national market trends, increasingly blurring boundaries, free 
transfer of capital, as well as the respective international interdependencies 
lead to a higher vulnerability of the national economies to global shocks 
(Oxelheim and Wihlborg 2008). This leaves less room to manoeuvre, which 
puts economies more and more at the mercy of global macroeconomic 
developments. Yet, there seems to be a scarcity of ways to prepare to this. 
Hereto, it has been claimed that, until lately, guidance and practices for such 
unanticipated and unexpected events are generally missing (Deroy and Clegg 
2011).  
 
2.2.3  Alignment: Financial Instability in the Context of Environmental 
Change 
 
This first part of the literature review reveals that existing theory about FI is 
dominated by definitions from researchers and public institutions. At the same 
time, their definitions are primarily specified for, and addressed to, financial 
institutions and policy makers while aspiring to macroprudential supervision. 
Furthermore, the majority of established indicators related to the systemic risk 
arising from FI are of a quantitative nature and mainly refer to the 
macroeconomic environment. 
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There is no single definition of FI and the existing ones show some 
controversy, so FI appears tangible and hard to define. In addition, FI has 
taken different forms over time with varying empirical focus, which leads to a 
wider range of specifications. However, there is a common understanding that 
FI is a macroeconomic irregular occurrence of financial disturbance (Mishkin 
1999; Padoa-Schioppa 2002; Schinasi 2004) with FC being its most serious 
form (Chant 2003). Hereto, several descriptions state that FI might pose 
detrimental consequences to the economy (Chant 2003; Ferguson 2003; 
Schinasi 2004; Allen and Wood 2006) or at worst, in FC, cease the normal 
functions of a financial system (Chant 2003). Nevertheless, there seems to be 
persistent confidence in the regulating function of the financial system to avoid 
disruptions and withstand shocks (Crocket 1997; Padoa-Schioppa 2002; ECB 
2014b), to maintain FS. 
 
Above, it becomes apparent that FI is the result of intense environmental 
changes and, as such, holds strong determinants as a condition of the 
financial system. Hence, it is being associated with overarching systemic risks 
that may have a considerable effect on the economy as a whole (Group of Ten 
2001). Therefore, indicators and quantitative variables for macroprudential 
supervision have been under theoretical consideration. Notably, however, prior 
to the latest FCs, the literature has not considered any potential correlation of 
any of these risk factors (Smaga 2014). Where FI seems complex and made 
up by several characteristics, a single indicator or a set of indicators may not 
be suitable for determining the phenomenon, but composite indicators become 
necessary to embrace all interdependencies. 
 
In relation to the organisational environment, it became obvious that 
occurrences of environmental change outside the organisation may take 
different forms. When FC is associated with occurrences that are unexpected, 
non-controllable, or unusual to the market participants, its effect on the 
organisation may be even worse.  
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Where existing definitions are elusive and a corporate perspective on this 
phenomenon of FI is, to date, non-existent, the research proceeds to examine 
the significance of environmental change towards organisational adaptation. 
 
2.3 Organisational Adaption to Environmental Change    
 
Following the empirical view on the phenomenon of FI as a macroeconomic 
occurrence in the organisational environment that is stimulated by substantial 
environmental change, this section focuses on extant literature pertaining to 
how much environmental stances relate to organisations. A specific focus is on 
organisational adaption, SM, and SRM following environmental changes.  
 
2.3.1  Elementary Theories about the Environment and its Relation to the 
Organisation 
 
The two major theories of GST and the related CT are utilised to ground the 
phenomenon of FI in the organisational-environmental context. As the study 
does not aim to extent existing theory, these two are simply considered as 
basic theoretical thoughts of this work.  
 
2.3.1.1 General Systems Theory 
 
GST provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the relations 
between the organisation and its external environment or rather its changes 
(Kast and Rosenzweig 1972). 
 
Historically, systems theory was introduced by von Bertalanffy (1949), who 
transferred his knowledge from biology to other sciences. His open-system 
approach considered the organism as a dynamic system, while its behaviour 
expands from the interrelation of the system elements. He assembles the 
characteristics, conditions, or behaviour of real systems to formal system laws, 
which finally lead to what is known as GST (von Bertalanffy 1972; Bamberger 
and Wrona 2012).  
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Within social psychology, GST was applied to explain the relation and 
structure between social organisations (Katz and Kahn 1966). Other scholars 
have adopted this view of organisations as open systems that are 
interchangeably connected to their changing external environment (Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1985; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013; 
Chikere and Nwoka 2015; Mele et al. 2017) and admitted that management 
can basically take little control over the environment (Alkhafaji 2003; Morgan 
2006; Daft 2007; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). However, or particularly because 
of this, organisations are necessarily required to be aware of their environment 
as the fundamental space in which they act.  
 
In conclusion, GST systematically gathers the environmental conditions of a 
company that are the focus of this investigation. Applied to corporate actions 
that take place within a highly sophisticated and fluctuating “peripheral system” 
(Haberfellner 1975, cited in Horvath 2011: 82) that necessitate a reduction of 
complexity, the systemic approach introduces a hierarchy of systems that 
allow the managing of complexities (Meffert 1971; Steinmann and Schreyögg 
1993; Mele et al. 2017) within the company and in relation to its environment. 
 
2.3.1.2 Contingency Theory 
 
From the prior elaborations arise the questions of if and how organisations 
consider environmental factors and if and how they adapt in order to become 
or remain compliant. Hence, CT provides the second theoretical mainstay 
because of its strong lens on organisational alignment to the environment.  
 
Historically, CT emerged from an attempt to depart from traditional 
management theories (Hatch and Cunliffe 2013) and has become one of the 
prevailing approaches in organisational theory (Donaldson 2001; Hatch and 
Cunliffe 2013). Like the aforementioned GST approach, it stipulates 
organisations as open systems which are not isolated from their external 
environment (Dessler 1976; Kast and Rosenzweig 1985; Hatch and Cunliffe 
2013). 
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Specifically, CT involves the adaptation of the organisation to the environment 
to allow for a perfect match of the two (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972; Sporn and 
Miller 1999; Donaldson 2001; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; Prajogo 2016; 
Scott and Davis 2016) in order to remain competitive (Bess and Dee 2008; 
Daft 2007; Donaldson 2001; Morgan 2006).  
 
While in the 1960s some authors (Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967) had already declared that there is one best management system 
and operating structure to optimally suit environmental circumstances, 
supporters of CT nowadays oppose the idea that there is a single optimal way 
(Donaldson 2001; Morgan 2006; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; Volberda et 
al. 2012; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). Management is not stable. It “[…] is 
contingent on the organisation’s situation” (Daft 2009: 27) and changing 
environments require a non-mechanistic form of management work (Burns and 
Stalker 1961; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013; Scott and Davis 2016).  
 
Notably, it is not only the organisation itself but also its members who align to 
their environments (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Scott 2001). However, a 
diligent consideration of the environmental states allows the evaluation of 
possibilities and risks and the achievement of better performance of the 
organisation (Donaldson 2001).  
 
Consequently, the environment shapes the organisation and organisations are 
concerned with constant alignment. Organisations are required to be flexible in 
terms of procedural and structural configurations to match their environment as 
well as in applying the different approaches that are suitable for aligning to 
every specific environmental state (Morgan 2006). 
 
In conclusion, this theoretical lens has provided several efforts to look for an 
explanation of the elements of the environment (Emery and Trist 1965; 
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Duncan 1972; Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Aldrich 
2008; Thompson 2017) and entails two prevailing perspectives: Environmental 
Uncertainty Theory (EUT), and RDT.  
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Environmental Uncertainty Theory  
With this contingency approach, researchers have put much effort into 
investigating the environmental stage of uncertainty. EUT mostly relates to 
explaining its changeable determinants and their frequency of variation (Hatch 
and Cunliffe 2013).  
 
The degree of environmental uncertainty has been investigated in two lines: 
the scholars who plead for an objective view (Child 1972; Yasai-Ardekani 
1986) and those who defend the necessity for a perceptual view (Burns and 
Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Duncan 1972; Miles et al. 1978; 
Weick 1979). 
 
The objective characteristics of the environment have usually been measured 
using archival time series data (Boyd et al. 1993). To this end, most of the 
criticism has been directed, because, it is the organisation or rather its 
members who perceive the environment and potential uncertainties, and 
account for them (Miles et al. 1978). Ultimately, there may be different 
experiences of the environmental circumstances by different people or 
companies, leading to a different behaviour and distinctive corporate strategies 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Duncan 1972; Starbuck 1976; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; Samsami et al. 2015).  
 
Hence, empirical objective measures in a process of individual perception are 
not sufficiently practicable and much of the modern EUT research is directed 
towards perceptual and interpretive concepts (Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). There 
is affirmative research available confirming that the decision-makers’ 
cognitions in choice will determine corporate actions (Donaldson and Lorsch 
1983; Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Romano et al. 2001; Michel 2007; Selznick 
2011), with special consideration for the executives’ perception of the 
environment in organisational action. PEU, compared to objective EUT, uses 
different methods to investigate environmental uncertainty and brings forward 
inhomogeneous results (Tosi et al. 1973; Downey et al. 1977; Buchko 1994). 
This is because perceptions may vary over time while objective measurement 
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is relatively stable (Buchko 1994), but this is also due to the fact that subjective 
data is more difficult to distinguish (Downey et al. 1977; Milliken 1987).  
 
Even though PEU has been criticised for lacking validity and reliability  
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Duncan 1972; Miles et al. 1978; Daft et al. 1988) 
it has been indicated to play a considerable role in organisational processes 
(Ashill and Jobber 2010; Bastian and Muchlish 2012; Regan 2012).  
 
In a noteworthy study, Milliken (1987) advanced three types of environmental 
uncertainty in relation to the interpretation process: state uncertainty, effect 
uncertainty, and response uncertainty. The first one relates to uncertainty 
about potential events or changes because predictions are not feasible. Effect 
uncertainty refers to the incapability of the executive to evaluate cause-effect 
connections and assess the potential and degree of a relevant impact on the 
organisation. Finally, response uncertainty emerges from unknowingness of 
response alternatives and their utility (Milliken 1987; Milliken 1990) Several 
other studies (Gerloff et al. 1991; Miller and Shamsie 1999; Ashill and Jobber 
2001; Doty et al. 2006; Ashill and Jobber 2010) have used these dimensions of 
uncertainty confirming their existence as separate types as well as their 
empirical link.  
 
Resource Dependency Theory 
This theoretical stream was introduced by a seminal work of Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978). Since then, this has been applied in a number of research 
fields to explain organisational dependencies and uncertainties in its external 
environment of resources and how these can be reduced (Hillman et al. 2002; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Hickson and Pugh 2007; Hillman et al. 2009).  
 
Within the context of the environment-organisation relationship, RDT mentions 
the availability of resources, the control over their allocation, and the 
monopolistic attitude of those who dominate these, as existential features to 
determine the interdependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Hickson and Pugh 
2007; Yilmaz 2014). The resources are all human and non-human material, 
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data, and technology that are relevant for the operation of the business, and its 
survival (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  
 
As such, RDT takes the open system approach and emphasises the relevance 
of the environmental context in understanding organisational behaviour. On 
the one hand, empirical studies confirmed the validity of RDT in explaining 
organisational behaviour, structures and related change (Nienhüser 2008). On 
the other hand, researchers criticise that RDT is only “[…] well established in 
terms of the general relationships […]” (Hillman et al. 2009: 12). It has been 
influential in SM and organisational research with a focus on mergers, joint 
ventures, board of directors, and executive succession, which are instruments 
for managing the dependencies (Hillman et al. 2009).  
 
RDT further stipulates that executives are ultimately the ones who have to 
cope with the externalities (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) and develop strategies 
to engage and navigate the environment (Williamson 1984). At the same time, 
RDT is declared as partly too narrow while objective, and socially constructed 
influences on resources and powers are bounded (Clegg and Rura-Polley 
1998). 
 
From the literature, it evolves that RDT has particular relevance when 
environmental stances, like munificence or aggressiveness, lead to a higher 
degree of uncertainty (Burns and Stalker 1961; Dess and Beard 1984; 
Cameron et al. 1987) or scarce resources (Nienhüser 2008). Then, executives 
are required to handle these uncertainties by decreasing the organisation`s 
dependence or by assuming more power over the nevertheless scarce 
resources in competing environments to ensure organisational effectiveness 
(March and Simon 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  
 
This makes it necessary to look at more precise propositions about when and 
how organisations adapt to fit into their environment, to withstand or actively 
engage with it in change.  
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2.3.2 Organisational Adaptation and Strategic Management 
 
Following these theoretical tendencies, this section searched extant literature 
with regards to organisational adaptation to environmental changes in the 
domains of SM and related SDM and RM concepts. 
 
2.3.2.1 Organisational Adaptation  
 
During the last decades, research highlighted different single triggers to 
organisational adaptation. These have referred to deregulation and economic 
reforms (Suarez and Rogelio 2005; Pettus et al. 2007) as well as technological 
changes (Volkoff et al. 2007; Nadkarni and Barr 2008) or privatisation (Cuervo 
and Villalonga 2000; Ramamurti 2000). Others have mentioned labour wage 
schemes (Keister 2002) or changes in customer preferences (Glenn and 
Malott 2004; Jones et al. 2005; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008) as causal.  
 
Such research strived for refinement and provided a specific focus on 
environmental particularities but most of them left the broader environmental 
circumstances of the industry in question out of consideration, or contemplated 
this as remaining stable (Garud and van de Ven 2006). The macroeconomic 
context and its multiple dimensions have only seldom been investigated 
(Bourgeois 1980). These externalities, however, cannot be neglected since 
large-scale environmental changes have spillover effects to industry and 
organisations and involve even greater alignment (Ginsberg and Buchholz 
1990; Bacharach et al. 1996; Huy 1999; Kraatz and Zajac 2001; Kezar 2005).  
 
Beside the triggering events, organisational adaptation has also been subject 
to several management studies and related to adaptive learning (Cyert and 
March 1963; March and Olsen 1976; Levinthal and March 1981; March 2003). 
Organisations develop and continuously redefine procedures to be able to 
align to changing environmental conditions (March 1981; Nelson and Winter 
1982; Levinthal 1991). The extent of such alignment has also been labelled as 
convergence or reorientation (Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Barr et al. 1992). 
Similarly, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) have categorised organisational 
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adaption as convergent or radical. Convergent change is mostly concerned 
with modifications within existing parameters, radical change, instead, means 
transformation of the overall concept and strategy (Tushman and Romanelli 
1985; Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Tushman and Romanelli (1985) also 
note that both are interwoven, where the convergent process is periodically fed 
with reorientation. 
 
In this regard, the literature also claims the need for organisational flexibility, 
because they would otherwise be too slow or unable to adapt (Gersick and 
Hackman 1990; Leonhard-Barton 1992; Argyris and Schon 1996). This 
concerns an ongoing learning and improvement process to align progressively 
(Siggelkow 2002; Abatecola 2012), but also involves managing and 
sensemaking of sudden and unexpected new phenomena (Leblebici et al. 
1991; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The former has been classified as 
evolutionary whereas the latter is considered revolutionary (Tushman and 
O`Reilly III 1996).  
 
Organisations are assumed to align to environmental changes in different 
forms, depending on the extent of such change. Because of its far-reaching 
consequences on the whole organisation, organisational adaptation is 
associated with the SM of the organisation.  
 
2.3.2.2 Strategic Management  
 
Expediting convergent or radical change is part of the corporate strategy and is 
in the hands of the executive management through their SDM (Thompson and 
Martens 2010). To this end, the literature review found that a distinction is 
made between the influences of environmental determinants and those of a 
managerial perspective in organisational adaptation.  
 
2.3.2.2.1 Corporate Strategy  
 
Strategy, as presented by Porter (2004; 2006), is described as a normative 
concept with a long-term horizon, with numerous deliberate (complex) choices 
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and with	 an emphasis on the activities in order to create a unique but also 
valuable position for the company. 
 
Conversely, Chandler (1962) considers strategy as descriptive in terms of 
defined organisational long-term objectives and plans for implementation of 
respective actions to achieve those. In his view, strategy is the instrument to 
divert the organisation in terms of structure and operations (Chandler 1962). 
Hofer and Schendel (1978) define strategy similarly, but they additionally 
include the necessity of an attribution of resources for the implementation plan.  
 
Mintzberg (1979: 25) instead provides a direct link to the environment-
organisation-relation and defines strategy as a consistent “[…] mediating force 
[…]”, to be able to cope with the environment. This relationship is also 
emphasised by other authors who mention an alignment of internal structures 
and processes to the external environment as parts of the strategy at certain 
times (Jemison 1981; Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Miles and Snow 2003; 
Suarez and Rogelio 2005; Thompson and Martens 2010).  
 
Embedded in organisational theory, these considerations of strategy 
formulation and implementation are usually part of a formal and analytical 
planning process that is driven and decided by the top management (Chandler 
1962; Ansoff 1965; Andrews 1987). However, the final corporate strategy is 
derived from various decisions that include a roadmap of structural and 
procedural adjustments to achieve performance and empower executives to 
SDM within this context (Thompson and Martens 2010). 
 
How these strategic decisions are made and what influences them, or the 
particular assumptions of the decision-maker, is further elaborated in the 
following section.  
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2.3.2.2.2 Strategic Decision-Making  
 
Decision-making, in general, is a habitual regular pursuit inherent in 
everybody’s lives. Even though it is pivotal (Carroll and Johnson 1990; 
Goldstein and Hogarth 1997) and may be course-setting, many people do not 
act deliberately, but rather make a decision without knowing how they reach 
their choice (Trimpop 1994; Gilovich and Griffin 2002). 
 
In theory, decision-making is designed as a step-wise process (Mintzberg et al. 
1976; Fredrickson 1984; Nutt 1984; Covello 1987; Hart 1992; Nutt 2000; 
Drucker 2001) based on decision strategies and rules (Beach and Mitchell 
1978). There are three models of decision-making (Cohen 1993). Besides the 
naturalist models, with a strongly experience-related approach to decision-
making (Klein 2014), the formal-empiricist uses a prescriptive and deterministic 
approach and thus does not include realistic decision-making dynamics 
(Beach and Lipshitz 1993; Hammond et al. 1999; Hammond et al. 2006). Other 
approaches, namely the rationalist models, are concerned with appropriate, 
rather than optimal, decision-making representations (Simon 1955; March 
1978; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986; Cyert and March 1992; Simon 1997).  
 
Compared to day-to-day decision-making, strategic decisions are ascribed with 
different characteristics. They are more committing, substantial (Hickson 1986; 
Stahl and Grigsby 1992; Dean and Sharfman 1996; Mintzberg et al. 2013), 
non-routine, and particularly complex (Hickson 1986; Schwenk 1988) while 
reflecting the organisation-environment relationship (Ginsberg 1988). Strategic 
decisions can appear as formal or informal (Pennings 1985) and embrace 
topics that are crucial for the organisation (Stahl and Grigsby 1992). Hence, 
they cannot be traceable without consideration of their context (Elbanna 2006). 
 
They also contain different dimensions, like rationality or comprehensiveness, 
centralism and politicisation, or formalisation, which affect the firm (Lyles 1987; 
Rajagopalan et al. 1993; Dean and Sharfman 1996; Goll and Rasheed 1997; 
Papadakis 1998; Hough and White 2003). Several researchers claimed that 
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executives oftentimes do not follow objective maximisation but the line of least 
resistance, while they are ambitiously following particular opportunities, 
meaning-making, and removing any potential threats (Cohen et al. 1972; 
March 1978; Montgomery 1983; March and Shapira 1987; Cyert and March 
1992; March and Shapira 1992; Kurtz and Snowden 2003). 
 
For another specific distinction, Elbanna (2006) draws on process and content 
research in strategic decisions. While the former deals with the processes of 
SDM, its implementation and triggers, the latter looks at strategy content and 
actions to align the firm to its environment (Elbanna 2006). Although, the 
literature provides manifold research, the process view is underexposed, even 
though both are considered complementary (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997).  
 
Based on this understanding, the existing literature is examined in more detail 
to identify emerging significant effects of environmental and managerial factors 
in strategic decisions, process, and content. 
 
2.3.2.2.3 Major Influences on Strategic Decisions  
 
From extent empirical organisational studies that have been reviewed, the 
research areas of ‘environmental determinism’, ‘strategic choice’ and 
‘managerial cognition’ were found to be representative and most influential to 
the present investigation.  
 
While, historically, the firstmentioned is more deterministic and the others more 
voluntarist, dichotomies between the three have been reduced while at the 
same time being directed towards the increasing role of the managerial 
perspective in organisational adaptation (Abatecola 2012).  
 
Environmental Determinism  
The literature review provided several streams of literature that conceptualise 
environmental circumstances as a crucial catalyst for organisations, which 
directs their activities. Research has been dedicated to the match between 
organisations and the environment (Bourgeois 1980; Miller and Friesen 1983; 
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Anderson and Zeithaml 1984; Hambrick 1988; Venkatraman and Prescott 
1990; Wiersema and Bantel 1993), focusing on specific features such as 
processes and structure of the organisation (Chandler 1962; Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Rumelt 1974; Keats and Hitt 1988; Miller et al. 1988; 
Rajagopalan and Finkelstein 1992; Porter 2004), in addition to administrative 
systems (Lorange and Vancil 1977; Galbraith and Nathanson 1978) or 
personalities, like managerial characteristics (Gupta and Govindarajan 1984; 
Hitt and Tyler 1991).  
 
This has moved into the environmental determinism perspective and the SDM 
process is contemplated to adapt to environmental features (Starbuck 1976; 
Keats and Hitt 1988; Romanelli and Tushman 1988). Such characteristics and 
other organisational chances, risks, or restrictions, together with their 
influences, have been part of the extensive research explaining organisational 
phenomena (Jones et al. 1992). Respective interventions and redirections are 
considered to be part of the executives` primary tasks (Romanelli and 
Tushman 1988). 
 
Much of these works have been discussing the extent of rationality in strategic 
decisions in relation to the environment (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; Abatecola 
2012). Existing literature, however, provides contradictory results. On the one 
hand, it was found that rationality is positively related to performance in stable 
environments, and with opposite effects in unstable environments (Fredrickson 
1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell 1984; Fredrickson and Ianquito 1989). They 
explain this by stating that not all the relevant information relating to a 
comprehensive decision is readily available, which means that decisions 
based on rational decision-making are doomed to failure in such unstable 
environments. Others (Miller and Friesen 1983; Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 
1988; Eisenhardt 1989; Glick et al. 1995; Priem et al. 1995) have found that 
environments with strong dynamics and velocity require fast and intelligent 
responses, where a more diligent and comprehensive analysis, and therefore 
a higher degree of rationality, contributes to higher performance. 
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Most of the empiricists demonstrate that high performing companies occupy a 
higher degree of rationality in velocity, strong dynamic, as well as in stable 
environments and in times of environmental threats, but comparably less when 
facing opportunities or in unstable environments (Fredrickson 1985; 
Fredrickson and Ianquito 1989). Besides, environmental complexity (Kukalis 
1991) or munificence (Miller and Friesen 1983; Castrogiavanni 1991) have 
been mentioned as important factors to rational and comprehensive strategic 
decision behaviour and planning. 
 
Another set of research has been dedicated to specific environmental states 
and their influence on strategic processes. The environmental dimensions 
have been differentiated as i.e. randomised, clustered, distributed-reactive, 
and turbulent (Emery and Trist 1965). They differ in their easiest form from 
static to dynamic environments, where disruptive factors are increasingly 
better perceived, but the circumstances also become more complex and 
multidimensional, hence they require even stronger and more centralised 
strategic intervention (Emery and Trist 1965). Such environmental 
characteristics are later confirmed by other authors who identified turbulence 
(Davis et al. 1991; Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993) and volatility (Bourgeois 
1985) or referred to dynamism (Miller and Friesen 1982; Thompson 2017). 
Others found complexities (Child 1972; Mintzberg 1979), but also named 
hostility (Khandwalla 1977; Miller and Friesen 1978; Mintzberg 1979; Miller 
and Friesen 1982; Covin and Slevin 1989) as a major environmental 
dimension.  
 
Alternatively, Aldrich (2008) determined environments by their capacity, the 
degree of homogeneity-heterogeneity, their stability, the concentration of 
resources within these environments, consensus between market participants, 
and turbulence due to interconnection of environmental elements. Similarly, 
Dess and Beard (1984) specified the environment by complexity, munificence, 
and dynamism and placed these into a multidimensional concept of 
environment. Because of its multidimensionality and consistency with 
numerous other empirical studies, this concept has been considered widely 
applicable and the three determinants will be examined in more detail.   
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Environments become complex when they are increasingly heterogeneous 
and comprise multidimensional factors that act upon the organisation (Child 
1972; Dess and Beard 1984; Keats and Hitt 1988; Thompson 2017). 
Executives who have to manage such complexities of conflicting demands and 
multiplicity, perceive a greater uncertainty while requiring more information 
about the environment (Duncan 1972). Beside the challenge to identify the 
main relevant factors that affect the organisation, there are also structural 
obstacles and those of resources and competences (Black and Boal 1994). 
Research suggests that a more complex environment requires a different 
organisational structure and a more heterogeneous team of executives to 
come up with different understandings in order to manage these challenges 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Wanous and Youtz 1986; Russo and Fouts 1997). 
Interaction between executives decreases (Mintzberg 1979) and the degree of 
specialisation and decentralisation increases (Galbraith 1973).  
 
Environmental munificence has been quantified by environmental resources 
available and sustainable industry growth factors (Starbuck 1976; Dess and 
Beard 1984). The resources are utilisable for a more proactive strategic 
approach to the environment, to add capabilities (McEvily and Zaheer 1999) 
and become more innovative, which in turn fosters internal structural changes 
to be ready ahead of time and of competitors (Aragón-Correa and Sharma 
2003). Dess and Origer (1987) point out that this environment offers plenty of 
strategic options for executive decision-makers, but also a great variety of 
opinions. Rajagopalan et al. (1993: 359) add that munificence contributes to 
“[…] performance effects of comprehensiveness […]”. However, controversially, 
Jensen (1986: 323) emphasises that senior executives invest “[…] free cash 
flow […] at below the cost of capital or wasting it in organisation inefficiencies”, 
while others seek to control costs by reducing staff (Hofer 1975). 
 
Dynamism of the environment has also been referred to as volatility, 
turbulence, or instability (Dess and Beard 1984; Aldrich 2008). In 
organisational theory, dynamism is defined by the degree and continuity of 
stability or instability in environmental factors (Tushman and Romanelli 1985; 
Thompson 2017). The more unpredictable and uncertain the changes in the 
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environment, the more they fluctuate (Mintzberg 1979). Furthermore, the 
external forces that drive such turbulences may hardly be tackled by 
organisations or planned for in advance (Aldrich 2008). Aldrich (2008) also 
stresses the influence through interdependence of externalities. In this regard, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 68) highlight that external influences are not limited, 
so “[c]hanges can come from anywhere […]”, unexpectedly as regards their 
cause, change, and consequences. However, it is not surprising that 
companies in dynamic environments look for homogenous elements of their 
environment in order to be better capable of coping with uncertainties (March 
and Simon 1993). 
 
Such uncertainties are considered the “[…] essence of the administrative 
process” (Thompson 2017: 159). They can affect organisational structure and 
operations to realise a certain performance (Galbraith 1973). Several authors 
(Shaw et al. 1981; Kotter 1982; Daft et al. 1988; Haleblian and Finkelstein 
1993) maintain that environmental instability leads to a broader positioning and 
therefore greater division of top management tasks, which will increase 
information demands and heterogeneity. Also, this puts pressure on 
executives` capabilities and decision-making (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978; 
Kotter 1982; Eisenhardt 1989), which leads to stronger unification among them. 
The relevance of the leadership structure in environmental change is 
confirmed in organisational theory (Mintzberg and Waters 1985), where a 
unanimous, or single, leadership is preferable in critical decisions (Harris and 
Helfat 1998).  
 
These environmental dimensions provide a good guide to understanding 
external characteristics, as well as uncertainties and their influence on 
corporate strategy (Miller and Friesen 1983; Miles and Snow 2003). An 
explanation of how decision-makers’ assumptions condition the SDM process, 
is limited but predominated in the voluntaristic school of thought, as follows.  
 
Strategic Choice  
Contrary to the deterministic perspective, the strategic choice perspective does 
not determine the relation between the environment and strategic processes, 
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but rather the influence of executives on strategy (Miller and Toulouse 1986; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990), outcomes (Miller et al. 1982; Gupta and 
Govindarajan 1984) and performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein 1993) when 
they have to adapt to the environment (Child 1997). 
 
Strategic choice claims executives` previous perceptions, assessments, 
experiences, and to a much lesser extent the environment, responsible for 
their actions (Child 1972). Thus Child (1972) and Cohen et al. (1972) argue 
that time is of the essence and that the meaning of choice varies over time, 
while strategic options and awareness change. This perspective claims that 
organisations taking opportunities can be pro-active in adapting to particular 
situations (Abatecola 2012). 
 
According to Miles and Snow (1978: 263), strategic choice occupies three 
central features that are 
 
“[…] the primary link between the organization and its environment, 
[…] management’s ability to create, learn about, and manage the 
organization’s environment; and […] the multiple ways that 
organizations respond to environmental conditions”. 
 
Numerous studies have explored the characteristics of the decision-maker and 
how their role impacts SDM (Child 1972) and organisational performance 
(Gupta and Govindarajan 1984; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Miller and 
Toulouse 1986; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Day and Lord 1992) with varying results. 
Some studies suggest that executives’ traits do not materially concern SDM 
(Lieberson and O`Connor 1972; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Lyles and Mitroff 
1980; Schwenk 1989) and are performed in line with organisational objectives, 
structure, and strategy (Child 1972). Others found that executives’ 
demographic characteristics (Hitt and Tyler 1991; Goll and Rasheed 2005), as 
well as educational level (Papadakis et al. 1998) exert influence on decisions. 
Further, education has been found to relate to information demands (Dollinger 
1984; Bantel 1993) and innovation (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981; Bantel and 
Jackson 1989; Child 1997). In another study, Papadakis and Barwise (2002) 
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explored tenure and competitive aggressiveness, beside education, for their 
relevant role in relation to hierarchical decentralisation. Further, there is 
positive correlation of education level to rational decisions (Goll and Rasheed 
2005). Tenure, experience, and age have been confirmed to impact decision-
making in other studies (Elbanna 2011). 
 
Managerial Cognition 
Beyond such observable characteristics, the managerial cognition theory 
suggests that executives are bounded rational and employ psychological 
mechanisms in decision-making (Simon 1957; Cyert and March 1963; Simon 
1997). Thus, they cannot obtain a complete understanding of their 
environments and situation (Daft and Weick 1984). Moreover, they inject 
subjective representations that foster their strategic actions.  
 
The literature provides varying explanations as pertains to the role of cognition 
structure in managerial decisions, and investigations have determined aspects 
of cognitive behaviour and mental shortcuts in SDM (Schwenk 1989; Finucane 
et al. 2000; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011). This may differ depending on 
whether the circumstances surrounding a particular situation are perceived as 
being complex (Dearborn and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963), or due to 
managers’ experiences and respective personal values and beliefs (Gupta and 
Govindarajan 1984; Hitt and Tyler 1991; Gallén 2006) or as a result of the 
influence of the top management team (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990).  
 
The main streams that were investigated in managerial cognition are hubris 
(Roll 1986; Hiller and Hambrick 2005), bias and heurisics (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 
2011). In this context, reference is made to the theoretical framework of the 
upper echelons perspective (Hambrick and Mason 1984), which is based on 
an early model of decision-making in a complex context (Cyert and March 
1963). It embraces the influence of numerous executives` attributes, such as 
cognitive base values and managerial background characteristics, which are 
reflected in the strategic actions of acquisitions, innovativeness and  
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diversification, and are therefore responsible for organisational performance 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984). Hence, managerial cognition is regarded as a 
belief structure, or a set of cognitive patterns, deeply rooted in executives’ 
psychological characteristics which have (historically) been formed by them 
and continuously influence their behaviour (Finkelstein et al. 2009). 
 
In summary, strategic choice became an essential perspective in strategy 
considering that “[…] organization […] permeate one another […]” (Child 1997: 
58). Managerial cognition also gained increasing importance in management 
research in order to understand why and how it influences SDM. There is 
substantial research and empirical results available that establish profound 
and widely dispersed knowledge about the link between executives` 
characteristics (reflective of their experiences), cognition and SDM, and 
organisational outcomes. Notably, all of the above results derive from studies 
in specific industries, many of them from the educational and health sectors, or 
are based on theoretical abstract investigations. Finally, the existing research 
indicates that there is a need to go beyond a pure environmental determinism 
perspective and to further consider the non-deterministic explanations of 
environmental phenomena. 
 
With the aforementioned representations, it became apparent that, in times of 
environmental change, SDM always presents uncertainties which must be 
considered in the executives’ evaluations and choices, and these bring with 
them a certain degree of risk. 
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2.3.2.3 Strategic Risk Management  
 
Literature claims to bring strategy and RM together for identifying and 
managing risk (Frigo and Anderson 2011a). Empirical views about its impact 
and the relevance of a RM in the context of changing environments will hence 
be elaborated further. 
 
2.3.2.3.1 Corporate Risk 
 
Insecurity and risks are a constant companion of corporate decisions, while 
success and progress require respective risk appetite, and chances are 
inextricably linked to risks (Weber et al. 1999). Consequently, the phenomena 
of insecurities and risks have occupied many economists, notwithstanding, a 
specific or generally accepted definition of the term risk still does not exist 
(Braun 1984; Fasse 1995; Wolf 2003; Gleißner 2008; Vanini 2012; Reijda and 
McNamara 2017). 
 
Risk is oftentimes related to future events and the impossibility of foreseeing 
the final outcome of the business actions with certainty (Gutmannsthal-
Krizanits 1994). As long as the occurrence of an event is still doubtful and can 
neither be validated in reality nor assured with high probability, insecurity 
exists (Mugler 1979).  
 
While, the phenomena of risk and security be obviously opposed 
(Gutmannsthal-Krizanits 1994), the inverse, insecurity and risk, suggest the 
same but are clearly to be distinguished (Mugler 1979). Insecurities are 
considered to be the prerequisite for risk (Neubürger 1989), where potential 
environmental states or alternatives for action and outcomes are not entirely 
known, and also where no certitude about the future or causal relations 
between action and real outcome exists (Philipp 1967; Dickinson 2005; Aven 
and Renn 2009). The risk itself, however, evolves from the decision that is 
made in that situation (Bamberg and Coenenberg 2006), and thus has a close 
relation to information. The more information is available for a decision, the 
more the insecurities decrease.   
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Information theory differentiates three types of information: complete 
information, which includes absolute knowledge about the future; total lack of 
information or ignorance; and in-between imperfect information (Wöhe and 
Döring 2010). While the first is criticised and realistically not achievable 
(Mugler 1979) the decision-maker only has inadequate information available. 
Literature contemplates that this may arise from incompleteness, 
indeterminacy, or uncertainty (Braun 1984), i.e. either quantitative or 
qualitative deficits. While incomplete information lacks problem-specific parts 
due to limited access to information, imperfect information processing 
capacities, or exclusion of objective information due to economic 
considerations, indeterminacy means imprecise and vague or unclear - future, 
present, historical - information (Braun 1984).  
 
Furthermore, risks come with different specifics and place multi-dimensional 
pressure on the company and its management. A classification brings 
structure and transparency on the corporate risk situation and entails the 
potential for risk control and allocation (Peter 2002). 
 
There exist several approaches for systematisation (Wolf 2003). For example, 
the classification, according to airmic et al. (2010), includes the potential 
marketplace, infrastructure, financial, and reputational risks for the company 
while distinguishing between internally and externally driven ones. Interestingly, 
half of the risks stem from internal actions and decisions and should be 
considered to be under the control of the company. The other half relates to 
factors such as the environment, regulation, financial market developments or 
disasters that are beyond the influence of the company.  
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Similarly, based on global research on public companies, another model 
suggests 36 risk factors clustered to four categories of risk, which are strategic, 
financial, operational, and external (Mitchell and Matruglio 2015).  
  
 
Figure 2: Broad Risk Categories and Their Frequency. Source: Mitchell and Matruglio (2015: 4). 
 
In their example, Mitchell and Matruglio (2015) found that the majority of value 
losses are driven by strategic and external risks.  
 
From the review of the existing models, it can be noted that the risk factors are 
almost consistent, even though they are clustered into different superordinate 
risk categories. Notwithstanding, against the background of a comprehensive 
assessment and accomplishment of individual corporate risks, the risk 
situation of a company in its entirety as well as the consideration of aggregate 
risks are of utmost importance (Wolf 2003).  
 
2.3.2.3.2 Risk Management  
 
A comprehensive management of (corporate) risks becomes even more 
important where underestimated or ignored risks may have detrimental effects 
on performance and substance (Frame 2003; Dickinson 2005; Frigo and 
Anderson 2011a; Frigo and Anderson 2011b). This task has reached special 
attention during turbulent times of instability and financial disruption as well as 
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 72 
due to pressures in a globalised environment where risk profiles constantly 
change (World Economic Forum 2010).  
 
In the organisational context, such risks are omnipresent and require explicit 
consideration through a coordinated activity directing and controlling potential 
and existing risks that may effect the organisation (ISO 2009). RM already 
became popular during the 1950s (Young and Tippins 2001; Dickinson 2005) 
but the implementation of an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) across the 
entire organisation is yet growing (Accenture 2009; Beasley et al. 2010; Ernst 
& Young 2010). 
 
ERM has been developed to implement a holistic, systemic, and proactive 
approach to corporate risk (Abrams et al. 2006) in order to safeguard 
performance, organisational sustainability, and shareholder value (Deloitte 
2009; AON 2010; Beasley et al. 2010; Accenture 2011). It has been 
contemplated as a responsibility of the SM to initiate the process in order  
 
“[…] to identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect the entity 
and to manage risk within its risk appetite, […] to provide reasonable 
assurance to […] management, […] [g]eared to achievement of 
objectives […]” (COSO 2004: 2).  
 
Hence, ERM is assumed to bring paramount benefits in volatile global 
environments. These specific circumstances, increasing regulation on 
businesses and corporate governance codices etc., have forced companies to 
reconsider their risk attitude (Tarantino 2008b). With a heightened risk 
awareness, SRM and ERM have over time become separate disciplines in 
research and several standards and best-practices, as well as tools and risk 
principles developed (IRM 2002; Abrams et al. 2006; Olson and Wu 2008; 
Tarantino 2008b; Towers 2009; airmic et al. 2010).  
 
The ERM methods applied are mostly considered as being either driven by 
process-control or by measurement (Hively et al. 2001). The measuring refers 
to identifying the relevance and occurrence probability of subject matters 
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acting on the company to mitigate and limit potential risks. When being 
process-control-driven, the focus is on immanent business process risks, 
especially taking care with regards to data collection and reporting processing 
to ensure information for decision-making (Yates et al. 2003). By doing so, not 
only will risk events be managed (COSO 2004), but so will their consequences, 
in order to prevent surprising and unexpected events (ISO 2009).  
 
Beside other systematic ERM models that have been suggested by different 
supporters of best practices for corporate and RM (Ritchie and Marshall 1993; 
Hively et al. 2001; Young and Tippins 2001; Sharman 2002; Frame 2003; 
Crouhy et al. 2010; Lam 2014), the ISO 31000:2009 can be considered as a 
basic and international standard of ERM process with powerful influence on 
organisations (Leitch 2010). This is also consistent with the ERM principles of 
COSO (2004) and ISO (2009: 3) defines it as the  
 
“systematic application of management policies, procedures and 
practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing 
the context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring […] 
and reviewing risk […]”.  
 
 
Figure 3: Risk Assessment Process. Source: airmic et al. (2010: 9). 
 
When managing risks, it is considered even more important nowadays, in a 
volatile environment, to proactively and therefore strategically manage 
corporate risks (Raghunath et al. 2017). Similarly, Frigo and Anderson (2009) 
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emphasised that strategic risk identification should initially look at those risks 
that can exert the strongest impact on the company, its strategy, and may limit 
the achievement of business aims as well as protecting company value.  
 
This is in line with the general strategies that emerged from the literature: a 
rudimentary strategy concerned with the implementation of systems and 
structures and organisational guidelines to foresee and manage the downsides 
of risks (Lam 2014; Agarwal and Ansell 2016); an anticipatory strategy where 
the company starts counter-measures due to expected losses (Pezzulo et al. 
2008); a resilient risk strategy used to integrate risk (Agarwal and Ansell 2016) 
for fast adaptation to small-scale environmental or organisational change and 
crisis situations while maintaining control (Fiksel 2003); and a transformatory 
risk strategy (Rajagopalan and Spreitzer 1997) for large-scale, structural or 
mindset changes. 
  
Many authors claim that in consideration of historical information and 
organisational performance, an innovative and transformative ERM is essential 
for keeping up with the times (Taplin 2005; Goto 2007; Stulz 2009; Taleb et al. 
2009) and for being able to make rigorous, pro-active, and prompt risk-based 
strategic decisions. It is meant to integrate “[…] with strategy and performance 
[…]” (COSO 2017: 1). However, in order to be able to put these risk strategies 
into practice, it is necessary to identify the risks and risk situations. The 
literature provides a number of key risk indicators or risk factors that have long 
predominated this field and still do (Scarlat et al. 2012). However, empiricists 
have challenged the notion of these quantitative risk factors (Church and 
Rogers 2011; Raghunath et al. 2017). The necessity of qualitative indicators, 
meaning peoples’ perception and judgement, go beyond figures and are 
considered to provide for “[…] a richer understanding of the dynamics at play 
[…]” (Church and Rogers 2011: 51). 
 
Hence, it is not only important to identify and monitor the risks, but also to 
consider how SDM about environmental change and its corporate risks are 
approached in organisations.   
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2.3.2.3.3 Decision-Making about Risk 
 
Decision-making about risks is considered challenging (Nutt 1989). This is 
again explained by the attached uncertainties and divergences due to task 
complexity and contextual factors, oftentimes accompanied by time pressure 
leading to framing or other short-cuts in executives` decisions (Slovic 2000). 
Where these aspects are ignored or pushed aside, detrimental effects may 
arise. This is also because these decisions leave room for an assessment of 
the situation, and they are not uncommon in information processing, errors, 
and failures of mislead decision-makers (Slovic et al. 1977; Schwenk 1988; 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992).  
 
In a standardised ERM process, risk decision-making can take on a 
deterministic structure when subsumed in a staged activity (Carroll and 
Johnson 1990). This starts with the identification of a necessity for a decision, 
followed by a formulation and classification of the risk situation; options are 
established and the required information base is set. Thereafter, the decision 
is taken, acknowledging preferences and potential influences of cognitive 
frameworks. Subsequently, the decision is implemented by taking action, and 
as a final step, feedback is provided and the decision is retrospectively 
assessed in order to learn for future decisions. (Carroll and Johnson 1990)  
 
In a particular situation, however, an acceptable choice with regards to risk is 
not only subject to the definition or characteristics of the problem, but is also 
about alternatives, contextual matter in organisation and environment, as well 
as the particular decision-maker (Fischhoff et al. 1984; Sitkin and Pablo 1992; 
Ritchie and Marshall 1993; Weick 1995). The latter becomes more and more 
important because it is assumed that the human factor adds to how the risk 
and related factors are interpreted and comprehended in order to make the 
decision (Beach 1990; Beach 1993; Pablo 1999; Orasanu et al.; Rettinger and 
Hastie 2001). This may conclude in a decision situation where reasonableness 
or acceptance attracts against the smallest risk impact.  
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Here, Fischhoff et al. (1984) claim a flexible and more individual, but at the 
same time comprehensive, logical and practical approach to decisions 
pertaining to risk, which is transparent and compatible with the organisation. 
Therefore, they presuppose a learning organisation in order to continuously 
advance better decision-making approaches.  
 
To conclude, risk is utmost subjective and there can be no universally 
acceptable risks or predetermined choices or methods for decisions for the 
preferred acceptable options. Risk decisions are subject to an organisational 
footprint. Moreover, they are value-laden judgements of the executives, which 
are made up by interpretation, meaningmaking, and context. 
 
2.3.3 Alignment: Financial Instability and Organisational Adaption  
 
The literature review provided an approximation on the relation of the 
organisation to its corporate environment and its adaptation to environmental 
changes.  
 
Based on the theoretical considerations of GST and CT, organisations exist as 
open systems that are constantly engaging with their environment (Morgan 
2006; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). Then, 
organisations adapt to environmental contingencies in order to remain 
competitive and achieve maximum performance (Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 
2008; Scott and Davis 2016).  
 
Beside social, legal, cultural, and technological factors, major influences on 
organisations come from changing macroeconomic stances (Katz and Kahn 
1966; Daft 2007; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). Where FI has previously been 
considered as environmental change, it is assumed that organisations need to 
adapt to this specific environmental circumstance with corporate strategy. 
Consequentially, it becomes one of the main tasks of SM of a company to 
actively and comprehensively mediate the relation to its environment, to 
become or remain adaptable and to, consequently, pro-actively consider 
potential effects from the environment on the organisation in a phase of FI.   
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It was revealed that the environment is an independent, external, and tangible 
entity. It relates to the perception of those experiencing it (Duncan 1972; Tosi 
et al. 1973; Downey et al. 1975; Lorenzi et al. 1981). Hereto, PEU has been 
acknowledged to play an important role in organisational interpretation 
processes, but it is claimed that more attention should be paid to its influence 
on such processes and organisational sensemaking (Ashill and Jobber 2010). 
Furthermore, PEU and RDT indicated that a lack of understanding, or limited 
managerial perception, as well as resources leaves room for interpretation by 
the executives and they may attach different meanings to the environmental 
conditions. Consequently, the definition may vary from one to another and over 
time, which also translates into the resulting corporate strategy and SDM. 
Moreover, it has been found that during environmental change, the 
environment, as it is perceived, is superior to the objective concept. 
 
In this regard, the power of the environment in relation to the organisation is 
discussed controversially. While several authors (Dess and Beard 1984; 
Aldrich 2008) claim that organisations are weak under the influence of 
environmental states, others (Child 1972; Haleblian 1993; Miller 1986) argue 
for a powerful organisation under the strategic choice perspective. Hereto, it 
has been demonstrated that the characteristics of the decision-maker, 
demographic factors, as well as personality or managerial cognition play a 
non-negligible role in their decisions (Child 1972; Bourgeois and Brodwin 
1984; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Miller and Toulouse 1986; Child 1997). This 
strengthens the questioning of whether organisations are more prone to those 
managerial perceptions and their constructed reality, or the real objective 
environment (Duncan 1972; Tosi et al. 1973; Downey et al. 1975; Lorenzi et al. 
1981). Beyond the focus of this investigation - the phenomenon of FI as an 
environmental phenomenon for CRE organisations – the strategic choice 
perspective is considered more suitable: it focuses on executive`s action to 
adapt to the environment (Child 1997), instead managerial cognition is more 
concerned with how executive`s drive phenomena (Nadkarni and Barr 2008). 
 
Regardless of whether environmental forces are selective or comprehensive, 
they are constitutive and immanent, and enforce organisational adaptation. 
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Following this view, executives are required to identify and understand what 
constitutes their environment and make decisions about respective alignments 
(Cyert and March 1963; Starbuck 1976). This includes considering 
uncertainties that constitute risks to the organisational strategy. 
 
The literature review showed that a reasonable and deliberate SM and related 
RM can offer great potential for an organisation in terms of existential security 
and competitiveness, where satisfactory information is available. RM has been 
claimed to be important in coordinating and controlling business actions (ISO 
2009), where risk is mostly unpredictable but inherent in all parts of the 
business, internal and external (Miller 1992; Aven and Renn 2009). Generally, 
but also particularly to FI, no strict cause-effect relations can be determined, 
nor can complete information ever be offered. Therefore, many scientists have 
claimed for a risk classification and comprehensive RM in companies 
(Cardona 2003; Gordon et al. 2009) that allow for a pro-active and coordinated 
management (Abrams et al. 2006). This so-called ERM has developed in a 
separate stream of management discipline with best practices and 
measurement-driven, as well as process-driven, control mechanisms (Hively et 
al. 2001; Tarantino 2008b). Even though it is assumed that potential corporate 
risks are generally presented in existing RM models, it has not been 
uncovered yet to what extent these are relevant in times of FI, and how they 
develop and assert. Thus, it is contemplated that risk is also a value-laden 
judgement call.  
 
Finally, for SM and SDM, there arises a need to take a more managerial 
perspective on business strategy and actions, especially when facing non-
routine and unexpected situations, laced with uncertainties, in environmental 
change. The relationship between the organisation and the environment is 
variable but the degree of influence that is in the evaluation of the decision-
maker is important for how they consequently take action. SDM and RM leave 
room for perception and comprehension by the responsible executives and 
require a deeper understanding of how interpretation and sensemaking in 
organisations take place to avoid unpleasant surprises.  
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2.4 Environmental Change and Organisational Interpretation 
 
This section explains the relationship between environmental change and 
organisational interpretation, and exposes its significance with respective 
consequences for strategic actions. Organisational sensemaking is elaborated 
to discover the process of understanding and meaning-generation in 
environmental change.   
 
2.4.1 Organisational Interpretation and Sensemaking 
 
It has become clear so far that executives have become more and more 
required to approach the organisational environment, perceive it, and make 
sense of it. Ericson (2001) addresses that most of the events, however, are 
being ignored or left to others - just observing how they manage it.  
 
At the same time, much of the research in organisational studies remains 
committed to an objective realistic positivist view of knowledge (Barrett 2008) 
and the notion of being able to provide a description of social phenomena by 
formulae and causalities is still widely represented. As indicated in the 
literature review so far, several behavioural and organisational researchers 
have criticised this approach because they doubt the existence of one solution 
for all, as well as a neutral and value-free inquiry (Wicks and Freeman 1998; 
Lacey 2005; Bhaskar 2009). Likewise, interpretivist sociologists (Schutz 1967), 
sociologists of knowledge (Berger and Luckman 1967), and also cognitive 
social psychologists like Weick (1979) take the view that environment and 
organisation are interrelated and that the environment is enacted by human 
interactions (Mason and Mintroff 1981; Davis 1982; Huff 1982; Peters and 
Waterman 1982). These researchers have also demanded that organisations 
need to interpret (Daft and Weick 1984) events, make a conversion, 
understand or create meaning and conceptualise among executives.  
 
In this regard, the literature provides several concepts of interpretation that 
include scanning, sensemaking, understanding, monitoring, and also learning 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Duncan and Weiss 1979; Weick 1979; Choo 2001).   
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Additionally, some models have been developed to explain the organisational 
process of handling possibly relevant information (Kiesler and Sproull 1982; 
Meyer 1982b; Dutton and Duncan 1987). 
 
Out of these concepts, sensemaking is frequently delineated as a general 
notion, providing a variety of largely similar definitions and designs (Starbuck 
and Milliken 1988; Weick 1995; Maitlis 2005; Weick et al. 2005; Sonenshein 
2010).  
 
In accordance with Maitlis and Christianson (2014), sensemaking is the 
process applied by people in order to reach an understanding of new, 
unexpected, or somehow confusing occurrences. In order to explain and settle 
the situation, executives start to interpret and extract cues that provide 
plausible ground for making sense of the circumstance and, hereinafter, 
enacting the environment (Weick 1995; Brown 2000; Brown and Jones 2000; 
Maitlis 2005; Weick et al. 2005; Neill et al. 2007). Sensemaking incorporates 
interpretation, but moreover, involves an active construal of the event in order 
to understand it (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005; Sutcliffe 2013) and to reduce 
complexity and uncertainty equally (Smerek 2011). 
 
Sensemaking is more than interpretation (Maitlis and Christianson 2014) and 
provides a rich concept of human cognition and perception, as well as its 
interpretation and action which influence organisational management (Weick 
1995; Allard-Poesi 2005).  
 
The following will review the organisational sensemaking process as a 
foundation for strategic decisions and its specific applicability in environmental 
change. 
 
2.4.2 The Organisational Sensemaking Process 
 
Generally, sensemaking is characterised as reciprocal while gathering 
information attributing meaning and respective accomplishments (Weick 1979; 
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Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). This is transferred to a three-stage approach of 
scanning, interpretation and action (Daft and Weick 1984; Milliken 1990).  
 
2.4.2.1 The Strategic Sensemaking Process 
 
The first step of the model starts with scanning, which equates to information-
seeking about what constitutes the environment, its relationships, events, and 
structure (Fahey and King 1977). Increasing importance has been attached to 
scanning as a pro-active task in order to improve timely alignments of the 
organisation to the environment and any upcoming changes of it (Milliken 
1990; Choo 2001; Danneels 2008). Milliken (1990) also aimed to provide the 
probabilities for the occurrence of impending events.  Differently, it was applied 
to balance the organisational perception of the environment with the objective 
reality of it (Bourgeois 1985).  
 
The importance of scanning in SM has, again, been pointed out by Danneels 
(2008) who attached a kind of absorptive capacity to it when being able to 
better and faster identify, integrate, and employ external information and 
knowledge in organisational processes. In the same vein, others relate 
scanning to dynamic capabilities of companies to cope with changing 
environments (Teece et al. 1977; Wilden et al. 2013). Also, the relation 
between the scanning process and strategic uncertainty has been found to be 
positively correlated and important to the quality of the strategic concept 
(Zhang et al. 2012).  
 
From various studies, it can be explicated that scanning is seldom fully 
comprehensive and oftentimes merely selective on specific environmental 
aspects (Hambrick 1982; Daft et al. 1988; Boyd and Fulk 1996; Garg et al. 
2003). Also, researchers found that there is no homogeneity with regards to 
the method of scanning, its level, or extent (Fahey and King 1977; Huber 1991; 
Beal 2000; Sutcliffe 2013). 
 
The second process step of interpretation attaches the organisation`s meaning 
to a shared understanding of the scanned information or event (Daft and 
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Weick 1984). Much of the literature has noted, in this regard, that such process 
may vary from company to company and from individual to individual, and 
ultimately lead to different processes of interpretation. Factors that have been 
identified to impact the process refer to overarching aspects like strategy and 
information processing (Thomas and McDaniel 1990), strategy type (Citrin et al. 
2007), and in more detail they reference market orientation (Qiu 2008), or the 
level of diversification (Ginsberg 1989). Others identified more human-related 
aspects like organisational culture (Harris 1994), or personal characteristics 
like cognitive motivation (Anderson 2008), and team or individual factors 
(Auden et al. 2006; Finkelstein et al. 2009). Finally, there are ones relating to 
environmental features of industry velocity (Eisenhardt 1989; Nadkarni and 
Barr 2008), and dynamism (Garg et al. 2003; Mitchell et al. 2011).  
 
In this context, literature has also dedicated increasing attention to executives` 
cognition, mental maps, and behavioural frames (Walsh 1995; Nadkarni and 
Barr 2008; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011; Narayanan et al. 2011). 
Empirical studies suggest that groups of managers may work with shared 
knowledge and use mental maps to put organisational meaning to events 
(Thomas et al. 1993; Weick 1995; Garud et al. 2011). They categorise while 
looking for patterns and similarities (Garud et al. 2011).  
 
Even though the importance of personal influence on the interpretation has 
been mentioned, it can be noted that several authors consider the 
categorisation and perception to be a collective and social process (Huber and 
Daft 1987; Maitlis and Christianson 2014). People, in general, but executives 
especially, generate and shape meaning steadily, while discussing, “[…] 
groping, trial and error, and sounding out" (Huber and Daft 1987, cited in 
Weick 1995: 99). Executives seem to classify events as either a threat or an 
opportunity, i.e. they associate positive or negative characters, estimate gains 
or losses, and consider a higher or lower degree of controllability by the firm 
(Dutton and Jackson 1987; Jackson and Dutton 1988; Thomas and McDaniel 
1990; Thomas et al. 1993; Barr 1998). As a member of the organisation, they 
introduce such interpretation through their decisions and therefore also effect 
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the actions in response to the event (Thomas et al. 1993; Julian and Ofori-
Dankwa 2007). 
 
Following the results of such interpretation, as a third step in the process, 
actions are introduced. These are the responses to the organisational context 
as perceived by the executive (Leavitt et al. 1974). This part, inter alia, 
includes changes in strategy, competitive strategy, or organisational structure 
(Dutton and Duncan 1987; Ginsberg 1988; Thomas et al. 1993; Qiu 2008). 
Critically, Smart and Vertinsky (1984) hereto emphasise that action responses 
to crisis settings can restrict strategy space, indicating that changes in strategy 
although implemented may not be appropriate or too short-sighted. Also, it has 
been pointed out that this phase leads to creating new action-outcome 
relations that are again interpreted and circled back, which leads to a kind of 
learning mechanism (Daft and Weick 1984). This is further positively correlated 
with the ability for strategic innovation (Berghman et al. 2013).  
 
In conclusion, the particular action emerges from the preceding recognition 
and interpretation of the environmental condition or change (Barr, 1998). While 
the interpretation is socially shaped and gradually refined by experiences, 
learning, and previous actions (Christianson et al. 2009; Catino and Patriotta 
2013; Maitlis and Christianson 2014), this may not be encompassing, and it is 
assumed that the choice of action is at least to some extent restricted.  
 
From this, it is suggested that each step of the sensemaking process is related 
to environmental change either due to the current situation or prior 
experienced ones and the lessons learned.  
 
2.4.2.2 The Properties of Sensemaking  
 
Having reviewed the sensemaking literature, there is much research 
investigating it in organisational contexts (Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Porac et 
al. 1989; Thomas et al. 1993; Laroche 1995). A growing body of work was later 
influenced by Weick`s (1995) idea of sensemaking as a structured process 
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(Ericson 2001; Maitlis and Christianson 2014; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2014) 
using practices of people in real-life situations (Brown et al. 2015).  
 
For Weick (1995), sensemaking concerns an explanation of what is going on 
through a process of framing based on individuals` experiences and their 
interactions with others. He presented seven characteristics: so-called 
properties of identity, retrospection, enactment, socialisation, continuation, 
extracted cues, and plausibility (Weick 1995). These remained prominent in 
guiding researchers in producing meaning and understanding of the process of 
sensemaking (Helms Mills et al. 2010).  
 
The first one looks at the organisation and its individual members, specifically 
the identity that they occupy (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005). This property is 
about a self that may vary depending on, or adapted to, the events, 
environmental conditions, organisation, and interaction with others. The 
identity is subject to continuous redefinition by the people: on the one hand, 
how they believe they are viewed by others, the organisational demand for 
executives’ self-effectiveness, self-consistency, and self-enhancement (Dutton 
and Dukerich 1991; Weick 1995), and on the other hand, how they present 
(parts of) self to the wider group (Weick 1995). With sensemaking, there is 
more weight on the process of how people construct their world, based on their 
underlying notions of themselves and how these influence their identity (Weick 
1995; Maitlis and Christianson 2014). 
 
Sensemaking is retrospective and asks for ‘the story’ of lived experience to 
attach meaning (Weick 1995). With such a view, sensemaking assumes a 
learning and reflection process of people on their past experiences and the 
implications of their actions in order to inform future decisions or, at best, 
enable them to anticipate the future (Weick 1979; Weick et al. 2005). This step 
supports gaining clarity about the near past, as well as order and rationality, 
which will end the process of retrospection (Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Weick 
1995).  
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Sensemaking, in line with other organisational theories, also includes the 
reciprocal interaction between, and transformation of, the individual or 
organisation and their environment (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). With the 
enactment property, sensemaking constitutes the environment as constructed 
by the people but also acting in response to this environment they created 
(Weick et al. 2005). The way in which this is done is by investigating what is in 
people`s mind and imposed for various occasions (Weick 1979) and not by 
describing an objective environment. This does not exist in sensemaking and 
instead, the individual and the environment converge towards each other 
(Weick 1988).  
 
This is also reflected in the property ‘social’. Sensemaking pays particular 
attention to the social interactions (Weick 1995; Maitlis 2005; Weick et al. 
2005). This becomes explicit in shared meanings, commonalities, and 
interactions in the social context (Weick 1995). Conversations, meetings, and 
other collaborations in the organisational context are required for interpretation 
and sensemaking by the executives (Maitlis 2005), while at the same time 
influencing the construction of the organisational environment (Weick 1995). 
Therefore, sensemaking procedures may obviously vary depending on the 
social interaction and interpretation. 
 
Sensemaking is continuous and executives are continuously engaged with 
handling flows of input, bracketing, and extracting information and irregularities 
(Weick 1995). There are countless external influences and the executives 
have to distinguish between important and irrelevant facts (Chia 2000) while 
these may also include irregular or contradictory events that were not 
estimated. Such interpretive occasions of unexpected, sudden, or irregular 
events are noticed and extracted to make sense of it (Weick 1995).  
 
These extracted cues are therefore special events oftentimes associated with 
previous experiences (Weick 1995). They are particularly relevant for 
understanding what people perceive (Starbuck and Milliken 1988) and how this 
will influence peoples’ sensemaking of the event. Cues can be considered as 
triggering events for whether and how people make sense of the event or 
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information (Daft and Weick 1984; Thomas et al. 1993; Weber and Glynn 
2006; Rudolph et al. 2009).  
 
People have a need to make sense of the world in a way that is reasonable for 
them. Finding an explanation for any environmental event, plausibility, and 
reasonableness has priority over accuracy (Weick et al. 2005). Constructing a 
possible justification that seems sound feels like reducing uncertainty, while 
increasing belief in this explanation facilitates sensemaking of the extracted 
cue (Weick 1993; Weick 1995; Maitlis 2005).  
 
These properties show that sensemaking procedures are triggered when 
unexpected or unpredictable events occur, or when they deviate from 
expectations. In such situations executives are required to reflect and engage 
with the situation because they don’t have a ready-made solution at hand 
(Weick 1995; Maitlis and Christianson 2014). When using sensemaking 
continuously, people extract cues that create a mode of action while making 
‘‘[…] sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed what 
they believe’’ (Weick 1995: 15). This is why sensemaking is considered to 
contribute to organisational research. It is recursive and fosters strategic 
change (Gioia and Mehra 1996; Helms Mills 2003; Nag et al. 2007), while 
motivating others to similarly use sensemaking (Corley and Gioia 2004; Denis 
et al. 2009). Other researchers associated sensemaking with learning and 
understanding weaknesses and chances for the organisation to decrease 
ambiguity (Thomas et al. 2001; Kayes 2004; Haas 2006; Ron et al. 2006; 
Christianson et al. 2009; Catino and Patriotta 2013; Colville et al. 2013). And 
finally, sensemaking is related to innovation and creativity, meaning a 
departure from deep-rooted behaviours and frames, where sensemaking 
supports a change in perspective (Weick 1988; Weick 1993; Cerulo 2006), 
especially in crisis situations (Drazin et al. 1999).  
 
It becomes obvious that Weick`s approach occupies hermeneutic influences of 
how people construct their world (Hendrix 1999; Barrett et al. 2011; Tomkins 
and Eatough 2013), as well as their meaning and self while making explicit the 
sensemaking efforts of people as they engage with the world. This also 
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 87 
includes the social interaction between people and their perception of 
unexpected events or changes in the environment.  
 
Notably, criticism remained mainly focused on the inattention of a prospective 
perspective, the lack of acknowledgement of mundane situations, and the 
indefinite status of enactment (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2014). This can only 
partially be acknowledged and will further be elaborated in the following 
paragraph. 
 
2.4.3 Environmental Change and Organisational Sensemaking 
 
This section emphasises on the literature that has placed the organisational 
sensemaking process in the context of environmental change, providing 
greater specification on the utilisation of the properties during this time.  
 
Environmental Change as Extracted Cue 
To understand the phenomenon of FI, the characteristics and circumstances 
through which people first encounter it must be known. From Weick`s (1995) 
theoretical model, it is emphasised that sensemaking is triggered by 
unexpected events, uncertainty, and ambiguity which provide extracted cues 
(Weick 1995). This assumes that the event has been noticed, but deviates 
from what has been expected or predicted in stable continuous operations. 
The recognition and significance may, however, greatly vary depending on the 
extent of violation that is perceived (Weick et al. 2005; Weick and Sutcliffe 
2006; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).  
 
Recent investigations have confirmed that unexpected events only trigger the 
sensemaking process if the experienced abnormality feels substantial enough 
for the particular person (Hoffmann and Ocasio 2001; Nigam and Ocasio 2010; 
Ocasio 2010). This assessment is, however, subjective and dependent on 
numerous factors (Hoffmann and Ocasio 2001; Bouquet and Birkinshaw 2008; 
Rerup 2009), also pertaining how individual, social, or organisational identity 
(Corley and Gioia 2004; Pratt et al. 2006), personal or strategic aims (Balogun 
and Johnson 2004; Maitlis et al. 2013) are effected. The literature provides 
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several examples that confirm that people adapt, explain away, standardise or 
normalise inconsistent cues (Weick 1988; Dunbar and Garud 2009). This is 
often argued with habits and routines, while cultures and the systems they 
belong to exert influence on their mindfulness (Levinthal and Rerup 2006; 
Weick and Sutcliffe 2006). 
 
In this regard, the relevance of context has also been investigated. Several 
studies have identified that situations of environmental jolts and substantial 
external changes (Meyer 1982a; Daft and Weick 1984; Milliken 1990; Pearson 
and Clair 1998; Bogner and Barr 2000) may alter organisational routines and 
habits and cause extracted cues. The same applies to organisational crises 
(Weick 1988; Weick 1993; Wicks 2001) or any other hazard pertaining 
organisational identity (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Elsbach and Kramer 1996; 
Ravasi and Schultz 2006), including deliberate action of organisational change 
(Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Balogun and Johnson 2004).  
 
Furthermore, it has been found that an unfolding crisis situation can raise 
ambiguous cues that cause repeated sensemaking for clarification, but may 
also extract further cues (Weick 1988; Christianson et al. 2009; Weick 2010).  
 
Such sensemaking procedures may vary by person. Everybody engages in 
their own sensemaking processes and may either adopt, modify, oppose, or 
refuse the sense that was given to it (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Gioia et al. 
1994; Pratt 2000; Sonenshein 2010). This is a particular consideration in 
organisational research, where executives have an intersubjective and 
interdisciplinary relationship. Despite sharing the same employer and 
corporate identity, executives may understand events in different ways or 
perceive them differently because of their different history and evolution 
(Brown 2004; Brown et al. 2008). In recent studies, it was proposed that over 
time groups develop frames and assimilate so intersubjective meaning is 
constructed into one prevailing perspective (Kaplan 2008). This will also have 
an impact on how people enact the situation.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 89 
Sensemaking and Action in Environmental Uncertainty 
Action, in terms of Weick`s enactment, is a central consideration in the 
sensemaking process where the environment is considered as being co-
created by the people experiencing it (Weick 1979; Weick 1988; Weick 1995; 
Orton 2000; Weick 2003; Weick et al. 2005), introducing “[…] structures, 
constraints, and opportunities that were not there before they took action” 
(Weick 1988: 306). 
 
It has been investigated that enactment during times of unexpected events or 
crisis situations may be challenging and difficult (Mitroff et al. 1987; Weick 
1988; Weick and Sandelands 1990; Weick 2010). These circumstances are 
special because they are not predictable, but are profound and sudden. Due to 
this, executives have little information available for taking a decision. This, in 
turn, unfolds even more uncertainty. At the same time, however, such 
situations oftentimes require immediate attention and executives have to take 
action based on incomplete information. Action in environmental uncertainty 
thus means a dichotomy “[…] between dangerous action which produces 
understanding and safe inaction which produces confusion” (Weick 1988: 305). 
 
Therefore, it is questionable whether or not, and to what extent, these actions 
result in an effect on the event. According to LaPorte and Consolini (1991), this 
is conditional on the profile of the executives and their tendency to agency as 
well as on the existing interdependencies in the system. The relevance of the 
strength of system elements was also confirmed by Orton and Weick (1990) 
and Weick (1976). The more strongly interconnected with established 
relationships, the easier it is to make enactment take place because then 
changing one part of the system will initiate an expectable change in another 
one, while in turn loosely connected and complex parts are far less predictable 
where the full extent and impact of the action is unknown (Orton and Weick 
1990).  
 
Weick (1988) has also shown how early or delayed activity or inactivity can 
negatively influence an emerging crisis. Pioneers in action are setting the route 
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for evolvement of a crisis, which results in the fact that there arise limitations in 
sensemaking during such situation (Salancik 1977).  	
2.4.4 Alignment: Financial Instability and Organisational Interpretation 
 
This section has elaborated extant literature in the field of organisational 
interpretation and sensemaking in the specific context of environmental 
uncertainty and change	that surround the firm. 
 
While being embedded in their environmental circumstances, organisations 
cannot ignore historically and contextually contingent contexts, especially 
volatile and complex environments, which require special attention. Arguably, 
the understanding of environmental conditions is, to a great extent, in the eyes 
of the beholder (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Gioia et al. 1994; Pratt 2000; 
Sonenshein 2010).  
 
In this regard, sensemaking is frequently delineated as a general notion for 
executives` interpretations, and follows a structured staged process of 
scanning, interpretation, and action (Daft and Weick 1984; Milliken 1990). 
Recognition is inevitable for considering organisational adjustments to 
environmental changes (Bourgeois 1985) and for assessing the likelihood of 
their occurrence (Milliken 1990). Action, or learning, respectively follow the 
previous interpretation of the executives. Thus, the interpretive process plays 
an important role in the organisation and is positively related to structural 
adjustments (Dutton and Duncan 1987; Ginsberg 1988; Thomas et al. 1993; 
Qiu 2008) as well as strategic innovation and performance (Berghman et al. 
2013).   
 
From empirical evidence, it seems necessary to better understand how 
executives give meaning to the phenomenon of FI as an unexpected event in 
the corporate environment. Due to its suddenness, the interruption of peoples’ 
ongoing action flows and understandings can be far-reaching with severe 
consequences (Turner 1976; Weick 1993; Pearson and Clair 1998). 
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The literature (Helms Mills et al. 2010; Maitlis and Christianson 2014; Brown et 
al. 2015) provided for Weick`s (1995) properties of sensemaking in 
organisations as one of the prevailing and advanced models used in 
organisational theory to approach how executives employ sensemaking about 
unexpected events, similar to the phenomenon of FI and a FC as an 
unexpected event in the corporate environment.  
 
The environment-organisation relationship is placed in the organisational 
sensemaking process, in addition to the notion that executives extract 
particularly other-than-expected events, uncertainty, or threats to routines, 
environmental disruptions (Meyer 1982a; Milliken 1990), as well as 
organisational crises (Shrivastava 1987; Weick 1988; Brown and Jones 2000; 
Wicks 2001). For these cues, meaning is ambiguous (Robinson and Morrison 
2000). This may be different for each person due to previous experiences, and 
therefore furthering their comprehension of the situation will influence their 
forthcoming action, which may also differ.  
 
In conclusion, organisational interpretation and sensemaking are of particular 
interest in unstable and uncertain environments. However, in relation to FI as 
an unexpected event, it remains open if and how the phenomenon is 
threatening the sustainability of the company, and whether or not the affected 
SM routines can be powerful enough to trigger sensemaking procedures. 
Potentially, this sensemaking can then be a measure to “[…] return a sense of 
stability […]” (Dougherty and Drumheller 2006: 216).  
 
2.5  Chapter Summary and Research Gaps Identified  
 
This section concludes with a clear synthesis from the literature review which 
results in the research gaps. The necessity for this investigation is elaborated 
and finally the RQs for this thesis are introduced.  
 
The literature review revealed that the existing theory about FI, as well as the 
related states of FS and FC in the financial system, are predominated by 
researchers and public institutions. Meanwhile, several classifications of FI are 
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provided, but there is no single definition. At the same time, existing 
descriptions take a prevailing macroeconomic perspective and remain rather 
elusive. Nevertheless, with its acknowledged characteristics of irregular 
occurrence, financial disturbance, and FC as its most serious state (Chant 
2003), FI is assumed as a systemic risk (Group of Ten 2001). Several 
researchers provided for determinants of related systemic risks, but these are 
also only based on more macroeconomic variables, and are quantitative in 
nature. Overall, the primary addressees of the studies are financial institutions 
and policymakers for macroprudential supervision. Resulting, FI could be seen 
as a phenomenon of the corporate environment but the corporate perspective 
remains undetermined.  
 
In the corporate view, following GST and CT with related approaches, a CRE 
company is considered as an open system that has an ongoing 
interdependency with the environment. Due to this, changes in the corporate 
environment require adjustments in the system ‘CRE company’ and in the SM, 
as well as in the SDM of the sub-system ‘executive management board’ – 
mediated by corporate strategy (Mintzberg 1979).  
 
Extant literature provided a long history and diversified research about triggers 
initiating such organisational adaptation to the environment (Suarez and 
Rogelio 2005). However, there is no clarity in terms of a best-suitable 
application. The literature embraces a large number of varying theoretical and 
empirical responses contemplating different environmental characteristics that 
bind organisational strategic activities (Tushman and Romanelli 1985; 
Ginsberg and Buchholz 1990; Christensen 1992; Haverman 1992). 
Additionally, there is increasing evidence that executives’ assumptions about 
the phenomenon and their intentionality are assumed to drive the 
implementation of a particular strategic choice (Miles et al. 1978; Abatecola 
2012). Hence, their awareness is expedient to respond to the environmental 
condition of FI, while it is their responsibility to monitor the corporate 
environment on an on-going basis with regards to changes and resulting risks, 
threats, and chances of potential impact on the corporate strategy for the CRE 
company, initiating according adjustment processes to regulate the 
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homeostatic balance. The importance of their behaviour in environmental 
change and respective action and its relation to one another has been 
emphasized theoretically in the strategic choice approach, however, is so far 
not comprehensively covered in existing studies, which demands a greater 
awareness of the managerial perspective in organisational research and SM, 
beyond pure environmental determinants. 
 
Hence, the phenomenon of FI, as the preliminary phase and environmental 
condition preceding an event of FC, has to be recognised in its nature and 
origin, as well as in its present form and extent of uncertainty from the 
organisational perspective. At the same time, this is relevant for SM and 
(prescriptive) decision-making in order to precisely define what will be 
observed and how to classify the phenomenon on a corporate level. This also 
requires an understanding of the meaning of the phenomenon from the 
perspective of the executives. 
 
Research Gap 1 
There are serious shortcomings in the existing literature pertaining 
to the phenomenon of FI from a (more) microeconomic perspective 
of the executive management board members on a corporate level 
for the purpose of SM and decision-making of CRE companies. 
 
To address this research gap, the study investigates the lived experiences of 
executives in CRE companies to explore their inner meaning of the 
phenomenon of FI, reflected in RQ1. From the literature review, it may be 
assumed that executives have already implicitly constructed their meaning of 
FI and this is already adopted in SDM. The meaning will be made explicit and 
tangible in this part of the investigation.  
 
Extant literature also provided evidence that such meaning will be influenced 
by the executives’ perception, mental processing, interpretation, and 
sensemaking about the phenomenon. Executives actively create and enact 
their reality (Weick 1979). Hence, the assumption that all executives share the 
same meaning generation in environmental change is questioned. The 
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objective environmental characteristics as such, that existing literature brings 
forth, are deemed insufficient for organisational identification of upcoming 
environmental changes. Where the executives of a CRE company have to 
advance appropriate adjustment mechanisms with regards to their SM - 
represented by strategic initiatives - in order to adapt to superior systems and 
to achieve the corporate objectives, their recognition and interpretation is 
important for how they process. This may also impose that practitioners modify 
their habits and usual routines or even alter their identity. 
 
Overlooking or ignoring signals from the corporate environment and its 
implications for the managerial interpretation process, is considered a notable 
oversight. Thus, managerial understanding about the SDM processes and 
practices with emphasis on the environmental determinants that challenge the 
executives are needed.  
 
Research Gap 2 
Specific process characteristics or an explicit explanation about the 
way senior executives form their expectations about FI based on 
their meaning are not provided by existing literature. 
 
As a first essential step to close this gap, the present study soughts the 
attention focus of understanding the phenomenon of FI, creating and defining 
its corporate meaning and how they construct this phenomenon from a content 
and process perspective. This is important because it has an influence on how 
much mindful attention the environmental event attracts at executive level 
(Weick 1995) to initiate further strategic action. Hence, even though both, 
strategic choice (Child 1972) and managerial cognition suggest that top 
managers bring together and interpret information for their SDM, the study 
does not yet move to the psychological ground of managerial cognition about 
why and how this may influence the perception and interpretation or SDM 
behavior. 
 
It has been shown from empirical works that CRE is exposed to risks and 
global economic events due to its strong integration in the real economy. Firms 
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have to continuously monitor changing circumstances in the organisational 
environment and advance appropriate adjustment mechanisms with regards to 
SRM initiatives to assimilate to superior systems.  
 
The literature has provided good reasons as to why holistic ERM and 
integrated strategy are beneficial to organisations in volatile environments to 
cope with uncertainties and risks. RM is a central part of the SM of any 
organisation and thus the responsibility is with company executives. ERM 
provides organisations with the possibility to take advantage of an integrated 
approach to support decision-making in managing risk and benefit from 
upcoming chances, and to transform the RM focus from a defensive approach 
to a more strategic and offensive one. Such ERM constitutes the 
methodological realisation of assessing the risk attached to the company`s 
activities in a volatile global environment. The literature is limited to conceptual 
and general level modelling of ERM and related procedures. While these 
provide a sound basis, they fail to show detailed adjustments necessary for FI 
specifics.    
 
From the SRM perspective, the latest three episodes of FI at the economic 
level, characterised by extensive failures and losses of financial institutions, 
became externalities that effected the rest of the economy (Group of Ten 
2001). In this context, central banks (e.g. ECB) have identified emerging 
threats to FS and established macroprudential measures to avoid systemic 
risks to the financial system. While these are deemed not applicable at the 
corporate level, executives rely on their expertise, judgement, perception, and 
sensemaking and at best a range of meaningful indicators that support their 
interpretation and could predict unfavourable developments for the CRE 
organisation.  
 
Executives seem to be currently unequipped to analyse risk-related events or 
aggregate risks from the phenomenon of FI in the context of CRE companies, 
which might affect corporate strategies and corporate objectives. To handle 
the respective risks from such phenomenon, it is essential, from the SM 
perspective, to develop corporate risk indicators for the context of CRE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 		
	 96 
companies. Metrics in SRM and ERM are so far predominated by quantitative 
factors as risk indicators and the monitoring of QIs is underrepresented. 
 
Research Gap 3 
The literature does not provide for the implications (potential risks 
and risk related events) and related QRIs of FI from a more 
microeconomic perspective for the SRM of CRE companies. 
 
Sound indicators are considered necessary to monitor and evaluate the 
development of the situation in order to manage or even prevent failures and 
detrimental effects on the business. The accountability of qualitative, instead of 
quantitative, indicators allows evaluating the type, characteristics, and extent 
of changes over a period of time against predetermined norms. Indicators can 
provide critical information about whether FI evolves or is present and increase 
absorption of information. Furthermore, there is a necessity for a more 
comprehensive picture about the complex situation, a great relevance of the 
degree of change imposed, and an importance of questions of process and 
relationships that need to be included. The significance of developing QIs also 
derives from the characteristics of the phenomenon where the multi-
dimensionality and complexity could not be captured appropriately with 
quantitative indicators.  
 
From the literature review, it became obvious that compared to the event of a 
FC, the phenomenon of FI has generally not been of rich theoretical interest. 
Three research gaps were presented which prompt the necessity of the study 
and investigation about FI. Even though there is a good theoretical basis in 
extant research on explaining the organisation-environment relation, strategy 
content, and its dependencies in general, existing studies fall short in providing 
insights about the complementary perspectives of content, meaning of FI, and 
process, how these environmental specifics are perceived and managed in the 
organisation.  
 
At the same time, traditional approaches in organisational science seldom 
embrace executives’ social and behavioural factors in real-life situations that 
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should be taken into consideration for a more realistic understanding of the 
phenomenon. The relation between the superior environmental systems and 
the organisation is not considered to be deterministic, but autopoiestic, which 
challenges the predictability of environmental changes. A generic cause-effect-
relation cannot be determined and requires a more detailed qualitative 
investigation of (implicit) considerations that are concerned with respective 
strategic decisions and action. The necessity for an interpretive, qualitative 
methodology also arises from the focus on the human factor where this 
approach may have a detrimental impact on views and actions in 
management, strategy, and the organisation as such.  
 
The literature review specifies that corporate strategy and SDM are context-
sensitive. As the CRE sector entails dependencies and is prone to global 
macroeconomic financial imbalances, it is particularly pertinent for this 
investigation (see also section 1.1.3). Therefore, it shall receive certain 
attention in data analysis, to place the findings of this study into that particular 
context.  
 
While currently no meaning of FI from the corporate perspective is available, 
there is also no specific theory or best practice for organisational adaptation to 
the phenomenon. Executives can make momentous misjudgements in their 
assessments - ranging from ignorance of information about the phenomenon 
and poor processing to implicit meanings that are not appropriately used. In 
this regard, SM, decision-making, and risk control can’t be fully realised. The 
CRE company may be at risk because environmental changes of FS to FI or 
FC will not immediately be recognisable in their SRM. Therefore, an according 
adjustment of the RM and incorporation of risk indicators for FI are also 
required. Where the phenomenon can only constitute a part of the corporate 
ERM, the study focuses on the SRM and not an integrative solution for an 
ERM. If, and to what extent, the qualitative findings are incorporated in a 
holistic RM remains with the corporates. 
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In conclusion, the investigation will address the aforementioned three gaps 
and provide answers to the following RQs: 
1. How do executive management board members of the real economy 
sector within CRE companies define the meaning of financial 
instability on corporate level? 
2. How do executive management board members form their 
expectations about financial instability given the meaning of it? 
3. How does the corporate meaning of financial instability and 
awareness of the respective expectations translate into different 
qualitative risk indicators and implications for SRM behaviour? 
 
The invention of this study is that it brings together SM and environmental 
change in relation to the phenomenon of FI, as experienced by executives 
from the CRE sector who were deeply involved in the latest GFC.  
 
In the following chapter, the research design and methodology for this study 
will be presented and explained.	
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Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology 	
This chapter outlines the research design and methodological approach of this 
study. Following the research paradigm of the researcher, this part of the 
thesis lays out the design and explains why this has been deemed most 
appropriate for this investigation. Further, the role of the researcher, standards 
for rigour and credibility, as well as ethical considerations are presented. 
Finally, the methodology as applied is laid out. 
 
3.1 Outline of Methodology  
 
From the research gap and unresolved theoretical issues originated the idea 
for a specific contemporary research design and methodology that had 
previously fallen short in SM research (Barrett et al. 2011; Tsoukas and Chia 
2011).  
 
The researcher, as an anti-positivist, used an interpretive hermeneutic 
phenomenological approach. This is supported by qualitative methods in data 
collection. Semi-structured interviews provide a substantial basis of subjective 
data from those who have experienced the phenomenon. Hereto, sample 
strategies and sample sizes are defended for appropriateness of the purposive 
selection of CRE executives. A distinctive data analysis, using TA, existential 
analysis, axial coding, and pattern coding complement a coordinated 
methodological concept to investigate the phenomenon of FI.  
 
After presenting the details of the research design and methodology, this 
chapter explains and justifies the methodological approach taken, and 
challenges the positivistic dominance in the field. This research design 
explores the meaning and discovers the sensemaking process of the 
phenomenon of FI from the corporate perspective and additionally develops 
QIs and implications of FI. 
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3.2 Research Design and Philosophical Underpinnings  
 
3.2.1 Research Paradigm 
 
Every researcher holds specific underlying assumptions pertaining to their 
investigation that are reflected in their philosophical worldview (Gray 2009; 
Creswell 2014). This researchers` paradigm emerges from their basic beliefs 
and flows into the way of designing the research methodology and how they 
conduct the investigation (Guba 1990). From a philosophical angle, this means 
a combination of ontological and epistemological stances together with 
appropriate methods to develop valid and rigorous knowledge as a meaningful 
outcome for the specific underlying context (Blaikie 2007; Gray 2009).  
 
Research methods literature (Gray 2009; Creswell 2014) suggests several 
research philosophies for empirical studies, which researchers can apply for 
their research design. This does not mean that one is prevailing over another, 
but that they all take a different perspective and thus, reach different objectives 
(Saunders et al. 2009). However, the theoretical perspective still has to be 
chosen deliberately while taking into account the research objectives as well 
as the overall paradigm. 
 
In consideration of the research focus on managerial lived experiences, for 
meaning and sensemaking, this study needs a cautious, careful, and 
reasonable look at existing, potentially implicit SDM procedures. These will be 
investigated in the specific domain of CRE companies experiencing 
environmental change during phases of FI. From the researcher’s perspective, 
this focus requires a departure from quantitative statistical methods in the 
social sciences in order to be able to derive more experiential results closer to 
real-life understandings. Here, the researcher recognises reality as complex 
and fluctuating, which leads to his view that there is no objective truth.  
 
As such, the positivistic stance becomes less important against the 
background of anti-positivism, or post-positivism, which are hereafter 
discussed in more detail as the three major philosophical stances.   
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Positivism 
Positivism is usually concerned with the natural sciences where the focus is on 
proving or disproving a hypothesis (Caldwell 1980; Bryman and Bell 2015). 
The positivist approach involves quantitative methods to assemble statistical 
data and accomplish generalisable results (Gray 2009; Saunders et al. 2009).  
 
Over time, the positivistic stance has brought forward a number of recognised 
thinkers with different philosophical foci. Particularly, these include Aristotle 
(deductive reasoning), Bacon (inductive reasoning), Galileo (scientific method), 
Descartes (realism), Comte (positivism), the Vienna Circle (logical positivism), 
and Popper (post-positivism), chronologically according to their existence 
(Pernecky 2016). Above all, positivism emphasises a reality that can be 
objectively observed by the researcher (Saunders et al. 2009). Furthermore, it 
is based on the ontological assumption that reality is external to the scientist 
and epitomised by living objects, that pertain meaning independently “[…] 
without influencing it or being influenced by it” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 110). 
Reality can be captured by people`s senses and then becomes predictable. 
The respective epistemological postulations are that the principles of the 
natural sciences should also be employed to study social reality (Bryman 
2016). Truth can be reached because knowledge “[…] rest[s] upon a set of firm, 
unquestionable […] indisputable truths […]” from which people derive their 
beliefs (Hughes and Sharrock 2016: n.p.). Hence, knowledge is deductively 
derived from a hypothesis, or theory, and is therefore objective (Bryman 2016). 
 
Anti-Positivism  
Controversially, the anti-positivistic stance, also known as interpretivism 
(Hayes 2000), considers social reality as being constructed. They ongoingly 
interpret and reinterpret the “[…] conscious human intention […]” (Smith 1984: 
380). Following, inquiry in the social sciences involves constructive elements in 
analysis and description, so that the researcher is inevitably tied with the 
phenomenon under investigation (Smith 1989). In the interpretivist view, the 
world is too complex a construct, and it is more important to understand the 
meaning of the phenomenon from the subjective perspective of those who 
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experience it, rather than to generalise or reduce the world to a number of 
observable characteristics (Gray 2009).  
 
This paradigm accepts that there are several realities in the social world, that 
data is perceived and interpreted by the researcher`s mind, and that the 
meaning constructed is not more valid than others (Schutt 2006). 
 
Ontologically, this approach is guided by constructivism (Bryman 2016). 
Reality is subjective while indirectly constructed based on individual 
interpretation. People create their own meaning for events, which is distinctive 
and cannot be generalised. There are multiple perspectives on one incident 
and hence this reality is socially constructed (Crotty 1998). Such social 
construction is based on several tenets with regards to meaning and 
understanding, which is why human emotion and mental procedures are 
central to it (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Additionally, its origin is in social 
interaction, giving shared common sense. And furthermore, it is specific to time 
and place while being rooted in continuous social-cultural processes (Bryman 
and Bell 2015). Notably, here reality differs according to circumstances (Lock 
and Strong 2010).  
 
From the epistemological angle, knowledge is created through an approach 
that takes account of differences between individuals and natural objects 
(Bryman 2016) by “[…] grasp[ing] the subjective meaning of social action” 
(Bryman and Bell 2015: 724). It evolves inductively to set up a theory (Creswell 
2013). Particularly, knowledge is gained from specific situations as 
experienced by the people, and therefore it cannot be reduced to simplistic 
interpretation (Pernecky 2016). 
 
Even though the main theorists share the subjective perspective, they have 
carved out different philosophical focuses: Husserl and Schutz 
(phenomenology), Geertz (anthropology), Dilthey and Gadamer 
(hermeneutics), Blumer (symbolic interaction) and Garfinkel 
(ethnomethodology) (Crotty 1998; Leavy 2014). Further details on this are part 
of the research strategy (section 3.2.2) that will follow.   
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Post-Positivism 
In relation to the aforementioned two paradigms, the post-positivist is situated 
in-between, but still seems closer to the positivist paradigm. Post-positivism 
has strong objective perspectives while seeking to develop a reality that is 
constructed by a (subjective) social life-world (Creswell 2014).   
 
A post-positivist is still concerned with looking for regularities and patterns as 
well as causalities. Researchers tend to critically evaluate the reality provided 
by the participants in order to be able to get as close to the ‘true’ description of 
the phenomenon as possible. (Groff 2004; Bhaskar 2009)  
 
Philosophical Worldview of the Researcher  
There are considerable differences in natural and social reality that necessitate 
specific consideration for the methodological approach (Crotty 1998).  
 
During the studies, it has become clear to the researcher that he is situated in 
the anti-positivistic tradition. Also in consideration of the research subject, 
positivism is far too much associated with the natural sciences and quantitative 
approaches. The same applies to post-positivism, which is still pursuing a 
more objective and quantitative path.  
 
Where experiences are the basis for understanding social reality (Gray 2009), 
there exist subjectively constructed, “[…] culturally derived and historically 
situated interpretations of the social life-world” (Crotty 1998: 67). In this regard, 
anti-positivism does subsidise the research purpose of uncovering the 
meaning of the phenomenon of FI from a corporate perspective. Where this is 
influenced by the idea of executives` subjective experiences about the 
research topic and their respective actions in SM, such a worldview informs a 
sophisticated (social) construction of reality about the phenomenon under 
investigation. Their stories require interpretation to extract the social reality of 
FI created from a common consensus. 
 
The anti-positivist (interpretivist) researcher reconstructs reality from human 
experiences through coalescing around a relative consensus. Here, in this 
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study, interpretivism means to construe the phenomenon of FI, explore the 
implicit meaning from the executive participants, discover the organisational 
sensemaking process, which they embody in their management action and 
that encourages them, and, finally, develop indicators and implications for 
SRM arising from this constructed meaning of the phenomenon.  
 
When indulging in the interpretivist paradigm, the researcher entered into the 
social world of executives in CRE companies. He got engaged with them and 
collected in-depth information about their perception of the phenomenon of FI. 
This approach enabled the researcher to understand what stimulates their 
behaviour and decision-making in the context of SM in a phase of FI and a 
subsequent event of FC on the corporate level. Also for the notion of 
sensemaking, philosophical stances have accepted an interpretivist 
perspective, while acknowledging subjective understanding and the fact that 
truth is actually historically and contextually contingent (Heidegger 1962; 
Knorr-Cetina 1981; Gadamer 1997).  
 
The study does not aim towards objective generalisable results, but towards 
uncovering the way in which senior executives construct their beliefs in their 
social environment (CRE company). To answer the question of the meaning 
and sensemaking based on their lived experiences of FI, an anti-positivistic 
interpretive study provided beneficial information and new knowledge based 
on individual experience that was brought together in collective meaning. 	
 
3.2.2 Research Strategy  
 
Under the umbrella of the researcher`s anti-positivistic stance, the research 
strategy is context-driven and seeks to obtain understanding of the experiential 
lifeworld of the participants. A qualitative and interpretive phenomenological 
research strategy fits well with the research paradigm in order to investigate 
the phenomenon of FI in executives’ SM behaviour and their meaning and 
sensemaking about it within the CRE context in which they occur. This 
approach meets the requirements to better comprehend realities and peoples` 
action in the world (Tsoukas and Chia 2011).   
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3.2.2.1 The Rationale for a Qualitative and Inductive Research Approach 
 
The Qualitative Approach 
Quantitative research is characterised by formulae looking for predictable 
results, whereas qualitative research seeks to discover and describe when 
searching for meaning (Laverty 2003; Bryman and Bell 2015). Both 
approaches have been used in the social sciences and management business 
studies, but for the underlying study a qualitative research has been preferred 
as more suitable. 
 
On the one hand, quantitative research is mostly applied to reveal 
dependencies of variables leading to measurable and numerical 
representations of the topic under investigation. Quantitative research uses 
statistical methods of data collection and data analysis, seeking objective and 
generalisable data from a huge population (Gray 2009; Bryman and Bell 2015).  
 
Qualitative approaches, on the other hand, are concerned with subjective 
descriptions or interpretations of social phenomena (Creswell 2014). They look 
for a deeper understanding of the social life-world and the meaning attached to 
it (Bryman and Bell 2015). Quantitative research puts such aspects aside and 
focuses on a theoretical concept (Creswell 2014). 
 
For this research, quantitative approaches were found to be unsuitable in 
providing answers to the ‘how’ RQs. Those require a direct exchange between 
the participant and the researcher for retrieving their subjective views. Also, 
this context-sensitive study needed a wider view of people’s experiences and 
environments. 
 
Although, historically, objectivity was essential in the sciences (Streubert and 
Carpenter 2011), recent studies are increasingly taking into account subjective 
data, particularly those that encompass human interaction or experience. Also, 
qualitative studies fill the gaps where topics remain poorly, or rarely assessed 
(Creswell 2014; Bryman and Bell 2015).   
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As such, qualitative research methods, like hermeneutic phenomenology, 
grounded theory (GT), as well as ethnography, have attracted attention 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998). They share the involvement of people to gather 
rich data to explore experiences, feelings, and thoughts in order to form 
realities (Dingwall et al. 1998). Qualitative research is thought to extend the 
view beyond the human as a functioning societal subject but sees them as 
individuals experiencing their lives (Morse and Field 1996).  
 
At the same time, the qualitative approach allows for taking a more holistic and 
context-sensitive view of the phenomenon of FI. This follows the circumstance 
that the event of FC is the most severe kind of FI and emerges during a phase 
of FI. Both can, therefore, not be disconnected and the characteristics and 
impacts of the phenomenon can only be considered holistically. Furthermore, 
as has been outlined earlier, the context and specifics of the CRE sector 
require particular attention for data collection and analysis, while the recurring 
phenomenon may have a detrimental effect on the macroeconomic, corporate 
environment of CRE companies.  
 
Therefore, a qualitative approach was chosen for this study, as being most 
suitable to gather meaningful data in order to answer the RQs. It is in line with 
the anti-positivistic paradigm, which is based on a subjective social 
construction of reality. It supports the research aim to explore meaning and 
discover sensemaking procedures as well as to develop indicators and 
implications of FI at the corporate level, directly from those who experience it.  
 
The Inductive Approach 
Theory is important to the social researcher in terms of providing a backdrop 
and rationale for the research that is conducted. Additionally, it is a framework 
in which social phenomena can be understood and the research findings can 
be interpreted (Bryman 2016).  
 
With a deductive research design, formulated theory is tested through 
developed hypotheses. While going beyond existing theory, this approach is 
very well applicable in advanced fields of enquiry (Marshall 1997). Data 
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collection serves to verify, or negate, the expressed theory. Conversely, with 
an inductive approach, researchers build a theory by using the freshly 
collected data (Gray 2009). This approach is regularly applied when opening 
up a new field of enquiry and where no expedient theories are available 
(Marshall 1997; Bryman and Bell 2015). Knowledge is derived by collecting 
information and trying to find patterns and an order that constitute a reliable 
theory.  
 
In connection with the qualitative research approach, this study used an 
inductive research design to explain the phenomenon under investigation. The 
field of research has no mature theories available that suit the investigation for 
further development or testing. Also, using an existing meaning that was not 
ready-made for the SM of CRE companies would restrict the vantage point of 
the researcher. Particularly, in light of the research objectives, this approach 
allows the necessary openness and flexibility in exploring and discovering, 
rather than testing.  
 
Such an “[…] inductive approach seeks to find the internal logic of the subject” 
(Gray 2009: 23), where the full subjective meaning of the interviewees is 
allowed. Therefore, the data collected is analysed in view of bringing theorists 
and practitioners to the position of understanding the nature of the 
phenomenon of FI and its implications for SM in more detail. 
 
3.2.2.2  The Rationale for an Interpretive Phenomenological Research 
Strategy 
 
3.2.2.2.1 Research Applications of Phenomenology 
 
Within the interpretive paradigm, several methodologies go well together. 
Familiarly, these include phenomenology, ethnography, and GT, in addition to 
ethnomethodology and performance ethnography (Denzin and Lincoln 2000).  
 
From these alternatives, the choice of phenomenology for this study is justified 
in the following sections.   
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 		
	 108 
Phenomenology has been recognised as an approach as well as a method. 
Husserl (1970) himself also attributed a third dimension to it, which is 
philosophy. As such, phenomenology is ontologically routed in asking for the 
meaning of being and epistemologically in reflection through analysis (Ray 
1994), and is considered to contribute to organisational research (Holt and 
Sandberg 2011; Thanem 2016). 
 
Phenomenology, according to its Greek origin, means “[…] to show itself” 
(Heidegger 1962: 51). It is aiming at a particular phenomenon (Lindseth and 
Norberg 2004). Therefore, for its transmission to research, it goes to the core, 
the essence of human experiences that is consistent with the aim of this 
research, to understanding the phenomenon of FI. It is attempting to bring this 
subjective view and action together with the external, objectivised reality 
(Moustakas 1994). 
 
Based on his interpretivist position, the researcher deployed the 
phenomenological strategy for a reflective study, presenting the phenomenon 
itself in phenomenological reflections (Audi 1999). Phenomenology studies 
“[…] lived, human phenomena within the everyday social contexts in which the 
phenomena occur from the perspective of those who experience them” 
(Titchen and Hobson 2005: 121). Hence, based on individuals’ experiences of 
social reality they form an understanding about the meaning of such reality, 
because it describes the world, the one that is experienced and lived (Audi 
1999; Vagle 2014). Phenomenology considers experiences to be the basis for 
understanding social reality (Gray 2009).  
 
The study followed the phenomenological notion that one needs to understand 
the problem in order to be able to solve it (Schön 2016) while being prepared 
for it. This approach supports the current study in providing an early 
understanding of the phenomenon and its complexities while openly reflecting 
participants` various realities. Following the interpretivist paradigm, reality is 
derived subject to cultural or historical influences on peoples` interpretation 
(Crotty 1998). As such, it is inevitable to gain insights about the social world 
constructed and continually reproduced by people (Blaikie 2007), which leads 
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to the conclusion that interpretivism can be considered to be associated with 
phenomenology - it is its theoretical perspective (Crotty 1998).  
 
Phenomenology has risen against the traditional social sciences, especially for 
organisational research, primarily because of the following features: 
 
 Phenomenology Normative Science 
Apprehension 
of the World 
• Largely indeterminate and 
problematic view of the 
world 
• Phenomena are viewed as 
functions of perceptions, 
intuition, and personal 
meanings 
• Determinate and non-
problematic worldview 
• Personal choice still is 
necessary to decide about 
what characteristics are to 
be studied and how to 
assess them 
Phenomenon 
Investigated  
• Lived experiences of 
subjects 
• Both, observed 
characteristics and 
perceived qualities, are 
subjective forms of meaning 
• Characteristics that can 
easily be enumerated  
• Empirically verifiable 
Problem 
Formulation 
• Begins with an attitude of 
epoché 
• (Mainly) brackets personal 
bias and beliefs 
• RQs are formulated and 
responses are analysed  
• Verification of formulated 
hypothesis about causal 
relations 
• Uses dependent and 
independent variables  
Research 
Methodology 
• Descriptive 
• Taking the view of those 
experiencing the world they 
live in 
• Inductive  
• Cannot be replicated 
exactly 
• Logical definitions 
• Broad, abstract 
generalisations 
 
• Deductive 
• Replicatable  
Research Aims 
and Inferences 
• Universal pure essence 
• New insights or 
reclassification  
• Statistical interpretation 
• Categorization and 
classification in numerical 
comparison 
Generalisation 
of Results 
• No generalisation beyond 
the group under 
investigation 
• Findings are data base for 
further investigation 
• Generalisations based on 
analysed data for similar 
classes or universal 
tendencies, expresses in 
a normative fashion 
Table 2:  Summary of Major Features of Phenomenologist Research Philosophy in Contrast to 
Normative Paradigms. Source: adapted from Sanders (1982: 358).   
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This research advanced a notion of the lived experiences from those who 
perceived the phenomenon, meaning the executives who have been 
responsible for the SM in CRE organisations during a phase of FI in the 
macroeconomic environment of the firm. As such, this distinct and novel 
phenomenological approach to the managerial encounter of the phenomenon 
of FI may also contribute to methodology. It facilitates an extended perspective 
on the phenomenon of FI and serves the purpose of the RQs. This includes 
exploring the experience and cognitive perception of executive management 
board members of CRE companies as pertains to their meaning and 
perception of the phenomenon of FI (content), to uncover the underlying 
sensemaking process, as well as their translation into respective indicators 
and implications. To achieve this, the phenomenological approach was 
considered a reasonable solution as it refers to the way (process) in which the 
participants experience and make sense of the world around them. Also, it is 
grounded in the researcher`s focus on an experiential rather than a statistical 
perspective. In the complex macroeconomic situation, with the specific setting 
of FI as part of the corporate environment, phenomenology enables the 
researcher to develop meaning right from the beginning. 
  
Consequently, the focus of this study was descriptive, exploring the meaning 
of the phenomenon of FI from the perspective of CRE senior executives’ real 
life experiences. Thus, it was necessary to capture specifics of the participants’ 
experiences, and their notions and preferences reflecting their individual 
awareness of FI. The phenomenon of FI is somehow tangible, but at the same 
time it is intangible and not easily accessible. Every executive experiences, 
behaves, and focuses on it in another, subjective, way, and probably perceives 
the phenomenon differently. This is what needed to be captured for a reliable 
study.  
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3.2.2.2.2 Phenomenological Key Concepts 
 
In this section, the key concepts in phenomenology, which informed the study, 
are laid out. Husserl (1970) as an entrepreneur, provided the groundwork for 
the phenomenological routes in the human and social sciences, which, 
basically, consist of the four key concepts of consciousness, lived experience, 
lifeworld, and phenomenological reduction in the researcher`s interpretation 
that were relevant to this research context (Moran 2000; Giorgi 2005; Finlay 
2009).  
 
Consciousness 
Consciousness has been assigned with a pivotal importance and put on the 
same level with human experience that is implicit in all actions (Husserl 1970). 
It assumes that there are common characteristics among all who shared the 
experience, so-called essences, or eidetic structures that portray the factual 
nature of the phenomenon (Allen 1995; Lopez and Willis 2004). Hence, it is 
specific to phenomenology that the trigger for the interest in the investigation 
originates from the experienced phenomenon itself, but not from the one who 
experiences it (Langdridge 2007). 
 
Opposite to the Cartesian view of human consciousness, in terms of a subject-
object dualism, Husserl believed in the entirety of people`s lived experiences 
and how these lead to their thoughts and feelings. He was much more 
concerned with looking at “[…] consciousness of the world, or more specifically 
the relationship between a person’s consciousness and the world” (Langdridge 
2008: 1128). From this standpoint, consciousness is intentional, in the way that 
meaning and a kind of being are assigned to all conscious experience (Moran 
2000). Thus, people are then conscious of something and there is an 
underlying process of perceiving this. Contradictory to the human sciences, 
however, phenomenology goes back to “[…] the things themselves […] ” 
(Husserl 1970: xxx), focusing on describing the lived experience (Moran 2000). 
This idea led Husserl, in turn, to relate how the subject human experiences 
something to the content and effect of this experience (Moran 2000). In his 
later works, he removed the subject from this connection to an outer sphere 
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(Langdridge 2007). This transcendental view allowed for the noticing of the 
phenomenon from a meta-level and becoming more reflective on the observed. 
 
In relation to this study, the researcher conforms with Husserl`s approach to 
seeing the subject and object as being naturally connected. Hence, there is a 
managerial perception of SM behaviour and a resulting strategic action of the 
executive human beings in connection with the object under investigation – the 
phenomenon of FI. 
 
Lived Experience 
The lived experience of humans is essential to phenomenology. Lived 
experiences are an interplay, a contextual grid described as something that,   
 
“[…] does not confront me as something perceived or represented; it 
is not given to me, but the reality of lived experience is there-for-me 
because I have a reflexive awareness of it, because I possess it 
immediately as belonging to me in some sense.” (Dilthey 1985: 223)  
 
Hence, lived experiences are subjectively perceived as being in the world, 
immediate, conscious life. They are temporal and people obtain meaning only 
through reflection of their past experiences (van Manen 1990). Notably, 
Husserl (1970) presented the view that humans do not behave as a reflex 
action to stimuli, but to their personal interpretation of such appeal. Hence, it is 
pertinent in phenomenology to investigate people in their standard settings and 
not in artificial ones.  
 
Quintessentially, the lived experience forms the basis for extracting the 
essence of the phenomenon under investigation. In an effort to circumvent 
critique on the rigour of phenomenology, compared to the prevailing traditional 
sciences, Husserl (1970) placed the lived experience independently from its 
context.  
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Although modifications of phenomenology have been developed, they mostly 
agree with Husserl that phenomenology is the study of experience, and the 
nature and meaning of such experiences for people (van Manen 1990; Laverty 
2003; Finlay 2009; Friesen et al. 2012). 
 
Lifeworld  
This human science perspective on the lived experiences of those being in the 
world provides for an understanding of the lifeworld (Husserl 1970), which 
refers to a day-to-day life packed with meanings that affect those persons in 
their (inter-)actions. Hence, the focus is on a holistic view of the people in their 
world (Merleau-Ponty 1962).  
 
This concept of an everyday lifeworld has been advanced by Schutz and 
Luckman (1973: 3-4), who stated that it, 
 
“[…] is to be understood that province of reality which the wide-
awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of 
common sense. By this taken-for-grantedness, we designate 
everything which we experience as unquestionable; every state of 
affairs is for us unproblematic until further notice.” 
 
Consequently, there is room for different lifeworlds of a variety of people but 
also each individual may occupy distinctive ones during different times (Schutz 
and Luckman 1973). 
 
This peculiarity forms the basis for this study when identifying the everyday 
lifeworlds of the senior executives, allowing different experiential qualities from 
the CRE firm lifeworlds or from the lifeworld of the researcher. Furthermore, 
the researcher assumes that the participants probably experienced different 
lifeworlds throughout the course of their everyday business lives, i.e. their 
lifeworld of working together with other managers, or the advisory board, 
differs from the lifeworlds of teaming up with employees or external 
stakeholders of the company or even their private lifeworlds. Therefore, the 
researcher accepts the notion of various and multiple lifeworlds and 
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deliberately integrates these into the methodology, aware of his own lifeworld 
from experiences and a subjective context (see also section 3.2.2.4).  
 
Phenomenological Reduction 
Where the lifeworld has such great significance in phenomenological studies, 
there has been much debate on the researcher’s subjective role in this regard 
(Langdridge 2008). 
 
In Husserl`s transcendental view, he believed that it is possible to bracket the 
researcher’s presuppositions and prejudices (Husserl 1970). These also may 
arise because the phenomenon exists prior to its exploration and the starting 
point for the investigation. 
 
Husserl implemented phenomenological reduction to allow for the 
development of a more precise and fresh research outcome and to help 
researchers to go beyond the natural approaches with predetermined 
assumptions. In his view, the naturalistic approach leaves a substantial gap, 
while not going beyond what is taken for granted. 
 
Phenomenological reduction can be realised by bracketing out and taking the 
reality out of participants` statements for granted (Giorgi 1997). This refers to 
prior (scientific) knowledge about the phenomenon, theories and explanations, 
as well as researcher`s personal opinions or preconceived assumptions 
(Ashworth 1996). It is a more critical approach to understanding the lived 
experiences of others (Langdridge 2007). 
 
The so-called existential phenomenologists (Heidegger 1962; Merleau-Ponty 
1962; Ricoeur 1991) have mostly criticised the phenomenological reduction 
and context-insensitivity of Husserl`s descriptive approach. They suggest that 
the researcher can never fully bracket out, because he is also embodied in the 
world. Furthermore, reference is made to the necessity of the hermeneutic 
stimulus when investigating meaning (Ricoeur 1991).   
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With the hermeneutic sensitivity of this study, it is deemed impossible to 
bracket all prior experiences of the researcher. Instead, it is argued that those 
contributed to the study and finally made it possible to investigate the 
phenomenon in this depth. 
  
This outline of the phenomenological key concepts provides for essential 
aspects to the phenomenological study. In consideration of the research 
objectives and RQs, here the researcher argues for the application of the 
specific phenomenological approach in this study, influenced by hermeneutics. 
 
3.2.2.3 The Rationale for a Hermeneutical Phenomenological Approach 
 
Over time, parts of these key concepts have been criticised and there emerged 
different phenomenological stances (Gill 2014). Hermeneutic phenomenology 
differs from other phenomenological approaches because of its focus on 
interpretation, departing from simple descriptions of the phenomenon (van 
Manen 1990). In accordance with the underlying research paradigm, two of the 
most influential positions, namely Heidegger`s (1962) interpretive approach 
and van Manen`s (1990) hermeneutic phenomenology, have been found 
relevant to this study. Additionally, there was some influence from Gadamer`s 
(2004) methods. These three approaches are consistent with the rationale of 
exploring new meaning while re-examining managerial taken-for-granted 
understanding and sensemaking in the context of experiencing FI.  
 
Even though hermeneutics is still rarely applied in organisational studies, it has 
gained increasing influence as an approach to explain human behaviours and 
meaning (Dowling 2007; Barrett et al. 2011). For the phenomenon under 
investigation in this study, the hermeneutical approach provides for an 
innovative view to understanding FI. It supports the enhancement of existing 
definitions and lived sensemaking procedures with a managerial perspective 
that is derived through interpretation of the exemplified narratives of those who 
experienced the phenomenon, and in its context, by referring to people`s 
backgrounds that cannot be excluded from the phenomenon.   
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Behind the background of its different approaches, compared to other 
methodologies, the following will provide a short overview about the 
development of these philosophies and contemporary philosophical views that 
bring them together. 
 
3.2.2.3.1 Heidegger`s Interpretative Phenomenology 
 
Husserl`s (1970) basic concept of phenomenology has been developed and 
enhanced with different understandings by other theorists. Besides Merleau-
Ponty, Levinas, and Sartre, Heidegger gave one of the most influential 
directions (Barrett et al. 2011). He perceived hermeneutics as a 
phenomenological method to explain human being and did not see it as a set 
of principles (Crotty 1998).  
 
Heidegger introduced the ‘immanent’ world of everyday objects, the nature of 
‘being’ (Giorgi 2005; Friesen et al. 2012) and departed from Husserl`s 
transcendental inclination. His view is grounded in the concept of 
consciousness and human existence, noting that the individual is not always 
conscious or deliberate of its body, mind, and thought, but a kind of ‘taken-for-
grantedness’ guides the action to exist in a certain way (Heidegger 1962). 
 
With this existential view, he included the human as being embodied in its 
environment, as ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger 1962). With this being the 
essential component of his concept, the world only exists if being exists, while 
the existence of being is determined by the different possible ways in which 
individuals structure the world. Oftentimes the appearances are not “[…] 
objectively present […] but rather possible ways for it to be […]” (Heidegger 
2010: 41).  
 
This perspective derives from the differentiation between two worlds: the lived 
world, that is to be revealed to others, and the physical world. This distinction 
includes the assumption that individuals cannot escape from their world and, 
therefore, only the physical world can be uncovered through scientific methods. 
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For the lived world, individual descriptions about their experiences and related 
context is required (Lopez and Willis 2004).  
 
In comparison to Husserl (1970), Heidegger`s (1962) approach goes beyond a 
pure description of the perceived, and seeks to derive meaning from the 
people and understanding about how this takes effect on their action (Chia and 
Holt 2006). As such, an exploration of the surrounding factors, like 
socialisation, politics, and history that may exert influence on experiences must 
be included.  
 
With this perspective, phenomenology is extended with hermeneutics (Moran 
2000). Hermeneutics is concerned with language (Moran 2000) and the art of 
interpretation (Friesen et al. 2012) to uncover meaning and essences, where 
the interpretation derives from a researcher`s work with the texts (Crotty 1998; 
Sutton and Austin 2015). 
 
As for this study, where the meaning of the participants is neither visible nor 
explicit to themselves, an inquiry with hermeneutic weight leads to uncovering 
and capturing the meaning from participants` narratives out of the interview 
conversations. Language is used through conversation to uncover implicit or 
hidden meaning (Heidegger 1962; Gadamer 1997; Gadamer 2007). It is 
accepted that meaning and sensemaking of FI with a hermeneutic stimulus is 
not infinite but contains a temporary snapshot that can be adjusted and 
changed over time when new interpretations are available (Chia and Holt 
2006; Finlay 2009).  
 
From the researcher`s considerations, Heidegger`s interpretive approach 
complies with the explorative study that looks into phenomena of everyday 
events of executives to reveal what has been taken for granted in their SM 
behaviour. 
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3.2.2.3.2 Van Manen`s Hermeneutical Phenomenology 
 
With a strong influence from Heidegger`s existential philosophical ideas, a 
further perspective on hermeneutic phenomenology emerged. Van Manen 
(1997; 2016b) introduced the need for deliberately considering the researcher`s 
own knowledge, bias, experience, and presuppositions where these may effect 
the research proceedings or outcomes. In his hermeneutic version of reduction 
van Manen (2016b) claims to illustrate such self-reflection but also to be as 
open-minded as possible to the phenomenon. His approach leaves much room 
for a linguistic mediation on understanding through conversation. Reality is 
explored in terms of a mutual understanding that represents a new meaning. 
 
Additionally, van Manen (1997) provides further refinement beyond the 
previously described approaches while giving some more direction to method. 
He recommended four existentials of lifeworld that are “[…] lived space 
(spatiality), lived body (corporeality), lived time (temporality), and lived human 
relation (relationality or communality)” (van Manen 1990: 101). Notably, these 
are stipulated to serve “[…] as guides for reflection in the research process […]” 
(van Manen 1990: 101), but others may reasonably be used in accordance 
with the particular complexity of the lifeworld under investigation.  
 
Furthermore, he provides guidance on hermeneutic phenomenological 
proceeds along six methodical steps (Vagle 2014). In his understanding, the 
first step is to formulate the RQs to turn “[…] to the nature of the lived 
experience” (van Manen 2016a: 35). Step two, called “[i]nvestigating 
experience as we live it” (van Manen 2016a: 53), considers the research 
methods for a meaningful investigation and their deliberate choice. After data 
has been collected there follows a third step of reflection. The essential 
themes identified as characteristic of the phenomenon under investigation are 
turned into meaning and essence of the lived experience. Van Manen (2016a: 
32) pointed out that there is “[…] a distinction between appearance and 
essence […]”, hence bringing into focus things which people see as 
commonplace, as well as those that appear confusing. Afterwards, step four 
covers the data analysis. The phenomenon is described in a process of writing 
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and rewriting (van Manen 1990; 1997) to bring emotions, thoughts, and 
stances of participants` expressions to the fore. This step delves into the 
fundamental details of the transcribed texts using interpretative descriptions, 
while striving to explore the phenomenon as exactly and precisely as possible 
(van Manen 1990; 1997). Step five is considered as a procedural aspect that 
accompanies the whole research. The researcher is required to maintain a 
strong interest in the phenomenon and the RQs in order to preserve focus. 
Lastly, van Manen (1990) calls for a constant measure of balance between the 
significance of the parts and the whole of the research textual design.  
 
From the researcher`s point of view, these steps provide a solid framework for 
the research as such. They do not necessarily have to be applied in sequential 
order, but rather guide throughout the process, while data is being collected, 
analysed, read, and re-read. With this approach there is sufficient flexibility in 
performing each step subject to the emergence of the data. The application of 
the data collection and analysis, as suggested by van Manen (1990), is further 
discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
As a complement to van Manen`s (1990) approach, the research has, in parts, 
also been informed by Gadamer (1975b). Specifically, his fusion of horizons 
and hermeneutic circle were considered to add to a rigorous and 
comprehensive study. Different to other hermeneutic approaches, Gadamer 
(1997; 2004) places emphasis on situating experiences in the overall context 
of the phenomenon, with an iterative and circular style of handling data moving 
between reading, thinking, and interpretation. With this understanding, the 
narrative must be related to historical situations and context of the participant 
and the phenomenon. Furthermore, his fusion of horizons and expanding the 
range of visions, contributed towards achieving more holistic views and 
levelling researcher`s prejudices. 
 
An understanding of hermeneutics and phenomenology, in its philosophical 
fundamentals and theoretical foundations supports the underlying research 
design. Hence, the motivation and relevance for using van Manen`s (1990; 
1997) hermeneutic phenomenology in this study is threefold. First, this 
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approach harmonises well with the research paradigm. It supports the 
interpretive exploration of participants` expressions of their lived experiences 
as being in-the-world, and what it means to be a senior executive in the 
designated world of the CRE context, more particularly in a phase of FI and 
the event of FC. Second, the focus on the lived experiences and the essentials 
of the meaning and organisational sensemaking embodied in them supported 
the aim of this study to uncover their managerial perspectives. Also, it reflects 
on the way the phenomenon is perceived by the participants and on the 
dynamics affecting such perceptions. Third, the context-sensitivity in 
hermeneutic phenomenology is consistent with this investigation that puts the 
phenomenon of FI into its context of SM in CRE organisations and their 
corporate environment. 
 
3.2.2.4 The Role of the Researcher 
 
As discussed above, in this phenomenological study it is pivotal for the 
researcher to critically reflect on his role to be self-aware of possible 
subjectivity and “[…] interpretive influences” (Laverty 2003: 24). Such 
awareness was imperative to separate his own meaning and opinion from 
those of the interviewees. This includes his presuppositions, assumptions, his 
voice and sensitivities (Creswell 2014; Marshall and Rossman 2016), as well 
as his background.  
 
Hence, the sense of reduction for this study is expressed in the researcher`s 
conscious considerations of his position and respective steps taken to make 
his role as the researcher and possible bias that could have impacted the 
study as transparent as possible.  
 
The qualitative investigation entails certain involvement by the researcher 
himself. From the drafting of the topic, up until data analysis, some parts more 
than others, could give him the possibility to provide direction to the research. 
Specifically, the openness of the semi-structured interviews and interpretation 
of the data left some room to point the study in either direction. With the benefit 
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of hindsight, the researcher`s influence on the study in this regard was 
negligible, as the focus on the participant`s involvement prevailed. 
 
However, some of the researcher`s personal experiences provided initial 
context for this study. The idea for this research topic emerged from a 
business situation in which the researcher was involved. His earliest memories 
of the presence of FI have been exactly at the time he experienced this 
unforgettable situation. He was heading a senior position of a CRE company. 
The management and he were hit by the event of the GFC 2007/08 suddenly 
and unexpectedly. The phenomenon of FI beforehand and respective 
implications for the company remained unrecognised by its executive 
management board for a long time. Even though the macroeconomic situation 
(economy level) was subconsciously considered critical over time, this 
deliberately had not been part of any strategic discussions, and thus no 
respective decision-making had been made. The phenomenon was faded out 
with regards to its potential adverse effects on the CRE company (corporate 
level), which could have jeopardised the existence of the firm, or resulted in a 
crisis for the firm at any point in time. Hence, there was no conscious 
consideration for the interface between the CRE company as a system and the 
environmental condition of FI. Consequently, the phenomenon was largely 
ignored by the executives, and there had not been any deliberate 
consideration in the SRM of the company. This means, the risk assessment of 
the preliminary phase of FI at the economy level has not led to the 
identification, analysis or evaluation of resulting risks at the corporate level. No 
one ever talked openly about any aspects of the situation or their perceptions 
of it.  
 
Even though the researcher has already been involved with macroeconomic 
crisis situations in his prior studies, this personal experience left a sustained 
impression that led him to investigate the matter further.   
 
With this background and long-standing expertise in CRE management, the 
researcher took on the role of a practitioner researcher. At the same time, 
being a researcher in the anti-positivist tradition requires a collaborative 
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approach with the participants and a trusting relationship. As such, he is 
involved in industry specifics and management procedures. Therefore, 
arrangements during the research process have been considered to avoid any 
possible negative influence on the study as much as possible. 
 
To limit the researcher`s bias during the interviews, he placed his full attention 
on the interviewees and their narratives. However, while being the instrument 
of data collection, he held a material role and the talks immersed in the details 
of the topic. Using open-ended questions prevented too much influence, on the 
part of the researcher, in any particular direction, and all interviews were 
carried out in as consistent a manner as possible according to the interview 
guideline.  
 
The double-edged role of the researcher, as a practitioner but also as a close-
to-objective researcher, was beneficial for the in-depth investigation in 
phenomenological means and suited the overall research design well.  
 
3.2.3 Formulating the Research Questions  
 
As laid out, this investigation was initiated by the central interest in 
understanding the phenomenon of FI beyond macroeconomic definitions. Also 
influential were the researcher`s personal experiences in the CRE sector and 
practical managerial considerations in SM to take a new perspective on the 
phenomenon.  
 
When finalising the RQs, the researcher had been influenced by wanting to 
finding out more about how SM is carried out in a phase of FI. In addition to 
this, came the deeper interest in the underlying reasons that affect the SM 
behaviour or decision-making procedures in the context of such challenging 
times.  
 
After studying the organisational management literature, the researcher 
believed that the motivations for what executives` do must originate in their 
sensemaking procedures. This inspired the researcher to go beyond the 
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exploration of the corporate meaning (RQ1) and to discover the organisational 
sensemaking procedures pertaining to senior executives` SM processes in 
times of FI in the corporate environment (RQ2). Furthermore, the resulting 
indicators and implications (RQ3), which were identified as meaningful 
characteristics during these periods, can be considered as indicative for similar 
future situations and were of interest for providing a sound picture of process 
and action during a phase of FI. 
 
Here, the researcher has deliberately decided to work with ‘how’ questions. 
These are particularly valuable for noting overarching themes or trends in the 
analysis (Bryman and Bell 2015). Also, sensemaking requires getting involved 
with the ‘how’ of people`s practices and understanding (Dervin et al. 2003).  
 
With these considerations, the three RQs match all areas central to this study 
from the research gap: the corporate meaning, executives` sensemaking in 
this regard, and resulting indicators and implications.  
 
3.2.4 Rigour and Credibility   
 
As discussed, this research falls under the umbrella of qualitative research, 
where some empiricists are still questioning the strength of its reputation, 
credibility and rigour or trustworthiness (Sandelowski 1993; Tobin and Begley 
2004; Koch 2006). Hereto, researchers have focused on criteria such as 
plausibility and credibility (Silverman 2001; Morse et al. 2002; Shenton 2004). 
This leads to the fact that qualitative research projects seek for an even better 
proof of academic rigour and integrity.  
 
For this study the researcher has shown that he is well aware of the different 
research approaches as well as their influence on process and outcome. While 
missing the ‘confidence’ of measurable figures, the transparent description of 
considerations shows a plausible, distinct, and rigorous approach. Also, the 
researcher was well aware that a retrospective study, after the situation under 
investigation has passed, could involve a potential distortion in participants` 
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judgement of the situation as they now involve more knowledge in hindsight 
(Fischhoff 1975; Fischhoff and Beyth 1975).  
 
Additionally, for a rigorous knowledge generation, it is essential to understand 
the context in which participants` responses and experiences are embedded 
(Rashotte and Jensen 2007). This context is, therefore, separately analysed 
and discussed to validate perception and understand the construction of the 
situation. 
 
When taking measures to ensure a trustworthy and rigorous study the 
researcher reached reliability and validity, in qualitative means. This was 
ensured by a detailed description of the steps taken during sampling and data 
collection. With the specifics of the hermeneutic phenomenological approach, 
the researcher also provided critical details of the numerous stages of data 
analysis and interpretation, the emergence of sub-themes and themes, and 
how the single stages finally contributed to the findings. Herewith, he ensured 
a verification and self-correction process during the investigation (Morse et al. 
2002). An additional validation by an external was not used since considered 
incongruent with the hermeneutical approach, so was member-checking 
(Webb and Kevern 2001; Webb 2003; Bradbury-Jones et al. 2010; McConnell-
Henry et al. 2011). Ashworth (1993) even questions wether data validation with 
participants lends support, because they may disagree with the interpretation, 
or others indicate that they may regret what they said (Sandelowski 2002). In 
line with the interpretative means of this study, the researcher`s version is 
deemed valid until another plausible view adds to this, but yet does not 
invalidate researcher`s description. 
 
Furthermore, the fit of data, method, and outcome was constantly monitored 
under the assumption of the research design and research focus. The 
researcher proved plausibility and credibility in data collection and analysis by 
using extracts from the data as sources for the sub-themes and themes. 
Hence, the findings allow for traceability and experts may easily identify with 
these descriptions. They provide for a strong recognition value and were 
considered congruent with reality. Plausibility and credibility also became 
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relevant in terms of the sampling strategy for the investigation, where the 
purposive character supports the use of reliable and trustworthy sources of 
data.  
 
Additionally, with the dual approach to meaning, the study validates the 
corporate meaning from lived experiences with the meaning provided through 
organisational sensemaking procedures. The deliberately chosen research 
methodology and design, therefore, also added credibility and validity to the 
study in each phase of the research. The methodological approach of this 
study has also been presented and discussed as conference proceedings with 
other researchers, who established confidence about the validity of the 
procedures. 
 
Finally, the research included researcher`s reflection on challenges of the 
research (section 6.3) and evaluated the investigation. That section lays out 
the researcher’s criticality and limited subjectivity to increase credibility.  
 
3.3 Research Methodology and Context 
 
The research methods were chosen in line with the phenomenological strategy 
and anti-positivist paradigm that ask for a profound examination. Because the 
researcher was looking to increase the understanding of the phenomenon 
under investigation and aimed for a rather novel meaning and an extended 
definition, he focused on perception, description, and sensemaking by 
knowledgeable participants as well as in-depth information. Hence, semi-
structured interviews and TA guided the methodology in this context-sensitive 
interpretive study.  
 
3.3.1 Data Sources  
 
3.3.1.1 Primary Data as a Reliable Source  
 
In qualitative research, data sources may be twofold: primary data is 
information collected in that researcher’s investigations, while secondary data 
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has been previously created and published by other researchers (Bryman and 
Bell 2015).  
 
For this study, taking into consideration the novelty of the investigation of the 
phenomenon of FI in the CRE sector, specific secondary data and studies 
about the phenomenon were difficult to find. Hence, secondary data was only 
considered through the literature review, where the research gap was 
identified but this study did not involve processing raw secondary data to 
deliver results. 
 
Hence, this study was based on information collected by the researcher, 
looking for topic-related information on this specific subject matter. This was 
also necessary because the data moreover involved qualitative aspects of 
personal experiences and meaning making, which has seldom been adopted 
so far.  
 
3.3.1.2 Sampling 
 
3.3.1.2.1 Site Selection  
 
In the first instance, according to Marshall and Rossman (2016), for the site 
and population selection, this is dependent on possible access, the exploitable 
mix of people available, processes and structures of interest and whether the 
researcher can establish trust with those participating, compliance with ethics 
requirements, and whether the information gathered is credible and of high 
quality.  
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the site selection of the CRE sector 
was primarily driven by its central role in the global economy (ESRB 2015) as 
well as its considerable relation to the latest SCC, GFC, SDC, and ongoing 
dependencies to other crises (Bianco 2008; Mishkin 2011; Lane 2012). The 
CRE sector can, however, be considered as an important sector of the 
economy and may have a significant impact on it. As such, it is a meaningful 
and valid site for the investigation of the phenomenon of FI.   
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Having chosen the German CRE sector as the site in general, the following 
sections will describe in further detail which sampling strategies were used for 
this study and will provide reasons for the choice of participants included in the 
investigation. 
3.3.1.2.2 Sampling Strategies 
 
In this study, the researcher sought a sample of people as sources of 
information that were able to provide an understanding of FI in executives` SM 
processes.  
 
The concept of sampling in phenomenological research is seldom explicitly 
mentioned in literature (Gentles et al. 2015). Van Manen (2014) considers the 
usually applied concept of qualitative sampling - sample size and population 
considerations, selection criteria, generalisation, or member checking - as not 
being compatible with phenomenology, but sees the sample as examples. 
Even though plausible, this was considered somewhat too vague and the 
researcher wanted to warrant a structured, efficient choice of participants to 
improve validity. This was considered in line with Goulding (2005), who argues 
that participants are the only source of data in phenomenology, and sampling 
should, therefore, be purposive. In this study, this is also particularly relevant 
because of the context-sensitivity and specific knowledge needed to meet the 
requirements of the interview conversation and to be able to answer the RQs.   
 
Purposive sampling is broadly applied in qualitative research (Yin 2011). It is 
effective in identifying and selecting the best matches with limited resources 
(Patton 2015) - meaning those that are knowledgeable and experienced with 
the phenomenon (Creswell and Plano Clark 2011), willing and available to 
participate and to disclose their impressions and experiences (Spradley 1979; 
Bernard 2002). These participants usually provide rich information for valuable 
in-depth visions, not just empirical generalisations (Patton 2015).  
 
Furthermore, elements of criterion, convenience, and snowball sampling were 
used to purposefully choose the right participants, as well as to achieve a 
reasonable mixture of participants for this study.   
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First, criteria that suit the purposes of this study and considered to be 
mandatory characteristics of the participants were defined by the researcher.  
 
These include: 
 
• being executive management board members (body), legally in charge 
of the company represented by them, hence being responsible for the 
SM of the organisation and for the chances and risks of the SRM; and 
• employed at German CRE companies, driven by international, 
multinational, and domestic firms; and 
• having obtained such, or an equivalent, position in the CRE sector 
during the period between 2005 to 2015 (time horizon/period). 
 
Out of this population, potential individuals were nominated as interviewees for 
the study. These included candidates that were easily accessible or personally 
known, which resulted in a good response rate and only 5 out of 15 contacts 
declined to participate.   
 
As a form of convenience sampling, the researcher contacted one of his 
established contacts who is an executive management board member of a 
CRE company, as well as another contact from his wider network, explaining 
the intent of the study using a form of introduction letter (Appendix 1). Such 
relations were primarily available due to the researcher`s professional 
experience within the CRE sector. One of them complied with the sampling 
criteria and participated in the study, but, notwithstanding, both of them were 
further utilised for a sort of snowball sampling, to help in identifying and 
recommending further participants from their network who also contributed 
information-rich cases (Patton 2015). By combining snowball sampling and 
criterion sampling as a type of purposeful sampling strategy (Creswell 2013), 
variation could be limited and similarities were brought into focus.  
 
As such, the researcher`s personal contacts were not the only participants 
used in this study, as primarily new contacts from a wider circle were 
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established. Such access ensured a rich mix of participants and processes, in 
the area of interest while maintaining data quality and credibility.  
 
3.3.1.2.3 Sample Size 
 
The unit of analysis in a qualitative study is referred to as “[t]he concept or the 
experience under study” (Starks and Trinidad 2007: 1374). The authors argue 
that a multitude of concepts and rich data can even be created from small 
samples or a single participant and hence, for phenomenological studies, a 
sample size generally “[…] range[s] from 1 to 10 persons” (Starks and Trinidad 
2007: 1375). This is in line with other studies that point to the average sample 
size as being around ten participants or even less (Morse 1994; Guest et al. 
2006; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009; Gentles et al. 2015). Seldom, is a wider 
range of between five to 25 participants mentioned (Creswell 1998; Miller and 
Salkind 2002). Usually, phenomenological studies are more in-depth (O`Reilly 
and Parker 2012) which justifies a smaller sample size.  
 
As there is no specific stipulation on an exact number, the researcher has 
decided to aim for a minimum of ten participants in this study, which is well in 
line with the sample size ranges indicated and agreed in empirical literature. 
Such a medium sample size was considered appropriate for this study in order 
to gain exploitable results and intensively engage with the data, in line with the 
phenomenological and in-depth approach to data collection. Furthermore, the 
population, which is deemed homogeneous in nature, justifies this smaller 
sample size, and this was further strengthened by the underlying sampling 
criteria. Diversity and a, sort of, representative example has been secured by 
age and gender, as well as business models (see Table 4 and Table 5).  
 
At the same time, the researcher designed and conducted this investigation 
with the intention not to impose an absolute predetermined sample size (Carter 
et al. 2009), but, rather, to go ahead with a minimum and continue interviews 
until ‘saturation’ had been reached. However, the anti-positivist researcher is 
  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 		
	 130 
always open to new insights gained within the phenomenological research 
strategy, and saturation, in its original form, was not relevant for this study (van 
Manen 2014). Hence, the sample size was driven by diving deep into the 
implicit meanings of the participants and collecting their intense experiences 
while stopping short of saturation from good “[…] experiential material […]” 
(van Manen 2017: 810). This kind of saturation follows the understanding of 
Legard et al. (2003) which points towards not aiming at an adequate scale, but 
gathering sufficient data to enable the illustration of a full understanding of the 
phenomenon.   
 
As a result, the study finally ended up with a sample comprising of ten 
interviews with senior executives from German CRE companies. The 
participant selection and composition of this sample is laid out in more detail 
as follows. 
 
3.3.1.2.4 Participant Selection and Sampling Group 
 
For the ten participants, the researcher took care in ensuring that the 
information provided was meaningful, in terms of developing new knowledge 
for the industry, and that the information was generalisable to a certain extent 
within the CRE sector. Thus, the variance in business types and personal 
characteristics was deliberately chosen.  
 
The mixture in business categories of the CRE companies was intended to 
allow for a complete picture of the research findings, not limited to national 
companies. The majority of the companies were international, or multi-national, 
covering the wider extent of businesses when looking at the global expansion 
of the phenomenon. 
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Business 
Category 
 
 
Organisation 
 
Interview Date 
 
Location 
 
Duration 
 
International 
(Global) 
 
 
H-Org.  
B-Org.  
G-Org. 
F-Org. 
E-Org.  
J-Org. 
 
 
23.03.2017 
27.01.2017 
22.03.2017 
21.03.2017 
24.03.2017 
26.01.2017 
 
 
Frankfurt/ Main 
Frankfurt/ Main  
Munich 
Hamburg 
Frankfurt/ Main 
Munich 
 
 
01:28:59 
01:07:26 
01:01:22 
00:36:12 
01:07:17 
00:58:35 
 
Multinational 
 
 
A-Org. 
C-Org. 
C-Org.  
 
25.01.2017 
21.03.2017 
25.01.2017 
 
Hamburg 
Hamburg 
Hamburg 
 
 
00:42:14 
01:04:39 
00:14:36 
 
National 
(Regional) 
 
 
D-Org. 
 
22.03.2017 
 
Munich 
 
00:46:58 
Table 3: Interview Schedule with CRE Companies. Source: Author (2017). 
 
Besides, the major business models of CRE market players are represented 
by the sample. A variety of small, medium, and large enterprises were also 
included, private and family-owned but also listed. 
 
 
Ownership 
 
 
Organisation 
 
Business Size 
(employees) 
 
 
Business Model CRE 
Private/  
Family owned 
B-Org. 500-999 Fund/Portfolio Management  
Family owned A-Org. >1.000 Asset Management 
Listed H-Org. >1.000 Asset Management 
Listed G-Org. >1.000 Asset/Wealth Management 
Listed F-Org. >1.000 Asset/Fund Management 
Listed E-Org. >1.000 Asset/Fund Management 
Listed J-Org. <100 Asset/Fund Management 
n.a.  C-Org. <100 Asset Management 
n.a. C-Org. <100 Asset Management 
Listed D-Org. 100-499 Asset Management 
Table 4: Characteristics of Participating CRE Companies. Source: Author (2017). 
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The researcher took care to maintain a variance in the characteristics of both 
the businesses and the participants. Out of the ten participants of the study, 
three were women and seven were men, which is above average for female 
executives in the industry (ZIA/ICG 2016). Their estimated ages ranged from 
40-59 years and all of them had long-standing experience in the CRE sector, 
which was essential for this study. 
 
 
Organisation/ 
Participant 
Alias 
 
 
Function 
 
Gender 
 
Age (est.) 
 
CRE 
experience 
H-Org. / Olivia CFO F 40-49 >20 years 
B-Org. / Jake Managing Director M 50-59 >20 years 
G-Org. / James 
 
Managing Director, 
Advisory Board 
M 50-59 >20 years 
F-Org. / George  Managing Director M 50-59 >20 years 
E-Org. / Charlie Managing Director M 50-59 >10 years 
J-Org. / William COO M 40-49 >10 years 
A-Org. / Scarlett CFO F 40-49 15-19 years 
C-Org. / Harry CEO M 40-49 >20 years 
C-Org. / Allen General Manager, 
Member of the Board 
M 40-49 10-15 years 
D-Org. / Sophia Managing Director F 50-59 >15 years 
Table 5: Characteristics of Participants. Source: Author (2017). 
 
Finally, a total of ten interviews were conducted for the main study during a 
period of two months at the beginning of 2017. All of the interviews were done 
face-to-face. Overall, the interview duration ranged from 14 to 88 minutes with 
an average of 54 minutes. The total material collected was approximately ten 
hours.  
 
Data collection 
Method 
Semi-structured 
single respondent 
interviews 
Type of interview Face-to-face 
Total No. of 
interviews  
10  Average interview 
length 
54 minutes 
Interviewee gender 3 females/ 7 males Interview duration 
range  
14 to 88 minutes  
Data collection 
period 
25.01.-24.03.2017 Total material 
collected 
10 hours 
Table 6: Interview Statistics Main Study. Source: Author (2017).  
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Apart from the main study, the research design had been piloted before data 
collection started. This was done to ensure reliable primary data sources and 
efficient data collection, as well as the appropriate choice of participants. The 
pilot study was conducted in April 2015. The three pilot participants had to 
undergo the process as planned for the main study, and were chosen 
according to the same sampling criteria. Out of the three, two were men, and 
the overall age was in the same range as the main study.  
 
Data collection 
Method 
Semi-structured 
single respondent 
interviews 
Type of interview Telephone calls  
Total No. of 
interviews  
3  Average interview 
length 
39 minutes 
Interviewee gender 1 female/ 2 males Interview duration 
range  
38 to 41 minutes  
Data collection 
period 
15.-17.04.2015 Total material 
collected 
2 hours 
Table 7: Interview Statistics Pilot Study. Source: Author (2017). 
 
As a result of this pilot study, it highlighted how very sensitive to context the 
study was. Therefore, the design changed from the transcendent 
phenomenological approach to a hermeneutic one. This resulted in CRE 
becoming an additional central point of the main study. Furthermore, the 
interview guideline was improved and adjusted accordingly. At the same time, 
the pilot study confirmed the necessity to have knowledgeable participants 
from the field and justified the sample size. For information rich cases in such 
context-sensitivity, a smaller, but experienced, sample was indispensable. 
 
With this two-step process to research design and selection of data sources, 
an appropriate and reasonable data collection, reliably representing the CRE 
industry in Germany for the main study could be secured. 
 
3.3.1.3 Ethical Considerations 
 
Research ethics describe the rules of conduct that are applied throughout the 
research proceedings (Saunders et al. 2009; Bryman 2016). Ethics ensure that 
the well-being of the participants is respected during the whole process of the 
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investigation. The study includes ethical principles that are compliant with the 
requirements from the University of Bradford`s Ethics Committee. The ethics 
approval for the study has been granted by the Chair of the Humanities, 
Social, and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford on May 25, 2016.  
 
In this phenomenological qualitative study, research ethics have a particular 
importance because of the close communication between the researcher and 
the participants and the very personal information, which they shared. This 
privacy and intimacy brought forward the possible vulnerability of the interview 
partner and, consequently, specific ethical considerations. During the 
interview, the managers might have felt uncomfortable or stressed when 
recalling an unpleasant experience. The researcher had to ensure that the 
interviewee was protected against any harm or pressure. On the one hand, 
this was taken into account when giving the executives the right to refuse 
participation in the project and an option to withdraw at any time. On the other 
hand, the researcher himself, as an experienced professional, is skilled in 
observing, evaluating, and reacting to managers` statements with regards to 
any distress they might experience. Retrospectively, no such situation 
occurred during the interview sessions.  
 
At the very beginning, the researcher informed the managers about the 
planned study and awaited their go-ahead. The executives were introduced to 
the project prior to confirming participation, which provided transparency and 
informed consent for all participants. As mentioned before, all of them were 
provided with an introduction letter (Appendix 1) outlining the research, which 
also included the contact details of the researcher, should the participant have 
felt the need to contact him before or after the interview in case of any queries 
or open items that needed to be clarified. Also, information about the ethics 
committee approval was included to provide further confidence for the 
participant. The additional consent form (Appendix 2) offered clear statements 
about the purpose, benefits, and potential risks of the study and had to be 
acknowledged with a signature as a prerequisite to undertaking the interview. 
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Furthermore, it was essential for the research process that participation was 
voluntary. Digital voice recordings during the interview were also specifically 
agreed upon in advance. 
 
Another material point for all participants was that their shared information was 
confidential. At every stage of the research process, the researcher respected 
the right to stay anonymous and the information provided to remain 
confidential. Any identifying details relating to the participant or their company 
were removed. In order to still refer to them as real people, their names were 
replaced by aliases. These were references during transcription, analysis, and 
quotation throughout the study. The data was stored separately and only for 
internal use and potential inquiry from the Bradford doctoral programme.  
 
All the procedures and relations to all of the people involved were trusted and 
respectful, without any discrimination or favouritism. All of the above 
prerequisites permitted that the participants’ rights to be secured according to 
research ethics guidelines governing research. 
 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
 
3.3.2.1 The Qualitative Interview as Data Collection Procedure  
 
Phenomenological research mainly involves interviews for data collection, 
beside other qualitative research methods, through focus groups and, to some 
extent, observations of the units of analysis (van Manen 1990). For this study, 
semi-structured interviews were chosen to uncover in-depth information and a 
richer understanding (Bayne and Montague 2014; Vagle 2014) from the 
perspective of senior executives. 
 
Qualitative interviews supported the aim to comprehend and describe social 
life, accessing motives, and achieving an understanding of those participating 
in the study as well as their social context (Gray 2009; Mohajan 2018). 
Specifically, in-depth interviews are considered to be in line with the social 
constructivist and phenomenological approach, which views the world through 
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the eyes of the participant who has extensive practical experience in the 
research topic. Therefore, the investigation on the phenomenon of FI required 
a methodology that provides for a first-person perspective of the individuals 
experiencing it.  
 
The in-depth interviews gathered opinions from participants, primarily asking 
open-ended questions, which allowed for gaining insight into their individual 
meaning and the interpretations ascribed to the research topic. This approach 
enabled the researcher to reconstruct the realities observed from the 
anecdotal narratives (Polkinghorne 1989; van Manen 1990; Clandinin and 
Connelly 2000; Smith et al. 2009). 
  
In order to answer the RQs, in-depth (intensive) interviewing is the most logical 
and appropriate research technique, because the research phenomenon of FI 
is largely exploratory and the technique seeks to obtain detailed responses for 
meaning and sensemaking. Also, this was suitable for uncovering executives` 
implicit understanding, while bringing forth unconscious procedural habits and 
thoughts that the CRE executives are used to in their everyday business 
without always consciously realising what they are doing and why. 
 
Furthermore, the interviewees were senior executives, who are usually limited 
in time and prefer talking about their work rather than filling in questionnaires. 
Semi-structured interviews provided them with an opportunity to reflect on 
events without having to commit them in writing, which is easier when they feel 
that the information may be confidential (Gray 2009).  
 
The semi-structured nature of the interview allowed for a flexible and 
customised way of getting as much information as possible, where the 
researcher could turn to specific points mentioned by the participants as they 
came up during the talk. 
 
However, despite the other options for data collection, such kinds of interviews 
were the most focused and trustworthy. They supported the aim of the study in 
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gaining an understanding and meaning of executives’ lived experiences (Gray 
2009; Saunders et al. 2009) within their specific business context.  
 
3.3.2.2 Primary Data  	
3.3.2.2.1 Designing the Interview Guideline 
 
While the interviews were semi-structured in design, they were loosely directed 
by an interview guideline (Appendix 3) that included six main questions in 
order to address the RQs of this study. Also, this concept secured some 
structure to the interview, even though it was conversational in nature. 
Particular sub-questions were noted, but not strictly placed, during the session, 
only where such points had not been mentioned by the interviewee themself.  
 
It was essential to get most out of the participants` expressions and here van 
Manen`s (1990) approach of using the main questions as an anchor and 
circling back to it in order to remain focused on the overarching aims of the 
study was adopted. This also provided for authenticity to the managerial 
experiences with SM in times of FI.  
 
Content-wise, the pilot study contributed to placing more focus and 
specification on context and the formulation of the particular interview 
questions, which were adjusted according to the learning and experience of 
these initial three interviews. 
 
Finally, the guideline was structured as follows: First, questions were related to 
some background information about the participant as well as to their 
organisation and its strategic perspectives. This helped the interviewee to gain 
familiarity with the situation and the researcher, in addition to providing base 
information that was used to analyse the background and change in the 
organisation in situations of FI. Following the main questions were related to 
the topic of the lived experience of FI and sensemaking in the CRE 
organisation. Concluding questions asked for any topics, that had not been 
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addressed by the researcher, and which the interviewee might consider 
relevant to the study.  
 
3.3.2.2.2 Conducting Qualitative Interviews in Phenomenological 
Conversation 
 
Semi-structured interviews in the style of phenomenological conversation with 
top tier managers responsible for SM and SDM were executed to explore the 
meaning of the phenomenon of FI and to discover the process of its 
organisational sensemaking.  
 
After participants confirmed their participation, they were contacted by email to 
set up a mutually convenient time for an interview. The interviews were 
scheduled for about one hour. The researcher conducted all the interviews 
himself and face-to-face at the offices of the participants or, in some instances, 
in conference rooms of local hotels.  
 
As for the interview style, the researcher used a phenomenological 
conversation (van Manen 1990), which, from the choices of interview styles 
available, matched well with the research strategy and the underlying research 
aims. The conversational interview is characterised by a partnering approach 
between the researcher and the interviewee during the data collection of the 
participant`s lived experience (van Manen 1990; Crotty 1998; Tracy 2013).  
 
Like other data collection methods, phenomenological conversation aims to 
create a textual narrative of the life story (van Manen 1990) of the executive. 
Therefore, semi-structured interviews were selected as a phenomenological 
conversation method, primarily, because of the qualitative and inductive 
approach adopted for this investigation. Secondly, it is appropriate for small-
scale research (Blaikie 2007) that aims at gathering rich and detailed 
information from the participants as they share their experiences and life 
stories. 
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All participants talked in a very open and free manner, as a form of ‘expert talk’, 
and candidly provided a lot of information offhand. Where necessary, follow-up 
questions were integrated to obtain more details about the information that 
was shared in response to the main questions. This procedure provided rich 
and detailed information about the phenomenon, personal views, and 
experiential pictures from and within the participant´s very individual setting. At 
the same time, the researcher could probe beyond the responses as well as 
uncover or open up new traces, which led to the conversational style. This 
provided for a maximum of true and comprehensive descriptions from the 
personal experience of the interviewees (Burgess 1991, cited in Easterby-
Smith et al. 2012).  
 
Additionally, the researcher`s personal experiences made him a valuable and 
recognised interlocutor, helping to strengthen a trustful relationship and 
building a rapport with the participants, being a fellow expert on the same 
wavelength as the interviewees. 
 
For further optimisation of data collection, the researcher utilised his 
communication skills. Active listening, silence, non-verbal body language, as 
well as questioning techniques were, especially, supportive to the 
conversational nature of the interview. The researcher left as much room as 
possible for the participant to talk instead of taking over the lead in the 
interview. Closed-ended questions were only used to clarify statements or ask 
for confirmation of understanding. 
 
At the end of the interview, when all participants were asked to share final 
thoughts or missing topics, many of them provided additional information in the 
form of another anecdote. This part was a very valuable addition to the 
phenomenological underpinnings and its beliefs as it encouraged the executive 
participants to take the role of a co-investigator by producing their own ideas 
from their experiences.   
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Due to the circumstance that the researcher, as well as the participants, were 
Germans, all interviews were conducted in their mother tongue. The interviews 
were audiotaped using a dictation device.  
 
The abovementioned approach fits well with the chosen strategy of 
phenomenology and the exploratory nature of this study, and therefore, the 
data collection led to several new aspects that arose during the conversation 
but could not have been foreseen beforehand. 
 
3.3.2.3 Supplementary Data  
 
In addition to the primary data collection through interviews, the researcher 
collected supplementary data in the form of additional notes and as part of his 
research log. He recorded conspicuous perceptions and observations from 
each of the interviews after they had taken place. The research journal also 
contains correspondence between participants and the researcher, as well as 
his thoughts, reflections, insights, or decisions that occurred during the study 
or those that were reviewed and considered later during interpretation. Such 
an approach follows van Manen`s (1990) phenomenological approach and 
provided some helpful reminders and guidance when engaging with 
interpretation of the data.  
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis  
 
The essential objective of the data analysis is to identify patterns in data in 
order to gather a description of a more collective meaning of FI and its 
sensemaking procedures by abstracting individual experiences with the 
phenomenon out of the personal interviews. 		 	
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The following figure presents the steps taken for data analysis:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Data Analysis Process Applied. Source: Author (2018).  
 
As noted before, the interviews have been conducted and transcribed in the 
German language. They have not been fully translated for the purposes of this 
study. However, a convenience translation of the significant statements 
(complete and half sentences), used as extracts of data analysis information, 
was made available (Appendix 4). 	
3.3.3.1 Transcription 
 
In line with the research strategy, van Manen`s (1990) guidelines were used in 
approaching the analysis. Therefore all interviews were transcribed verbatim 
(van Manen 1990; Liamputtong 2013) to produce a word document from the 
audio recordings. This work was done immediately after the interviews had 
taken place to ensure that no data or memory were lost.  
 
These texts were made available to the interview participants, giving them the 
opportunity to clarify any details of the conversation where necessary. None of 
them replied with any amendments other than remarks on grammar or 
punctuation. Some of the executives provided the feedback that they felt 
unfamiliar when reading verbatim transcripts of their interview, compared to 
the reporting of their interviews in journal articles and press releases. 
 
The interview transcripts were read and re-read by the researcher in an effort 
to remain deeply involved within the rich phenomenological texts and oriented 
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to the phenomenon (van Manen 1990) of FI in preparation for the analysis of 
these texts. The transcription was also beneficial in that it required listening to 
the voice and wording again and again, and to become deeply involved with 
the data. 
 
As the results cannot be directly presented from such texts, they require 
interpretation and the uncovering of meaning in the experiential data.  
 
3.3.3.2 Thematic Analysis  
 
In the next stage, a step-wise approach to TA and open coding was applied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Data Analysis Process Applied – The Step of TA. Source: Author (2018).   
 
In this qualitative research, data analysis was used to bring meaning to the 
data and arrange it in a formal concept when working through the descriptions 
of the interview partners. Obviously this information is much less pre-arranged 
or organised than quantitative information and also required interpretation 
(Marshall and Rossman 2016).  
 
In van Manen`s (1990) phenomenological approach, there is no reference to 
one specific method for data analysis but he suggests multiple techniques that 
may ultimately be applied. Out of these, the researcher decided to use an 
open coding style and TA procedures. This contributed to the in-depth 
investigation with a systematic thorough interpretation of texts to uncover 
themes (Vaismoradi et al. 2016), thus making it an appropriate method for this 
experiential investigation. It fits the interpretive-constructivist paradigm and 
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phenomenological research strategy in accounting for participants` lived 
experience within their contexts. 
 
Furthermore, TA provides the necessary focus on personal (managerial) views 
in line with the research aim to uncover expressive meaning under participants’ 
visions. The themes provide for structure in the data regarding this complex 
phenomenon and elaborate the meaning in order to answer the RQs. This 
method helped to explore executives` business practices and also 
unconscious meaning from the cautious statements of the interviewees 
permitting for interpretation (Braun and Clarke 2006) beyond them. 
 
All transcripts were coded using NVivo as a data analysis tool. This was 
helpful up to the point of extracting significant statements. Afterwards, the 
researcher decided to manually analyse the data as NVivo could not further 
support the complex structure and vast amount of concepts, sub-themes, and 
themes in relation to the context. Also, for axial coding, the researcher had to 
analyse manually as going back and forth with the codes was not easily 
feasible in NVivo. 
 
Base Case: Thematic Analysis 
The interviewees shared a lot of information about their organisation, strategy, 
goals, and competition etc. Even though no RQ was directly concerned with 
the general situation and circumstances of the CRE companies, this 
information was, nevertheless, considered meaningful due to the context-
sensitivity of the study. Therefore, this set of data was also analysed using TA. 
The emerging themes helped in structuring the base situation of the company 
and contributed towards having sufficient reference data for a distinction 
between the phase before the event (FI) and the event (FC).  
 
RQ1: Thematic Analysis and Existential Analysis  
TA, under the research strategy, was informed by van Manen (1990) to answer 
the first RQ and uncover meaning through experience. With this research 
strategy of van Manen`s phenomenology, the researcher was guided by four 
steps of analysis, starting with TA, to isolate significant statements and 
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categorise those to thematic themes. Afterwards, the concepts of interpretation 
through conversation and collaborative analysis were introduced. Finally, the 
coding concept of existential analysis was applied, which will be further 
elaborated in section 3.3.3.3. 
 
RQ2: Thematic Analysis and Axial Coding  
The same steps as above were applied in answering the second RQ. However, 
notably, the last step deviated from RQ1, as RQ2 underwent axial coding. This 
step only came about during the analysis procedures where the emerging 
themes shared similarities with several of Weick`s (1995) seven properties of 
sensemaking and Daft and Weick`s (1984) model of organisational 
interpretation. The steps taken after TA are described in further detail in the 
section 3.3.3.4.  
 
RQ3: Second Cycle Pattern Coding 
The analysis of data for RQ3 was based on the TA for corporate meaning and 
sensemaking as described above. For this second cycle of analysis, the 
researcher used the approach of pattern coding (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
This step is outlined in more detail in section 3.3.3.5.  
 
3.3.3.2.1 Isolating Thematic Statements 
 
To isolate thematic themes, all three of van Manen`s (1990) methods were 
applied in an effort to get the most out of the data. Also, this provided the 
possibility to extract different information and facilitated a meaningful and 
rigorous development of sub-themes and themes in the search for an 
extended meaning of FI evident in the data. 
 
The proceedings included (1) a preliminary analysis using the detailed reading 
approach, and (2) a final analysis applying the selective, or highlighting, 
approach and the holistic reading approach, being applied subsequently. 
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The Preliminary Analysis: Detailed Reading Approach 
First, all transcribed data was read sentence-by-sentence, marking what the 
phrases disclosed about the phenomenon and what was readily available in 
the text. These statements were assigned with initial ideas and keywords. 
Similar wording or opinions of the participants were grouped together and 
made up, so-called, concepts. Equally, concepts developed through the 
intuitive notions of the researcher while reading the transcripts (van Manen 
1990). 
 
This step was performed for each record separately using NVivo. The results 
from the preliminary analysis were gathered together for all interviews and 
tabularised. 
 
The Final Analysis: Selective Reading, Highlighting, and Holistic Reading 
Approach  
The researcher read and re-read the texts using the selective reading, or 
highlighting, approach (van Manen 1990) of moving from the keywords and 
concepts to the sub-themes and themes. Here the focus was on the 
statements that seem illuminating and express specifics about the 
phenomenon of FI. These were then also linked with key words and concepts, 
brought together with those from the preliminary analysis. The concepts were 
further aggregated in sub-themes and grouped together into the themes, 
creating an understanding of the particular shared experiences of the 
executives.  
 
As a final step of the analysis, the holistic reading approach was applied. This 
emerged from the key words and concepts of the preliminary analysis and 
worked towards the texts as a whole. Attention was paid to looking again for 
statements with regards to their significance of meaning and sensemaking of 
the phenomenon, in a way that was relevant to either explicitly or implicitly 
form themes. Fundamentals shared by the majority of the participants laid 
down meaningful patterns. 
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Besides the basic concept of van Manen`s (1990) isolating thematic 
statements, the process used ideas of Gadamer (1975a). Particularly, 
supporting the researcher’s approach was Gadamer`s concept of fusion of 
horizons which allow the researcher to be open to emerging themes. The 
hermeneutic circle also helped to uncover a great amount of implicit meaning 
while engaging back and forth with the text during interpretation. 
 
This process was supportive in discovering patterns and similarity across the 
data of the participants and in getting a holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
 
As indicated before, NVivo was, at some point, limited in its technical, systemic 
support of analysis due to the extensive data and the lack of support in the 
structure of the concepts, sub-themes, and themes in relation to the context. 
Hence, the researcher exported the statements and key words to a word 
document, which was used to code for concepts, sub-themes, and themes 
from there on. It helped to group, link, and oversee the data, while moving, 
adding, and amending was easily possible. For the researcher, Microsoft Word 
proved much more convenient for the final analysis, as the researcher found 
NVivo lacked intuitive handling. 
 
The results from this final analysis constitute a table of 22 themes and 63 sub-
themes, including around 100 concepts, related to the preliminary phase of FI 
and the event of FC, its meaning, sensemaking, QRIs, and implications. 
Extracts are attached in the appendices (Appendices 5-11).  
 
3.3.3.2.2 Interpretation through Conversation  
 
In his phenomenological approach van Manen (1990) suggests that the 
researcher may also involve the interviewee in conversation for interpretation. 
 
Initial conversation came up with some participants in response to returning 
the transcripts, which mostly involved reconfirmation about what the 
experience was like. No further findings emerged from this. For later 
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interpretation, the participants were invited to engage in a follow-up discussion. 
This lapsed into silence as they either replied with contentment about the 
descriptions of the transcripts or they had nothing to add, but highlighted that 
they would be very much interested in the final study. It seemed that all had 
experienced a good and satisfactory conversation during the interviews and a 
sense of truth about what the experience was like was probably reached.  
 
3.3.3.2.3 Collaborative Analysis  
 
In a further step, the researcher approached other experts for an informal 
collaborative analysis (van Manen 1990). Such experts included professors 
and lecturers from diverse disciplines, especially Economics and Behavioural 
Finance. Findings were selectively discussed related to their subject area with 
them, which facilitated the detection and strengthening of the themes that had 
emerged from the textual description, as well as assessing the investigation by 
looking more through the transcripts, as well as beyond them (van Manen 
1990).  
 
3.3.3.3  Analysis and Interpretation of the Managerial Lived Experience of 
the Phenomenon 
 
After identification of the themes of experience with TA, a more profound 
understanding of the meaning was sought by diving into deeper reflection and 
interpretation of the data. Hence, in a second step after the TA, the researcher 
applied the idea of existentials of van Manen’s (1990) lifeworld in the data 
analysis and interpretation of the managerial lived experience of the 
phenomenon of FI. 
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Figure 6: Data Analysis Process Applied – The Step of Existential Analysis.  
Source: Author (2018).   
 
Since there exist multiple lifeworlds, there can be various existentials that 
guide reflection. Looking at the underlying specifics of personal experiences 
and the context-sensitivity of the firm, as well as the macroeconomic state of FI, 
the researcher decided on the following fundamental existentials for the 
analysis of study: lived time (phase of FI, event of FC), lived other 
(relationships to other persons involved), lived space (company), and lived 
body (physicality of a visceral presence).  
 
In van Manen’s (1990) contemplations, ‘lived time’ means the temporality of 
people’s experiences and their action over time, which is not measurable like 
minutes or seconds. The conscious perception of time affects the lively picture, 
which individuals create of the world (van Manen 1990). Lived time is the 
moments in-between (van Manen 2016a). For this study, these are the 
particulars of the passing of executives’ experiences during the phase of FI or 
the event of FC, partially or fully implicit, but that could be gleaned with in-
depth interviews. 
 
‘Lived other’ focussed on the executives’ lived relationships, which they 
maintain with other persons involved, as well as their grounding and the 
perception of relationality to those individuals (van Manen 1990). The 
phenomenological interest is in the experience of others and with others - the 
social relation (van Manen 1990). In the context of this study, it includes how 
people approach one another and how their relationships are maintained or 
commenced. ‘Lived other’ were the human relations that the executive unfolds 
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with other (groups of) people, like colleagues, risk managers, management, or 
advisory board, customers, banks etc. 
 
‘Lived space’ refers to the experience of day-to-day existentials and spatiality 
(van Manen 1990). It is worth emphasising that different people may obviously 
give different meaning to it. Since space, or in this context the CRE company 
and its physical environment, is connected with some kind of essence, the 
deviations of this space to and within the phenomenon can be studied (van 
Manen 1990; Moustakas 1994; Dahlberg 2006). This specifically also refers to 
the importance of context to the study, where the ‘lived space’ was of particular 
relevance in contributing to the meaningmaking and providing a proper 
distinction for the phenomenon of FI as well as for the event of FC. 
 
The fourth existential chosen by the researcher was ‘lived body’. This refers to 
the corporality, the physical presence, and how bodily perceptions and 
reflections were understood (van Manen 1990). For this study, the meaning of 
the lived body of, for instance, colleagues, customers, networks, banks, looked 
at what the people disclose about themselves, not only consciously or 
deliberately, but as a result of their behaviour and conduct. This existential 
adds to a more complete picture of the meaning of FI, where executives 
shared their views by corporal responses and behaviour during this phase. 
 
For analysis, these four dimensions were considered material for the meaning 
structures of executives’ lived experience of the phenomenon of FI. As will be 
shown later in the findings, the existentials are interwoven in the experiences 
of the executives and, as such, cannot stand on their own. 
 
From the data collected, interpretations were drawn by the researcher to serve 
the research aims and objectives of this study, which are intended to 
contribute to a better understanding and, consequently, a better monitoring of 
the phenomenon of FI as part of the SM. 
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3.3.3.4  Analysis and Interpretation of the Organisational Sensemaking 
Process of the Phenomenon 
 
Even though the researcher was committed to the open coding process of TA, 
he also turned to additional axial coding and categorisation procedures for 
RQ2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Data Analysis Process Applied – The Step of Axial Coding. Source: Author (2018).   
 
From the TA emerged themes that showed similarities with several properties 
of Weick`s (1995) sensemaking. In a further effort to improve the analysis 
results, this process was informed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) concept of 
GT in uncovering the organisational sensemaking process of the phenomenon 
of FI. Their GT has been widely applied in organisational science studies (Lee 
et al. 1999), where it is associated with generating theory about complex social 
phenomena with less fixed conduction procedures, and important in 
management studies (Lee 1999).  
 
In this study, the researcher does not use a GT approach, but has adopted the 
conceptual parts related to coding and categorisation processes. Axial coding 
was used to deepen and structure the themes associated with “[…] their 
properties and dimensions […]" (Corbin and Strauss 2015: 61). This step was 
taken to compile the dataset within the context and actions of SM for further 
discovering managerial sensemaking procedures.  
 
When applying axial coding, the researcher related the established themes 
from TA back to Weick`s properties, one after the other. He was also open to 
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establishing new properties and, thus, there were blank properties for those 
themes that might not match any of the existing classifications. This procedure 
continued until all the data had been evaluated. As will be discussed later in 
chapter four, no additional properties emerged. Hence, axial coding could 
provide convincing categories and links to an already established theory. 
 
3.3.3.5  Analysis and Interpretation of the Indicators and Implications of 
the Phenomenon 
 
To answer RQ3, the concepts that were derived in the preliminary analysis for 
the corporate meaning and sensemaking were used to develop the QRIs and 
determine the implications of a phase of FI and an event of FC. They provided 
the basis for the investigation and interpretation with regards to translating the 
meaning and sensemaking into QRIs and respective implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Data Analysis Process Applied – The Step of Second Cycle Pattern Coding.  
Source: Author (2018).   
 
For this second cycle of analysis, the researcher used the pattern coding 
approach (Miles and Huberman 1994). The QRIs were developed by the 
researcher and considered as explanatory codes, identifying the emerging 
themes of that qualitative risk from the concepts of FI and FC, already 
identified through TA (Appendices 6-9). For each QRI, one or more indicators 
that allow for scalability and ‘measurement’, and therefore an identification of 
the changes, were developed. Both together constitute the QIs.  
 
In comparison to quantitative indicators, there was no numeric measurement 
but different scales that were proposed to classify the indicators. Qualitative 
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dimensions were better suited in the context of this analysis because 
measuring progress that is complex and multi-faceted, like the phenomenon of 
FI or FC, are well presented in the broad picture, the change progress, and the 
evolution of the organisation-environment relationship during these times.   
 
Furthermore, each QRI holds potential risks for the CRE company. In order to 
substantiate these risks, the researcher referred back to the concepts related 
to corporate risks that were explored beforehand for the organisational context 
(Appendix 5). These mirror the generally applicable and perceived risks for 
CRE companies in the specific context and are considered to be inherent risks 
of and for their business model.  
 
The same applies for the potential effects on SM. These were revealed based 
on the concepts pertaining strategig goals of CRE companies that were 
explored beforehand from the corporate context (Appendix 5). The reference 
back to the original concepts of the corporate context was sensible as these 
stipulate reliable notions because they originate from the interview data and 
first cycle analysis.  
 
The potential risks were then, finally, allocated to broad risk categories and risk 
factors (Mitchell and Matruglio 2015; Figure 2) in an effort to categorise the 
discovered CRE risks to acknowledged categories with clear instances already 
studied. Also, this served as a kind of verification of the fungibility of the QRIs 
and implications. As a result, the categorized potential risks and risk related 
events make up the implications of FI or FC, respectively. 
 
3.4 Alternative Research Methods 
 
Given the acknowledged aims and specific propositions of the research 
approach, this next section will consider why the above-identified approach is 
most suitable for the study and for answering the RQs, compared to other 
alternative research methods. 
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Research Strategy 
The main alternative in research strategy that was taken into consideration 
was an embedded single-case study. With its longitudinal approach, this could 
provide the opportunity to investigate the phenomenon in its real-life setting 
over time and analyse different stages in more depth (Baškarada 2014; Yin 
2014). The approach was, however, rejected due to the objective of 
understanding the subjectively and socially constructed meaning and 
sensemaking procedures from those experiencing it. Also, the phenomenon of 
FI is rather retrospective in nature and would have been difficult to investigate 
over the past three years, when this study was conducted. Furthermore, a 
case study was considered to be too one-sided and the wider analysis of 
different CRE executives` experiences is more beneficial for a reliable and 
sound study in order to create shared meaning and understanding. Moreover, 
the researcher did not have the necessary access for studying one single case 
CRE company.  
 
The phenomenological approach clearly required a qualitative research design. 
Quantitative methods are only concerned with testing hypotheses and 
designing relations into formulae (Gray 2009; Saunders et al. 2009). From the 
literature reviewed, no particular existing method or theory could be identified 
in order to form a hypothesis. In addition, the aim of exploring insights into 
experiences and behaviour required going beyond statistical representation. In 
the context of SM and environmental change influenced by FI, the qualitative 
approach provided a more innovative methodology and complemented the 
required provision of experiential data to enrich existing definitions. This 
means developing new knowledge from data, rather than looking for data to 
confirm to prior theory. 
 
Data Collection 
To collect the required information from the participants, alternatives like 
observation or focus groups were considered. Observations, as a primary data 
collection method, were not practical for this study where the specific time 
frame of FI is retrospective and thus behaviour or experiences cannot be 
observed at this point in time or in any specific case. Also, the researcher 
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followed the view that observations are, in general, not a preferred data 
collection procedure in management studies (Curran 1989; Sandiford 2015) 
because many of the high level executives are good actors in covering up 
parts of their behaviour and impressions and the possibility to obtain unfiltered 
and true information is limited. 
 
As the study was focused on individual experiences and not specific group 
behaviour or shared experiences, focus group sessions were not considered 
appropriate for this investigation. Also, in groups of senior executives from 
different companies, the willingness to share information would have been 
limited to a minimum that would have restricted the outcome of the findings. 
Finally, this would not have been feasible for organisational reasons. 
 
Furthermore, interviews play a central role in phenomenological research to 
gaining insider descriptions of thoughts and understanding from the 
participants’ lived dimensions (van Manen 2014). This approach also perfectly 
suited the researcher`s ontological positioning. 
 
Data Analysis 
There is a variety of qualitative data analysis methods available that support 
different outcomes, i.e. focusing on linguistics, developing theory, and 
interpretation (Miles and Huberman 1994; Creswell 2013; Yin 2014). Within the 
interpretive paradigm, and in consideration of the research objectives to 
uncover managerial meaning and enrich the understanding of the executives’ 
lived experiences of the phenomenon, an in-depth investigation of the data 
was necessary. 
 
TA and GT were considered to be the best alternatives for these aims. TA, in 
van Manen`s (1990) approach, provides the necessary focus on personal 
(managerial) views and the inductive emergence of themes, and fits the 
interpretative constructivist ontology of deriving subjective data from lived 
experiences to construct reality.  
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GT as a complete approach was too deductive and not compatible with the 
inductive research approach to the data and concept in this study. However, 
as already mentioned, essential parts of GT have been adopted when 
analysing the data for RQ2 where its deductive approach was specifically 
supportive in aligning the themes with pre-existing data from Weick`s (1995) 
seven properties.  
 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This third chapter provides an understanding about the research design and 
how this research was conducted. The following table summarises the key 
aspects in this respect.  
 
Research Category Research Positioning 
Philosophical stance Antipositivist / Constructivist  
Research strategy Hermeneutical phenomenology  
Research context SM of German CRE companies in FI 
Study phenomenon Executives lived experience and sensemaking 
process in SM (influenced by FI) 
Unit of analysis Senior executives of German CRE companies 
Research method Inductive, qualitative approach 
Primary data collection method Semi-structured interviews 
Data analysis method Thematic analysis, existential analysis, axial coding, 
pattern coding 
Table 8: Key Features of Research Design. Source: Author (2018). 
 
Within the anti-positivist paradigm, the researcher has conducted an 
interpretive research study that is a novel approach to the phenomenon of FI 
and organisational studies.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher identified the need for a phenomenological 
strategy in this study. On the one hand, this refers to the openness in 
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designing and conducting the study, methodologically. On the other hand, this 
perspective was considered to be an applied method to the phenomenon of FI 
that has seldom been used. The phenomenological approach fits the 
experiential and constructive research aims. The hermeneutic approach is a 
descriptive-interpretive approach (Cohen et al. 2000) that is congruent with the 
researcher’s worldview. It supports the objective to go beyond explicit 
managerial behaviours and uncover the meaning and the sensemaking 
procedures of executives.  
 
Within the phenomenological strategy, the researcher found himself largely in 
accordance with Heidegger`s (1962) philosophical stance that the human 
being cannot be disconnected from their lived experiences. Moreover, the 
hermeneutic phenomenological approach of van Manen (1990) was 
considered to be the most suitable as it reflects the context-sensitivity of the 
study. The phenomenological approach allows for making the different layers 
of lived experience explicit, and afterwards, discovers how executives apply 
understanding and beliefs to make sense of it. Where the subject (senior 
executive) and object (phenomenon) under investigation are to be seen as 
connected, executives’ behaviour during a phase of FI and their related actions 
are seen as ontologically grounded in the way of being in the social world.  
 
In line with the hermeneutic phenomenological strategy, the researcher 
provided an extensive explanation and reflection on his personal 
preconceptions and potential bias. Additionally, the ethical principles, which 
the study complies with, maintain and strengthen a rigorous and qualitative 
study. 
 
Data collection and analysis procedures were chosen in accordance with the 
research strategy to uncover in-depth information about the phenomenon.	 To 
seek appropriate data, the researcher used a purposive sample of executives 
from the CRE sector who have experienced the phenomenon. Qualitative 
interviews found access to executives and gained data from managers’ 
personal experiences, though processes and organisational procedures in 
SDM may generally be harder to collect due to corporate foresight and 
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reluctance to share strategic information. The distinctive data analysis steps 
undertaken helped uncover implicit information and provide sound results. 
 
Overall, the above provides for a methodologically coherent research design 
that takes the complexities of human experiences and their meaning, as well 
as sensemaking, about the phenomenon into account. It was selected as the 
appropriate approach because it was the most likely to reveal ontological 
implicit understanding of the phenomenon and, therefore, tell the story. As the 
topic developed from the personal experiences and interest of the researcher, 
the hermeneutic phenomenological approach provided space for the 
researcher by not excluding his valuable appropriate expertise for data 
analysis and interpretation. Participants shared their personal lived 
experiences of the phenomenon of FI and the approach added meaningful 
information when putting this into their specific contexts. Furthermore, as the 
meanings were mainly implicit, the phenomenological approach helped 
uncover relevant information by allowing the participants to freely talk and 
allowing the researcher to accompany them in reflection. Together with the 
qualitative inductive approach, it has proven to be an appropriate method for 
gaining in-depth data and facilitated answering the RQs for this study with 
empirical soundness. 
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Chapter Four: Findings 
 
The thesis has so far provided for the contemplated research gaps as well as 
the respective research design and methodology that were applied in this 
study. This chapter four presents the findings of the investigation. It includes a 
detailed description of the data analysis steps taken to derive the sub-themes 
and themes as well as the interpretations. 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings 
 
The structure of this chapter follows the step-wise process of the data analysis, 
as outlined in chapter three. Due to the partly deviating approaches to the 
interview data and for a proper distinction of the findings, this chapter is 
divided into the following four parts. 
 
First, the researcher introduces the findings related to the context and 
conditions of the corporate environment using TA. The study is highly context-
sensitive and this section provides the necessary analysis and explanation to 
capture the environmental circumstances under which CRE executives are 
usually operating and are experiencing.  
 
The managerial lived experiences of the phenomenon of FI are explored in line 
with RQ1. Guided by van Manen (1990) and influenced by Gadamer (1975; 
2004), the findings developed through an iterative process of analysis, 
interpretation, and reinterpretation of the participants’ descriptions. This 
allowed the researcher to become deeply involved with their experiences as 
well as expand his own understanding and horizons that contributed to the 
more objective and unbiased interpretation of the data. While it turned out that 
the analysis required a distinct consideration of the phase of FI and its most 
severe form, the event of FC, the findings are presented separately.  
 
The next section focuses on the organisational sensemaking process of the 
phenomenon (RQ2). When developing the sub-themes and themes, 
comparability with several of Weick`s (1995) seven properties became evident.   
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During analysis, the data relevant to these properties emerged in the final 
results and became part of the interpretation of organisational sensemaking in 
the phase of FI and the event of FC.  
 
Next, the analysis and interpretation of QIs and the implications for CRE 
companies are provided. Based on the concepts from RQ1 and RQ2, the data 
has been further processed to develop QIs and to explore implications that 
result from the lived experience and sensemaking of the phenomenon (RQ3). 
The analysis also includes the dimensions of FI and FC. 
 
Revisiting the researcher`s antipositivistic worldview with strong ontological 
guidance from constructivism, the findings are an outcome of detailed 
examination of the data, uncovering the meaning of FI as experienced by the 
executives in the CRE sector, grounded in interpreted facts that are attached 
to the meaning of the phenomenon. It became clear that the participants in 
each case made reference to the crisis context of the GFC in the period of 
observation (2005-2015) in the narration of their experiences. The following 
interpretation is through the construction of reality based on the life stories and 
perceptions of the interviewees at these times. In accordance with the 
hermeneutic phenomenological approach, the interpretation is primarily based 
on the participants` views, and researcher`s personal experiences and 
understanding in the process was as substantially limited, while impossible to 
fully exclude. 
 
4.2 The Corporate Environment of CRE Companies: Context and 
Conditions  
 
4.2.1 Analysis 
 
This section details the process of analysis and how the themes related to the 
organisational environment emerged from the preliminary and final analysis. 
The theme of “A complex and dynamic corporate environment” will be used 
exemplarily for the preliminary analysis. The other themes of “Dependency of 
business performance on developments in the corporate environment” and 
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“Uncontrollability of massive changes in the corporate environment” will be 
presented afterwards in the final analysis.  
 
4.2.1.1 Preliminary Analysis 
 
The preliminary analysis was conducted using van Manen`s (1990) detailed 
reading approach. Olivia, for example, described how she characterises the 
environment of her organisation as follows:  
 
“The environment has become more complex. In any case, I don’t 
think it is easy any more, no longer simple, it has become more 
complex and everybody who is of a different opinion, is either only 
involved in a part of the business or really has not been here that long. 
[…] My assessment derives from numerous characteristics. It is easy, I 
mean, on the one hand it is experience that one gained exceeds that 
[…] and also the personal experience that one can gain. And second, 
one sees different aspects of the business because of business 
model expansion or internally. Again I have to come back to the topic 
KVG. With the regulations nothing has become easier. This is 
where my assessment that it has merely become more complex 
derives from.” (Olivia #00:12:05#-#00:13:04#) 
 
The statements were extracted to a table and keywords were marked in bold 
and linked in extra columns. On the next level, a subsuming concept was 
assigned. From Olivia`s above statement, the keywords “environment has 
become more complex”, “business model expansion”, and “With regulations 
nothing has become easier“ were extracted. The concept became “A great 
amount of influencing factors in the remote environment”.  
 
The following table provides two other examples from interviews that mention 
relevant information for the characterisation of the organisational environment. 
These examples show how various concepts developed from the participants` 
data and how the process can be traced.  
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Significant Idea or Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking Keywords Concept 
 
“It is relatively complex because various 
factors do influence something like investment 
performance. It is less complex, because in 
the, in many different – but the mechanisms 
remain relatively the same. Insofar, our 
business is relatively well foreseeable and 
predictable.” (James #00:06:45#-#00:07:10#)  
 
Complex, various 
factors, 
mechanisms 
remain relatively 
the same 
 
Numerous 
dependencies on 
the developments 
of different 
structures and 
markets 
 
“Here it gets complex. Because at this point it 
becomes complicated and confusing, 
because we have very complex structures in 
tenant demand, geopolitical issues. My 
tenants also have to earn money and they in 
turn are dependent on geopolicy/economy. 
The whole environment is currently a bit 
unsettled and the same applies for the 
investment demand, this goes hand in hand. 
People who invest in real estate want to have 
a safe haven, and if this cannot be secured 
any longer and a bond is again more secure 
like real estate, demands will decrease. 
Therefore it is more complex. […] Interest 
rates and GDP growth.” (Sophia #00:05:21#-
#00:06:17#)  
 
 
Complex, 
complicated, 
confusing, complex 
structures, tenants 
have to earn 
money, dependent 
on geopolicy/ 
economy 
 
A great amount of 
influencing factors 
in the remote 
environment 
Table 9: Preliminary Analysis. Source: Author (2017). 
 
Sophia`s characterisation was different to James’, who mentioned that 
complexity is low due to relatively constant mechanisms. But apart from that, 
both participants shared several similarities in their statements, i.e. the 
classification of the organisational environment as complex due to a bulk of 
factors that have to be taken into consideration, with respective dependencies 
for their business, leading to some kind of confusion. 
 
This approach of preliminary analysis was used for all interviews, looking for 
significant statements, extracting them from the text, and linking keywords and 
concepts. 
 
4.2.1.2 Final Analysis 
 
With the outcomes from the preliminary analysis, the final analysis - based on 
van Manen (1990) and Gadamer (1975; 2004) - was conducted, moving on 
from keywords and concepts to sub-themes and themes. The emergence of 
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the theme “A complex and dynamic corporate environment” is illustrated with 
examples as seen in Table 10. A full overview of how the concepts and sub-
themes developed into the three themes for explaining the context of CRE 
organisations is provided in Appendix 5.  
 
The Theme of “A Complex and Dynamic Corporate Environment” 
The following table shows how the theme “A complex and dynamic corporate 
environment” developed using one of the sub-themes “Complex external 
environment”. The stories of the participants Harry and Olivia are used as 
examples.  
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme  
 
“[...] On the one hand, 
on the financing side, 
there are interest rate 
developments, that are 
important for the 
profitability of the 
property. On the other 
hand, there is the 
institutional investor, 
who is certainly not 
presented 
homogeneously in 
Germany […] That is, 
because of the manifold 
exogenous topics, a 
complex structure, and 
you must get to the 
heart of it and bring 
these together.” (Harry 
#00:08:16#-#00:09:14#) 
 
Financing 
side, interest 
rate 
developments, 
investor not 
presented 
homo-
geneously, 
complex 
structure, 
 
 
Heterogeneous 
structure of 
demands of the 
stakeholder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numerous 
dependencies 
on the 
developments of 
different 
structures and 
markets  
 
 
Complex 
external 
environment 
 
 
 
 
A complex 
and 
dynamic 
corporate 
environ-
ment 
 
“[…] What affects us is 
of course the interest 
rate policy of ECB. We 
could discuss at length if 
it is right or not. […] And 
this is for example the 
composition of the 
margins of the bank. 
[…] I believe, we have 
too less liquidity. That´s 
the uncertainty. This is 
the uncertainty, which 
the banks carry with 
them, and that is not 
logical for us, at first 
sight. Well, interest rate 
environment, politics, 
GDP growth – it 
depends how you look 
at it […]” (Olivia 
#00:16:27#-#00:18:55#) 
 
Affects, 
interest rate 
policy of ECB, 
margins of the 
bank, liquidity, 
banks not 
logical, interest 
rate 
environment, 
politics, GDP 
growth 
 
 
A great amount 
of influencing 
factors in the 
remote 
environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numerous 
dependencies 
on the 
developments of 
different 
structures and 
markets 
 
 
 
Complex 
external 
environment 
 
 
 
A complex 
and 
dynamic 
corporate 
environ-
ment 
Table 10:  Final Analysis of the Theme “A complex and dynamic corporate environment”. 
Source: Author (2017). 
 
The researcher approached this data coding using a word table when reading 
and re-reading the transcripts. Express specifics, similarities, and patterns 
about the phenomenon that appeared throughout the texts were highlighted 
and also linked with keywords and concepts. These were assembled with 
those from the preliminary analysis and grouped into a sub-theme. Additional 
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ideas emerged at a later stage when going from the parts to the whole and 
capturing all interviews as a holistic data set. 
 
As an example, one of the keywords that was attached to the statement of 
Harry is “investor not presented homogeneously”:    
 
“Well, very, very complex, I would say. On the one hand, on the 
financing side, there are interest rate developments, that are important 
for the profitability of the property. On the other hand, there is the 
institutional investor, who is certainly not presented homogeneously 
in Germany, but there are insurance companies, who are acting very 
professional, pensions schemes whose investment volume is around 2 
to 10 million and who are more emotional than professional. Further, 
the investment market is considerably difficult, not only temporarily but 
in, in times when demand is not that high. There are also fewer 
developments available in the market. That is, because of the manifold 
exogenous topics, a complex structure, and you must get to the heart 
of it and bring these together.” (Harry #00:08:16#-#00:09:14#) 
 
The concept that was connected was “Heterogeneous structure of demands of 
the stakeholder”. Other participants shared equivalent ideas, so similar 
concepts like “Numerous dependencies on the developments of different 
structures and markets”, and “A great amount of influencing factors in the 
remote environment” were grouped under the sub-theme “Complex external 
environment”.  
 
To make the steps more transparent, Olivia`s statement from the preliminary 
analysis is used:  
 
“The environment has become more complex. In any case, I don’t 
think it is easy any more, no longer simple, it has become more 
complex and everybody who is of a different opinion, is either only 
involved in a part of the business or really has not been here that long. 
[…] My assessment derives from numerous characteristics. It is easy, I 
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mean, on the one hand it is experience that one gained exceeds that 
[…] and also the personal experience that one can gain. And second, 
one sees different aspects of the business because of business 
model expansion or internally. Again I have to come back to the topic 
KVG. With the regulations nothing has become easier. This is 
where my assessment that it has merely become more complex 
derives from.” (Olivia #00:12:05#-#00:13:04#) 
 
Her keywords were “environment has become more complex”, “business 
model expansion” and “with regulations nothing has become easier”. These 
came up to the concept of “A great amount of influencing factors in the remote 
environment” which was brought together with similar concepts from the final 
analysis.  
 
For example, Charlie shared the experience by saying: 
 
“Complex. […] On the one hand, the political risk in which we 
operate currently, in an environment where regulatory 
encroachments exert great influence, after the financial crisis. And, 
as well the resulting risks for the markets. While in the past, we have 
seen real cycles in the respective, for example global real estate 
markets, we can currently see that the cycles simply change. And that 
is what economists determine oftentimes, that, let`s say, historic 
developments cannot be extrapolated to the future any more, because 
many, many developments are just diametrical illogical.” (Charlie 
#00:08:38#-#00:10:02#).  
 
This statement emphasises the reasons why the CRE sector is affected by 
strong regulations (after FC) and that this results in a respectively high 
complexity of the external environment. At the same time, the participant refers 
to the consequences of the regulations that, in his view, result in additional 
complexities due to shifts in cycles and seemingly illogical developments in the 
CRE sector. Even though Charlie provided different explanations than Olivia, 
both have shared thoughts under the concept of “A great amount of influencing 
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factors in the remote environment”, which merged into the sub-theme 
“Complex external environment”.  
 
Overall the theme “A complex and dynamic corporate environment” advanced 
from the two sub-themes of “Complex external environment” and “Dynamic 
external environment”. 
 
Using the table format for structuring and analysing the data has turned out to 
be an effective and systematic way of working for the researcher to group, link, 
and organise the data in a concise format. Sub-themes could be handled one 
by one and worked through by adding data and moving between the sub-
themes, and the information could be sorted not only textually but also visually. 
It helped to manage the large amount of unstructured data at the beginning 
and brought this into a format that the researcher was able to work with. 
Refining of the keywords, concepts, sub-themes, and themes meant that the 
analysis improved on an on-going basis, until finally a sound thematic 
development could be reached.  
 
The Theme of “Dependency of Business Performance on Developments 
in the Corporate Environment” 
This theme comprised of the sub-themes “Business model is oriented towards 
growth”, “Manifold strategic risks in the corporate environment”, as well as 
“Strong dependencies of the business model on developments in the corporate 
environment”.  
 
As an example, the development of the sub-theme “Strong dependencies of 
the business model on developments in the corporate environment” is 
presented. As with the other sub-themes, the words of the participants were 
grouped together according to related thoughts.   
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George talked about the relationship between the business model of his 
company and its external environment: 
 
“[…] all things that we are engaged in, say rent or otherwise we are 
dependent on our clients, thus our tenants, and because we are not 
actively managing but ultimately just provide the space, we are always 
also to some extent, lets say in retail still very significantly, also hotel 
and same for office, where the tenants ultimately have to make their 
money and the rent, much more indirectly involved the business than 
we are. But this also applies for us.” (George #00:11:33-#00:12:02#)  
 
Another participant, Harry, also confirmed the dependency for his business 
model, mentioning the development of the external environment as well as 
specific resources as relevant: 
 
“For sure, the possibility to acquire new properties, say the 
connection to the asset managers, property managers, developers to 
then purchasing and acquiring properties for the own fund and asset 
management […]” (Harry #00:27:13-#00:27:52#) 
 
Another executive was even more specific and mentioned interest rates, a 
macroeconomic resource, as one of the critical factors:   
 
“Now it is macro again, it is also interest rates, also geopolitical 
issues, I am very much dependent on that. And I cannot influence 
any of them, I can just implement them.” (Sophia #00:19:30-
#00:19:45#) 
 
From these three examples, the keywords were “Dependent on our tenants”, 
“Possibility to acquire new properties”, “Interest rates”, “Geopolitical issues”, 
and “Very much dependent”. These were matched to the concepts of 
“Dependency on interest rate development”, “Dependency on cash inflows and 
willingness to provide financing”, and “Availability of projects”. The respective 
sub-theme was “Strong dependencies of the business model on developments 
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in the corporate environment”, which became part of the overall theme of 
“Dependency of business performance on developments in the corporate 
environment”.  
 
Table 11 shows further examples of how this sub-theme and theme emerged 
from the keywords and concepts.  
 
 Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
 
“Well, as I said, the 
macroeconomic issues, 
population 
development, inflation, 
interest rate 
development have a, 
have a direct influence 
on our asset manage-
ment and fund manage-
ment performance, 
therefore definitively, 
yes.” (Harry #00:21:21#-
#00:21:40#)  
 
Population 
development, 
inflation,  
interest rate 
development 
 
Dependency 
on 
developments 
in the remote 
environment 
 
 
Dependency 
on interest rate 
development 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
“Certainly, strong. […] 
Because the individual 
factors, that make 
people to, for example, I 
have nothing more to 
offer then real estate, 
this is sometimes even 
binary, so either 
everybody wants it and 
likes it, or even no one, 
it is actually not en 
vogue and this is why 
the dependency is so 
strong. […] Here also, it 
is grotesque, I mean 
primarily, the interest 
rate environment, 
because a lot depends 
on it.” (James 
#00:19:39-#00:20:37#)  
 
 
Strong, 
binary, 
interest rate 
environment 
 
Dependency 
on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to 
provide 
financing 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependency 
on interest rate 
development 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
 
“Well, resources are 
essentially the cash 
inflows. As I said 
before, our investor is 
more a 50+ and this is 
why I assume it is very 
strongly dependent on 
the prosperity in 
Germany. […] For 
individual customers we 
are obviously slightly 
broader positioned, but 
very much focussed on 
Germany. Finally, we 
are much dependent on 
the German customer, 
that`s clear.” (George 
#00:17:29#-#00:18:09# 
 
Cash 
inflows, 
dependent, 
prosperity 
in 
Germany, 
customer  
 
Dependency 
on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to 
provide 
financing 
 
 
 
 
Dependency 
on 
developments 
in the remote 
environment 
 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
“The risk appetite of 
the money. And 
availability of a stable 
financial market 
environment, i.e. 
statutes, all these 
things. Not only how the 
interest rates look like, 
but also how the legal 
parameters are set, if at 
once Germany or 
Europe start to change 
their regulation, then I 
do have a problem, 
because there is no 
certainty and that would 
put my long-term 
business model at risk.” 
(Sophia #00:18:46#-
#00:19:17#) 
 
Risk 
appetite of 
the money, 
stable 
financial 
market 
environ-
ment, 
interest 
rates, legal 
parameters  
 
Dependency 
on 
developments 
in the remote 
environment 
 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
“It could – we are 
currently in an environ-
ment, where real estate 
is much in demand, the 
prices are also very 
high. There may come 
a time, were the 
environment suddenly 
materially changes and 
we will not have any 
possibility to exit the 
dearly bought properties 
well. That is, I believe, 
that is the highest risk 
that we face.” (Olivia 
#00:36:35#-#00:37:54#)  
 
There may 
come a 
time, were 
the environ-
ment 
suddenly 
materially 
changes 
 
 
Dependency 
on 
developments 
in the remote 
environment 
 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
 
“Well, certainly that is 
the political 
environment, in any 
case the politically 
stable environment and 
the supply of financial 
resources, interest 
rate development. 
These are the two 
primary drivers. I would, 
may be, add a third one, 
that is the regulatory 
environment […]” 
(Harry #00:28:11#-
#00:29:04#) 
 
 
Political 
environ-
ment, 
supply of 
financial 
resources, 
interest rate 
develop-
ment, 
regulatory 
environ-
ment 
 
Dependency 
on 
developments 
in the remote 
environment 
 
Dependency 
on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to 
provide 
financing 
 
Dependency 
on interest rate 
development 
 
 
Strong 
dependencies 
of the 
business 
model on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Dependency of 
business 
performance 
on 
developments 
in the 
corporate 
environment 
Table 11:  Final Analysis of the Theme “Dependency of business performance on 
developments in the corporate environment”. Source: Author (2017). 
 
Besides these, the concepts of “Dependency on developments in the task 
environment”, “Availability of human resources”, and “Availability of projects” 
became part of this sub-theme.  
 
The Theme of “Uncontrollability of Massive Changes in the Corporate 
Environment” 
The third theme that emerged was “Uncontrollability of massive changes in the 
corporate environment”. Related sub-themes were “Numerous risk factors in 
the external corporate environment”, as well as “Predictable development of 
the corporate environment“, “Non-controllable effects due to massive changes 
in the corporate environment”, “Limited alternatives to respond to epochal 
changes in the corporate environment” and “Massive changes in the corporate 
environment are not manageable with usual routines”. 
 
To show how this theme developed, the sub-theme “Predictable development 
of the corporate environment” is used as an example.  
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Again the statements of the participants were used to extract keywords and 
form concepts. Sophia, for example, talked about the development of the 
external corporate environment with regards to its predictability:  
 
“If I had looked at the last years, I had said, we are very stable. But I 
expect turbulences, I could see it coming already, and that’s why I 
expect turbulences that I will not be able to control, but I will react in 
the usual manner. I would not materially change my behavioural 
attitude because of that.” (Sophia #00:07:24#-#00:07:51#)  
 
Sophia predicted that some turbulence, which she will not be able to control or 
manage, will occur. Hence, she foresees upheavals and assumes that these 
are predictable in their development. 
 
Likewise, Harry made assumptions in order to be able to predict and assess 
the development of the external corporate environment.  
 
“People make assumptions. We can be wrong with the interest rate 
development, but for sure you can make certain predictions about the 
interest rate developments in the course of research and a 
macroeconomic consideration for a specific economic region.” (Harry 
#00:12:56#-#00:13:19#)  
 
From the above, the following linking keywords were compiled: “expect”, 
“assumptions”, and “predictions”. The concepts are “Predictable external 
environment due to previously determined expectations” and “Assumptions 
made about the developments of the corporate environment”.  The sub-theme 
“Predictable development of the corporate environment” further emerged. 
Table 12 shows some additional examples of this progress through each step 
of the analysis.   
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
 
“[…] calculable, because 
we are making 
assumptions that do not 
represent a “worst-case-
scenario”. But certainly 
always a “base case”, 
“best case” and “worst 
case”. And in the course 
of the overall view we do 
also illustrate the risks. 
And insofar, the 
investment will only be 
done when we can 
handle the calculable 
risks”. (Harry #00:12:13#-
#00:12:41#)  
 
Calculable, 
assumptions, 
scenario 
 
Predictable 
external 
environment 
due to 
previously 
determined 
expectations 
 
 
 
Assumptions 
made about the 
developments of 
the corporate 
environment 
 
Predictable 
development 
of the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Uncontroll-
ability of 
massive 
changes in 
the corporate 
environment 
 
“[…] on the 
macroeconomic level, to 
some extent, one can 
predict many things, 
prepare oneself and 
you have to do your 
homework, definitely. 
You can`t see every-
thing, because the 
behaviour of the other is 
depending on other 
factors. But, I believe, 
that’s the responsibility 
of every member of the 
management board, to 
think about what 
influences myself, how 
do I want to react on it, 
how do I prepare.” 
(Olivia #00:22:06#-
#00:22:48#)  
 
One can 
predict, 
prepare 
oneself, 
responsibility 
of the 
management 
board 
 
Predictable 
external 
environment 
due to 
previously 
determined 
expectations 
 
 
Predictable 
development 
of the 
corporate 
environment  
 
Uncontroll-
ability of 
massive 
changes in 
the corporate 
environment 
 
„Simply put, the asset 
class ‘alternatives‘ has 
advanced to a real 
asset class during the 
last year and I expect 
that this will develop 
further, sustainably. 
[…] But it is easily 
recognisable that the 
globalization of the 
world has led real estate 
as an asset class to 
becoming a real asset 
class.” (Charlie 
#00:20:15#-#00:21:06#)  
 
Asset class 
‘alternatives‘, 
real asset 
class, 
sustainably  
 
Predictability 
due to real 
estate being a 
sustainable 
asset class 
 
 
Predictable 
development 
of the 
corporate 
environment 
 
Uncontroll-
ability of 
massive 
changes in 
the corporate 
environment 
Table 12:  Final Analysis of the Theme “Uncontrollability of massive changes in the corporate 
environment”. Source: Author (2018)   
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4.2.2  Analysing the Corporate Environment of CRE Companies  
 
This section goes beyond the description of the data and attaches meaning to 
the external environment in which CRE companies operate. The researcher 
provides explanations while discussing the sub-themes and themes that 
developed from the data and brings the research into context. 
 
4.2.2.1 A Complex and Dynamic Corporate Environment  
 
As a first theme, “A complex and dynamic corporate environment” 
characterises the CRE sector. It derives from the sub-themes “Complex 
external environment” and “Dynamic external environment”, outlined in more 
detail below.  
 
Complex External Environment  
The senior executives perceived the external environment of a CRE 
organisation as generally complex. This is explained by the heterogeneous 
requirement structures of the stakeholders, numerous dependencies of the 
organisation on the development of different structures and markets, and a 
large number of influencing factors in the remote environment of a CRE 
organisation. 
 
The executives gained the impression of a complex task environment of the 
organisation because they do not perceive the investor as being “[…] 
presented homogeneously […]“ (Harry #00:08:16#-#00:09:14#). Moreover, 
investors appear heterogeneous in different types, from different sectors, and 
with different requirements on which the CRE companies, as service providers, 
orient themselves, or to which they have to align organisationally. 
 
The impression of a complex task environment was underlined by price and 
rent developments in the respective markets (Charlie #00:11:38#-#00:12:31#) 
as well as by the necessary assessment of the property location with regards 
to its stability, i.e. by means of the “[…] macroeconomic situation of a city 
[…]“ (Harry #00:09:35#-#00:10:09#). At the same time, the senior executives 
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perceived tenants and their demands as complex (Sophia #00:05:21#-
00:06:00#), because the background shareholder structures of tenants turned 
out to be unclear and diverse. Due to the fact that the tenants themselves have 
to earn the rent before they pay it, the profitability of the tenants is “[…] 
dependent on geopolicy/economy“ (Sophia #00:05:21#-00:06:00#), and thus 
there is also an indirect dependency of the property owners on that. 
 
Hence, complexity is also derived from the perceived remote environment of 
the organisation where various factors need to be taken into consideration. 
These include regulatory requirements and a resulting dependency on the 
legislator (George #00:03:41#-#00:04:39#), political risks (Charlie #00:08:40#-
#00:10:02#), requirements in terms of debt financing and facets of interest rate 
developments (Harry #00:08:16#-#00:09:14#), and GDP growth (James 
#00:08:58#-#00:09:06#) of an economy.  
 
Dynamic External Environment  
Depending on the business model of the CRE companies, the senior 
executives characterise their external environment as mostly dynamic, due to 
“[…] numerous factors […]“ (Olivia #00:19:27#-#00:19:41#) that have an 
impact on CRE organisations.  
 
A constantly changing requirement structure of the market participants 
contributes to such perceived dynamics. The continuous changes are 
generally experienced as not foreseeable, which leads to the impression that 
the lifetimes of CRE business models are “[…] becoming shorter and shorter 
[…]“ (James #00:10:36#-#00:10:56#). However, the executives still consider 
the task environment as stable where the rental income of RE constitutes a 
valued cash flow component as an “[…] anchor of stability“ (George 
#00:06:18#-#00:07:16#) and is typically not considered eroding.  
  
The perception of dynamism in the external environment by the executives is 
also underpinned with indicators from the remote environment of the 
organisation. From this angle, the external environment is perceived as 
dynamic because of a “[…] turbulent geostrategic environment“ (George 
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#00:06:18#-#00:07:16#) or because of the “[…] demographic development […]” 
(James #00:11:04#-#00:11:14#). Both contribute to a continuous and ever-
accelerating change (Olivia #00:19:49#-#00:20:01#) of the external 
environment. Here, interest rate developments play a special role because 
they encourage banks and institutionals to depart from their usual tasks and 
inherent purposes or “[…] doing things, they would not have done 
normally“ (James #00:11:11#-#00:11:20#). Therefore, the actions of credit 
institutions in connection with interest rate developments seem unpredictable.  
 
From a different angle, interest rate developments are attached to a more 
static-stable meaning, because it usually takes some time for interest rate 
adjustments to come into force (George #00:07:23#-#00:07:50#). Additionally, 
the executives recognised that the interest rate development ”[…] seems no 
longer as influenceable due to different reasons“ (Charlie #00:14:50#-
#00:15:30#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “A complex and dynamic corporate environment” 
Due to the numerous factors that dominate the remote, as well as the task 
environments of a CRE organisation, the corporate environment is 
characterised as complex by the senior executives. A heterogeneous structure 
of stakeholder demands and manifold dependencies on the developments of 
different structures and distinctive markets evoke challenges for executives` 
day-to-day management. They are not only directly concerned with regulatory 
requirements, market, or asset specifics, but are indirectly dependent on 
geopolitics, (macro-)economics, politics, or demographics. While these factors 
are generally volatile and mostly lack stability, the executives share the 
experience that the corporate environment is dynamic. CRE market 
participants are exposed to constantly changing conditions that are not easy to 
handle and that challenge them with on-going assessments and respective 
organisational actions to align.  
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4.2.2.2  Dependency of Business Performance on Developments in the 
Corporate Environment 
 
The second theme “Dependency of business performance on developments in 
the corporate environment“ is made up of three sub-themes: “Business model 
is oriented towards growth”, “Manifold strategic risks in the corporate 
environment”, and “Strong dependencies of the business model on the 
development in the corporate environment”. 
 
Business Model is Oriented Towards Growth 
The senior executives of a CRE organisation pursued four primary strategic 
targets. These are an improvement of the performance, accomplishment or 
defence of their market dominance, and, as a means to achieve both of the 
aforementioned, an increase of the assets under management while 
simultaneously enhancing client satisfaction. 
 
The achievement of top performance as a strategic goal (Charlie #00:04:59#-
#00:05:20#) is expressed differently by the participants, i.e. through 
accomplishment of the financial plan and increased revenues (James 
#00:04:41#-#00:05:02#), the aspiration to increase the clients` assets (George 
#00:02:17#-#00:02:46#), adding value, especially for the investors (Jake 
#00:05:27#-#00:06:20#), and also the generation of stable returns, particularly 
for institutional clients (Allen #00:00:56#-#00:01:03#), as well as the 
achievement of optimal investment performance (James #00:03:34#-
#00:04:23#).  
 
As for the second aim, the executives attempted to accomplish or defend their 
market dominance, in order to strive to “[…] being number 1 in the 
market“ (Scarlett #00:04:06#-#00:04:37#), and to “[…] be better than the 
competition“ (Charlie #00:04:59#-#00:05:20#), thus establishing an 
organisation that pioneers investment by wealthy private customers to invest in 
bigger, sizeable CRE (James #00:03:34#-#00:04:23#).  
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To achieve the aforementioned targets, an increase of the assets under 
management was necessary (James #00:04:41#-#00:05:02#). This required 
the creation of additional volumes for the investors (Jake #00:05:27#-
#00:06:20#) and granting foreign investors access to the (German) portfolio 
(Olivia #00:08:30#-#00:08:53#), as well as an extension in the product range 
(William #00:05:58#-#00:07:07#).  
 
The executives mentioned the above consistently in relation to the 
accomplishment and increase of client satisfaction. This is considered to be 
“[…] customer loyalty […]“ (James #00:04:41#-#00:05:02#), with the effect that 
“[…] satisfied clients […]“ increase their investments in the same but also other 
products (James #00:03:34#-#00:04:23#). In this context, it is necessary to 
“[…] make clients happy […]“ and to manage their assets “[…] as securely as 
possible and to lead through crises […]“ (George #00:02:17#-#00:02:46#). For 
the executives, this meant a “[…] creation of added value“ (Jake #00:05:27#-
#00:06:20#) for their investors, in particular, the realisation of stable returns 
(Allen #00:00:56#-#00:01:03#), and offering a great product range, as well as 
the possibility to access investment opportunities faster (William #00:05:58#-
#00:07:07#).  
 
The basis for the achievement of the strategic aims is the availability of 
projects that fit the requirements of the executives and ultimately those of the 
investors and clients. Projects comprise stabilised properties as well as 
development sites. At the same time, this requires the availability of sufficient 
funds to be able to acquire such projects. 
 
Manifold Strategic Risks in the Corporate Environment  
The senior executives identified a number of risks in achieving their strategic 
goals. These sit in the task environment and also in the remote environment of 
the organisation. Primarily, such risks arise from the goal of reaching 
performance targets, from price increases, from a lack of transparency, 
developments in the respective markets, from strong competition, interest rate 
developments, and regulatory requirements, as well as from the developments 
in the political environment of the CRE organisation.   
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Strategic risks emerge due to non-achievement of investment performance 
targets (James #00:05:11#-#00:05:56#). Against this background, a question 
about investors` expectations emerges. There is “[a] second field of risk, that 
we run […], or that we may carry, that we overpromise to our investors in 
terms of investment volumes” (Olivia #00:09:01#-#00:10:45#). To achieve the 
aspired and announced target returns (William #00:14:44#-#00:15:56#), the 
senior executives considered the timing of the acquisition (Sophia #00:03:15#-
#00:03:37#) as particularly relevant. In connection with the anticipated interest 
rate developments and unmodified return expectations, the participants 
expected future downside scenarios (Allen #00:02:51#-#00:03:24#).  
 
In the task environment of the CRE organisation, price risks have been 
identified as the most important risk factor for the market participants (George 
#00:02:51#-#00:03:27#). Olivia (#00:09:01#-#00:10:45#) emphasised, that the 
organisation is situated in a market where “[…] purchase yields are extremely 
low […]“ and “[…] prices are very high“. The participant concluded, that “[…] 
caution should be exercised“ in this market. As a consequence, thorough 
contemplations about what can be acquired for whom, and under which 
circumstances, and how these decisions were to be communicated became 
elementary (Olivia #00:09:01#-#00:10:45#). Also, it is stressed that a 
particularly high appraisal value of the properties was a result of historically 
low interest rates (Scarlett #00:10:01#-#00:11:24#). Furthermore, challenges 
may arise for the CRE organisation due to the increasing price developments 
against the stable return requirements of the investors (Allen #00:02:51#-
#00:03:24#). 
 
Olivia contemplates that strategic risks occur on different levels, and worries 
that the information needs of the investors, in order for them to be able to 
make the right decisions, might not be satisfied by her organisation (Olivia 
#00:09:01#-#00:10:45#). Such risks, arising out of a lack of available 
information, are supplemented with a lack of transparency in the markets. 
According to Jake, this arises out of a lot of withheld information, in the hopes 
that investors nevertheless make their decision in favour of the property (Jake 
#00:15:45#-#00:17:50#). In this context, the participant also stressed that due 
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diligence processes are often shortened in order to comply with the market 
pressures which in turn leads to a decrease of transparency in the transaction 
(Jake #00:15:45#-#00:17:50#). 
 
Another risk identified in the task environment of the CRE organisations is 
increasing competition. This is expressed by “[…] many people [who] enter the 
cosy core sector who previously were rather involved in investment banking or 
opportunistic asset classes” (James #00:05:11#-#00:05:56#). In this context, 
Scarlett emphasised that the historically low interest rate level has led to an 
oversupply of retail spaces in the market, which in turn increased pressures on 
rents (Scarlett #00:10:01#-#00:11:24#). 
 
Further strategic risks assigned to the remote environment of a CRE 
organisation were identified. George highlighted that the success of a CRE 
organisation depends on bond yields (George #00:02:51#-#00:03:27#). The 
executive attributed particular importance to the long-term development of the 
capital markets. James saw a risk in case of a sharp increase in the interest 
rate level (James #00:05:11#-#00:05:56#). In this context, Charlie highlighted 
the existence of interest-change risks for the organisation that need to be 
taken into consideration as economic risks in the yearly forecasts (Charlie 
#00:06:56#-#00:07:32#). Harry worried that the decrease of the RE quota will 
steer the CRE sector in a new direction and the interest rate increase will no 
longer be an important point of fact (Harry #00:06:23#-#00:07:40#). Allen 
stresses that an increase of interest rates in times of rising RE prices and 
continuous return requirements from the investors will challenge his CRE 
organisation (Allen #00:02:51#-#00:03:24#). 
 
The regulatory landscape turned out to be another important risk factor in 
realising the strategic targets. Olivia emphasised that the CRE sector is 
particularly highly regulated and risks arise from the circumstance that all of 
these regulations may not be considered adequately and affect the thus far 
positive image of the organisation (Olivia #00:09:01#-#00:10:45#). Charlie 
confirmed the existence of such regulatory risks in his organisation and added 
legal and statutory risks (Charlie #00:06:56#-#00:07:32#).   
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As further risks in the remote environment, the executives mentioned political 
circumstances (Harry #00:06:23#-#00:07:40#) and political developments 
(William #00:14:44#-#00:15:56#). They also identified threats from 
unpredictable events like Brexit shocks (James #00:05:11#-#00:05:56#) or 
other exogenous developments due to terrorist attacks (Harry #00:06:23#-
#00:07:40#). In this context, the executives also noted the risk resulting from 
volatile economic regions (Harry #00:06:23#-#00:07:40#), as well as due to 
currency and exchange rate developments or the maturity of the net asset 
value (William #00:13:47#-#00:14:30#). 
 
Strong Dependencies of the Business Model on Developments in the 
Corporate Environment  
The senior executives experienced a strong dependency between the 
business model of their CRE organisation and its external environment.  
 
With regards to the task environment, the participants considered their 
success to be highly contingent upon cash inflows and investors’ willingness to 
provide financing and the availability of investment projects. 
 
Olivia declared this dependency as the “[...] appetite of investors [...]“ (Olivia 
#00:27:08#-#00:27:19#), Sophia defined it as the “[…] risk appetite of the 
money“ (Sophia #00:18:46#-#00:19:17#) and James saw a dependency in 
general on the “[...] availability of capital and availability of assets“ (James 
#00:27:27#-#00:27:34#). Hence, the business model is dependent on 
resources, like liquidity and assets, which are external to the CRE organisation.  
 
Furthermore, the executives mentioned the dependency of their business 
model on the availability of human resources in the labour market. One of the 
major challenges for a CRE company, according to Charlie, is to be sufficiently 
attractive for the next generation of young employees (Charlie #00:30:43#-
#00:31:20#). Also, Olivia highlighted the “[...] availability of staff [...]“ (Olivia 
#00:35:26#-#00:36:21) as an issue that may cause trouble for reaching 
strategic aims. Therefore, securing qualified young talents for the CRE sector 
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is considered as a further addiction of the business model to resources in the 
task environment.  
 
The participants identified competition as another dependency in the task 
environment, appearing in different forms. Harry mentioned the necessity of 
“[...] offering assets that are yet also demanded in the market“ (Harry 
#00:19:48#-#00:21:08#). Olivia considered a dependency on pricing (Olivia 
#00:27:08#-#00:27:19#) and George explained a dependency on achievable 
rents and the tenants` performances of having to make the money to pay the 
rent (George #00:11:33#-#00:12:02#). The availability of suitable properties, in 
order to compete against the supply of space from competitors, setting 
adequate pricing for the assets, and the choice and performance of the tenants 
posit further dependencies of the CRE organisation.  
 
Additionally, the executives have identified further dependency factors in the 
remote environment of the CRE organisation for their business model. The 
dominating risk arises from its general dependency on the macroeconomic 
environment of the organisation. According to Charlie, his organisation is “[...] 
certainly heavily dependent [...]“ (Charlie #00:25:09#-#00:25:21#) on the 
macroeconomic environment. James confirmed this dependency as “[...] 
strong [...]“ (James #00:19:39#-#00:20:11#).  
 
Such macroeconomic factors were predominantly expressed in interest rates 
and their developments. Harry considered this to have a direct influence on the 
asset management and fund management performance in his organisation 
(Harry #00:21:21#-#00:21:40#). James pointed out that a strong dependency 
lies with the “[...] interest rate environment, because a lot depends on 
it“ (James #00:20:25#-#00:20:37). Charlie confirmed the dependency of his 
organisation on the interest rate development by acknowledging that the 
observation and reaction to any kind of change is part of his business (Charlie 
#00:31:37#-#00:31:58#). These dependencies offer chances for CRE 
organisations for financing in times of low interest rates. At the same time, 
such chances switch to risks when interest rates increase and the costs of 
financing may evolve to a great threat.   
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A further factor in the macroeconomic environment is the GDP growth of an 
economy. The executives noticed the importance of the “[...] population 
development [...]“ (Harry #00:21:21#-#00:21:40#), which is considered to have 
a direct impact on the asset management and fund management performance 
of the organisation. George saw the dependency on “[...] prosperity 
[...]“ (George #00:17:29#-#00:18:09#) of an economy while James emphasised 
a general dependency of the business model on GDP (James #00:27:48#-
#00:27:55#).  
 
Additionally, the executives experience dependencies on the regulatory 
requirements (Charlie #00:24:48-#00:25:01#) and legal parameters (Sophia 
#00:18:46#-#00:19:17#) of an economy, the political environment (Harry 
#00:28:11#-#00:29:04#), as well as the status of the financial markets in terms 
of stability (Sophia #00:18:46#-#00:19:17#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Dependency of the business performance on 
developments in the corporate environment” 
The senior executives experience their business model as being focused on 
growth and expansion in terms of performance, market leadership, assets 
under management, and customer satisfaction. Such expansion targets are at 
risk due to several strategic risks in the task and in the remote environment. 
There is a strong dependency on the business model in many of the factors in 
the corporate environment. Thus, the potential impact of the external 
environment on the CRE organisation is considerably high, and the necessity 
of managing potential impacts from this becomes an important task for 
executives in their SM. 
 
4.2.2.3  Uncontrollability of Massive Changes in the Corporate 
Environment 
 
As a third theme, “Uncontrollability of massive changes in the corporate 
environment” has been identified. It comprises the following five sub-themes: 
“Numerous risk factors in the external corporate environment”, “Predictable 
development of the corporate environment”, “Non-controllable effects due to 
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massive changes in the corporate environment”, “Limited alternatives to 
respond to epochal changes in the corporate environment”, and “Massive 
changes in the corporate environment are not manageable with usual routines”. 
 
Numerous Risk Factors in the External Corporate Environment  
The senior executives mentioned several different factors of assessing the 
external corporate environment. These concern the chances and risks of the 
CRE organisation and can again be associated with either the task or remote 
environment. 
 
The executives judged the changes in the task environment of the CRE 
organisation predominantly by indicators from the tenant market. Scarlett 
considered the external environment of her organisation on the basis of 
turnover development of the properties, the number of signed lease contracts, 
and the rent level (Scarlett #00:12:42#-#00:13:22#). Harry experienced the 
environment of his CRE organisation in terms of vacancy rates and “[…] new 
lettings […]” (Harry #00:31:52#-#00:32:40#). Additionally, James considered 
the “[…] space absorption […]“ (James #00:30:21#-#00:30:47#) of the market 
as a valuable factor. Furthermore, there are tendencies to look for information 
about the CRE buyer and seller markets or about transactions. Sophia, for 
example, mentioned that she analyses the corporate environment in terms of 
transaction volumes and “[...] which product is acquired at what price“ in order 
to be able to detect “[...] how does my direct environment behave, not only my 
direct competitor [...]“ (Sophia #00:21:24#-#00:22:21#). Here, this participant 
took particular note of the money flow of institutional investors, while Olivia 
mentioned looking at acquisition yields in the different asset classes (Olivia 
#00:40:31#-#00:40:50#). 
 
For the remote environment, the executives focused on an assessment of 
macroeconomic factors. Harry examined the interest rate development based 
on his own market research (Harry #00:31:52#-#00:32:40#). Sophia formed 
her view using external research data, even though this sometimes seemed to 
be contradictory (Sophia #00:21:24#-#00:22:21#). While James considered the 
availability of liquidity (James #00:30:21#-#00:30:47#) to be important in 
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assessing the external corporate environment, and Sophia similarly looked at 
the liquidity in the market (Sophia #00:21:24#-#00:22:21#). Olivia analysed the 
GDP in different countries (Olivia #00:40:31#-#00:40:50) and Harry considered 
the development of income levels (Harry #00:31:52#-#00:32:40#) in his own 
market research proceedings. Besides the abovementioned, inflation, as a “[...] 
classical factor [...]“ (Olivia #00:40:31#-#00:40:50), is applied. Furthermore, the 
executives made use of social dynamics, like population growth (William 
#00:12:19#-#00:13:36#), population development (Harry #00:31:52#-
#00:32:40#), demographic developments (James #00:30:21#-#00:30:47#), and 
demographic change (William #00:12:19#-#00:13:36#). At the same time, the 
participants mentioned regulatory factors (Jake #00:18:04#-#00:20:14#), 
currency movements, and the rise of megatrends (Charlie #00:36:17#-
#00:36:56#).  
 
Predictable Development of the Corporate Environment  
The senior executives considered changes or developments in the corporate 
environment, as well as the effects on their business arising from these, as 
being generally predictable due to predetermined expectations and 
assumptions.  
 
George deemed the corporate environment as foreseeable because affects 
“[...] do not at all fall from the sky [...]” (George #00:08:00#-#00:08:25#). Harry 
experienced the environment of his organisation as predictable because of 
existing assumptions about the development of the external environment 
(Harry #00:12:13#-#00:12:41#). Charlie also confirmed the assessment of a 
predictable external environment, explained by the sustainability of the asset 
class RE. Additionally, he mentioned exchanging information with other market 
participants in order to confirm his view and to count on experiences as a basis 
for his decisions (Charlie #00:19:31#-#00:21:06#). Olivia claimed that “[...] one 
can arrange for several issues, prepare for and one should do its homework 
[…] that`s the responsibility of every member of the management board, to 
think about what impacts myself, how do I want to react on it, how do I prepare” 
(Olivia #00:22:06#-#00:22:48#).  
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Non-controllable Effects due to Massive Changes in the Corporate 
Environment  
The senior executives have a different understanding of the possibilities to 
control changes in the corporate environment with regards to consequences 
for their CRE organisation. 
 
Ultimately, an exogenous impact has direct consequences for the respective 
investments, the asset classes and their performance. A terrorist attack in a 
shopping centre was mentioned as an example that had a direct impact on the 
frequencies and shopping behaviour and, consequently, on turnovers (Harry 
#00:13:42#-#00:14:35#). The effect of such an event on the CRE organisation 
is, in the view of the participant, assessable and calculable. Harry further 
stated that, from his point of view, changes in the macroeconomic environment 
of the organisation are also predictable, where several assumptions make the 
impact of the CRE organisation, at least to some extent, controllable (Harry 
#00:15:48#-#00:16:49#).  
 
Controversially, Charlie did not consider it possible to forecast the impact of 
changes in the corporate environment on the organisation. He underpinned his 
view by stating that political and regulatory risks, as well as statutory changes, 
are not predictable (Charlie #00:22:06#-#00:22:18#). Meanwhile, James takes 
a more differentiated view and perceived the impact of interest rate 
developments or inflation of an economy on a CRE organisation to be 
predictable. The impacts of massive changes in the corporate environment, 
however, are not predictable in his view, i.e. the collapse of the EUR currency 
(James #00:15:19#-#00:15:33#).  
 
In summary, the senior executives viewed the impact of changes in the 
external corporate environment on the CRE organisation as generally 
predictable as long as the event does not constitute a massive change in the 
remote environment of the organisation.  
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Limited Alternatives to Respond to Epochal Changes in the Corporate 
Environment  
The senior executives showed a general understanding of how they can or 
must, respond to changes in the corporate environment as long as these are 
not epochal. Then, in such serious instances the response options are 
considered limited and might impose challenges to the CRE organisation in 
handling such events. 
 
The number of possible alternatives does not seem large (James #00:15:58#-
#00:16:55#). Charlie had tools available to react to changes in the external 
environment and emphasised that, in the case of a risk situation, he would 
consider so-called defence lines to the extent within his area of responsibility 
(Charlie #00:23:22#-#00:24:04#). For Sophia, action alternatives to change 
were amendments to the product or a turn to different groups of investors 
(Sophia #00:10:10#-#00:10:53#). Another executive stressed that even though 
she is not able to implement all action on her own, she is very well aware of 
what has to be approved by the advisory board and what she can manage 
without board approval (Olivia #00:25:38#-#00:26:04#). James pointed out that 
an understanding about the possibilities of reactions to changes in the 
environment only exists as far as “[...] it is not an expression like ‘Euro bursts’ 
[...]“ (James #00:18:17#-#00:18:25#). 
 
Massive Changes in the Corporate Environment are not Manageable with 
Usual Routines   
The senior executives suspected that massive changes in the corporate 
environment are manageable with some adjustment of routine processes 
dependent on the degree of turbulence.  
 
Generally, George underlined that massive changes in the corporate 
environment can be handled with existing organisational routines (George 
#00:12:59-#00:13:28#). James stressed that there exist diverse tools, 
processes, and emergency procedures or survival strategies that are applied 
when familiar events occur. But he also points out that an event like Brexit 
required the executive to think afresh because there are no concepts or 
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processes for special unprecedented events like this (James #00:21:17#-
#00:21:41#). With a focus on process organisation, Charlie posited that 
regardless of the type and extent of changes in the corporate environment, an 
on-going adjustment of procedures in his organisation is necessary. Besides 
the required alignment, this may also include the abandonment of processes 
or divisions (Charlie #00:25:55#-#00:26:23#).  
 
Sophia clearly stated that she could not manage changes in the corporate 
environment with standard processes and routines. She would adjust the 
processes according to the new requirements and would implement new 
procedures where necessary (Sophia #00:12:44#-#00:13:21#).  
 
Another executive was more distinctive in his description and differentiated 
according to the strength of the event and the resulting turbulences. Generally, 
he also confirmed that changes in the corporate environment that are recurring 
could be managed by the CRE organisation with existing standard procedures. 
Those that are less routine, mentioning for example the events on September 
11 in New York, require a different treatment than a simple assessment of 
inflation, population developments, or volatilities in wages (Harry #00:22:08#-
#00:22:45#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Uncontrollability of massive changes in the 
corporate environment” 
In summary, the senior executives experience numerous changes and 
resulting risks in the task as well as in the remote environment of a CRE 
company. Hereto, the executives considered the developments in the 
corporate environment as generally predictable. However, the effects of any 
such changes on their organisation were stipulated as non-controllable. 
Although they felt that they were in the position to appropriately react to 
changes in the corporate environment, they considered their alternatives to 
respond in cases of epochal changes as limited. CRE organisations are not 
able to manage massive changes in the corporate environment with routines. 
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4.3 The Managerial Lived Experience of the Phenomenon of Financial 
Instability 
 
4.3.1 Analysis 
 
This section presents an overview of the analytical process to explore the 
managerial lived experience of the phenomenon of FI, and shows how the 
sub-themes and themes emerged. They essentially developed through 
reflection in existential analysis guided by the lifeworld existentials ‘lived body’, 
‘lived time’, ‘lived space’, and ‘lived relation’, as proposed by van Manen 
(1990), and the circular and dynamic procedures influenced by Gadamer 
(1975b). In addition to these general existentials, ‘lived feelings’ also emerged. 
 
4.3.1.1 Preliminary Analysis 
 
The preliminary analysis was conducted in the same way as described before 
in section 4.2.1.1. 
 
4.3.1.2 Final Analysis 
 
The final analysis of the ‘lived experience’ was split into the event of FC and 
the preceding phase of FI, where these two stages provided substantially 
different characteristics and meanings from the senior executives, which 
emerged during the preliminary analysis.  
 
4.3.1.2.1 The Themes and Sub-Themes of Financial Instability 
 
There emerged five themes from the 15 sub-themes about the lived 
experience of the phenomenon of FI. One of the themes, to which a lot of data 
from the transcripts was allocated, was “Unrealistic market situation”, which 
will be used exemplarily in the following presentation of the analysis. The other 
themes of “Informal and individual intensification of lived relations”, “Euphoria 
and expansion pressures of the actors”, “Unregulated workload in the 
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organisation”, and “Ignorance in perceived certainty” will be described 
afterwards.  
 
The theme “Unrealistic market situation” comprises of the sub-themes “Eroded 
market mechanisms and experiences” and “Risk-free availability of capital”.  
 
The analytical process started with selective reading and highlighting of 
participants` words that were grouped together according to similar thoughts 
and ideas. An example of how the executives talked about their experiences in 
the phase of FI is: 
 
“At that time, everything was possible and everything was generally 
okay, you know. I believe, what has been extremely 
underestimated were the new products that emerged on the 
market, that one surveyed. But this was not our playing field, not our 
sector. And we have only recognised this to a limited extent, no one 
really has dealt with this that much, actually. I think, we also 
focused on our real estates and the monies that were available. And 
probably, we were shy of looking beyond the end of our nose.” 
(Olivia #00:43:38-#00:44:47#)  
 
In another interview, Harry confirmed the exceptional market situation by 
mentioning the example of a total change in risk and investment behaviour due 
to the analyst`s recommendation, which was: 
 
“[…] a fully regulated and publicly listed REIT that was operating 
extremely conservative and with all approaches to risk management in 
its domestic market, but had to, by request of analysts and banks […], 
transfer to another risk area that one did not oversee moreover was 
not able to survey.” (Harry #00:38:21#-#00:39:56#)  
 
From these two statements, the keywords “extremely underestimated”, “new 
products”, “no one really has dealt with this”, “shy of looking beyond the end of 
our nose”, “transfer to another risk area that one was not able to survey“ were 
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highlighted and grouped in the concepts “Investments in ambitious and 
intransparent types of investment“ and “Inexperienced decision-makers“. 
Finally, this was assigned to the sub-theme “Eroded market mechanisms and 
experiences“, and became part of the theme “Unrealistic market situation“.  
 
The next table shows some further examples and how these progressed from 
the initial statements of the participants to keywords, becoming concepts, sub-
themes, and themes.  
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme  
 
“[…] the types of 
investments that were 
practiced in those days, 
for example mezzanine 
financing, […] for that 
you need to be trained 
as a banker […] to 
actively operate in that 
business. You need 
such an apprenticeship 
[…] these days you 
should not operate like 
a pure real estate 
investor in that area.” 
(Harry #00:57:24#-
#00:58:18#) 
 
Types of 
investments, 
need to be 
trained as a 
banker, not 
operate like a 
pure real 
estate investor 
 
Investments in 
ambitious and 
intransparent 
types of 
investment  
 
Inexperienced 
decision-makers 
 
Eroded 
market 
mechanisms 
and 
experiences  
 
Unrealistic 
market 
situation 
 
“[…] actually, prior to 
this there was no real 
situation, it was only 
afterwards a real 
situation that properly 
shows the 
macroeconomic 
circumstances.” 
(William #00:43:03#-
#00:44:39#) 
 
 
No real 
situation, that 
properly 
shows the 
macro-
economic 
circumstances 
 
Unrealistic 
macroeconomic 
situation (market 
mechanisms 
suspended) 
 
Eroded 
market 
mechanisms 
and 
experiences 
 
Unrealistic 
market 
situation 
“[…] and once you 
notice which properties 
were acquired, in 
recognition of the 
European market, then 
this immediately 
attracted your 
attention. […] with the 
result that this proves 
right because the major 
part of the portfolio 
had to be written off 
completely.” (Harry 
#00:45:26#-#00:46:15#) 
 
Which 
properties 
were acquired, 
immediately 
attracted 
attention, the 
major part of 
the portfolio 
written off 
completely 
Bad quality of 
acquired 
properties 
 
 
 
Inexperienced 
decision-makers 
Eroded 
market 
mechanisms 
and 
experiences 
Unrealistic 
market 
situation 
Table 13: Final Analysis of the Theme “Unrealistic market situation”. Source: Author (2018). 
 
The development of the other emerging themes and sub-themes related to the 
managerial experience of the phenomenon of FI is presented in Appendix 6. 
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4.3.1.2.2 The Themes and Sub-Themes of Financial Crisis 
 
With reference to the lived experience of the event of FC, there are five 
themes and 14 sub-themes. The theme “Unexpected market standstill” will be 
used exemplarily in the following description of the analysis. Further themes 
that emerged were “Formal and social intensification of lived relations”, 
“Disillusionment and consolidation of the actors”, “Without alternatives, 
alignment of the organisation in uncertainty” and “Irrational behaviour in 
perceived uncertainty”. 
 
The theme “Unexpected market standstill“ includes the sub-themes 
“Standstill“ and “Unexpectedness”. As before, the researcher used the words 
of the senior executives, which were grouped together along the lines of 
similar ideas to develop the sub-themes and themes. The sub-theme 
“Standstill” is used to illustrate the development of the theme. 
 
For the first theme, for example, the researcher found the statement of Jake 
who talked about his lived experience in the event of FC: 
 
“In principle, it was during a very short time when investment 
behaviour, bank lending behaviour, consent to investments in 
real estate was completely interrupted. Let`s say, it grew like a 
tsunami that irrupted at some point and people said: now 
everything is standing still. Nobody knew where it will lead to, 
nobody, it was a crazy uncertainty in the market – am I able to 
finance at all, am I able to acquire at that rent levels, am I still able 
to acquire at these cap rates.” (Jake #00:39:58-#00:41:55#)  
 
Allen confirmed this impression by mentioning and explaining that:  
 
“[…] then, the models suddenly did not work any longer because 
decreased leverage incurred increasing interest rate, well, and at 
the same time price declines as well as the lower value of the 
assets, and, then finally also causing the problematic situation 
with regard to the loans.” (Allen #00:06:34#-#00:07:08#)   
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From these statements the researcher highlighted the keywords ”during a very 
short time”, “investment behaviour”, “bank lending behaviour”, “investments in 
real estate was completely interrupted”, “everything is standing still”, 
“uncertainty”, “models suddenly did not work any longer”, “decreased 
leverage”, “price declines as well as the lower value of the assets”, and 
“problematic situation with regard to the loans”. From this, the concept of 
“Within short time investments and debt financing abandoned“ emerged. This, 
along with the other concepts of “Limited availability of capital” and “Stop of 
expansions”, were grouped to the sub-theme “Standstill“.  
 
Table 14 illustrates some further exemplary statements from the executives in 
this regard and it shows how they progressed to become part of the sub-theme 
“Standstill” and the theme “Unexpected market standstill“.  
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Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme  
 
“[…] first of all the 
publicity - so to say – 
with the existing system 
that goodish operates, 
the banking system 
was then however 
suddenly relatively 
quickly affected, I 
believe, this was 
definitely something 
where we thought, ‘well 
now, this will bring a 
massive change’.” 
(George #00:24:48# 
#00:25:46#)  
 
 
Banking 
system, 
suddenly 
relatively 
quickly 
affected, 
massive 
change 
 
Within short time 
investments and 
debt financing 
abandoned  
 
Standstill  
 
Unexpected 
market 
standstill 
“This has changed when 
[…] capital availability 
became limited, even 
though the valuation and 
evaluation of the 
properties, the 
profitability, the risk 
profiles of the assets did 
not provide for any 
reasons hereto. This 
has limited our business 
in this regard and it 
required us to stop 
further expansion due 
to limited capital 
availability […]” (Scarlett 
#00:20:01#-#00:21:33#)  
Capital 
availability 
limited, stop 
expansion 
Limited 
availability of 
capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Stop of 
expansions 
Standstill Unexpected 
market 
standstill 
     
Table 14: Final Analysis of the Theme “Unexpected market standstill”. Source: Author (2017). 
 
The development of the other emerging themes and sub-themes for exploring 
the managerial lived experience in the event of FC are presented in 
Appendix 7.  
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4.3.2  Analysing the Managerial Lived Experience of Financial Instability 
and Financial Crisis  
 
This part aims to explore the senior executives` experiences and the corporate 
meaning of the phenomenon of FI.  
 
The following section presents the interpretation of the findings from the 
analysed interview data guided by van Manen`s (1990) existential analysis and 
his fundamental existentials. 
 
4.3.2.1 The Managerial Lived Experience in a Phase of Financial 
  Instability 
 
4.3.2.1.1 Unrealistic Market Situation 
 
The first theme “Unrealistic market situation” comprises two sub-themes: 
“Eroded market mechanisms and experiences” and “Risk-free availability of 
capital”. 
 
Eroded Market Mechanisms and Experiences  
During this time, the senior executives perceived the macroeconomic situation 
as unrealistic. Strategic decision-makers, some of them with only little RE 
experience, engaged with ambitious and intransparent types of investment and 
acquired properties of low quality.  
 
William perceived this as “[…] no real situation […] that properly shows the 
macroeconomic circumstances“ (William #00:43:03#-#00:44:39#). During this 
phase, Jake experienced “[...] horrendous added values [...], that were yet also 
in part additionally financed“ (Jake #00:27:45#-#00:29:16#). Likewise, Charlie 
confirmed this view by mentioning hyperbolic investment markets as 
characteristic for this time (Charlie #00:45:59#-#00:46:14#). James recognised 
that during this phase, risk premiums of CRE returns and bond yields have 
been major criteria for investors to make their acquisition decisions for 
properties (James #00:41:28#-#00:41:56#).   
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From Harry`s point of view, the business remained rather conservative during 
this time and all possible tools of RM had been taken into consideration. But 
one was pressed ahead by recommendations of analysts and consultants to 
operate in an area of risks that one did not, and could not, oversee (Harry 
#00:38:21#-#00:39:56#). During this phase, new products that came into the 
market were extremely underestimated because they were not part of people`s 
core competencies. Moreover, the focus was on CRE properties and monies 
that were available. Olivia pointed out having been too “[...] shy of looking 
beyond the end of our nose“ (Olivia #00:43:48-#00:44:47#) during this time. 
The investment types that were realised usually required completed banking 
training (Harry #00:38:21#-#00:39:56#), and Harry stressed that “[...] there 
were also several actors who exploited the situation to profit from other third 
parties` inexperience [...]“ (Harry #00:42:37#-#00:45:06#).  
 
James characterised this time as a phase of desperation where good 
properties in prime locations could hardly be found and the prime factor 
collapsed against the periphery (James #00:40:44#-#00:41:13#). Beside other 
factors, Olivia got the impression that everything was just very expensive 
(Olivia #00:45:10#-#00:45:55#). And James perceived the properties as being 
massively “[…] high-priced“ (James #00:40:13#-#00:40:34#) at this time, while 
also experiencing the “[...] investment pressure [...]“ from the investors` side 
(James #00:36:22#-#00:36:37#). 
 
Risk-free Availability of Capital 
In terms of the financing of RE projects, this phase was characterised by high 
availability of capital without any requirement for providing warranties by the 
debtor. At the same time, the senior executives experienced extremely high 
relations of loan to values. Additionally, it was perceived that risks were 
outsourced to the financing banks. 
 
During this phase, Olivia recognised that the actors had a great focus on 
available funds (Olivia #00:43:38#-#00:44:47#). While Jake emphasised that, 
with regards to debt financing of CRE, people actually lost sight of things at 
that time, and everybody could obtain debt financing and everybody did (Jake 
FINDINGS 		
	 197 
#00:31:30#-#00:35:02#). This participant added that a loan to value of 90% to 
95% was nothing special then. Sophia stated the same and underpinned this 
by mentioning that debt was available for CRE financing even without 
warranties and that the loan to value steadily increased up to 90%. She was 
stunned that such pattern was possible at all (Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#). 
For Sophia, the changes in the ratio of the loan to value (Sophia #00:32:04#-
#00:32:10#) as well as the active outsourcing of client risks to the banks 
(Sophia #00:28:08#-#00:28:48#) were characteristic for this time. 
 
Summary of the Theme “Unrealistic market situation”  
The senior executives perceived the time prior to the FC as being a phase 
where market mechanisms had been suspended because of a lack of 
transparency and the inexperience of the actors. Their experiences in the CRE 
sector from the past had been faded out. This phase was characterised by 
high availability of capital that was provided for investments without, or with 
only little, guarantee requirements by the debtor, where risks had been 
outsourced from the CRE companies to the financing banks. Overall, the 
executives perceived this to be an unrealistic market situation. Guided by van 
Manen`s (1990) existentials during the advanced analysis, this theme was for 
the most part reflected against the existential of ‘lived time’. 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Informal and Individual Intensification of Lived Relations 
 
As a second theme, an “Informal and individual intensification of lived relations” 
was identified. This comprises two sub-themes: “Informal intensification of the 
relations in order to assess the situation” and “Individual intensification of the 
relations in order to account for potential consequences”. 
 
Informal Intensification of the Relations in Order to Assess the Situation  
To assess the situation, the senior executives used informal talks with several 
parties on different levels during this phase. 
 
According to George (#00:30:26#-#00:30:42#), the assessment of the situation 
was a ”[...] multi-layered approach [...]“ because it is always multiple persons 
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who determine the situation. Information and assessment were mainly sought 
informally (James #00:45:17#-#00:45:35#) through phone calls and 
conversations (Olivia #01:16:26#-#01:16:43#). The exchange took place with 
market participants and clients (James #00:35:54#-#00:36:05#), researchers 
(George #00:23:16#-#00:23:55#), with friends and the personal network 
(Charlie #00:49:51#-#00:49:55#), the management committee and other senior 
management (James #00:42:32#-#00:42:43#), the risk committee (James 
#00:43:15#-#00:43:49#), heads of transactions and asset management (Olivia 
#00:54:57#-#00:55:42#), as well as the supervisory board (James #00:51:50#-
#00:52:09#). 
 
Individual Intensification of the Relations in Order to Account for 
Potential Consequences   
In order to account for the potential consequences of the perceived situation 
for the CRE organisation, relations were intensified on an individual basis.  
 
On the interpersonal level, the senior executives addressed long-term risk and 
outlined the consequences during the cycle (Olivia #01:16:50#-#01:18:06#), 
while documenting the perceived situation in detail (Olivia #01:16:26#-
#01:16:43#). At their own discretion, and informally, they passed their 
assessment on to colleagues (James #00:45:17#-#00:45:35#), communicated 
the necessity of a prior, intensive research on the target markets (Harry 
#01:00:50#-#01:01:09#), and reassessed their investment approach and 
strategy (Harry #00:40:35#-#00:41:27#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “Informal and individual intensification of lived 
relations”  
The senior executives experienced that they had intensified their network 
during the phase of FI in order to assess the situation. This was mainly an 
informal consultation or discussion on different levels. The executives had 
used different ways to address the potential long-term consequences of the 
situation, to document their assessment, and to review present investment 
approaches. The informal discussions about the assessment of the situation, 
as well as the communication of their own considerations, indicate that the 
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organisation did not have any formal procedures or communications structure 
in place. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the exchange, as well as the 
communication of information, was only unofficial in order to avoid being 
regarded too critically by colleagues, the advisory board, and other employees. 
Over the course of the analysis and reflection guided by van Manen (1990), 
this theme was predominantly exposed to the existential of ‘lived relation’.  
 
4.3.2.1.3 Euphoria and Expansion Pressures of the Actors 
 
The third theme “Euphoria and expansion pressures of the actors” comprises 
four sub-themes: “Ignorance of the decision-makers”, “Financing pressure of 
the banks”, “Decisions under pressure to succeed” and “Investment pressures 
of the clients”. 
 
Ignorance of the Decision-Makers  
During this phase the addressees were perceived as not interested in the 
information about the assessment of the situation. The participants noticed a 
lack of skills that prevented the addressees from processing the information. 
Furthermore, the decision-makers must experience non-compliance with the 
principles of due diligence. 
 
Olivia experienced the following in this phase:  
 
“Actually, I don`t know how I made it, but thanks to god they have 
listened. May be one or the other thought ‘goodness, she is 
exaggerating’. But no one really expressed that toward me. Or even if 
they said something like that then it was – with a nice manner, this was 
not dismissive or somehow pejorative. I think, also because I was new, 
they listened. I did not have the feeling, that they were casual about 
me, but I generally had the feeling that I cannot get away with this” 
(Olivia #01:11:45-#01:19:08#).  
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According to Sophia, the addressees reacted “[p]ejoratively and dismissive […]” 
(Sophia #00:44:34#-#00:44:36#) and they had “[i]mmediately 
forgotten“ (Sophia #00:44:39#-#00:44:41#) about the information provided.  
 
She perceived a specific behaviour of her addressees:  
 
“No. Yet, it must be said that, people actually don`t want to know it. 
That`s it. If I talked about things like that, I realised that my counterpart, 
being it shareholder or investor, they were not interested in warning 
statements.” (Sophia #00:38:38#-#00:39:00#)  
 
Despite the non-existent interest, Harry perceived that in CRE transactions 
there was “[...] no relevant knowledge“ (Harry #01:02:51#-#01:03:18#). Olivia 
underpinned the perceived change in the behaviour of the decision-makers in 
the organisation during this time as follows: 
 
„What made me recognising this was the basis for the decisions. In 
many cases the commercial principles of a proper due diligence have 
been ignored. Decisions have been made like this. Imagine, if you 
acquire a real estate asset, you have to carefully look what you are 
buying. This is not only opening the door and walk in. Technically – 
look at the property for different things. And if you recognise, it`s 
sufficient to arrange for a helicopter, I buy, you now, there is something 
wrong.” (Olivia #00:45:10#-#00:45:55#)  
 
Financing Pressure of the Banks  
Additionally, the senior executives also experienced a change in the behaviour 
of their banks during this phase towards an open and active approach to their 
clients. At the same time, banks did not require the borrowers to provide 
warranties or other securities. The executives felt that the banks did not 
possess the necessary CRE expertise and therefore a feeling of power over 
the banks evolved. 
  
FINDINGS 		
	 201 
Sophia emphasised that during this phase banks acted “[…] too bullish […]” 
towards their clients (Sophia #00:43:59#-#00:44:11#). The banks contacted 
the borrowers in a forthright manner regarding their need for refinancing. 
Sophia perceived this feeling of power of the client towards the bank as 
inappropriate (Sophia #00:31:33#-#00:31:55#). Furthermore, no warranties 
were required any longer (Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#). Harry stated that 
many financing banks were acting in markets that they did not know and did 
not understand (Harry #00:38:21#-#00:39:56#). 
 
During this phase, Sophia experienced another change in the behaviour of the 
banks. Where previously it was mandatory to ”[…] service interest and 
repayment obligations […]“, suddenly, in the phase prior to the FC, only the 
“[…] interest cover ratio […]“ became important. Sophia named the bank and 
their behaviour as “[…] very euphoric […]“. It felt strange, that the financing 
banks wished to push the external appraiser “[…] to make it a higher value” for 
the property to be financed (Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#). 
 
Decisions under Pressure to Succeed  
During the phase of FI, the senior executives thought only little about the 
potential consequences of their decisions and did not embrace the full 
complexity of the circumstances. Decisions had been made under pressure. 
 
Sophia mentioned that she tried to foresee risks in this phase and to control 
those in the RM of the organisation (Sophia #00:42:48#-#00:42:53#). Olivia 
stressed that there were 
 
“[…] little thoughts about the consequences. And, because such 
investments were authorised, the decisions were finally made by, 
under pressure.” (Olivia #01:00:09#-#01:00:40#) 
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Sophia emphasised that she acquired properties during this phase 
 
“[…] that were much worse in quality, at a price that could be 
considered favourable in comparison what has been paid elsewhere in 
the sector, but because the quality was much worse, it was yet much 
more expensive then acquiring quality at a higher price.” (Sophia 
#00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
 
From her perspective, it would have been the right strategy to either not 
acquire anything or to acquire really expensive assets. Olivia stated that she 
was “[…] shy of looking beyond the end of our nose.“ She explained that, 
despite having looked at the properties, she did not pay attention to how “[…] 
the different products were compiled and resold, what are the hedgefonds 
doing, what are alternatives.” This participant believed that she had overlooked 
something during this phase, because she regarded the “[…] real estate 
economy simply […] isolated […]”, and did not recognise its complexity (Olivia 
#00:47:02#-#00:50:39#).  
 
Investment Pressures of the Clients  
The senior executives perceived an increased investment pressure from their 
clients during the phase of FI, especially driven by higher leverages. Thus, the 
CRE asset was given more attention in terms of property yield. 
 
Olivia said that she felt more investment pressure from the clients and the wish 
to acquire more properties in a shorter term during this phase (Olivia 
#00:56:32#-#00:57:18#). Similarly, for such a period Sophia noticed that when 
she did not exceed 80% leverage, the investor and shareholder pressured 
“[a]nd up we go“ (Sophia #00:39:35#-#00:40:03#).  
 
James perceived the circumstance of steadily growing repayments of the 
funds, compared to the former strong inflow. Additionally, he expressed his 
incomprehension regarding clients who were happy about vacant properties 
with the explanation that increasing market rents could lead to better exit 
prices (James #00:34:58#-#00:35:40#). Olivia determined, in this regard, that 
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during this phase “[…] a lot of institutions and investors in several retail funds 
[…] just have parked their monies there. And the regulation at that point of time 
did permit that they could request their money back within relatively short 
notice.” (Olivia #00:47:02#-#00:50:39#).  
 
Harry assessed this time as a period where one was  
 
“[…] send off, to manager investment worldwide […] based on a 
spread of financing costs and the actual net initial yields of the property, 
regardless of where the property is located, of its quality […] but the 
target was just the spread of around 250 basis points […] which finally 
led the partner, when released, acquired everything with a yield of 
more than 7% […].” (Harry #00:42:37#-#00:45:06#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Euphoria and expansion pressures of the actors” 
The senior executives perceived a behavioural change of the actors during the 
time prior to the outbreak of the FC. The executives were characterised as 
ignorant because they were either disinterested in the information about the 
situation to be able to assess it or they lacked the respective knowledge to use 
the information.  
 
General guidelines for commercial due diligence had been neglected. Because 
of the investment pressures from the investors and the financing pressure of 
the banks, the executives were under successive pressure to find appropriate 
assets and to invest the clients’ monies. In this phase, the actors lived in a 
‘here and now’ and did not invest much effort into seeing the big picture. Due 
to the short-term success pressure, they did not consider the long-term 
consequences of their actions. The executives have experienced the 
behaviour as euphoric and focused on expansion. During the existential 
analysis, and in accordance with van Manen (1990), this theme became 
mainly reflected against the existential ‘lived body’.  
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4.3.2.1.4 Unregulated Workload in the Organisation 
 
The fourth theme “Unregulated workload in the organisation” comprises three 
sub-themes: “Unregulated processing of a large number of projects”, 
“Unchanged analysis of information” and “Maintenance of the strategic focus”. 
 
Unregulated Processing of a Large Number of Projects  
The senior executives mentioned a perception of a growing number of projects 
as well as a higher workload in their CRE companies during the phase of FI. At 
the same time, such work was performed in a working environment that was 
limited in regulations and guidance. 
 
Olivia noticed that during this phase she was  
 
“[…] closing deals every month. Every month another property was 
added. […] And every month a further property, that means a lot of 
work and of stuff remains behind and that`s what happened.” (Olivia 
#01:01:32#-#01:05:14#)  
 
She added that “[g]overnance was non-existent […] At the time, everything 
was a bit more loosely.“ (Olivia #01:05:41#-#01:06:55#) 
 
Unchanged Analysis of Information  
In order to be able to control the CRE organisation during this phase, the 
senior executives monitored the tenant market dynamics, analysed the 
macroeconomic developments, and deduced the mood of the CRE sector from 
reports and discussions. The intensity remained unchanged, as usual. 
 
Charlie monitored the volume of RE transactions and the yield development 
(Charlie #00:42:07#-#00:42:27#), analysed the lettings, and evaluated the 
existing portfolio (Charlie #00:42:35#-#00:45:41#) as well as the developments 
and dynamics on the tenant markets (Charlie #00:39:15#-#00:41:57#). Here, 
macroeconomic analyses and research reports with a CRE focus were also 
taken into consideration (Charlie #00:50:42#-#00:51:02#). James used market 
analyses and client publications for his assessment and control of the CRE 
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organisation (James #00:44:04#-#00:44:39#). George talked to researchers 
and included long-term cycles of the investment and leasing market in his 
analysis (George #00:23:16#-#00:23:55#). Another participant said she 
focused on internal risk reports and profit forecasts (Scarlett #00:27:47#-
#00:28:29#), while another interviewee used discussions with market 
participants and clients as an add-on to his own analysis (James #00:35:54#-
#00:36:05#). And lastly, some information about the situation prior to the 
outbreak of the FC was taken from the press (George #00:25:52#-#00:25:54#).  
 
Maintenance of the Strategic Focus  
The senior executives experienced only marginal pro-active changes in 
organisational processes as a response to the perceived environmental 
changes during this phase. However, the decision-makers properly 
documented the perceived situation and the effects on the organisation. 
 
James implemented “[…] adjustments here and there […]“ due to the 
environmental changes but the strategic direction remained the same (James 
#00:48:19#-#00:48:27#). Charlie acted “[…] operationally preparatory, 
imposing processes and measures, in order to being able to respond to every 
possible risk event” (Charlie #00:55:26#-#00:56:18#). Olivia limited her 
reaction on the perceived changes “[…] reduced – to a proper documentation 
of the process […]”. In retrospect, she considered these actions as “[…] 
absolutely not sufficient. But at that point in time it was the right thing” (Olivia 
#00:58:25#-#00:59:55#). Harry also noticed that the RM of his CRE 
organisation gathered information about the situation, but they did not decide 
what consequences should follow (Harry #01:02:28#-#01:02:46#). Sophia tried 
to “[…] being more critical in acquisitions“ and subsequently determined that 
she was not sufficiently critical (Sophia #00:39:23#-#00:39:30#). James 
arranged for some behavioural changes in his organisation with regards to a 
“[…] turn to products that are much more predictable […]” (James #00:47:33#-
#00:48:09#) during this phase. At the same time Sophia implemented “[c]over 
mechanisms […]“ in their Asset Management Agreements (Sophia 
#00:39:13#-#00:39:18#). 
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Summary of the Theme “Unregulated workload in the organisation” 
In the phase of FI, senior executives perceived the CRE organisation as a 
place where numerous projects were processed, but guidelines in this regard 
were only available to a limited extent. The increased workload was handled 
by the executives and their staff, commonly without standardised processes 
and rules or instructions. The assessment of the situation and the control of 
the organisation were managed on the basis of unchanged information 
analysis. Indeed, they tried to determine the sentiment in the CRE sector from 
talks and reports, but they did not extend their information basis for an 
assessment of the situation. Beside marginal operative adjustments within the 
CRE organisation, the executives did not initiate any strategic changes in the 
organisational or process structure. Moreover, their reaction was limited to 
perceiving the environmental changes and its immediate impact and 
documenting those properly, attached with their personal evaluation, for their 
organisation in order to derive recommendations for action. During the course 
of the existential analysis and reflection this theme was for the most part 
reflected against the existential of ‘lived space’. 
 
4.3.2.1.5 Ignorance in Perceived Certainty 
 
The fifth theme “Ignorance in perceived certainty” comprises four sub-themes, 
“Overstrain leads to resignation”, “Over-optimism”, “Ignorance”, and “Certainty”.   
 
Overstrain Leads to Resignation  
In this phase, the senior executives perceived the communication of their 
assessment of the situation as a challenge. They said they acted more 
cautiously towards the recipients and found themselves to be unclear and 
discouraged to communicate. 
 
Olivia reflected that she considered herself as a ”[…] guardian […]“ and it was 
challenging for her to put the brakes on her colleagues` euphoria (Olivia 
#01:18:10#-#01:18:27#). The executive sent cautious signals to the 
addressees to describing the perceived situation. She tried to avoid being 
penetrating, which affected the clarity and explicitness of the messages (Olivia 
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#00:51:30#-#00:53:03#). Although the messages were communicated, Sophia 
emphasised that she had experienced that the addressees did not even want 
to know anything about such warning signals regarding the perceived situation. 
As a reaction to this, and in order to make her life less difficult, she stopped 
such discussions (Sophia #00:38:38#-#00:39:00#). Similarly, due to the 
reaction from the addressees, Olivia felt that she was “[…] perceived unstable 
[…]” (Olivia #00:51:30#-#00:53:03#) and lost the motivation to inform about the 
situation and her assessment.  
 
Over-Optimism  
The senior executives perceived this phase as a period of euphoria and 
exaggerations. They noted that CRE had been acquired above value and the 
sector was characterised by a missing problem consciousness.  
 
Olivia emphasised that the actors had underestimated the situation (Olivia 
#00:51:30#-#00:53:03#) and described the phase as marked by ”[…] great 
optimism everywhere and I believe this made us blind“ (Olivia #00:42:53#-
#00:43:30#). Harry named it a misjudgement of the market (Harry #00:46:38#-
#00:46:40#). For Sophia, the situation was euphoric, everything was possible 
and “[…] still high potential“. She described the perception of an omnipresent 
optimism (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#). Self-critically, the participant 
reflected that she herself “[…] also acquired a portfolio at an exorbitant 
price“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) during these times.  
 
Also, James mentioned “[…] high prices for real estate“ (James #00:56:39#-
#00:59:14#) in this context and judged himself for having thought too long that 
this would go well (James #00:54:33#-#00:56:20#). Harry determined that he 
and his colleagues were “[…] not the only ones who were very euphoric, at 
that time, so […] unbridled in the market” (Harry #00:42:37#-#00:45:06#). He 
characterised the market behaviour as “[…] overestimating oneself and only 
seeking for expansion“ (Harry #00:40:06#-#00:40:26). Allen perceived a lack of 
consciousness of the problem and compared the time to the “[…] wild west […]” 
(Allen #00:05:41#-#00:06:08#). Charlie considered this phase as one of “[…] 
exaggeration […]” (Charlie #00:40:14#-#00:40:43#). Olivia also stressed that, 
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from her point of view, during this phase there were “[...] no rational decisions 
– not based on a rational analysis, but made under pressure. Investing, being 
fast, placing money quickly without thinking” (Olivia #01:00:50#-#01:01:25#).  
 
Ignorance 
As a further point, the senior executives perceived that there was only little 
reaction to warning signals and a lack of adjustment by the CRE organisation 
to the changing market conditions. Furthermore, the CRE had been acquired 
with less criticality, and experiences of the actors from the past were ignored. 
The executives felt that the market situation was not healthy and that the 
decisions were wrong. This led to diffused gut feelings, which were eventually 
faded out and ignored. 
 
In this phase, Olivia perceived that the addressees had in fact received 
indications about the situation, but due to no resulting short-term 
consequences she felt that those were ignored (Olivia #01:19:03#-#01:19:35#). 
Harry witnessed how his organisation failed in foreign markets because the 
actors did not adjust to the different domains properly. The executives  
 
“[…] failed with such a naive approach, because they did not adjust to 
the foreign market, or placed their internal experiences […] onto the 
foreign market. And this is why many failed.” (Harry #00:38:21#-
#00:39:56#)  
 
For Charlie, this phase was characterised by “[…] closing the eyes, forgetting 
past experiences, non-observance of cycles […]“ (Charlie #00:40:14#-
#00:40:43#), which also underpins the ignorant behaviour of executives. Olivia 
perceived the actors as “[…] placing money quickly without thinking“, but not 
looking beyond and asking for “[…] did I do everything, did I see everything, 
did I uncover all risks“ (Olivia #01:00:50#-#01:01:25#). Even though Sophia felt 
that during the situation it was “[…] no longer healthy“, she ignored these 
feelings while “[…] hoping that it hits the others, that it comes a year later” 
(Sophia #00:34:01#-#00:35:18#). Charlie mentioned that he previously thought 
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about how to react when the cycle moves downwards but he did not expect 
“[…] that it comes to a total crash“ (Charlie #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#).  
 
Even though James had a diffused gut feeling during this time, all his 
experiences were ignored (James #00:56:39#-#00:59:14#). He discounted the 
“[…] feeling, I would like to sell more […], to reward the money back to the 
clients, waiting until the market is down […] and then we can start to acquire 
again” (James #00:37:22#-#00:39:17#.) Olivia determined that during this 
phase ”[…] you feel the decision is not right. Or, may be the decision is right, 
but how I derived there is not correct. And then, if you don`t know the process, 
the steps, it becomes clear, there is something wrong.” (Olivia #00:46:11#-
#00:46:43#).  
 
Furthermore, the executives mentioned that factors like loan to value, cap 
rates, or rent levels alone couldn’t provide an answer if and when the bubble 
burst.  According to Jake, the context and the perception of the actors “[…] at a 
time where there was no more leeway in the market, say, no more ideas to 
add value and this is why the bubble burst some day” (Jake #00:35:30#-
#00:37:23#) were much more decisive.  
 
Certainty  
As a further characteristic of the corporate environment in this phase, a 
perceived certainty developed, where macroeconomic factors were perceived 
as harmonious. 
 
From James`s perspective, his perceived certainty was derived from the 
operating result of the CRE company, which had never been better either 
before or afterwards. He compared this feeling to “[…] a certain illusion of 
unassailability […]“ (James #00:37:22#-#00:39:17#) that also resulted from a 
“[…] very decent bonus […]“ (James #00:54:33#-#00:56:20#). 
 
Another executive perceived certainty because Germany was on its way to 
recover and the macroeconomic indicators felt “[…] harmonic“ and “[…] 
consistent“ (Sophia #00:29:22#-#00:29:07#). The certainty was also perceived 
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because it looked like “[…] everything is more or less in the green area“ (Olivia 
#00:42:53#-#00:43:30#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Ignorance in Perceived Certainty” 
The time prior to the outbreak of the FC was characterised by senior 
executives` over-optimism and a perceived certainty, which may both be 
considered interlinked. The perceived positive environment allowed the 
executives to fade out their diffused gut feelings and experiences from the past. 
Potential problems and risks from the consequences of the market situation 
had been ignored. During these times, critical assessment of the situation had 
been communicated only very cautiously to the addressees. This led to 
excessive demands on the senior executives with warning voices and finally 
resulted in their resignation.  
 
Over the course of the analysis and reflection, it turned out that a further 
existential, above the four general existentials recommended by van Manen 
(1990), became relevant. Considering the sub-themes and concepts of this 
theme, feelings, moods, and emotions seem to be vital in executives` lifeworld 
related to the phenomenon of FI, which was recapped in adding the existential 
‘lived feelings’.  
 
4.3.2.2  The Managerial Lived Experience in the Event of Financial Crisis 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Unexpected Market Standstill 
 
The first theme “Unexpected market standstill“ comprises two sub-themes, 
“Standstill“ and “Unexpectedness“. 
 
Standstill  
In the event of FC, the senior executives experienced that the clients` 
investment behaviour came to an end and bank lending was aborted at very 
short notice. The availability of capital was limited. 
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Jake compared this situation to a “[…] tsunami […]” where “ […] during a very 
short time […] investment behaviour, bank lending behaviour, consent to 
investments in real estate was completely interrupted“ (Jake #00:39:58#-
#00:41:55#). He added that “[…] there was no more leeway in the market, say, 
no more ideas to add value and this is why the bubble burst some day” (Jake 
#00:35:30#-#00:37:23#). Jake emphasised that this situation triggered several 
distressed sales and ”[…] on-going machinery, was principally abruptly 
stopped“ (Jake #00:42:16#-#00:43:15#). For Charlie, this event was 
characterised by “[…] huge portfolios could be seen in […] the real estate 
market […] and […] the size was much more important than the asset” (Charlie 
#00:41:10#-#00:41:39#).  
 
Unexpectedness 
The senior executives experienced the changes as unexpected and sudden, 
and executives saw no possibility to predict this event. 
 
Allen described the event as “[…] sudden […]“ (Allen #00:06:34#-#00:07:08#). 
William also considered this event as surprising (William #00:50:58#-
#00:50:58#). Moreover, he mentioned that he “[a]ctually did not expect […]" it 
(William #00:33:00#-#00:34:16#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “Unexpected Market Standstill“ 
The senior executives were confronted with a standstill of the relevant market, 
where investors stopped their investment activities and banks no longer 
provided debt. For the executives this happened suddenly and unexpectedly. 
The perceived market changes were seen as non-predictable events. Guided 
by van Manen`s (1990) existential analysis, this theme emerged predominantly 
reflected against the existential ‘lived time’. 
 
4.3.2.2.2 Formal and Social Intensification of Lived Relations 
 
The second theme “Formal and social intensification of lived relations” 
comprises two sub-themes: “Formal intensification of relations to assess the 
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situation“ and “Social intensification of relations to constitute potential 
consequences and proceedings“.  
 
Formal Intensification of Relations to Assess the Situation  
The senior executives intensified their relations with other involved parties in 
order to formally assess the event of FC. The intensive exchange between 
these people created transparency regarding the perceived changes and the 
situation. 
 
William, for example, experienced that, in the event of FC, portfolio 
management as well as the management board involved the RM for the 
assessment of the situation (William #00:38:42#-#00:39:08#). The same was 
mentioned by Scarlett who also consulted with her RM (Scarlett #00:28:35#-
#00:28:36#) based on an existing interactive process between RM and the 
management board (Scarlett #00:28:55#-#00:30:23#). George asked 
economists at their headquarters for an assessment of the situation (George 
#00:30:51#-#00:31:21#). Furthermore, for his analysis, he coordinated with his 
colleagues from stock trading who were “[…] delivering an appropriate 
analytical basis, for what happens or may happen” (George #00:29:08#-
#00:29:51#). Similarly, Jake involved the RM and felt reassured in his 
assessment of his colleagues’ judgment (Jake #01:05:43#-#01:06:16#).  
 
George intensively exchanged information with those involved to allow for the 
best possible transparency regarding the occurrences and in order to explain 
what happened. He emphasised which consequences occurred for the 
business model of his CRE organisation and how these were dealt with by the 
executives (George #00:35:00#-#00:35:45#). Jake looked for the exchange 
with other companies (Jake #00:52:50#-#00:53:49#), and other decision-
makers ”[…] to also get a better picture“ (Jake #01:00:32#-#01:01:06#), and 
the RM department was also consulted for a bilateral exchange (Jake 
#00:54:01#-#00:54:13#). To provide for more transparency, Scarlett intensified 
the communication with her employees, management, and the advisory board 
member of her organisation (Scarlett #00:26:55#-#00:27:35#). Sophia also 
looked for exchange, but preferred to talk to market participants (Sophia 
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#00:40:37#-#00:41:33#) while Charlie communicated their strategy in order to 
provide more transparency and a remaining commitment to a longstanding and 
sustainable implementation (Charlie #00:59:00#-#00:59:28#).  
 
Social Intensification of Relations to Constitute Potential Consequences 
and Proceedings  
The senior executives socially intensified their relations further in order to 
constitute potential consequences resulting from the event. The decision-
makers specifically focused on a common and coordinated approach to create 
trust and keep calm. 
 
George used the opportunity to describe the consequences of this event on 
the business model, as well as the envisaged handling of the situation, to the 
addressees (George #00:35:00#-#00:35:45#). It was important for Jake to 
share his personal assessment about the situation under consideration of his 
prior experiences (Jake #01:02:09#-#01:02:54#). He emphasised an active 
handling of such a situation and to “[…] consider the consequences […]“ (Jake 
#01:03:43#-#01:04:14#). Harry intensified his relation to the management 
board and communicated his assessment to them (Harry #00:51:58#-
#00:52:33#).  
 
Charlie stressed that the aim of the intensification of the relations in such a 
situation means “[…] moving closer within the management division 
[…]“ where the “[…] parent company has actually pulled in the same 
direction“ (Charlie #01:03:32#-#01:04:14#). One of the prevailing objectives for 
him was to “[…] creating trust […]“ (Charlie #00:59:36#-#01:00:54#) in this 
situation, “[…] to implementing the strategy over the long-term and sustainably” 
(Charlie #00:59:00#-#00:59:28#), and finally “[…] keeping calm […]“ (Charlie 
#00:54:58#-#00:55:08#). Jake strived for an intensification of the relations 
during this phase to place “[…] sensitivity for the underlying risk parameters 
which could again be strengthened or enhanced” (Jake #01:01:18#-
#01:01:28#).  
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Summary of the Theme “Formal and social intensification of lived 
relations” 
During the event of FC, senior executives became more formal and socialised 
comparatively more. They intensified their relations with other internal 
departments, especially RM, and with the management board, in order to 
jointly reconsider the happenings and rest assured about the assessment. 
They also sought externals and other market participants to evaluate the 
situation. Additionally, executives used this socialisation to constitute potential 
consequences arising from the event. Overall, this time was characterised by a 
growing transparency. During the course of the analysis and reflection, guided 
by van Manen (1990), this theme was mostly reflected in the existential of 
‘lived relation’.   
 
4.3.2.2.3 Disillusionment and Consolidation of the Actors 
 
The third theme “Disillusionment and consolidation of the actors” is made up of 
three sub-themes. These are: “Bank lending abruptly stopped“, “Refocusing on 
core business”, and “Radical investment stop”. 
 
Bank Lending Abruptly Stopped  
It was perceived by the senior executives that credit institutions changed their 
behaviour during this time. This was derived from the occurrences of abrupt 
stops in bank lending and a need for the restructuring of existing financings, 
which was addressed by the lenders to the borrowers. 
 
For example, Allen mentioned that he experienced situations where the 
financing bank addressed “[…] restructuring of debt financing when developing 
exit strategies“ (Allen #00:07:26#-#00:07:54#) to their clients. Jake perceived 
that “[…] during a very short time […] investment behaviour, bank lending 
behaviour, consent to investments in real estate was completely interrupted” 
(Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#). Here, both experiences seem to be 
interconnected where either can trigger the other and lead to an abrupt stop in 
bank lending. 
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Refocusing on Core Business 
The senior executives also perceived a behavioural change of their 
management board with regards to strategic aims. They recognised 
adjustments in the strategic business orientation (adjustment of the strategic 
focus in RM, increase of innovative abilities, consideration of arising chances) 
as well as with regards to the portfolio strategy (purification and refocusing on 
core competencies, focus on efficient asset classes). 
 
Olivia mentioned that she enforced an adjustment of the strategic focus of the 
RM in due consideration of legal and sector-specific requirements in her CRE 
organisation (Olivia #01:07:29#-#01:11:27#). Harry, more specifically, 
mentioned that he expanded new areas into the RM and other non-relevant 
fields of risk had been eliminated from analysis (Harry #00:57:24#-#00:58:18#). 
Another executive instead mentioned that they had not changed their RM 
strategy, but at the same time he said that the awareness had been “[…] 
sharpened in one direction or the other“ (Allen #00:11:29#-#00:11:42#). James 
also did not change his anticipatory RM strategy, but his risk assessment was 
extended in the analysis and assessment of risks (James #00:51:22#-
#00:51:22#).  
 
With regards to the general strategic aims, Jake stressed having become more 
innovative (Jake #00:57:02#-#00:57:07#). Harry perceived that the 
management board’s behaviour had changed because the sales of non-core 
business led to a refocusing on the core business of the CRE organisation 
(Harry #00:47:36#-#00:48:32#). Generally, the same core refocus was 
mentioned by Jake, who took a closer look at the asset classes during this 
time and consequently decided to focus on qualitatively good ones for his 
portfolio (Jake #00:57:15#-#00:57:48#). George decided to stop investment in 
the U.S. (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#). Other organisations were even 
more radical and reacted with a purification and purge of the balance sheet 
(Harry #00:48:38#-#00:49:21#). William mentioned that he identified the 
perceived changes as chances for his CRE organisation (William #00:28:02#-
#00:28:03#). 
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Radical Investment Stop   
Additionally, the investors, clients, and advisory board of the CRE companies 
changed their behaviour. The senior executives experienced clients` 
investment stops and a corresponding lack of capital inflow, which contributed 
to a standstill in the CRE organisation. Hereto, the advisory board was 
perceived as rough when pushing for restructuring measures.  
 
Olivia experienced a “[…] full stop of expansion and standstill“ in her 
organisation during this time (Olivia #01:01:32#-#01:05:14#). Other 
participants also confirmed that their asset managers could neither acquire nor 
sell assets: “On the acquirer – as well as […] on the sell side, it was a standstill” 
(Jake #00:42:16#-#00:43:15#). Correspondingly, Charlie perceived that the 
company “[…] within short-term suffered a cash outflow of 1.3 bn in the open-
ended real estate retail funds […]” (Charlie #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#). From 
another angle, Scarlett added what she knew from direct contacts at banks 
“[…] that there was no more willingness to invest […] on the bank side, while 
limiting availability of equity and actually there was simply no more propensity 
to invest” (Scarlett #00:21:47#-#00:22:13#). Also the advisory board, as Harry 
observed, introduced “[…] a very rough behaviour […]” to restructure the 
balance sheet as soon as possible (Harry #00:48:38#-#00:49:21#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “Disillusionment and consolidation of the actors” 
In the event of FC, the senior executives perceived numerous behavioural 
changes in the actors. The financing banks abruptly stopped their lending. The 
management board of a CRE organisation refocused on its core competencies. 
Clients and investors reacted to the events with a radical investment stop and 
divestments, discontinued their liquidity inflows, and therefore contributed to an 
acceleration of the crisis. Using van Manen`s (1990) existential analysis, this 
theme was mostly reflected against the existential ‘lived body’.  
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4.3.2.2.4  Without Alternatives, Alignment of the Organisation in 
Uncertainty 
 
The fourth theme "Without alternatives, alignment of the organisation in 
uncertainty” comprises four sub-themes: “Professionalism and routine during 
standstill”, “Extended analysis of information”, “Adjustments under uncertainty”, 
and “Adjustment of the risk awareness”. 
 
Professionalism and Routine during Standstill  
Notwithstanding the occurrence of the event, the behaviour of the CRE 
organisation was described by routines and continuity of employees and 
colleagues during this time. The senior executives perceived professionalism 
in handling the situation and with those involved. According to them, even 
though the expansion stop and standstill occurred, they saw the necessity to 
analyse the situation as well as their own investment behaviour. Changes in 
the organisational or procedural structure as a reaction to the changes were 
largely not implemented because of the event. 
 
Scarlett experienced that the availability of capital was limited which “[…] led to 
a certain expansion stop“ in her organisation (Scarlett #00:20:01#-#00:21:33#). 
Olivia also experienced a “[…] full stop of investments […]“, that triggered a 
standstill of the organisation (Olivia #01:01:32#-#01:05:14#). The same was 
reported by Jake who perceived an unexpected standstill where the “[…] 
people […] either not make any decision any longer or irrationally from specific 
perspectives made irrational decisions“ (Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#). 
Similarly, Sophia said that her organisation “[…] experienced a complete 
breakdown of the new business for 2 years” (Sophia #00:32:46#-#00:33:48#). 
Allen mentioned that in his company models suddenly did not work any longer, 
interest costs increased and a corresponding price as well as value decline 
brought the organisation into a problematic situation regarding their debt 
situation (Allen #00:06:34#-#00:07:08#).  
George came across a professional interaction between all involved parties, 
who first of all sought to analyse “[…] what this actually means for us“ (George 
#00:28:16#-#00:29:05#). During this situation the participant determined a “[…] 
FINDINGS 		
	 218 
kind of routine […] in the team […]” who in turn was acting on behalf of a 
company “[…] with a certain consistency […] positioned and not immediately 
[…] reacting in panic to any topic, but first observes what happens” (George 
#00:35:00#-#00:35:45#). Jake experienced his employer as being “[…] 
professional“ because they did not react in panic (Jake #00:48:59#-
#00:50:03#). In this situation, George used the expertise from the stock trading 
department of his organisation (George #00:29:08#-#00:29:51#) and noted 
that CRE in comparison to other asset classes “[…] actually moved always a 
bit different and also more sluggish […]” (George #00:29:08#-#00:29:51#). 
Charlie experienced that one “[…] can only make it through as a team, during 
such crisis situation […]” and emphasised the “[…] moving together of all 
employees of the company during this phase” (Charlie #01:05:35#-#01:06:29#).  
 
Jake followed up on the investment behaviour of the asset managers (Jake 
#00:55:53#-#00:56:34#). Olivia also analysed the properties acquired, but only 
afterwards, in order to know what kind of properties the company had acquired. 
In debates with appraisers, it was discussed whether the values are still 
correct. This included the review of the debt financing position of these 
properties to assess the situation in this regard as well (Olivia #01:01:32#-
#01:05:14#).  
 
Professionalism and routine were also presented by the executives in terms of 
their business model and strategy. Scarlett, for example, stressed that a 
diversified and flexible business model was advantageous for the CRE 
organisation during these times while not only being dependent on 
development activities but also having a second solid mainstay with asset 
management to generate a sufficient contribution margin (Scarlett #00:24:20#-
#00:26:36#). Also, Jake noticed that transaction fees stagnated during this 
period but he had a fall back with on-going management fees for the existing 
portfolios (Jake #00:51:29#-#00:52:50#).  
 
The outbreak of the crisis did mostly not trigger serious strategic measures 
with regard to the organisational structure but only with regard to some minor 
operational adjustments (Allen #00:10:06#-#00:10:23#; George #00:33:07#-
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#00:33:16#; Sophia #00:40:07#-#00:40:07#). Jake felt “[…] relatively good 
positioned […]“ with his organisation and he only initiated personal measures 
in order to lift “[…] potential of the existing employees“ (Jake #00:56:42#-
#00:57:02#).  
 
Extended Analysis of Information  
A further point that was noted by the senior executives was the extended 
internal information intake and analysis during this event. This was primarily 
extended with the information from external partners. 
 
Jake reasoned that internal dialogue allowed him to gather further information, 
which strengthened his opinion of the situation (Jake #01:00:32#-#01:01:06#). 
He used to discuss the portfolio and its strategy with the asset manager, which 
laid the ground for the next steps (Jake #00:55:27#-#00:55:38#). The asset 
manager was also the source of information regarding the standstill on the sell- 
and buy-side (Jake #00:42:16#-#00:43:15#).  
 
Due to behavioural patterns with regards to information intake and sharing by 
the external partners, this phase was also considered as exhausting for doing 
CRE business (Jake #00:48:59#-#00:50:03#). The extended analysis of the 
information required a supplementary database. Allen received additional 
information from default letters of the financing banks (Allen #00:07:08#-
#00:07:16#). George gathered information to assess the situation of his 
organisation due to the malfunctioning of the banking system, primarily from 
publications (George #00:24:48#-#00:25:46#). Other sources included 
research reports from renowned research companies (Jake #00:54:20#-
#00:55:20#). William instead used Bloomberg information (William #00:40:20#-
#00:40:32#). Harry noted that his CRE organisation engaged external 
valuation agencies for impairment tests in order to be able to deduce 
consequences (Harry #00:51:04#-#00:51:38#).  
 
Adjustments under Uncertainty  
This event was also characterised by several adjustments in the CRE 
organisation that were initiated to comply with demand-related-behaviour and 
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liquidity was procured from distressed asset sales. Notably, all of these 
decisions and measures were taken under uncertainty. 
 
Where adjustment measures were initiated due to the event, Scarlett focused 
these on the corporate strategy as well as on the organisational structure and 
procedures to “[…] adjust to changed requirements” (Scarlett #00:39:04#-
#00:39:23#). In terms of organisational structure, the capacities in departments 
involved with project development activities were reduced “[…] to a great 
extent […]” and, instead, focused on asset management activities (Scarlett 
#00:33:29#-#00:34:31#), to be able to cope with the changed demand-related-
behaviour of the CRE market (Scarlett #00:22:37#-#00:23:06#). Similarly, 
another company reacted with the implementation of an additional general 
advisory board in addition to the management board “[…] while colleagues well 
thought about, in which direction investments can be made and how markets 
can be evaluated on a half-yearly basis“ (George #00:33:36#-#00:34:47#). 
Others installed strategy days for the board to improve the exchange while 
talking about growth opportunities and potential risks under the consideration 
of the management board members (Sophia #00:40:37#-#00:41:33#).  
 
Based on his assessment of the situation, Charlie placed the focus on 
generating liquidity for his CRE organisation (Charlie #00:54:55#-#00:54:58#). 
Jake perceived that some CRE organisations considered distressed sales as 
inevitable and actually transacted those (Jake #00:42:16#-#00:43:15#).  
 
Olivia noted that the developments that were perceived during this phase had 
not been included in the strategic planning of her CRE organisation (Olivia 
#00:51:07#-#00:51:09#). Charlie emphasised that he could not have foreseen 
the changes in the corporate environment to this extent (Charlie #00:46:21#-
#00:46:52#). And James confessed that he “[…] partly observed […]“ the 
developments in the corporate environment, but he did not take these further 
into account (James #00:36:37#-#00:36:54#).  
 
During this event, Sophia considered the effects of the changes in the 
corporate environment on her organisation as predictable, because she was 
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convinced that they “[…] already hold so many assets, say a critical volume is 
reached, and no bank would ever pull the plug […]” (Sophia #00:36:42#-
#00:37:12#). Meanwhile, Charlie did not consider the changes in the 
environment to have been foreseeable by his organisation (Charlie 
#00:49:37#-#00:49:37#).  
 
Olivia emphasised that she recognised the shifts in the environment too late 
and therefore could not estimate the impact on her organisation (Olivia 
#00:53:14#-#00:53:21#). George also mentioned that such massive changes 
were not calculable (George #00:29:59#-#00:30:18#). Another participant also 
considered the effects on his organisation as non-predictable because “[…] the 
respective risk management tools were not yet available in that configuration” 
(Harry #00:49:21#-#00:50:10#).  
 
Furthermore, one executive mentioned that the mechanisms and parameters 
for adjustments within the CRE organisations that were a response to the 
changing environment were known (Scarlett #00:24:20#-#00:26:36#). She also 
stressed that this kind of market situation does not provide any alternatives, 
and that it is just necessary to accept the situation (Scarlett #00:40:53#-
#00:41:21#). Harry similarly considered the strategic measures that were 
implemented by the supervisory board as a reaction to the event as having no 
alternatives and one “[…] had to bow to […]” these (Harry #00:53:19#-
#00:53:37#) while recognising that “[…] there were no more action alternatives 
due to the strategic, overall strategic approach.” (Harry #00:55:26#-
#00:56:20#).  
 
During this phase, Charlie was well aware of the organisation`s possibilities to 
react to the event. Here, his company had respective lines of defence at its 
command, especially the generation of liquidity and the utilisation of credit 
lines within regulatory limits (Charlie #00:56:34#-#00:57:40#). Sophia, however, 
did not have any understanding of her specific decision and reaction 
alternatives (Sophia #00:40:25#-#00:40:25#). The same applied to James who 
also did not have any kind of catalogue of measures that could be applied in 
this situation (James #00:49:14#-#00:49:19#).   
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Adjustment of the Risk Awareness 
Due to the perceived changes in the corporate environment of the CRE 
organisation, the senior executives adjusted the RM in terms of their 
perspective, general overview, and interpretation of the indicators. The risk 
awareness of the executives was extended, and new risks (i.e. tenant credit 
worthiness, interest-change risk, availability of CRE) were incorporated and 
additional qualitative parameters were included in the RM strategy while the 
anticipatory approach was strengthened.  
 
As a consequence of the event, Harry newly set up the processes in the RM 
as well as the approach and type of assessment of CREs (Harry #00:54:52#-
#00:55:16#). Their RM also incorporated the recent experiences and new risk 
areas were included (Harry #00:58:18#-#00:57:24#). Sophia, for example, 
identified the credit standing of the tenants as a “[…] real risk […]“, which was 
then included in the RM report (Sophia #00:41:40#-#00:42:20#). The same 
applied to the key figure “[…] interest-change risk […]“ (Sophia #00:43:15#-
#00:43:42#) that was added. Sophia also emphasised that the anticipatory 
approach remained in their RM strategy, but it was enhanced by additional key 
figures (Sophia #00:42:53#-#00:43:04#). Olivia also stayed with the 
anticipatory approach in her RM to remain flexible. She additionally stressed 
on the placing of “[…] talented people […]” in such positions (Olivia 
#01:11:45#-#01:12:09#) and, overall, on implementing a common 
understanding of risk in the international CRE organisation (Olivia #01:07:29#-
#01:11:27#). New qualitative parameters were introduced to the RM in this 
organisation (Olivia #01:12:21#-#01:12:35#). This included an analysis of the 
tenants and their global rent arrears (Olivia #01:12:43#-#01:14:01#).  
 
Some other participants mentioned instead that the strategic approach to RM 
had not changed overall, but that the risk awareness of the executives had 
been sensitised (Allen #00:11:29#-#00:11:42#). The same was experienced by 
William who saw “[…] very profound adjustments” in the RM with regards to 
the product range (William #00:45:29#-#00:45:47#), i.e. he performed a more 
detailed risk analysis when thinking about new product placements (William 
#00:42:03#-#00:42:41#).   
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Harry emphasised that an assessment of the targeted markets prior to entering 
them had so far not been performed, but now, with such an event, processes 
were set up to identify risks that had not existed before (Harry #00:59:10#-
#01:00:11#). As a response to the situation, George tried “[…] a bit more multi-
layered positioning […]“ (George #00:33:36#-#00:34:47#) of the RM. Charlie 
perceived that the criteria for analysis and assessment in the RM had been 
adjusted (Charlie #00:58:34#-#00:58:35#). Consequently, the RM evaluations 
were also assimilated (Charlie #00:58:03#-#00:58:26#). Jake experienced only 
little adjustments in the RM, he recognised it as more of a fine-tuning of the 
existing key factors but noted a sensitised consideration of these factors by the 
executives (Jake #00:59:10#-#00:59:26#). Hence, the existing key figure 
systems were placed more broadly, allowing for an overall view and “[…] 
providing an indication if a potential crisis is coming up or not“ (Jake 
#00:45:58#-#00:47:35#). Only such fine-tuning of the RM allowed for a 
profound analysis of the key indicators (Jake #00:58:46#-#00:59:08#) and the 
creation of awareness for potential scenarios and how to approach them (Jake 
#00:47:43#-#00:48:18#).  
 
Like other participants, James mentioned that the general anticipatory 
approach to RM remained in force. For him, however, the risk assessment with 
regards to risk identification, analysis, and valuation was extended (James 
#00:51:10#-#00:51:22#). His company added interest risk types, like interest-
change risk and availability of RE properties (James #00:50:03#-#00:50:49#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Without alternatives, alignment of the 
organisation in uncertainty” 
This topic shows that the executives had no alternatives and simply had to 
align their organisation to the environmental changes in uncertainty, which was 
a result of the event of FC.  
 
However, the senior executives experienced that the CRE organisations had 
handled the investment stop and the resulting standstill of the market 
professionally and performed routinely. The executives made use of the 
situation to analyse the organisational situation and review their investment 
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behaviour. Serious adjustments in the business strategy, however, largely fell 
short, and the review of their own investment behaviour was supported by 
external assessments. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of their conduct, the evaluation of the organisational 
situation was driven by more intensive internal information and was extended 
by information from external parties.  
 
The measures deployed during this event, and in response to the uncertain 
situation, the CRE organisation initiated several adjustments. This situation 
and the changed demand-related behaviour led the CRE companies to 
procure liquidity through distressed asset sales. The executives determined 
that the perceived event was neither projected in the strategic planning nor 
was it foreseeable; the implications of this event on the organisation were also 
mostly not predicable. Executives used existing mechanisms to react to the 
unexpected event, but considered these largely without any alternatives.  
 
The result led to an adjustment of the risk awareness of the involved parties. 
This awareness related to a holistic approach and interpretation of the 
parameters, enforcement of the existing anticipatory RM approach, inclusion of 
new risks in the risk assessment, and the adjustment with few selected 
qualitative parameters. While strongly connected to the organisation and its 
actions during this time, the theme was predominantly related to ‘lived space’ 
in the course of van Manen`s (1990) existential analysis and reflection.  
 
4.3.2.2.5 Irrational Behaviour in Perceived Uncertainty 
 
The fifth theme that emerged is “Irrational behaviour in perceived uncertainty”. 
It covers the three sub-themes of “Irrationality”, “Uncertainty”, and “Motivation”. 
 
Irrationality  
During the event of FC, the senior executives perceived irrational behaviours 
by the decision-makers. This was explained by decisions and actions executed 
based on gut feelings.   
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Jake determined that the shareholders, as well as the institutional investors, 
behaved irrationally. In this regard, Jake observed that institutional investors 
tried to sell their CRE “[…] in panic about loosing their money […]“ (Jake 
#00:43:28#-#00:45:44#). Thus, Jake saw “[…] no single asset that […] 
disappeared in due to the subprime crisis.” From his perspective, “[…] such 
irrational behaviour […] finally led to […] perceiving the crisis even stronger” 
(Jake #00:43:18#-#00:45:44#). He described the relation as follows: “Because, 
then there actually were distressed sales. Distressed sales would not have 
been necessary. But because everybody wanted to get his money back, this 
resulted in distressed sales, that strengthened the whole thing even more” 
(Jake #00:43:18#-#00:45:44#).  
 
Jake observed that  
 
“[…] such scaremongering […] led people to either not make any 
decision any longer or irrationally from specific perspectives made 
irrational decisions. Potentially also the irrational decision, I do not 
invest in real estate any more.“ (Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#)  
 
Such irrationality is justified by time because “[…] it is only 10 years ago, that 
the market has more or less recovered completely“ (Jake #00:39:58#-
#00:41:55#).  
 
Jake himself based his decisions during this event on “[…] a mixture of gut 
feelings and experience […]” (Jake #00:58:00#-#00:58:46#). Sophia was also 
led by her gut feelings and these were proven right, finally: “[…] a very bad 
feeling, if your business model coincides, and it did” (Sophia #00:32:46#-
#00:33:48#). 
 
Uncertainty  
A further major point was the uncertainty perceived by the senior executives. 
There was tremendous uncertainty in assessing the situation, insecurities in 
SDM, panic behaviour in the markets, and mixed feelings of surprise, fear, and 
motivation.   
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Due to the cessation of investment activities and debt facilities in the CRE, in a 
very short time, Jake perceived that “[n]obody knew what is going to happen, 
nobody, there was a crazy uncertainty in the market […]” (Jake #00:39:58#-
#00:41:55#). William described the phase as “[…] associated with uncertainty, 
because you don´t know, if this is a permanent or temporary issue”. He 
emphasised the possibly that this event is “[…] more a profound trend and not 
a temporary problem, because at the end it is a macroeconomic adjustment, 
which you actually do not recognise immediately“ (William #00:43:03#-
#00:44:39#). Scarlett reflected that she felt insecure about her strategic 
decisions during this time because “[…] at the end it is […] an assessment, an 
evaluation of the future developments. You can never say with absolute 
certainty if you are right here. Especially if it relates to macroeconomically 
influenced changes, but finally you have to act in any manner” (Scarlett 
#00:34:47#-#00:35:19#). Jake saw investors who were in panic due to the fear 
of loosing their money. This mood resulted in claiming their invested funds 
back immediately “[…] when it is said, something burst“ (Jake #00:43:18#-
#00:45:44#). From Jake`s perspective, “[…] a lot emerged out of the situation, 
because panic also played a role” (Jake #00:48:59#-#00:50:03#) from the 
investors` side. Sophia felt uncomfortable while their business model could 
collapse completely. She also feared firing employees (Sophia #00:32:46#-
#00:33:48#). The executives experienced mixed feelings during this phase. 
Jake explicitly mentioned having been “[…] surprised, tense, motivated 
[…]“ (Jake #00:50:17#-#00:50:24#). Allen felt “[…] stressed, bad night sleep, 
and testy” (Allen #00:08:00#-#00:08:09#).  
 
Motivation  
Beside the abovementioned impulses of the event, the senior executives also 
stated that they felt motivated during this phase. They regarded this situation 
as a chance and were inspired to make the best out of it (Allen #00:10:49#-
#00:10:57#). Jake also felt motivated to “[…] make the best out of the 
unfortunate situation […]” and to “[…] move forward […]“ (Jake #00:50:24#-
#00:51:15#). 
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Summary of the Theme “Irrational behaviour in perceived uncertainty” 
The senior executives characterised the behaviour of the parties during this 
event primarily as irrational. Decisions had predominantly been taken on the 
basis of gut feelings and experiences gained. The assessment of the situation, 
as well as the SDM, had to be taken under uncertainty during this time. 
Several parties were panicking and experienced mixed feelings ranging from 
surprise, to fear and motivation. However, the executives also experienced the 
event as a chance and were forward-looking to make the best out of the 
situation.  
 
Similarly to the lived experience of FI, the analysis and reflection revealed that 
there is a need for an additional existential above the four general ones 
recommended by van Manen (1990). Considering the sub-themes and 
concepts of this theme, feelings, moods, and emotions seem to be vital in 
executives` lifeworld, as well as in the event of FC, which was recapped in the 
existential ‘lived feelings’.  
 
4.4 Analysing the Organisational Sensemaking of the Phenomenon of 
Financial Instability 
 
4.4.1 Analysis 
 
This section describes the analysis proceedings for discovering the 
organisational sensemaking process of CRE executives in detail and shows 
how the themes developed. It became obvious during the final analysis that 
the emerging themes were comparable to Weick`s (1995) seven properties. 
Therefore axial coding was applied to link the themes back to these properties 
and the majority of the seven were corroborated within this study. 
 
4.4.1.1 Preliminary Analysis 
 
The preliminary analysis followed the same process described in section 
4.2.1.1. 
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4.4.1.2 Final Analysis 
 
The final analysis of the organisational sensemaking process was also 
separated into the prior phase of FI and the event of FC, while a differentiation 
by the executives became obvious during the preliminary analysis. 
 
4.4.1.2.1 The Properties of Financial Instability 
 
There emerged four themes from the 11 sub-themes regarding the 
organisational sensemaking process in the phase of FI. The property 
“Extracted cues of FI” with one of its sub-themes “Increasing investment 
pressure” will be used exemplarily to present the progress of the analysis. The 
other related sub-themes were “Contradictory moods“ and “Strong dynamics of 
the markets“.  
 
The further properties of “Enactment through risk prevention”, “Social 
interaction for preparation”, and “Retrospective discernment of carelessness” 
will be presented afterwards to explain the organisational sensemaking 
process of the phenomenon of FI.  
 
The sub-theme “Increasing investment pressure“ developed from the words of 
the participants, which were highlighted and assembled along others with 
similar thoughts.  
 
Thus Olivia talked about her sensemaking in the phase of FI: 
 
“What made me recognise this was the basis for the decisions. In 
many cases the commercial principles of a proper due diligence 
have been ignored. Decisions have been made like this. Imagine, if 
you acquire a real estate asset, you have to carefully look what you 
are buying. This is not only opening the door and walk in. Technically – 
look at the property for different things. And if you recognise, it`s 
sufficient to arrange for a helicopter, I buy, you now, there is something 
wrong.” (Olivia #00:45:10#-#00:45:55#)   
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James details the investment pressures during this time and names how the 
acquisition behaviour changed:  
 
“[…] one of the most alarming things was that the desperation about 
finding good assets in prime locations was that big, that you had to 
pay more or less the same for peripheral properties, if you got 
them. Meaning, the, the prime factor versus periphery collapsed more 
and more.” (James #00:40:44#-#00:41:13#)  
 
The keywords linked to these significant statements were “principles of a 
proper due diligence have been ignored”, “pay more or less the same for 
peripheral properties“ and the concept became “Increasing willingness to pay 
higher prices with negligent attitude“. This was summarised in the sub-theme 
“Increasing investment pressure“, which is part of the theme/property 
“Extracted cues of FI“.  
 
The following table provides single examples of how the words of the 
participants progressed in each phase of the analysis by linking keywords, 
concepts, sub-themes, and finally became themes that were coded to 
properties.  
  
FINDINGS 		
	 230 
Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme / 
Property 
 
“[…] and once it was 
recognised which 
assets were acquired, 
aware of the European 
market, then it becomes 
immediately apparent. 
And, at that time, I was 
already involved, to, to 
tighten the set screws 
significantly. Well, with 
the result to agree with 
this, because the major 
part of the portfolio 
had to be written off.” 
(Harry #00:45:26#-
#00:46:15#) 
 
Assets 
acquired, 
immediately 
apparent, 
major part of 
the portfolio 
written off 
 
Increasing 
willingness to 
pay higher 
prices with 
negligent 
attitude 
 
 
Acquisition at 
the expense of 
quality 
standards 
 
Increasing 
investment 
pressure 
 
Extracted 
Cues of FI 
 
„[…] that`s purely 
figures, which we that 
we then saw in the real 
estate sector. Meaning 
sizes, volumes and, 
and yields, return 
developments in 
connection with 
weakened economic 
developments […]” 
(Charlie #00:42:07#-
#00:42:27#) 
 
 
Sizes, 
volumes, 
yields, return 
developments 
 
 
Acquisition at 
the expense of 
quality 
standards  
 
Increasing 
investment 
pressure 
 
Extracted 
Cues of FI 
Table 15: Final Analysis “Extracted cues of FI”. Source: Author (2017). 
 
The emergence of the other sub-themes of the theme “Extracted cues of FI“ is 
presented in Appendix 8.  
 
4.4.1.2.2 The Properties of the Financial Crisis 
 
The property “Extracted cues of FC” comprises the sub-themes “Market 
standstill“, “(Irrational) decisions under uncertainty“, “Business model 
malfunctions”, and “Contentual enriched information intake“. The sub-theme 
“Market standstill“ is presented exemplarily below.  
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The sub-theme “Market standstill” began with the participants` statements. 
Scarlett, for example, talked about what attracted her attention in the event of 
FC: 
 
“This has been perceived in direct contact with the respective market 
players, because on the bank side there were specific, specific 
countries did not want to invest any more, while equity availability 
was limited and generally the willingness to invest no longer 
existed.” (Scarlett #00:21:47#-#00:22:13#)  
 
Another executive confirmed the market standstill and described the 
happenings he noticed in more detail: 
 
“But, I do not believe, that we have placed any thoughts in the run-up 
that it comes to a total crash. That the lending was fully abandoned, 
for example. Or that there were not any market participants asking 
for real estate any more while at the same time, at the same time 
actually withdrew the money, in, in that great extent.” (Charlie 
#00:47:05#-#00:48:53#)  
 
From these statements, the linking keywords in the analysis became “did not 
want to invest any more”, “willingness to invest no longer existed”, “equity 
availability limited”, “total crash”, “lending fully abandoned”, “not any market 
participants any more”, “withdrew money in great extent“, and developed into 
the concept “real estate ignored as an asset class“. The sub-theme 
became ”Market standstill“, which is part of the theme/property “Extracted cues 
of FC“. 
 
  
FINDINGS 		
	 232 
Table 16 provides examples of this progression from the words of the 
participants, to the keywords, concepts, sub-themes and themes, to properties. 
 
 
Significant Idea or 
Statement  
(trans. from transcript) 
Linking 
Keywords 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme / 
Property 
 
„Suddenly, well, I am 
coming from the real 
estate sector, but 
suddenly real estate 
was ignored. Nobody 
was interested in real 
estate any more. 
Everybody thought 
‘Goodness, here I do 
acquire risks’.” (Jake 
#00:37:43#-#00:39:41#) 
 
Nobody was 
interested in 
real estate any 
more, acquire 
risks 
 
Real estate 
ignored as an 
asset class 
 
Market 
standstill 
 
Extracted 
cues of FC 
 
“[…] there were these 
refinancing efforts. At 
that time, it was 
customary to refinancing 
existing portfolios, 
withdrawing equity, let´s 
say, increasing the risk 
position of the bank 
while lowering the own 
one. Always against the 
background, if 
something happens, the 
bank is then to some 
extent dependent on the 
client and says ‘what 
shall we do now?’ At 
this, many customers 
had to learn, because 
the bank had to file 
bankruptcy. We had 
ABN Amro, Royal Bank 
of Scotland, Euro Hypo 
and Hypo Real Estate. 
All gone. Because the 
bank went bankrupt.” 
(Sophia #00:29:43#-
#00:31:16#) 
 
 
Refinancing 
efforts, 
increasing the 
risk position of 
the bank, bank 
went bankrupt 
 
Lack of 
refinancing 
efforts of banks 
 
Market 
standstill 
 
Extracted 
cues of  
Table 16: Final Analysis “Extracted cues of FC”. Source: Author (2017). 
 
The other emerging sub-themes and themes/properties “Enactment through 
organisational adjustments”, “Operational plausibility”, “Social interaction for 
reaction”, and “Retrospective discernment of misconduct and overreaction” are 
presented in Appendix 9.   
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4.4.2  Analysing the Organisational Sensemaking of Financial Instability 
and Financial Crisis  
 
This part aims to discover how the senior executives made sense and hence 
created meaning about the phenomenon of FI.  
 
The following section focuses on the interpretation of the findings from the 
analysed interview data using axial coding according to Weick`s (1995) seven 
properties of sensemaking in organisations. The relevant empirical data fit four 
properties for FI phases and another five properties for FC events.  
 
4.4.2.1 Organisational Sensemaking in a Phase of Financial Instability 
 
4.4.2.1.1 Extracted Cues of Financial Instability 
 
Extracted cues are relevant for if and how people make sense of the event or 
information and how they react to it (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Which 
associative events are extracted as cues and how these are interpreted 
depends on the respective context (Weick 1995). Hence, extracted cues are to 
identify phases like FI in order to make sense of them.  
 
From the variety of perceived information in the phase of FI, the senior 
executives extracted diverse cues that could be categorised according to 
“Increasing investment pressure”, “Contradictory moods”, and “Strong 
dynamics of the markets”. 
 
Increasing Investment Pressure  
In the phase of FI, it was especially during the transaction processes, in 
acquisitions and sales, that the executives extracted cues which confirmed 
their increased willingness to pay higher prices for CREs, while at the same 
time managing these transactions with carelessness.  
 
The participants stressed that during this phase they noticed an increasing 
investment pressure at the expense of quality standards in acquisitions. Olivia 
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extracted from the investment behaviour that  “[i]n many cases the commercial 
principles of a proper due diligence have been ignored“ (Olivia #00:45:10#-
#00:45:55#). Similarly, Sophia noticed that there were acquisitions “[…] that 
were much worse in quality, at a price that could be considered favourable in 
comparison what has been paid elsewhere in the sector, but because the 
quality was much worse, it was yet much more expensive then acquiring 
quality at a higher price” (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#). Also, Harry 
detected a mismatch between price and quality of the acquired properties with 
the result that “[…] the major part of the portfolio had to be written off 
completely” later (Harry #00:45:26#-#00:46:15#). James recognised the “[…] 
quality of the real estate products […]“ that were on the market (James 
#00:36:22#-#00:36:37#). Jake noticed similar developments with regards to 
rents that, according to his interpretation, were “[…] exorbitantly high in relation 
to the purchase price“ (Jake #00:35:30#-#00:37:23#). Compared to the 
macroeconomic context, Charlie extracted the cues “[…] sizes, volumes and, 
and yields, return developments in connection with weakened economic 
developments […]“ (Charlie #00:42:07#-#00:42:27#).  
 
Contradictory Moods  
What is assumed to be associated with the above are the executives` 
emotions, where the cue of diffused gut feelings was extracted from their 
behaviour. This resulted in them having mixed and contradictory moods 
between euphoria and nervousness.  
 
One of the executives described this phase as an “[…] euphoric environment 
[…]“ underpinned “[…] with the feeling: everything is possible“ but it provided 
her with a “[…] diffuse feeling […]“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#). Sophia 
also noticed an euphoric behaviour by the banks and interpreted this as “[…] 
strange […]“ (Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#). The bullish behaviour of the 
banks also made her “[…] nervous […]“ (Sophia, #00:43:59#-#00:44:11#). She 
further explained that she was “[…] actively contacted by the banks […] to 
refinance”. Such recognised power of the clients towards the bank felt 
inconsistent and “[…] does not fit any more“ (Sophia #00:31:33#-#00:31:55#). 
Other participants implicitly provided accounts of similar contradictory moods 
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by describing their actions and behaviour during this phase. While not explicitly 
stated, it is nevertheless believed that they extracted such cues, but were 
simply unable to talk about their interpretation and related emotions, as they 
were trying to preserve their countenance.  
 
Strong Dynamics of the Markets  
Additionally, the senior executives extracted cues from the developments in 
the relevant markets. These cues refer to the high availability of liquidity, high 
pricing for CRE assets of low quality, decreasing occupancy rates, and a shift 
of corporate risks to the banks. 
 
Sophia noticed that during this phase “[…] actively pushing risks from the client 
to the banks” took place and she interpreted such behaviour as “[…] 
strange“ (Sophia #00:28:08#-#00:28:48#). This understanding is affirmed by 
the extracted cue “[…] that the banks provide […] a lot of [liquidity], and also 
do so easily” (Sophia ##00:25:35#-#00:27:57#) where the participant 
recognised that non-recourse financing was secured with leverage of up to 
85% and 90% (Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#). Another executive extracted a 
cue from the investment behaviour, detecting high pricings for properties with 
low quality (Harry #00:45:26#-#00:46:15#) in the market. In his CRE 
organisation, he recognised that investors “[…] just acquired everything that 
brought a return of 7%, because compared to the debt interest rate at that 
point of time, you could get the so-called spread” (Harry #00:42:37#-
#00:45:06#). Similarly, James noticed market dynamics where he considered 
the pricing to be too high. He extracted cues from “vacancy rates […]“ and 
“[…] area supply to the market“ (James #00:36:22#-#00:36:37#) displaying 
strong dynamics on the tenant market, which was characteristic for this phase. 
Charlie interpreted the cues as “[…] exaggeration […]“ (Charlie #00:40:14#-
#00:40:43#).   
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Summary of the Theme/Property “Extracted cues of FI” 
In a phase of FI, senior executives extracted cues in order to develop a larger 
sense of what happened or may occur. These cues seemed to have been 
used by them as reference points to make sense of changes in the corporate 
environment and to manage their company in the volatile corporate context. 
This enabled them to react to, and stay competitive during, the phase of FI.  
 
Executives extract cues based on internal and external information or events 
happening. It is clear that they extracted from numerous sources of information 
and behaviours in their acquisition and sale processes, noticing that something 
was going on. It seems however, that they did not apparently relate it to, or 
name it as, a phase of FI at that time.  
 
Overall, the extracted cues are very much similar among the participants. The 
extracted cues are related to the mood of the actors and observations of the 
relevant markets, which suggests a more subjective assessment, where the 
cues they use are not fully tangible or quantifiable, which leads to uncertainty. 
Such uncertainty about what happened and the respective cues can hence 
also mislead.  
 
It is visible that the executives believed in the cues they were given on the 
market but excused these signals with increasing investment pressures while 
still acquiring and exploiting market dynamics. Only in retrospective, now in the 
interviews, there seemed to be some reflection on their actions under pressure 
during that time. This is also because any consequences from potential 
misinterpretation or misleading from the extracted cues were only visible years 
later. This can be seen as a bias for managing such an unfamiliar phase of FI 
and consequentially evidences their underdeveloped ability to extract and 
interpret cues during these times.  
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4.4.2.1.2 Enactment through Risk Prevention  
 
Enactment is about what senior executives made out of what they sensed and 
which action was taken in the situation. They enact the phenomenon they face 
through narratives and actions to understand and control the situation (Weick 
1995). Hence, with enactment, executives can construct their reality and, as 
such, a part of their environment (Helms Mills 2003; Maitlis and Christianson 
2014).  
 
The property “Enactment through risk prevention” covers respective initiatives 
of the senior executives and comprises the two sub-themes “Irrational 
acquisition decisions” and “Internal organisational actions to avoid impending 
risks”. 
 
Irrational Acquisition Decisions  
Based on what was sensed in this phase, the executives made decisions 
under time pressure, which have been considered as non-rational. 
 
Olivia emphasised that there was “[…] little thought about the consequences” 
of investment decisions, and that investments had been acquired by decisions 
under pressure (Olivia #01:00:09#-#01:00:40#) and without consideration of all 
the diligent examination (Olivia #01:00:50#-#01:01:25#). When the euphoric 
mood was added during this time, executives executed more non-rational 
decisions and the usual basis of a rational prior analysis was abandoned. 
Olivia, for example, confirmed that “[…] ad-hoc reactions were much more 
important than diligent process-oriented work“ (Olivia #01:00:50#-#01:01:25#).  
 
Internal Organisational Actions to Avoid Impending Risks  
From the interviews it is clear that the executives reacted to a sensed situation 
of risk or at least associated it with potential risk.  
 
One of the participants therefore initiated contractual cover mechanisms and 
amended the asset management agreements in her CRE organisation (Sophia 
#00:39:13#-#00:39:18#). At the same time, she pursued a different acquisition 
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policy and wanted to “[…] being more critical in acquisitions“ (Sophia 
#00:39:23#-#00:39:30#). Another executive implemented proper process 
documentation in order to document her hints and recommendations, and she 
was embarrassed about that today because this was too little action (Olivia 
#00:58:25#-#00:59:55#). James turned to refocus on products that are “[…] 
much more predictable […]“ (James #00:47:18#-#00:48:09#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “Enactment through risk prevention” 
What is different in the case of the senior executives of CRE companies, 
compared to other organisations, is a strong dependency between their 
business model and the developments in the corporate environment. Hence, 
risks and uncertainties that occur when the corporate environment massively 
changes, but over which the executives have little control, are constantly part 
of their SDM.  
 
With regards to this property, executives made decisions based on 
preconceptions and cues about this phase of FI and interpreted them as 
irrational. Such irrational decisions were particularly driven by the context of 
time pressure and investment pressure under which the executives had to 
perform their CRE transactions. If they were not able to comply, they would 
have lost the deals or mandates, which could have posed even worse 
consequences for their company.  
 
Furthermore, the executives reacted with internal adjustments to avoid 
upcoming risks. This included contractual cover mechanisms but also process 
documentation so that they could some day tell ‘I knew it, I had documented it’. 
Additionally, they pursued a more critical acquisition policy, in order to act as a 
corrective in the SM of their CRE organisation. Overall, the enactments show 
that the senior executives had interpreted, or even constructed, the situation 
as unstable without explicitly stating their interpretation at the point in time 
when it occurred. 
 
The executives provided the impression that they acted on what was sensed 
from the cues they extracted in the phase of FI. However, the pressures and 
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indefiniteness of the event prevented them from recognising and dealing with 
the phenomenon straight away. Without a clear understanding about the 
situation, they were not able to control the environment but only reacted to 
prevent potential risks to their businesses.  
 
4.4.2.1.3 Social Interaction for Preparation  
 
The property “Social interaction for preparation” is related to Weick`s (1995) 
property ‘social’. It refers to the fact that organisations and the business world 
are communicative networks with commonalities and shared meanings (Helms 
Mills 2003; Weick et al. 2005; Maitlis and Christianson 2014). Sensemaking 
though is social while involving others who add to one`s personal 
understanding and sense and is never solitary (Weick 1995; Sutcliffe 2013; 
Maitlis and Christianson 2014).  
 
This property comprises two sub-themes: “Interpretation through inclusion and 
exchange of internal information” and “Interpretation through social interaction 
and inclusion of external information”. 
 
Interpretation through Inclusion and Exchange of Internal Information  
In the phase of FI, the senior executives exchanged information internally with 
different people on different professional levels.  
 
The executives looked for an exchange with other like-minded people during 
this time. Jake conversed with the shareholders and other internals during this 
phase (Jake #00:52:50#-#00:53:49#) and did not limit this to any particular 
person or level. Charlie debated in “[d]iscussions with the management board 
[…]“ due to the noticed changes in the environment while he addressed the 
question of possible alternatives to “[…] considering in the run-up what to do if 
the cycle goes down” (Charlie #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#). Following his 
recognition of the environmental changes, another participant gathered 
information through interaction with her colleagues, the heads of transaction or 
asset management, and discussed the assessment of the situation (Olivia 
#00:54:57#-#00:55:42#). Sophia also discussed with colleagues (Sophia 
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#00:37:52#-#00:38:01#). James talked to the global management committee 
about the situation and also involved the senior management of his company 
(James #00:42:32#-#00:42:43#). The internal social interaction is therefore 
used to process the information gained in a preparatory measure and forms 
part of his SM task to avoid potential harm for the company. 
 
Interpretation through Social Interaction and Inclusion of External 
Information  
The senior executives also assessed the situation through social interaction 
with the wider external network or information from newspapers. 
 
Charlie, for example, also talked to friends and members of his personal 
network to assess the changes in the corporate environment (Charlie 
#00:49:51#-#00:49:55#). Beside the internal exchange, Sophia used “[…] 
usual newspapers […]“ (Sophia #00:37:52#-#00:38:01#) as a supplementary 
external source of information about the situation in this phase of FI. 
 
Summary of the Theme/Property “Social interaction for preparation” 
The senior executives applied sensemaking during the phase of FI as a social 
process. After they initiated the sensemaking process, they interpreted the 
situation predominantly with internal information that was derived and evolved 
from discussions with colleagues, the board, shareholders, as well as experts 
and responsible persons. Supplementary information came from external 
sources but this exchange was generally held lower. The executives preferred 
a more individualistic type of sensemaking, as it was important to avoid 
discussing half-baked or unclear and vague matters with other external 
decision-makers in the CRE sector in order to avoid being branded as a ‘party 
pooper’ or ‘naysayer’. However, external information was used to strengthen, 
or even confirm, the assessment of the situation. 
 
Executives used internal and external exchanges and shared meanings in a 
form of collaborative sensemaking regarding the situation. Here, the 
complexity of the situation also seems to be reflected in the choice of 
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counterparts they used - ones who were predominantly on the same, or an 
even higher, occupational level as they were.   
 
4.4.2.1.4 Retrospective Discernment of Carelessness  
 
“Retrospective discernment of carelessness” relates to the senior executives` 
meaningful lived experiences in the past, during the phase of FI, and 
afterwards, as well as how they made sense of it. This property describes an 
activity that may involve several possible thoughts and feelings occurring at 
the point in time of reflection (Weick 1995). Notably, the executives` 
retrospective sensemaking only started during the interviews and was not 
applied during the phase of FI already. 
 
This theme covers the four sub-themes: “Lack of risk awareness”, “Uncritical 
acquisition policy”, “Underestimated complexity of the products and methods”, 
and “Inconsequential action and communication”. 
 
Lack of Risk Awareness  
In retrospective, the senior executives determined that they had perceived 
certainty during the phase of FI, but that instability was hardly noticeable.  
 
George described the phase prior to the outbreak of the crisis as follows: 
 
“Honestly, the topic was not perceptible in the run-up. Well, I don´t know 
anybody here who was of the opinion, that a substantial crisis is 
emerging, I don´t believe that, I even don´t remember that.” (George 
#00:24:11#-#00:24:42#)  
 
In retrospect, James stressed that he had observed the changes in the 
corporate environment and he was “[…] also worried to some extent”. However, 
his colleagues and he “[…] felt very secure and also too certain, because, the 
real estate is a late bloomer […]” during this time (James #00:37:22#-
#00:39:17#).  
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He emphasised in this context:  
 
“So, in retrospect, it would have been right, I wanted to sell more assets 
during that time than the management, the higher management and the 
clients.“ (James #00:37:22#-#00:39:17#)  
 
Such perceived certainty and stability during this time resulted in a lack of risk 
awareness of the executives, and potential risks and consequences for the 
CRE companies remained unexploited.  
 
Uncritical Acquisition Policy  
In retrospect, the senior executives experienced an uncritical acquisition policy 
during the phase of FI. This was expressed by acquisitions of properties of 
poor quality, the lack of knowledge about the particularities of CRE as an asset 
class, an uncritical behaviour and blind faith, as well as the underestimation of 
the greed of banks. 
 
When looking back, Sophia described the situation as follows:  
 
”[…] we have acquired assets, that were much worse in quality, at a 
price that could be considered favourable in comparison what has 
been paid elsewhere in the sector, but because the quality was much 
worse, it was yet much more expensive then acquiring quality at a 
higher price.“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
 
From Sophia`s retrospective view, the correct strategy would have been “[...] to 
either not acquire anything, and hold out, or very expensive, but not to fade 
away the quality, rather than further acquire the expensive assets.“ (Sophia 
#00:24:00#-#00:25:27#)  
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In this context, she determined with hindsight:  
 
“I think, we have done a lot of things wrong due to ratings. And such 
throwing together of risks and then let someone ’guess’ who did not 
have any knowledge about real estate, some things one cannot guess, 
this was a big mistake.“ (Sophia #00:44:56#-#00:46:44#)  
 
She also complained that she applied Anglo-Saxon valuation methods without 
criticism during this time (Sophia #00:44:56#-#00:46:44#). William emphasised 
retrospectively that “[...] you should not acquire what you don`t know”. 
According to him a proper analysis of the asset is necessary, so one can 
consciously accept weaknesses. In retrospect, it was exactly this weakness 
that “[…] products were chosen where you did not understand all 
facets“ (William #00:41:00#-#00:41:48#). Sophia reflected that she tried to be 
more critical with regards to acquisition decisions at that time, but finally “[…] 
could have been more critical“ (Sophia #00:39:23#-#00:39:30#). Jake 
identified that, in retrospect, he had “[...] totally underestimated the greed of 
the banks for additional sources of income“ (Jake #00:29:17#-#00:31:12#).  
 
Underestimated Complexity of the Products and Methods  
Another issue mentioned in retrospect by the executives was a lack of 
understanding of new products and methods. This was linked to the 
underestimation of its complexity due to an isolated view of the asset.   
 
In retrospect, Olivia described the situation as follows:  
 
“I believe, what has been extremely underestimated were the new 
products that emerged on the market, that one surveyed. But this was 
not our playing field, not our sector. And we have only recognised this 
to a limited extent, no one really has dealt with this that much, actually. 
I think, we also focused on our real estates and the monies that were 
available. And probably, we were shy of looking beyond the end of our 
nose.“ (Olivia #00:43:38#-#00:44:47#)  
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In this regard, William stressed that, from experience, he gained the insight 
that,  
 
“[o]ne should really analyse, what is it what you want to acquire and 
trying to be clear about the weaknesses of the asset that one accepts. 
And I believe that was one of the weak points, especially when 
products were chosen where you did not understand all 
facets.“ (William #00:41:00#-#00:41:48#)  
 
One participant confessed that she had underestimated the Anglo-Saxon 
valuation methods (Sophia #00:44:56#-#00:46:44#). Another participant 
declared that she did not realise the overall complexity of the situation during 
this phase and the “[…] real estate economy [was] simply considered isolated 
[…]”  (Olivia #00:47:02#-#00:50:39#).    
 
Inconsequential Action and Communication  
A further point that the senior executives recognised in retrospect was that 
their decisions and communication during this phase were inconsequential. 
The executives had been negligent in communicating the identified risks, and 
despite those risks, they did not recognise the gains of the value increase that 
had been achieved at that point in time. 
 
One of the participants said she only sent discreet signals when 
communicating during this phase: “You send signals [...] but you are not 
obtrusive, you are not so clear. And then you are perceived as 
unstable“ (Olivia #00:51:30#-#00:53:03#). Sophia determined that some risks 
had not been properly communicated because some individuals had not 
mastered the English language (Sophia #00:44:56#-#00:46:44#). James 
found: “So, in retrospect, it would have been right, I wanted to sell more assets 
during that time than the management, the higher management and the clients. 
[...] Through profit taking no one ever became poor, old folk saying“ (James 
#00:37:22#-#00:39:17#). 
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Summary of the Theme “Retrospective discernment of carelessness”  
Retrospective sensemaking in the phase of FI provided numerous thoughts 
and expressions with different evaluations of the importance of aspects during 
that time and then afterwards.  
 
The senior executives did not actively engage with retrospective sensemaking 
during the phase of FI nor shortly after. They did not take the chance to benefit 
from retrospectives during that time. They were to manage without it. Or, it 
could be explained that executives were notably drawing on past equivalent 
cases. Regardless, retrospective sensemaking was not applied in this 
unfamiliar situation and their cognitive processing broke down in that moment. 
Only when asked now, years after the respective phase, their discernment, 
carelessness, and the retrospective helped them to understand the decisions 
they had made, and the situation they had been engaged in. Executives 
referred to their SDM and their experience as being the main factors enabling 
them to do their job and to quickly understand the situations they were in.  
 
With a retrospective view on the situation, the executives acknowledge that 
they had underestimated the complexity of the CRE products and lacked an 
understanding of valuation methods. The executives did not sufficiently 
engage with the risks arising from the products and methods, which led to a 
lack of risk awareness. Consequently, CRE properties were acquired in blind 
faith as a pure yield providing assets without considering the particularities of 
CRE. Even though the executives tried to point out the risks they identified and 
make the necessary resulting decisions, the communication about these was 
hesitant, and even inconsequential. 
 
Executives, during the phase of FI, were much more concerned with managing 
their business instead of taking the time to reflect on their behaviour and it was 
obvious that the participants in this study took a detailed look back on this time 
only because this was part of the interview. However, from the data it is clear 
that the executives tried to make sense of the given situation now when they 
were invited to do so and thought about what they could have done differently, 
or better, after the situation had already passed. In retrospect, the executives 
FINDINGS 		
	 246 
discerned carelessness during the phase of FI, but could create new 
sensemaking frames, that then may be available for them to draw on in future 
similar situations.  
 
4.4.2.2 Organisational Sensemaking in an Event of Financial Crisis 
 
4.4.2.2.1 Extracted Cues of the Financial Crisis 
 
The senior executives also extracted cues of the event of FC to make sense of 
the situation. These were related to “Market standstill”, “(Irrational) decisions 
under uncertainty”, “Business model malfunctions”, and “Contentual enriched 
information intake”. 
 
Market Standstill  
During the event of FC, the senior executives noticed a behavioural change in 
two main market participants. On the one hand, investors ignored the asset 
class CRE. On the other hand, the banks limited their refinancing efforts or 
even stopped it. 
 
The participants recognised the standstill on the buy-side as well as on the 
sell-side. As a result, the market interaction of supply and demand came to a 
standstill. The situation actually attracted Jake`s attention because “[…] an 
ongoing machinery, was principally abruptly stopped.” (Jake 00:42:16#-
#00:43:15#). Charlie detected “[t]hat the lending was fully abandoned […]“ and 
“[…] that there were not any market participants asking for real estate any 
more while at the same time, at the same time actually withdrew the money, in, 
in that great extent” (Charlie #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#). Another participant 
observed a “[...] price decline and depreciation of the assets” (Allen 
#00:06:34#-#00:07:08#) during this event. 
 
Scarlett extracted, from the investment behaviour, that investors and clients 
limited the provision of capital from their side, which led to an end to expansion 
for her CRE organisation (Scarlett #00:20:01#-#00:21:33#). The availability of 
equity was restricted and there was no willingness to invest any longer 
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(Scarlett #00:21:47#-#00:22:13#). On the other side, Charlie noticed that the 
debt financing was entirely suspended (Charlie #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#). At 
worst, banks had to file for bankruptcy during this event. For one of the 
participants this was a new exogenous factor (Sophia #00:29:43#-#00:31:16#) 
and a surprising event that resulted in an extracted cue.  
 
(Irrational) decisions under uncertainty  
A further major point during the event of FC was the recognised uncertainty. 
The market players made irrational decisions when reacting to the unexpected, 
non-controllable situation – from their sensing. The uncertainty and 
helplessness resulted in rough reactions and approaches.  
 
One of the executives mentioned his uncertainty  
 
“[…] because you don´t know, if this is a permanent or temporary issue 
[…] more a profound trend and not a temporary problem, because at 
the end it is a macroeconomic adjustment, which you actually do not 
recognise immediately. […] This is a bit difficult here because it is also 
a kind of paradigm shift.” (William #00:43:03#-#00:44:39#) 
 
Another participant talked about fears of potential consequences on the 
business of his CRE organisation and possible dismissals of employees 
(Sophia #00:32:46#-#00:33:48#), which can also be related to the perceived 
uncertainty. 
 
Another executive extracted the cue of irrationality from the decision-making 
behaviour when mentioning to “not make any decision any longer or irrationally 
from specific perspectives [...]. Potentially also the irrational decision, I do not 
invest in real estate any more.“ (Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#). He himself also 
made decisions “[…] out of a mixture of gut feelings and experience […]” (Jake 
#00:58:00#-#00:58:46#) during this time.  
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For William, the event occurred suddenly and was non-controllable:  
 
“Well, it was the opposite of ‘I can perceive it and control it’, it was 
more actually a, a feeling of being hit by something surprisingly, from 
the left hand side, something that you did not expect, that a model did 
not foresee” (William #00:38:10#-#00:38:26#).  
 
This also meant uncertainty about the situation, its occurrence, and coping. 
Another interviewee noticed that the decision-makers applied rough behaviour 
in their decisions and measures during this time in order to achieve the 
organisational strategic aims despite the actual occurrences in the corporate 
environment (Harry #00:48:38#-#00:49:21#).  
 
Business Model Malfunctions  
Another material cue extracted from the changed market conditions during the 
event of FC was the malfunctioning of models due to changed parameters and 
the withdrawal of liquidity, which led to a freeze in expansion.  
 
The senior executive William determined that suddenly huge credit spreads 
had been priced compared to specific bonds. The interest development in 
several countries was recognised as displaying the risk in these countries as 
being much higher than in Germany (William #00:34:30#-#00:35:31#). 
Coherently, Scarlett noticed during this event “[...] simply limited capital 
availability, even though the appraisal and evaluation of the assets, the 
profitability, risk profiles of the assets, did not provide for any explanation on 
this. And this has restricted our business insofar that the limited availability of 
capital led to a kind of expansion stop“ (Scarlett #00:20:01#-#00:21:33#). 
Similarly, another executive recognised that due to “[...] a lack of liquidity 
together with a decrease in leverage also accompanied by an increase in 
interest costs, together with lower prices and decreasing values of the assets 
finally triggered a problematic situation with regard to the loan situation “ (Allen 
#00:06:34#-#00:07:08#) their models did not function any longer.  
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During this time, the withdrawal of money was a material cue that also 
contributed to the market standstill. Charlie talked about the circumstance that 
not only “[…] lending was fully abandoned“, but “[…] while at the same time, at 
the same time actually withdrew the money, in, in that great extent” (Charlie 
#00:47:05#-#00:48:53#). Jake detected a stagnation of their transaction fee 
but was able to further operate his CRE business due to constant 
management fees (Jake #00:51:29#-#00:52:50#). From his point of view, 
transactions came to a standstill during this event because of the absence of 
supply but also demand (Jake #00:42:16#-#00:43:15#). Jake noticed that the 
decision-makers practically no longer made any decisions during this event, 
which contributed to the standstill and malfunction of the models (Jake, 
#00:39:58#-#00:41:55#).  
 
Contentual Enriched Information Intake  
As further cues, the senior executives used to enhance their information intake. 
Therefore, they additionally included specific company information and also 
processed general information. 
 
Several participants were informed about the event of FC through external 
information. There were default letters from the financing banks that drew the 
attention of one participant to the changes in the corporate environment (Allen 
#00:07:08#-#00:07:16#). Another executive became aware of the event 
(George #00:25:46#-#00:25:54#) and the consequential publications about the 
status of the banking system (George #00:24:48#-#00:25:46#) through press 
releases. Scarlett also took information from the media and used direct 
exchange with banks or expert talks as part of events (Scarlett #00:30:35#-
#00:31:13#).  
 
Summary of the Theme “Extracted cues of FC” 
Using numerous cues extracted in the event of FC, executives seem to be very 
sensitive to triggers for FC situations and to making sense of them. During this 
event, the senior executives noticed signals, like market standstill and the 
malfunctioning of their business models, which led them to reconsider their 
strategies. At the same time, the situation provided the executives with 
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uncertainties as it was different from the patterns of their usual business and 
from any situation they had experienced before, which resulted in irrational 
decisions.  
 
Where their own recognitions were limited, another cue was extracted from 
information from the media. The situation was still not crystal clear to the 
executives, some of them did not even recognise a FC themselves but only 
became aware of it when noticing information from the public.  
 
It is apparent from the above that the cues extracted by the executives were 
moderated by their uncertainty about the event of FC and their resulting limited 
capacity to take note of the full extent and consequences of the situation. 
 
4.4.2.2.2 Enactment through Organisational Adjustments 
 
The second theme “Enactment through organisational adjustments” is about 
the actions towards what was sensed in the situation of FC. It comprises the 
four sub-themes, “Deinvestive actions to handle the realised portfolio risks”, 
“Analysis and adjustment of the financing management”, “Alignment of the 
business model and of strategic goals”, and “Adjustment of the risk 
management strategy”. 
 
Deinvestive Actions to Handle the Realised Portfolio Risks  
As a reaction to what was sensed from the extracted cues of the event, the 
senior executives stopped their investments and reduced their portfolio assets. 
One participant declared that they acquired “[...] initially a long time [...] only 
few investments in the USA [...] as a more or less direct 
consequence“ (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#). In another CRE organisation, 
a “[…] full stop of investments […]“ was initiated which developed to a 
standstill (Olivia #01:01:32#-#01:05:14#). William`s preconceptions resulted in 
a general adjustment of the portfolio with regards to disposals and alignments 
of the hedging strategy (William #00:42:03#-#00:42:41#). Charlie was more 
aggressive and tested the market in order to determine the achievable prices 
for their CRE assets (Charlie #00:51:18#-#00:53:56#). Another participant 
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started the “[...] sale of portfolios or liquidation of divisions, so to say strategic 
participations that we were involved in, which we sold off because they did not 
fit to the core competencies of the organisation any longer“ (Harry #00:52:43#-
#00:53:06#). Following what he sensed, Allen also pushed exit strategies for 
the CRE assets of his organisation (Allen #00:07:26#-#00:07:54#). 
 
The quotes confirm that the senior executives reviewed and tested their 
investment behaviour and the value of their portfolios based on what was 
sensed from the cues. As mentioned before, one participant reconsidered the 
US exposure but finally there were no massive impairments because of the 
high occupancy (George #00:26:12#-#00:27:28#). Olivia said, due to what was 
sensed, that “[f]or some assets, we have analysed afterwards what we actually 
acquired [...]”, and in this regards she emphasised “[...] big debates and 
discussions with appraisers if the values are still correct, and if the values are 
achievable“ (Olivia #01:01:32#-#01:05:14#). Harry`s organisation initiated that 
“[...] the type of appraisal and approaches [...]” were “[…] newly 
established“ (Harry #00:54:52#-#00:55:16#). Jake “[…] refocused on […] how 
the investment behaviour of the asset managers is monitored. Meaning, do 
they still look for critical locations, do they take risks, how do they handle risks 
if they take them.“ (Jake #00:55:53#-#00:56:34#).  
 
Analysis and Adjustment of the Financing Management  
Another enactment of the event of FC related to the financing management in 
the CRE organisations. Actions included an analysis of the financing situation 
and adjustments in the financing strategy. 
 
The participants mentioned that due to what they sensed about the situation, 
they initiated “[...] adjustments in the hedging alternatives […]“ and “[...] newly 
customised hedging strategies“ (William #00:42:03#-#00:42:41#). Another 
consequence was the “[...] restructuring of loans [...] in an adequate way that is 
acceptable for the bank and the equity investor“ (Allen #00:07:26#-#00:07:54#). 
Olivia wanted to get an overall view on the financing situation and “[f]inancing 
agreement reviewed in full, where am I standing with regard to my debt. Am I 
able to deliver in any case“ (Olivia #01:01:32#-#01:05:14#). Another executive 
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mentioned that they arranged for liquidity (Charlie #00:54:55#-#00:54:58#), 
which was placed as part of the internal credit lines (Charlie #00:56:34#-
#00:57:40#).  
 
It becomes clear that CRE is strongly connected with the financing and debt 
markets and that the processing of adjustments in the financing management 
and strategy to the market are vitally important for CRE businesses.  
 
Alignment of the Business Model and of Strategic Goals  
A third major point of the enactments that were consequential to what 
executives sensed about the event were adjustments of the business model 
and of the strategic goals of the CRE organisation. 
 
All of the participants mentioned that the event of FC resulted in strategic 
decisions about adjustments in the CRE organisation with different intensities 
and forms. Innovations and a refocus were characteristic for this event.  
 
Sophia started considering a new business model (Sophia #00:32:46#-
#00:33:48#). Similarly, others mentioned that their senses about the situation 
resulted in an adjustment of the organisational structure of the company. 
Especially, project development capacities were decreased and the focus 
turned to other divisions related to portfolio management. Additionally, 
investments in new business areas, like special properties, were targeted and 
respective knowhow was gathered to establish a further pillar (Scarlett 
#00:33:29#-#00:34:31#). Harry reacted with “[...] a refocus to the domestic 
core business. A full disposal of the non-core assets, meaning the ones 
previously defined a score investments and optimisation of the balance sheet, 
including the according third party debt positions“ (Harry #00:47:36#-
#00:48:32#). This also resulted in sales of the assets “[...] because they did not 
any longer belong to the core business of the organisation“ (Harry #00:52:43#-
#00:53:06#). As an initiative with long-term effect, the CRE organisation “[...]  
stepped back from business divisions, from the risk experience, that 
developed“ (Harry #00:57:24#-#00:58:18#).   
FINDINGS 		
	 253 
George (#00:33:15#-#00:33:16#) and Sophia (#00:40:07#-#00:40:07#), 
however, did not see any necessity to implement any changes in their 
organisational structure after having made sense of the crisis situation. Jake 
(#00:57:07#-#00:57:07#) mentioned that his organisation became more 
innovative during that time. 
 
Based on what was sensed, Charlie`s organisation decided to inform the 
investors about the situation (Charlie #00:54:58#-#00:55:08#). James also 
remembered his close contact with the clients during this phase and he had to 
manage the equity withdrawals while convincing the investors to keep their 
money in the fund (James #00:46:17#-#00:47:08#). 
 
A further strategic action was the alignment of the strategic goals of the RM. 
One participant, for example, considered it necessary to implement a common 
understanding of risk for the whole group covering all different cultures (Olivia 
#01:06:55#-#01:11:27#).  
 
Adjustment of the Risk Management Strategy  
The adjustments also related to the RM strategy that was considered to be no 
longer adequate enough to manage and prevent the CRE risks and risk 
assessment needed to be extended. 
 
One participant reacted to the situation with profound changes to the RM. The 
focus here was on “[…] the new products […]” (William #00:45:29#-
#00:45:47#). Also George “[...] significantly enhanced the risk systems in the 
medium-term, and tried to, let`s say, to assess such topics also 
beforehand“ (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#). Others reacted with a fine-
tuning of the RM and a more detailed analysis, while becoming more sensitive 
to key figures (Jake #00:59:08#-#00:59:26#).  
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He elaborated on this issue:  
 
“What has changed is the handling. The interpretation of it. Surely, you 
may add further key figures or for certain have to include additional key 
figures. Preferably dynamic ones, because we have enough static 
ones. But the interpretation, what about this, this is what really 
changed, that there is an awareness if how to manage the situation of 
either scenario occurs.” (Jake #00:47:43#-#00:48:18#)  
 
Scarlett, however, mentioned that as a result of what she had sensed from the 
situation, the concept and structure of their RM system was not changed, 
but ”[…] the focus and choice of risks is subject to changes” (Scarlett 
#00:36:20#-#00:36:33#). Another organisation focused on “[...] now hired 
talented people [...]“ for the RM team (Olivia #01:11:45#-#01:12:09#). 
Meanwhile George enhanced the scoring model with regards to CRE 
investment in different countries (George #00:33:28#-#00:34:47#). Harry 
restructured the processes in the RM and the monitoring of risk was 
implemented (Harry #00:54:52#-#00:55:16#). Additionally “[...] new areas of 
risk [...] included in the overall view“ (Harry #00:57:24#-#00:58:18#). It became 
clear that a more thorough approach to risk identification was important (Harry 
#00:59:10#-#01:00:11#).  
 
Similarly, in another CRE organisation, the processes of risk identification, 
analysis, and assessment were extended (James #00:51:22#-#00:51:22#):  
 
“[...] we have changed it with regard to a significantly higher number of 
risks included in our ’types of risk’, that we monitor. So, also, an 
example is not, how we monitor the interest-change risk, a question 
was how we assess the availability of real estate assets, how do we 
evaluate the implementation of the investment guideline in the 
individual funds. All of these were aspects which were not covered 
before because we were much more focused on if we achieve the 
volume of management fees that we had forecasted for that 
year.“ (James #00:50:03#-#00:50:49#)  
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The assessment of risks and additional risk factors seemed to be an 
appropriate process of enactment for the senior executives. Olivia adjusted the 
analysis and assessment of risk for her organisation (Olivia #01:12:21#-
#01:12:35#) especially implementing qualitative risk factors, like ones resulting 
from the tenant quality (Olivia #01:12:43#-#01:14:01#). Sophia considered 
more quantitative factors but also implemented additional factors, like interest 
change risk and tenant credit rating, in her RM (Sophia #00:43:15#-
#00:43:42#). 
 
Another interviewee mentioned a shift in risk relevance for his organisation 
where “[...] particular risks have moved to the foreground even though 
previously not considered that strong“ (Allen #00:11:13#-#00:11:24#). 
 
Summary of the Theme “Enactment through organisational adjustments” 
The senior executives made sense of the extracted cues from the market 
change and sudden events that resulted in uncertainties and imposed risks to 
their organisation. However, this did not paralyse them as they initiated 
organisational and strategic adjustments. There is no evaluation of whether 
these actions have finally proven right or wrong. 
 
With regards to this property, the common pattern is that the executives 
implemented deinvestive actions in order to handle the occurring portfolio risks, 
based on what they sensed. During this phase, these actions were not limited 
to cessation of investment but also included verification of the existing 
investment behaviours by means of evaluating the portfolio and reducing 
holdings.  
 
Additionally, the financing management was analysed and, due to the actual 
perceived situation, was adjusted to needs. During this time, the executives 
made changes to their business model based on a newly established strategic 
direction. Here, beside the focus on the core competencies, the alignment of 
the capacities was paramount. Furthermore, the executives decided on an 
adjustment of the RM approach and an extension of the risk assessment.  
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Thus, the executives’ reactions were influenced by their sensemaking of the 
event. What they sensed about the recognised crisis situation induced radical 
and far-reaching adjustments in the strategic and RM, as well as the resulting 
organisational adjustments in the CRE organisation.  
 
4.4.2.2.3 Operational Plausibility  
 
In Weick`s (1995) view, sensemaking contains plausibility because the 
phenomenon will not be seen as most accurate, but rather plausible. This 
touch of hermeneutics is seen as a strength of sensemaking (Helms Mills et al. 
2010) where the pragmatic and reasonable leaves room for the executives in 
their interpretation and their invention from the multiple cues they extracted. In 
a subjective world, plausibility comes into play where decisions need to be 
made even though information is missing or, in some cases, there is not 
enough time to reconsider all the information (Weick 1995; Maitlis and 
Christianson 2014).  
 
The theme “Operational plausibility” comprises the sub-theme, “Prevalence of 
operative decisions”. 
 
Prevalence of Operative Decisions  
During the event of FC, the executives felt that there was a lack of time to 
react to the event and had to make decisions at short notice. They had to react 
based on what was most plausible rather than accurate decision-making. 
 
William stressed “[...] there was little time to think about“ (William #00:38:42#-
#00:39:08#). “Actually, this was, it had to move quickly, there were no long 
reports or slow developments, but it was a relatively fast development.” 
(William #00:46:48#-#00:46:58#). Similarly, Allen emphasised that this time 
required a “[...] comprehensive operative utilisation, little time remaining to 
strategically change something in the organisation, that happened that, let`s 
say, in retrospective“ (Allen #00:10:06#-#00:10:23#). 
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Summary of the Theme “Operational plausibility”  
Based on the abovementioned quotes, it is obvious that the senior executives 
were not able to fully perceive, analyse, and interpret all cues prior to reacting 
to the new and complex situation. There was not sufficient time to reconsider 
all the alternatives and possibilities accurately, but a decision had to be made.  
 
For the executives, it was sufficient to base their decisions on cues and 
information that were plausible and probable. During this event of FC, it 
became necessary to reply quickly and pragmatically to the event, limiting the 
time for reconsideration.  
 
4.4.2.2.4 Social Interaction for Reaction 
 
During the event of FC, social interaction was an essential part of the senior 
executive`s sensemaking of the situation. They used the exchange with 
manifold parties to share experiences and make sense of the situation 
collectively.  
 
The property “Social interaction for reaction” refers to interaction for reaction in 
this study. It comprises two sub-themes “Ambitious information exchange” and 
“Assessment of events through social interaction”. 
 
Ambitious Information Exchange  
During the event of FC, the handling of information by the senior executives 
was strongly intensified but not standardised. The inclusion of the various 
different parties involved was challenging. 
 
In this context, George mentioned that it was a multi-layered matter when the 
event of FC in the corporate environment was assessed from the perspective 
of the CRE company (George #00:30:26#-#00:30:42#). He determined that 
relations between all parties involved was very professional during this time 
and a proper analysis of the consequences for the organisation was the first 
thing to be done (George, #00:28:16#-#00:29:05#). Jake noticed that 
everybody dealt with the issue rather differently, “[b]ut because we have had 
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the exchange there existed a well-rounded picture” (Jake #01:02:09#-
#01:02:54#). Allen considered it difficult to gain a maximum of knowledge and 
to involve all relevant persons in order “[...] to get all knowledge carriers in the 
right compilation around the table or in the right compilation“ (Allen 
#00:12:46#-#00:13:25#).  
 
It became clear that the social interaction during the event of FC was 
challenging and an involvement of all parties was hardly possible. The 
information exchange was more interactive and focused on managing the 
situation.   
 
Assessment of Events through Social Interaction  
Above the prevailing internal exchange, the executives used their network and 
expert talks to assess the event of FC. Social interaction was rather important 
in evaluating the event.  
 
Harry involved his management board and supervisory board for an evaluation 
of the situation (Harry #00:50:25#-#00:50:27#). Scarlett talked to her 
colleagues “[...] those who are actively involved in the respective departments 
and who are responsible [...] and then this is obviously discussed between the 
board and usually also with our other committees in the advisory board, so that, 
for this case, we are intensively occupied with all these risk factors and the 
resulting response alternatives for our organisation“ (Scarlett #00:26:55#-
#00:27:35#). Charlie also involved the management board and experienced a 
collective sensemaking that allowed the members to move closer together 
(Charlie #01:03:32#-#01:04:14#). There were also bilateral discussions 
between one participant and his management colleagues as well as the 
advisory board members during this phase where the risks and scenarios were 
evaluated (Jake #00:59:49#-#01:00:20#). This also included the active 
involvement of the RM in the bilateral exchange (Jake #00:54:01#-#00:54:13#). 
George further obtained expertise from the headquarters and asked for expert 
opinions in diverse calls (George #00:30:45#-#00:31:21#). 
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During the crisis, it seemed that internal collaborative sensemaking became a 
substantial source for the executives; especially taking opinions from higher 
ranked executives and experts to evaluate the situation.  
 
Summary of the Theme “Social interaction for reaction” 
The statements show that the executives executed sensemaking as a social 
process during the event of FC. They performed an ambitious and interactive 
information exchange. It became clear that a standardised interaction could 
not be implemented because of the complex situation. The assembling of the 
numerous addressees was challenging but the social interaction in talks 
contributed to the interpretation and evaluation of the event. It was important 
for the executives to involve a high number of addressees to base their 
decisions on a broad foundation and thus increase certainty about the 
assessment.  
 
For the event of FC, the information exchange increasingly extended beyond 
the intra-departmental level. Executives sought information on a broader basis 
and they also allowed themselves to talk more openly about their experiences 
and evaluations without being labelled as a ‘naysayer’ or a ‘party pooper’ – but 
moreover being recognised as a kind of ‘fellow sufferer’. 
  
4.4.2.2.5 Retrospective Discernment of Misconduct and Overreaction 
 
Referring to Weick (1995), people need to have experience before they can 
know what they are doing. For the event of FC, the senior executives 
acknowledged that only after the crisis did they become conscious of what 
they had done, as well as their misconduct and overreaction. 
 
The property “Retrospective discernment of Misconduct and Overreaction” 
comprises two sub-themes, “Irrational management decisions” and “Panic 
reaction of clients”. 
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Irrational Management Decisions  
In retrospect, the executives admitted that the market participants acted 
irrationally during the event of FC, which went along with strategic misconduct. 
 
Nowadays, Harry named the event a “[...] misjudgement of the market 
[...]“ (Harry #00:46:38#-#00:46:40#) and affirmed that, in retrospect, 
“[s]trategically it may even have been wrong to sell the one or the other, if we 
basically would have been able to resist longer, but the strategy, strategy was 
set and we had to bow to it […]“  (Harry #00:53:19#-#00:53:37#).  
 
With some hindsight, George admitted that one could have done “[...] bargains 
hunting [...]“, if there had been a more open approach for dealing with the 
event (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#). In this context, he stressed that “[...] 
from today`s view, we have to say, that it develops much, much better than we 
have expected at that time“ (George #00:26:12#-#00:27:28#).  
 
Panic Reaction of Clients  
Another material statement in retrospect was about the clients’ reaction and 
behaviour during that time. They expressed irrational fears and panic 
withdrawal from the asset class CRE. 
 
Jake determined that the investors were in a panic fearing they would lose 
their money and therefore wanted to return their shares. This was especially 
pertinent in the case of open-ended mutual RE funds, where the FC resulted in 
forced sales of CRE assets to arrange for the necessary liquidity. From this 
perspective, the behaviour is considered irrational because the assets still 
existed and were still leased. Jake also stated that during the crisis “[…] 
especially institutional investors, who were generally in panic to loose their 
money rather said, I want to get rid of my shares” in fear that CRE could 
disappear in times of crises or that it would not longer exist afterwards (Jake 
#00:43:18#-#00:45:44#).  
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Summary of the Theme “Retrospective Discernment of Misconduct and 
Overreaction”  
Looking at the senior executives’ expressed experiences about this event, it is 
clear that they did not involve retrospective sensemaking during the event of 
FC. It seems that this was not because of ignorance, but due to confusion and 
lack of time to reflect because the situation required speedy decisions and 
reactions. In hindsight, they felt retrospect could have assisted them, and they 
now understand the decisions that they made during that time, and the 
situations they previously engaged in. They all refer to their SDM and their 
experience as being the main factors in being able to do their job. A job that 
involves making strategic decisions and quickly understanding the situations 
they are in.  
 
Furthermore, the situation was complex and unusual. The participants had not 
experience anything like this before, which consequently resulted in the failure 
of their usual patterns of sensemaking. Cognitive frames and irrationality drove 
their strategic misconduct, which they now recognise. Furthermore, the clients’ 
and investors’ behaviour was called a panic reaction. The withdrawal from the 
asset class CRE was based on the irrational fears of the investors. 
 
With a retrospective view of these experiences, the executives are able to 
make sense of the situation and prevent further misconduct in future similar 
situations. In the event of FC, the ultimate effect of not being able to apply 
retrospective sensemaking may have been the initial paralysis, leading to the 
sudden market standstill. Even though professionalism appeared during FC, 
they did not have a solution or action response at hand. However, the findings 
indicate that the executives are able and willing to break down old 
sensemaking frames or even establish new ones to learn from this exceptional 
event. 
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4.5  Qualitative Indicators and Implications of the Phenomenon of 
Financial Instability  
  
4.5.1 Analysis 
 
In the course of the TAs that have been conducted for the study to investigate 
the lived experience as well as the process of organisational sensemaking, FI 
and FC concepts have been developed from the significant ideas and 
statements or linking keywords that were taken from the interview data. These 
existing concepts are now utilised when analysing and developing the QIs and 
implications of FI and FC.  
 
In the first step, the concepts that emerged for the phase of FI (Appendices 6 
and 8) were grouped thematically. Those that shared patterns were developed 
to QRIs. Separate indicators were attached as specific classifications for 
scalability. The classification and scales were established with caution, using 
suggestions and contributions from the interview data, but they should be 
considered as samples and are open for further refinement in future 
application. The QRIs and indicators together constitute a QI. 
 
In the next step, the developed QRIs were linked with the potential risks and 
resulting potential effects on SM (corporate strategy) for the CRE company 
that executives experience. In order to substantiate these potential risks, the 
researcher referred back to the concepts of the sub-themes “Manifold strategic 
risks in the corporate environment”, “Strong dependencies of the business 
model on developments in the corporate environment” and “Numerous risk 
factors in the external corporate environment” that were explored beforehand 
for the organisational context (Appendix 5). Those mirror the generally 
applicable and perceived risks for CRE companies in the specific context and 
were considered as being inherent risks of, and for their business model. The 
same applied to the potential effects on SM, which were revealed based on the 
available concepts of the sub-theme “Business model is oriented toward 
growth” (Appendix 5). As described before in sec. 3.3.3.5, a reference back to 
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the original concepts of the corporate context was sensible as these specify 
reliable notions from the first cycle analysis of the original interview data. 
 
In the final step, all the potential risks were allocated to the broad categories of 
‘strategic’, ‘financial’, ‘operational’, and ‘external’ risks, as well as related sub-
risks (Mitchell and Matruglio 2015) as acknowledged classifications (Appendix 
12).  
 
An example of how the QRI “Decision-makers act negligent and uncritical in 
real estate acquisitions”, indicators, and potential risks for the phenomenon of 
FI developed during the analysis is shown in the following table: 
 
 
Concept  
(Appendices 6 and 8) QI 
Potential Risk 
Concept (Appendix 5) 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
Commercial 
principles of due 
diligence ignored  
Acquisition at the 
expense of quality 
standards  
Poor letting and low 
occupancy  
Acquisition of 
properties of poor 
quality  
Uncritical acquisition 
of real estate  
Uncritical 
behaviour and 
blind faith  
QRI: 
Decision-makers act 
negligent and 
uncritical in real 
estate acquisitions 
(lack of risk 
awareness / 
increased risk 
appetite) 
 
Indicators: 
Diligence of the 
decision-makers in 
acquisitions (good/ 
poor) 
Compliance with the 
principles for a proper 
due diligence 
(complete, partially 
complete, incomplete)  
Available time for 
performing a proper 
due diligence 
(appropriate, 
inappropriate) 
Risks:  
Increasing prices  
Lack of transparency 
for the decision-
maker  
 
ð potential effects 
on SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership (corporate 
strategy) 
 
Strategic risks: 
Pricing pressures  
Corporate 
governance 
Miscommunication 
 
Table 17: Development of the QIs and Potential Risks in a Phase of FI. Source: Author (2018) 
 
The QRIs and respective indicators are a narrative, descriptive assessment. 
They were established to allow the measuring of environmental changes in the 
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complex CRE environment against these specific criteria, illustrating the 
different dimensions of the phenomenon of FI.  
 
Integrating such QRIs in the SRM of the CRE organisation involves a 
distinction and specification of individual indicators that meet the formal 
requirements and allow for a clear identification of the states. Thus, all 
indicators were well defined and clearly specified. Notably, the indicators do 
not involve any quantification. Nevertheless, for all of these indicators the 
researcher also developed a kind of metrics that allow for scalability to 
evaluation and operationalisation. These metrics are characteristic dimensions 
of these indicators as potential states, and display realistic capacity in order to 
account for the understanding and sustainability of these indicators and strive 
for a more objective view of the phenomenon.  
 
After all this analysis, referencing and coding to categories took place, the 11 
QRIs with 30 indicators were found to be related to potential risks during a 
phase of FI for CRE companies with corresponding effects on the SM 
(Appendix 10).  
 
Together with the potential risks and related potential effects on SM, the QRIs 
make up implications for the CRE companies. 
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Similarly, the above-described analysis steps were applied for the event of FC 
and, exemplarily, the QRI “Investors ignore real estate as a form of investment 
and withdraw funds” and respective implications emerged as follows:  
 
 
Concept  
(Appendices 7 and 9) QI 
Potential Risk 
Concept (Appendix 5) 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
Within short time 
investments and debt 
financing abandoned  
Real estate ignored 
as an asset class  
Drawback from the 
asset class real 
estate in a panic  
Irrational fears of 
investors  
Limited availability of 
capital  
Lack of liquidity  
Withdrawal of 
liquidity and freeze 
on expansion  
QRI: 
Investors ignore real 
estate as a form of 
investment and 
withdraw funds 
 
Indicators: 
Willingness of 
investors to invest in 
real estate (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Availability of liquidity 
from investors (high/ 
normal/ low) 
Notice periods for 
return claim of funds 
(long/ medium/ 
short) 
Risks: 
Reaching 
performance targets   
Interest development  
Availability of liquidity 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Achieving market 
leadership (corporate 
strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
 
Strategic risk: 
Demand shortfalls  
Operational risks: 
Earnings shortfall, 
cost overruns 
Financial risks: 
Asset losses, high 
debt and interest 
rates, liquidity 
crises 
External risk: 
Rating impacts 
Table 18: Development of the QIs and Potential Risks in an Event of FC. Source: Author (2018) 
 
Finally, the analysis resulted in ten QRIs with 28 indicators in all the broad 
categories that impose potential risks during an event of FC (Appendix 11).  	
4.5.2  Developing Qualitative Indicators and Implications for CRE 
Companies 
 
This section provides further understanding about the QRIs and implications 
developed in the analysis, as well as their potential effects on CRE companies. 
From the total of 21 QRIs, 11 have been identified as majorly relevant. This 
was due to their great expressiveness of the changes that occurred as a 
consequence of the event of FC in a phase of FI and because of characteristic 
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parallels in these QRIs that allow for a comparison and distinction between the 
two stages in the SRM. These QRIs are thus considered as representative for 
FI or FC respectively and could be coded to five overarching patterns (Table 
21).  
 
4.5.2.1 Qualitative Indicators and Implications for a Phase of Financial 
  Instability 
 
In general, it can be noted that the QRIs for a phase of FI are very much 
internally driven and predominantly subject to executives` behaviours. A 
statement about the individual specification and interpretation will be provided 
for each QRI, as follows. 
 
Willingness of the Decision-maker to Acquire Overpriced RE Properties 
This QRI covers the price acceptance of the decision-makers during the phase 
of FI. During this time, they were willing to acquire overpriced properties, with 
features (i.e. location) that did not justify the asking price. Furthermore, this 
willingness was provoked by the deficient availability (i.e. age, building 
condition, facilities) of CRE that satisfy the investors’ demands.  
 
With such price acceptance arises the potential risk of increasing prices for the 
CRE products. This is allocated to the strategic risks of the CRE company 
because higher prices bring increasing pricing pressures with them.  
 
As a consequence, the decision-makers faced the potential risk of a lack of 
transparency regarding the situation. Therefore, this risk is allocated to the 
broad category of strategic risks. It does not meet the requirements of proper 
corporate governance and progresses to a miscommunication within the CRE 
organisation.  
 
At the same time, the price acceptance leads to a stronger competition for RE 
assets with other CRE players in the market, which leads to a strategic risk 
because of the product competition with other players.  
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Due to a lack of transparency about the situation, the management may 
develop wrong strategies and make inappropriate decisions, which finally put 
the corporate goal aspired to by the senior executives - improvement of the 
performance of the CRE organisation - at risk.  
 
Higher prices, along with a missing improvement of the performance of the 
CRE company, led to missing the strategic aim of enhanced client satisfaction. 
With paying higher prices comes the respective lack of performance 
improvement of the CRE company. Here, the increase in client satisfaction, as 
another strategic goal of the organisation, is at risk because the promised 
acquisition and sale yields cannot be reached and the client expectations of 
the investors are not fulfilled. 
 
These potential affects on SM also put the achievements of the targets of an 
increase of assets under management as well as the achievement of market 
leadership at risk. 
 
Integrating this QRI in the SRM of the CRE organisation is carried out by using 
the indicator of relation between purchase price and characteristics of the 
asset, which can be high, medium, or low. Another indicator is the availability 
of CRE properties that can vary between high, medium, and low. Finally, the 
traceability of the managers’ acquisition decisions, based on objective 
characteristics, indicates a risk of overpricing. This one is also rated as high, 
medium, or low.   
 
Decision-Makers Ignore Hints from the Markets in their Decisions 
(Perceived Certainty)  
This QRI refers to the way executives handle the perceived signals of the 
markets during this situation and how they react and decide respectively.  
 
It has been found that during the phase of FI, there is less consideration of 
hints and signals from the markets in executives` decisions. Moreover, they 
give a sense of certainty both to others and to themselves. 
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The insignificant consideration of hints relates to some kind of ignorance of 
information from the task environment of the CRE organisation, 
macroeconomic factors and the emotional state of the decision-makers due to 
their perception of the respective factors and signals. 
 
Such ignorance of signs from the market entails the potential risk of increasing 
prices for RE and the strategic risk of pricing pressures. Where important 
information is deliberately faded out, executives may not consider those in the 
price negotiations and would be willing to pay prices at an unchanged level. 
 
In this regard, there is also a potential risk of a lack of transparency regarding 
the situation for the decision-maker. Hence, there is a strategic risk of the CRE 
organisation where corporate governance becomes vulnerable because of an 
intransparent information basis for their decisions. Additionally, such ignorance 
will lead to a miscommunication within the organisation.  
 
At the same time, the ignorance of market information entails the risk that 
developments of the markets are not taken into consideration in the SDM. As 
such, there is missing or little reaction and adequate adaption to the market, 
which results in the strategic risks of an inappropriate corporate governance 
when decision-makers become non-diligent, ultimately leading to 
miscommunication within the organisation.   
 
The management may develop false strategies and make wrong decisions in 
such situations, which thwart the performance improvements of the 
organisation. Following this affects the strategic goal of enhancing client 
satisfaction, because the investment decisions may not meet the expectations 
of the investors in the long term. 
 
The aforementioned is covered by indicators that present the handling of 
information by the decision-makers. On the one hand, this can be determined 
by the handling of information about the task environment. On the other hand, 
the handling of information regarding macroeconomic parameters is a further 
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indicator. Both are expressed according to the kind of reaction (no reaction, 
little reaction, comprehensive response).  
 
Above these two, the emotional state of the executive, due to the perceived 
task environment as well as due to perceived macroeconomic parameters - 
whether they are certain or uncertain - is a suitable indicator. 
 
Decision-Makers Act Euphoric in Strategic Decisions and Disregard 
Experiences 
This further QRI looks at the emotional state of the executives in their strategic 
decisions during a phase of FI. It has been found that decision-makers act 
euphorically during this phase with the detriment of relying on their prior 
experiences. Here, euphoria means that decision-makers take more and more 
risks to remain competitive in the market and to meet investors` expectations. 
Personal experiences gained previously are faded out and predominated by 
euphoria and exaggerations. Several decision-makers have only few thoughts 
about immanent CRE cycles or future consequences. And even though they 
have some diffused gut feelings and negative impressions, the euphoric mood 
overruled. 
 
This leads to the potential risk of increasing prices as well as the resulting 
strategic risk of pricing pressures. Here, decision-makers were found to be 
riding a wave of a euphoric positive mood and exercised a higher price 
acceptance. At the same time, this leads to the potential risk that 
developments of the market are not taken into consideration in strategic 
decisions. This again is a strategic risk while not conforming to the 
requirements of good corporate governance. Further executives` internal 
communication may be affected while no longer being in line with objective, 
rational, and logic considerations. 
 
Executives` propensity for euphoric activism and their fading out of prior 
experiences may result in false strategy considerations and the consequent 
inappropriate strategic decisions. The improvement of the performance will 
then be affected and so will client satisfaction.  
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The above circumstances and emotional state of the decision-makers can be 
covered by the two indicators of emotional perception. The first one relates to 
the emotional perception of personal decision-making behaviour. The second 
indicator relates to the emotional perception of people`s decision-making 
behaviour. Both can be expressed as euphoric, neutral or depressed, 
exaggeration, neutral or understatement, diffused or clear, critical or uncritical, 
secure or risky, correct or false. 
 
Investors Treat Real Estate as a Pure Yield-providing Object 
When it comes to the risks and indicators that are externally driven, investors 
are one of the most important parties to exert influence on the CRE company 
and its decision-makers. This QRI refers to the investors’ investment 
objectives for RE during a phase of FI.  
 
It has been found that investors treat CRE as a pure yield-providing object 
during an event of FI. Notably, CRE specifics are widely ignored by the 
investors as long as the promised yields suffice or overfulfil their requirements. 
This is the major feature of why a CRE property or product is selected, and a 
high ratio of debt financing is accepted which has a favourable impact on the 
returns. When the RE asset is only considered as a yield-providing object, the 
focus might turn from a long-term investment to a short-term one. Re-leasings 
are done to generate as much income as possible in the short term, mostly 
with short running contracts, and to a lesser extent with the purpose of 
providing a stable income over several years. Every possible value 
appreciation is immediately capitalised upon, and where exits with high profit 
margins are possible, assets are sold.  
 
The target of the investors to treat CRE as only yield providing leads to the 
potential risk of a dependency on cash inflows from the investors’ side as well 
as on the willingness of the banks to provide financing. This results in a 
financial risk for the CRE organisation because missing liquidity, either equity 
or debt, consequentially leads to a liquidity crisis within the organisation. 
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Further potential risks arise due to a stronger competition in CRE acquisitions 
because of yield expectations. This competition however is not only related to 
those that acquire and manage CRE with competitive yields, but also to other 
asset classes, because the returns are the decisive parameter. In order to fulfil 
the expectations of the investors, other risk factors have to be taken into 
consideration to meet the yields and the parameters of the return calculations 
required according to adjustments. 
 
There is also a resulting potential risk of dependency on interest developments. 
While the yield expectations may be met with a higher leverage, the RE 
products become more dependent on interest rates and bond yields in the 
market. Such a financial risk derives from excessive indebtedness where 
increases in interest rates lead to increasing interest costs and press yields 
down. 
 
The stronger, or even pure, focus on yields of CRE from the investors’ side 
can lead to an erroneous focus in strategy and misleading strategic decisions 
that result in the company’s failure to achieve their strategic goal of improved 
performance. 
 
At the same time, the goal of enhanced client satisfaction is at risk when the 
targeted and promised yields cannot be met. This happens because the 
returns are affected due to changes in the dependent variables (i.e. interest 
development), or due to the unwillingness of the banks to finance at the 
estimated terms, or if a higher purchase price comes into effect due to 
increasing competition etc. Finally, this will possibly fall short of the investor`s 
expectations. 
 
When implementing the QRI in the SRM of a CRE organisation this can be 
controlledby two indicators. First, is the indicator of a loan to value ratio. Even 
though this is usually a quantitative figure, here there is no specific percentage 
that indicates a risk, but it is rather qualified as either high or low.  
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A further indicator is the relevance of asset specifics for investors when 
investing in CRE. This relates to the features of the properties and their quality 
and relevance can be determined as either high or low. 
 
Credit Institutions Provide Real Estate Financing Uncritically  
This QRI relates to the behaviour of credit institutions with regards to the 
financing of CRE and CRE products. During a phase of FI, the credit 
institutions have been found to provide financing for RE products uncritically 
and this developed as another external driver for risks. 
 
Banks were willing to offer a disproportionally high loan amount in relation to 
the property value during this phase. At the same time, they also offered very 
favourable financing terms, so financing was an interesting opportunity for 
decision-makers. This also contributed to the aforementioned yield pressures, 
while a higher loan to value at favourable conditions contributed to higher 
yields.  
 
However, in this phase, executives noted that they perceived a lack of 
expertise of the banks, which was conveyed through insufficient professional 
experience with the CRE products of the decision-makers at the credit 
institutions. 
 
Following the uncritical position of the banks in financing RE, there arises the 
potential risk of stronger competition in CRE acquisitions but also in cheap 
financial products. The favourable financing terms that were offered by the 
banks could be used for financing various CRE products and there were less, 
or even no, warranties, securities, or any minimum equity proportion required 
by the banks. 
 
As a consequence, competitors in CRE acquisitions were entering the market. 
Apart from the fact that some of them had not been active in the CRE sector 
before, others had not been able to enter the market because of the 
characteristics of the CRE product to be financed. This results in a strategic 
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risk for the CRE company because the decision-makers face further product 
competition due to the new participants in the market.  
 
The uncritical financing behaviour of the banks and the consequential 
competition result in the potential risk of increasing prices for CRE. This is a 
further strategic risk because the price acceptance of the decision-makers 
entails an increasing pricing pressure. 
 
Furthermore, the behaviour of the credit institutions leads to a potential risk of 
dependency on the interest developments for the CRE organisation. This 
makes up a financial risk for the company. Notably, such risk does not emerge 
because of an increasing indebtedness or over-indebtedness, but because of 
a rise in interest rates that will trigger increasing interest costs for the financed 
projects. An increasing dependency of the CRE organisation also exists with 
the existence and continuation of the bank`s operative business.  
 
A further potential risk results from the regulatory work applicable to CRE. This 
is especially true in debt financing, as well as in the banking sector in general, 
where a stronger regulation in leverage quota, requirements for equity 
coverage, or warranties by the borrower or its parent company, may bring the 
CRE organisation to its knees. More restrictive governance would require 
reducing the financing amounts or bring additional guarantees that require 
additional equity and a guarantor with a strong balance sheet. This adds to the 
strategic risks of a CRE company because regulations of supervision 
authorities may restrict financings or impose additional conditions they deem 
necessary.  
 
Based on the aforementioned uncritical behaviour of the credit institutions, the 
executives may develop inappropriate strategies and make wrong strategic 
decisions that contradict the strategic goal of improved performance of the 
CRE organisation. The financing opportunities may lead to the situation that 
executives have cheap funds available for properties that otherwise would not 
have been acquired. The low financing costs can have a detrimental effect if 
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bond yields start to rise and the properties become unprofitable while not 
reaching the pursued performance goals. 
 
Consequently, the other strategic goal of client satisfaction is at risk because 
the return expectations cannot be met. With variables of interest developments, 
or regulatory restrictions, or changing financing conditions margins narrow and 
move below the promised returns. 
 
For implementing this QRI in the SDM, the indicators cover the externalities 
driven by the banks. Here, the indicator is the loan to value ratio. This indicator 
determines the proportion of debt financing in comparison to the value of the 
property that is financed, which can either be high or low.  
 
The offered financing terms are an additional indicator. This relates to the 
interest, warranties, and guarantees required. These conditions can either be 
favourable, appropriate, or expensive. 
 
As a further indicator, the professional expertise (high, medium, low) as well as 
the professional experience (long-term, medium-term, short-term) of the 
banks` decision-makers pertaining to RE products should be mentioned.  
 
4.5.2.2  Qualitative Indicators and Implications for an Event of Financial 
Crisis 
 
The QRIs of an event of FC are mostly externally driven and triggered by, or 
highly dependent on, the behaviour of credit institutions and investors. The 
conduct of the executives or the CRE companies is mostly a consequence of 
the banks` and investors’ behaviour. A statement about the individual 
specification and interpretation will be provided for each QRI, as follows. 
 
Decision-makers Discontinue Acquisitions and Investments 
This first QRI of FC refers to the CRE investment behaviour of decision-
makers during this event. The decision-makers discontinue their acquisitions in 
CRE and the investment volume is reduced or even stopped. The decision-
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makers signal their lack of further investments in this asset class, causing it to 
come to a standstill. 
 
Such cessation of investment in CRE leads to the potential risk that the 
performance goals of the CRE organisation can no longer be met. While there 
are no more acquisitions and investments in CRE, the transaction volumes 
and letting potential decrease. The usual management fees and rent can no 
longer be obtained and the targets cannot be achieved. 
 
This poses an operational risk for the CRE organisation that comes along with 
a shortfall in earnings and an investment stop. This also becomes a financial 
risk because the decrease in income and fees, as well as in rents, results in 
asset losses. Where no additional investments are procured, the properties fall 
into disrepair, tenants move out, and these assets no longer generate enough 
income.  
  
The investment stop in CRE places the increase of performance of the CRE 
organisation at risk. The management might consider inappropriate strategies 
and decisions and fail to take new opportunities in the markets. Furthermore, 
there is another strategic goal at risk. When returns can no longer be achieved 
due to the investment stop and asset losses, clients` satisfaction is reduced. 
Therefore, the strategic targets of an increase of assets under management, 
as well as the achievement of market leadership, cannot be reached. 
 
The implementation of this QRI in the SRM of a CRE organisation is 
constituted by the investment volume for RE products. This indicator can take 
the dimension of high, medium, or low.  
 
Decision-Makers Reduce Portfolio Assets in Order to Arrange for 
Liquidity 
This QRI shows how the decision-makers behaved with regards to their 
portfolio assets. During this phase, the decision-makers reduced their portfolio 
assets, and disinvested in order to arrange for liquidity. When there was no 
additional cash inflow from the investors’ side or from bank lending, the 
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decision-makers sold RE in order to procure liquidity. In this event, the 
necessity of funds resulted from a shortfall in liquidity due to the redemption 
requests of the investors who wanted to withdraw funds. 
 
With the decrease of the portfolio assets comes the potential risk that 
performance targets cannot be reached. The decision-makers have to cope 
with the risk that the decrease in assets leads to an increasing disposition 
volume while at the same time the letting potential of these properties 
decreases. Fees and rents cannot be collected as planned and the respective 
performance targets are missed. 
 
This is considered as an operational risk of the CRE organisation. The 
reduction of portfolio assets supplies liquidity from sale proceeds in the near-
term, but at the same time there is an earnings shortfall in the medium- and 
long-terms. The sale of assets in order to arrange for liquidity may also pose 
the risk that the value of the RE property is not reflected in the sale price. In 
distressed sales the price is usually far below the actual value of the asset. 
This further results in additional financial risks for the CRE organisation 
because asset losses come along with the decrease of portfolio assets.  
 
Due to the downturn that is shown in the disposal of properties and the 
decrease of the portfolio assets, the management might impose false 
strategies and respective inappropriate decisions that result from such 
movement. On the one hand, less properties means a reduction in rental 
income and management fees. Assets sold during this time may not reach the 
targeted exit prices, which will probably lead to worse performance and targets 
may not be reached.  
 
Again, this puts the strategic goal of enhanced client satisfaction at risk. Due to 
asset sales, at worst below value, performances cannot be achieved and the 
investors’ yield expectations are jeopardised. The increase of assets under 
management as well as the achievement of market leadership as strategic 
goals cannot be achieved. 
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For the SRM, the QRI is translated into several individual measurable 
indicators. As one indicator serves the disposition volume of RE products, it 
shows whether the volume is high, medium, or low, and can indicate whether 
the volume is rising, stable, or decreasing. A further indicator is the achieved, 
or achievable, exit price for the RE assets, which can either be high, low, or 
appropriate with regards to the value of the property.  
 
Additionally, the duration of the sales transaction is an established indicator. 
This one specifies whether a transaction has been done under time pressure 
or under usual circumstances. The duration can either be long, medium, or 
short. 
 
The Event is Perceived as Sudden and Unexpected by the Decision-
Makers 
This QRI refers to the way in which the decision-makers perceived the event of 
FC, which is characterised as sudden and unexpected. The event, in terms of 
its development, had not been taken into consideration for the strategic 
planning of the CRE organisation. Also, the organisation did not have 
adequate measures at hand to react to the event.  
 
As the situation was perceived as sudden and unexpected, it is obvious that 
the decision-makers did not foresee, or plan for, the event strategically. 
Consequentially, they did not develop any corresponding scenarios. 
Performance targets had not been adjusted to the situation either. Hence, the 
potential risk of not achieving the performance targets for the CRE 
organisation increased. 
 
This is an operational risk, on the one hand, and a financial risk on the other. 
Since, the event was perceived as sudden and unexpected this resulted in an 
earnings shortfall. This, in turn, is followed by cost overruns, because the 
structural, as well as the process organisation, cannot be adjusted in the short-
term. The financial risk arises from the potential asset losses due to 
unexpectedness. Such perception of the situation also leads to the potential 
risk of a lack in transparency regarding the market situation. This is a strategic 
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risk where the organisation misses adequate corporate governance. Also, 
such lack in transparency may result in miscommunication within the 
organisation. At the same time, the executives may be disoriented or 
overstrained, which results in them making the wrong decisions based on 
strategies that have not been clearly thought out. As an example, during this 
time there may be considerations about asset sales that provide for liquidity 
but are far behind the targeted exit yields, and this will have a negative effect 
on the performance of the CRE company.  
 
Following the other strategic goal of enhanced client satisfaction may place the 
company at risk because the returns and performances cannot be met and can 
fall well below client expectations. 
 
Furthermore, the surprising outbreak of the event was followed by adjustments 
in the strategic planning of the CRE organisation that put the strategic aims of 
an increase of assets under management and an achievement of the market 
leadership at risk. 
 
When applying the QRI, this has been transformed with several qualifying 
indicators. The first one is used to cover the development of the event as 
incorporated in the strategic planning, which can be included or partially or not 
at all. Another indicator looks at whether the consequences of the event are 
included in strategic planning or just partially or not at all. And a third indicator 
comprises the development of mechanisms to react to the event – either given, 
partially, or not at all. 
 
Decision-Makers Focus on Core Competencies of the CRE Organisation 
This QRI is supposed to comprise the way in which SDM is performed. During 
the event of FC specifically, decision-makers concentrated their strategic 
decisions on business model adjustments, and turned their focus back on the 
core competencies of their CRE company. 
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Such concentration refers to the portfolio assets on the one hand, as well as 
the business segments of the organisation. A further focus was on the 
competencies that relate to corporate participations.  
 
Because of the decision-makers’ refocus on their core competencies, the 
potential risk of failing the performance targets arises. This risk can be 
considered as an operational risk because this focus and the according exit of 
several properties, or the sale of participation interest in other companies, as 
well as the abandoning business segments, correlate with earning shortfalls. 
 
Furthermore, this can also become a financial risk for the CRE organisation 
because the focus on core competencies may involve decisions to close or 
limit other business segments, which finally leads to asset losses. 
 
Due to the decision to focus on the core competencies of a CRE organisation, 
the management may develop wrong strategies that limit the achievement of 
increased performance of the organisation. Assets that are sold due to such 
refocus may be sold with losses or lower the targeted exit yield. An early 
abandonment of previously profitable business areas may result in start-up 
losses not being compensated. Exiting participation interests that are not 
related to the core business can result in a loss of a strategically necessary 
position. The same applies to the loss of respective future earnings from these 
assets, which results in less stable cash returns, even though the exit might 
provide a one-time return and cash effect. 
 
Again, this may result in performance losses and therefore the strategic target 
of enhancing client satisfaction may not be reached. Furthermore, due to the 
purification and sale of assets, the strategic goals of an increase of assets 
under management and the achievement of market leadership are also at risk. 
 
For implementing this QRI in the SRM, the following indicators are used. First, 
the indicator of the development of the volume of assets under management. 
Second, the activities in different business segments that may also increase or 
decrease during this phase. And last, the number of existing participation 
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interests. All of these may be measured when considering whether they 
increased or decreased. 
 
Investors Ignore Real Estate as a Form of Investment and Withdraw 
Funds 
This QRI refers to the investment objectives for CRE of the investor. For an 
event of FC, the investors’ readiness to invest in CRE levels off and finally 
comes to a standstill. Investors ignore the asset class CRE as an investment 
and withdraw their capital. The availability of liquidity from investors decreases 
or they claim the returns of their funds. 
 
Due to investors ignoring the asset class CRE and withdrawing liquidity, there 
arises the potential risk of not being able to reach the performance targets of 
the CRE company. This strategic risk evolves due to the lack of interest in 
CRE and a decline in demand for CRE products. These demand shortfalls 
ultimately result in the operational risk of earning shortfalls because fees and 
income decline due to a lower volume of assets under management. At the 
same time, there is an operational risk of cost overruns if the process and 
organisational structure of the CRE organisation are not adjusted and are not 
flexible enough for alignments. 
  
This, in turn, leads to a financial risk for the CRE organisation. The withdrawal 
of funds consequentially requires selling assets, which results in asset losses. 
There is also an external risk for the CRE organisation. The lack of liquidity 
from the investors and withdrawal of funds results in performance losses and 
impacts the rating of the CRE organisation. 
 
The investors` ignorance of the asset class RE and their withdrawal of funds 
provides the risk of an increasing dependency on interest developments during 
this time. This is considered a financial risk for the CRE organisation. Due to 
the lack of equity, there is increasing demand for debt in RE products to 
balance the missing funds. Consequently, there is not only the risk of an 
increasing indebtedness or overindebtedness, but also an increase of interest 
which results in increasing costs that have to be borne by the company.  
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During this situation, while investors ignored the asset class and withdrew 
funds, the dependency of the CRE company on the cashflows of investors was 
intensified. This financial risk arose because a lack of liquidity from investors 
may lead to a liquidity crisis for the organisation. 
 
The ignorance of the investors investing in CRE and the withdrawal of funds 
may lead to the wrong conclusions and strategies from management. 
Following such decisions, the performance of the CRE organisation may be at 
risk. To substitute the lack of capital, the executives may decide to take debt 
from banks, likely at terms that imply high financing costs that burden 
performance. Or they even sell assets. Therefore, the non-performance also 
puts the strategic goal of enhanced client satisfaction at risk and customer 
expectation cannot be met.  
 
At the same time, the strategic goals of an increase in assets under 
management and market leadership are jeopardised because an investment in 
CRE or CRE products is only possible under unprofitable terms.  
 
For implementing the QRI in the SRM of the organisation, the following 
indicators are used: The first indicator refers to the willingness of investors to 
invest in CRE, which is either high, medium, of low. Another indicator is the 
availability of liquidity from investors during this phase. This can be a high, 
normal, or low amount. Another indicator is the notice periods for return claims 
of funds, which can be either long, medium, or short-term. 
 
Within Short Notice Credit Institutions Abandon Lending 
This QRI relates to the behaviour of credit institutions with regards to the 
financing of CRE and CRE products in the event of FC. 
 
Notably, during the event of a FC, credit institutions abandon lending for CRE 
within short notice. Their willingness to provide debt for CRE assets came to a 
standstill and liquidity to financing CRE was not available. 
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The missing engagement of credit institutions to provide financing for CRE 
products leads to the potential risk that CRE organisations cannot reach their 
performance targets. This strategic risk refers to the demand shortfalls for CRE 
products because debt is not available, yet is required in addition to equity in 
order to be able to acquire high-volume properties. At the same time, with its 
leverage effect, debt boosts the performance and is necessary to achieve the 
requested yields. 
 
At the same time, this is an operational risk for the CRE organisation because 
the declining demands for CRE will lead to earning shortfalls in terms of fees 
and on-going earnings. This again results in a financial risk for the CRE 
organisation, because the lack of debt financing for CRE assets will result in 
asset losses due to the limited possibilities of refinancing followed by forced 
sales. 
 
As a consequence of no further financing from the credit institutions at very 
short notice, there arises a potential risk for the decision-makers of a 
dependency on cashflows from the banks. The requested restructuring of debt 
financing, as well as a lack of refinancing efforts from the banks’ side, requires 
the CRE organisation to arrange other liquidity sources. Where no equity can 
be provided, the lack of liquidity may lead to a liquidity crisis. 
 
Due to the lack of willingness from the banks to finance the asset class CRE, 
the management may implement wrong strategies and make strategic 
decisions that jeopardise the improvement of the performance of the CRE 
company. To secure liquidity, CRE may be sold or distressed, and at lower 
returns than originally planned, which impacts the performance of the CRE 
organisation. These performance losses further result in a loss of client 
satisfaction and the failure to achieve this strategic goal. 
 
Following the abandoning of lending for the CRE asset class and the resulting 
liquidity crisis, the strategic goals of an increase of assets under management 
as well as market leadership will consequently be missed.  
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This QRI is being implemented in the SRM using three indicators. These are 
defined as: the willingness of the banks to finance the asset class CRE, 
classified as high, medium, or low. Another indicator is the availability of funds 
from credit institutions, which is also categorised as high, medium, or low. And 
lastly, there is an indicator given that relates to the termination notice periods 
agreed upon in loan agreements. These can either be long, medium or short 
periods. 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter included an overview of the progression of the data analysis and 
the factual evidence of the findings. For each of the analyses considered - 
context, managerial lived experience, and the organisational sensemaking 
process - first, the approach to analysis and the emerging sub-themes and 
themes were presented. Followed by the TA and coding progress, as well as 
the interpretation of the findings. Finally based on the elelaborated concepts 
from lived experience and sensemaking, QIs and implications of the 
phenomenon were developed. 
 
A distinction between the phase of FI and the event of FC had to be drawn as 
these are characterised and perceived differently, and as a consequence, 
executives interpreted each in distinct ways.  
 
The Themes of the Corporate Environment of CRE Companies 
Acknowledgig the context-sensitivity of this phenomenological study, in the first 
step, the CRE context was analysed. The executives provided three themes 
that represent their perception of the corporate environment in which they are 
usually operating (Table 19). 
 
The findings show that the senior executives perceived the context of the CRE 
business as complex and dynamic in general. They noted the dependency of 
business performance on the developments in the corporate environment and 
mentioned that the severe changes related to the insecurities of the strategic 
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decision-makers. Hence, they confirmed that the specific corporate 
environmental conditions of CRE companies pertains their SM behaviour. 
 
The Themes of the Managerial Lived Experience 
In order to explore the corporate meaning of FI, the managerial lived 
experiences of the senior executives in the CRE organisations were analysed. 
To this end the data provided five themes that represent the corporate 
meaning of FI, as the preliminary phase, and another five for the corporate 
meaning of the event of FC. 
 
Financial Instability Financial Crisis 
1. Unrealistic market situation 
2. Euphoria and expansion pressures of the 
actors  
3. Unregulated workload in the organization 
 
4. Ignorance in perceived certainty  
 
5. Informal and individual intensification of 
lived relations  
1. Unexpected market standstill 
2. Disillusionment and consolidation of the 
actors 
3. Without alternatives, alignment of the 
organization in uncertainty 
4. Irrational behaviour in perceived 
uncertainty 
5. Formal and social intensification of 
lived relations  
CRE Context 
1. A complex and dynamic corporate environment 
2. Dependency of business performance on developments in the corporate environment 
3. Uncontrollability of massive changes in the corporate environment 
Table 19:  Summary of Themes about the Context, and the Corporte Meaning of FI and FC. 
Source: Author (2018). 
 
For the specific situation of a phase of FI, the findings show that executives 
perceived it as an unrealistic market situation. This is characterised by 
euphoria and expansion pressures from all market participants accompanied 
by an unregulated workload in the organisation. At the same time, the 
executives perceived certainty and ignored the warning signs of the market. 
During this phase, they preferred informal communication about the situation 
and have chosen their interlocutors individually, while intensifying their internal 
network.  
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Against the background of this lived experiences of a phase of FI, the 
executives perceived the event of FC as a sudden and unexpected situation. 
This is characterised by a standstill of operations in the relevant markets as 
well as by the disillusionment and consolidation of the actors in the CRE 
organisation. Adjustments of the organisation, as well as the risk awareness to 
the changed environmental conditions, were implemented in uncertainty and 
without alternatives, even though, or exactly because, executives performed 
professionally and routinely during the standstill. The executives perceived 
uncertainty and displayed irrational behaviour, based on gut feelings. At the 
same time, they looked for a more formal communication and social 
intensification of relationships to assess the situation and potential 
consequences.  
 
The Properties of the Organisational Sensemaking Process of the 
Phenomenon of FI 
The sensemaking process of the senior executives in the CRE organisations 
was analysed in order to discover the way they form their expectations 
regarding FI based on their meaning. The data provided four properties that 
represent the executives` sensemaking process of FI and another five for FC.  
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Financial Instability Financial Crisis 
1. Extracted cues of FI 
• Increasing investment pressure 
• Contradictory moods 
• Strong dynamics of the market 
 
1. Extracted cues of FC 
• Market standstill 
• (Irrational) decisions under uncertainty 
• Business model malfunctions 
• Contentual enriched information intake 
2. Enactment through risk prevention 
 
• Irrational acquisition decisions 
• Internal organisational actions to avoid 
impending risks 
 
2. Enactment through organisational  
 adjustments 
• Deinvestive actions to handle the 
realised portfolio risk 
• Analysis and adjustment of the 
financing management 
• Alignment of the business model and 
strategic goals 
• Adjustment of the risk management 
strategy 
3. Social interaction for preparation 
• Interpretation through inclusion and 
exchange of internal information 
• Interpretation through social interaction 
and inclusion of external information 
3. Social interaction for reaction 
• Ambitious information exchange 
• Assessment of events through social 
interaction 
 
4. Retrospective discernment of carelessness 
 
• Lack of risk awareness 
• Uncritical acquisition policy 
• Underestimated complexity of the 
products and methods 
• Inconsequential action and 
communication 
4. Retrospective discernment of misconduct   
 and overreaction 
• Irrational management decisions 
• Panic reaction of clients 
 
 5. Operational plausibility 
• Prevalence of operative decisions  
CRE Context 
Table 20:  Summary of Properties about the Process of Sensemaking of FI and FC.  
Source: Author (2018). 
 
These findings show that executives` sensemaking process is very much 
characterised by extracted cues and followed by enactment as well as social 
interaction. At the same time, they only made sense of the situation in 
retrospect because they had been interviewed and did not use their 
experiences during the particular phase of FI or the event of FC – executives 
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seemed unable or incapable of applying retrospective practices when facing 
the situation.  
 
During a phase of FI, they were driven by cues of investment pressures and 
contradictory moods in order to comply with market pressures, which resulted 
in actions to prevent risk. Executives carried out manifold social interactions to 
grab internal and external information that contributed to further considerations 
in preparing for the situation. They reflected, in retrospect, that there was a 
lack of risk awareness and criticality in their acquisitions policy, which also led 
to inappropriate action and communication. At the same time, executives 
realised their underestimation of the complexity of the products and methods.  
 
Differently, in the event of FC, executives extracted cues of market standstill 
and business model malfunctioning. Decisions were made under uncertainty 
and they drew on content enriched information. Their respective process of 
enactment was merely characterised by strategic organisational adjustments 
to reduce risks, implementing deinvestive actions, aligning the financing 
management, as well as overarching alignments of the business model and 
strategic goals or RM strategy. It became obvious that, during this time, 
operative decisions were prevailing. Furthermore, social interaction focused on 
the assessment of the event through ambitious information exchange. In 
retrospect, however, the executives discerned their misconduct and 
overreaction during this time. They admitted irrational management decisions 
and panic reactions of the clients. 
 
Qualitative Indicators and Implications of the Phenomenon of FI 
Finally, the analysis looked at how the corporate meaning and awareness of 
the respective expectations translate into different implications for SRM 
behaviour. The QIs (QRIs and indicators) and implications (potential risks and 
risk-related events) of the phenomenon of FI were identified. For both, FI and 
FC, several QRIs could be developed for implementation in SRM. 
 
For FI, as well as for FC, these QRIs can be allocated to five overarching 
dynamics: executives` investment behaviour, executives` market perception, 
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executives` SDM behaviour, investors` investment behaviour, and banks` 
financing behaviour. There are different specifications in each of the QRIs that 
are expressed through individual indicators. The potential risk that is generally 
perceived together with the inherent potential effects on SM (risk-related 
events) for CRE companies, as found in the previous analysis about context, 
constitute the implications of a phase of FI, or an event of FC, from a corporate 
perspective. 
 
 FI FC 
Dynamics QI Implication 
 
QI Implication 
  Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 
Executives` 
Investment 
Behaviour 
 
QRI 
 
Willingness of the 
decision-maker to 
acquire overpriced 
RE properties 
 
Indicators: 
Relation between 
purchase price 
and characteristics 
of the real estate 
(high / medium / 
low) 
 
Availability of real 
estate (high/ 
medium/ low)  
 
Traceability of the 
acquisition 
decision based on 
objective 
characteristics 
(high/ medium/ 
low) 
 
 
Risks 
 
Increasing prices  
Strategic risk: 
Pricing pressures 
 
Lack of 
transparency for the 
decision-maker  
Strategic risks: 
Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
Strong competition  
Strategic risk: 
Product competition 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
 
 
QRI 
 
Decision-makers 
discontinue 
acquisitions and 
investments  
 
Decision-makers 
reduce portfolio 
assets in order to 
arrange for liquidity 
 
Indicator: 
Investment volume 
for real estate 
products (high/ 
medium/ low) 
 
Disposition volume 
(high/ medium/ 
low) 
 
Achieved or 
achievable exit 
prices for real 
estate (high/ 
appropriate/ low) 
 
Duration of sales 
(long/ medium/ 
short) 
 
Risks  
 
Reaching 
performance 
targets  
Strategic risk: 
Demand shortfalls 
Operational risk: 
Earnings shortfall, 
cost overruns 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses 
External risk: 
Rating impacts 
 
ð potential effect 
on SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under 
management 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate 
strategy) 		 	
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- continued - 
 FI FC 
Dynamics QI Implication 
 
QI Implication 
  Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 
Executives` 
Market 
Perception 
 
QRI 
 
Decision-makers 
ignore hints from 
the markets in 
their decisions 
(perceived 
certainty) 
 
Indicators: 
Handling of 
information about 
the task 
environment by 
the decision-
maker (no 
reaction, little 
reaction, 
comprehensive 
response) 
Handling of 
information about 
the 
macroeconomic 
parameters by the 
decision-maker 
(no reaction, little 
reaction, 
comprehensive 
response) 
Emotional state of 
the decision-
maker due the 
perceived task 
environment 
(certain, uncertain)  
Emotional state of 
the decision-
maker due the 
perceived 
macroeconomic 
parameters 
(certain, uncertain) 
 
 
Risks 
 
Increasing prices  
Strategic risk: 
Pricing Pressures 
 
Lack of 
transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: 
Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication  
 
Developments of 
the markets 
Strategic risks: 
Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate strategy)  
 
QRI 
 
The event is 
perceived as 
sudden and 
unexpected by the 
decision-makers 
 
Indicators: 
Development of 
the event included 
in the strategic 
planning (yes/ 
partially/ no) 
Consequences of 
the event included 
in strategic 
planning (yes/ 
partially/ no)  
Development of 
mechanisms to 
react to the event 
(yes/ partially/ no) 
 
Risks 
 
Reaching 
performance 
targets  
Operational risks: 
Earnings shortfall, 
cost overruns 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses 
 
Lack of 
transparency 
Strategic risks: 
Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect 
on SM: 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under 
management 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate 
strategy) 
 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate 
strategy) 
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 FI FC 
Dynamics QI Implication 
 
QI Implication 
  Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 
Executives` 
Strategic 
Decision 
Making 
Behaviour 
 
QRI 
 
Decision-makers 
act euphoric in 
strategic decisions 
and disregard 
experiences  
 
Indicators: 
Emotional 
perception of the 
own personal 
decision-making 
behaviour 
(euphoric/ neutral/ 
depressed, 
exaggeration/ 
neutral/ 
understatement, 
diffuse/ clear, 
critical/ uncritical, 
secured / risky, 
correct/ false) 
Emotional 
perception of 
people`s decision-
making behaviour 
in this situation 
(euphoric/ neutral/ 
depressed, 
exaggeration/ 
neutral/ 
understatement, 
diffuse/ clear, 
critical/ uncritical, 
secured / risky, 
correct/ false) 
 
 
Risks 
 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: 
Pricing pressures 
 
Developments of 
the markets 
Strategic risks: 
Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
 
 
QRI 
 
Decision-makers 
focus on core 
competencies of 
the CRE 
organisation 
 
Indicators: 
Asset under 
management in 
real estate 
(increase/ 
decrease) 
Existing business 
segments 
(increase/ 
decrease) 
Existing 
participation 
interests (increase/ 
decrease) 
 
Risk 
 
Reaching 
performance 
targets  
Operational risk: 
Earnings shortfall 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses  
 
ð potential effect 
on SM: 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(Corporate 
Strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under 
management 
(Corporate 
Strategy) 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate 
strategy) 
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 FI FC 
Dynamics QI Implication 
 
QI Implication 
  Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 
Investors` 
Investment 
Behaviour 
 
QRI 
 
Investors treat 
real estate as a 
pure yield-
providing object 
 
Indicators: 
Ratio: Loan to 
value for bank 
loans (high/ low) 
Relevance of real 
estate specifics 
for investors 
when investing in 
real estate (high/ 
low) 
 
 
Risks  
 
Dependency on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to provide 
financing 
Financial risk: Liquidity 
crises 
 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
 
Interest development 
Financial risk: 
High debt and interest 
rates 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction (corporate 
strategy) 
 
 
QRI 
 
Investors ignore 
real estate as a 
form of 
investment and 
withdraw funds 
 
Indicators: 
Willingness of 
investors to 
invest in real 
estate (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Availability of 
liquidity from 
investors (high/ 
normal/ low) 
Notice periods 
for return claim 
of funds (long/ 
medium/ short) 
 
Risks 
 
Reaching 
performance 
targets  
Strategic risk: 
Demand shortfalls 
Operational risks: 
Earnings shortfall, 
cost overruns 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses 
External risk: 
Rating impacts 
 
Interest 
development 
Financial risk: High 
debt and interest 
rates 
 
Availability of 
liquidity 
Financial risk: 
Liquidity crises 
 
ð potential effect 
on SM: 
Achieving market 
leadership 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under 
management 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate 
strategy) 	 	
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 FI FC 
Dynamics QI Implication 
 
QI Implication 
  Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 Potential Risk 
Broad Risk 
Category: Factor 
 
Banks` 
Financing 
Behaviour 
 
QRI 
 
Credit institutions 
provide real estate 
financing 
uncritically 
 
Indicators: 
Ratio: Loan to 
value of real 
estate financing 
(high/ low) 
Professional 
expertise of 
banks` decision-
makers about real 
estate products 
(high/ medium/ 
low) 
Professional 
experience of 
banks` decision-
makers about real 
estate products 
(long-term, 
medium-term, 
short-term) 
Financing terms 
(interest, 
warranties and 
guarantees) for 
real estate 
products 
(favourably/ 
appropriate/ 
expensive) 
 
 
Risks 
 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: 
Product competition 
 
Regulatory 
requirements  
Strategic risk: 
Regulation 
 
Interest development 
Financial risk: High 
debt and interest 
rates 
 
Dependency on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to provide 
financing 
Financial risk: 
Liquidity crises 
 
ð potential effect on 
SM: 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under management 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market 
leadership (corporate 
strategy)  
 
QRI 
 
Within short 
notice credit 
institutions 
abandon lending 
 
Indicators: 
Willingness of 
banks to finance 
the asset class 
real estate (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Availability of 
funds/liquidity 
from credit 
institutions (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Notice periods to 
terminate loan 
agreements 
(long/ medium/ 
short) 
 
Risks  
 
Reaching 
performance 
targets 
Strategic risk: 
Demand shortfalls 
Operational risk: 
Earnings shortfall 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses 
External risks: 
Rating impacts, 
industry crises 
 
Availability of 
liquidity 
Financial risk: 
Liquidity crises 
 
ð potential effect 
on SM: 
Reaching market 
leadership 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Increase of assets 
under 
management 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of 
performance of the 
CRE organisation 
(corporate 
strategy) 
Enhancing client 
satisfaction 
(corporate 
strategy) 
 
Table 21:  Summary of Findings about the QIs and Implications of FI and FC.  
Source: Author (2018). 
 
It was found that the QRIs for the phase of FI are concerned with more 
internally driven factors, in terms of being actively pursued by the executives. 
This is their willingness to acquire overpriced CRE properties, ignoring hints 
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from the markets in their decisions, euphoric actions of the executives in 
strategic decisions and their disregard of past experiences. Investors` 
behaviour to treat the property as a pure yield-providing object, and the banks’ 
lack of criticality in financing seem to contribute to this behaviour. These 
behaviours imply strategic and financial risks as major risks during this phase, 
predominated by factors like high debt and interest rates, pricing pressures, 
and strong competition.  
 
In the event of FC, indicators are instead predominated by externally driven 
states. Executives could do nothing but react to the situation, as it was 
perceived as sudden and unexpected. While investors ignored CRE as an 
asset class and withdrew their funds, banks abandoned financing in the short-
term. As a consequence, executives discontinued acquisitions, and finally 
reduced their portfolio assets in order to arrange for liquidity. They refocused 
and concentrated on the core competencies of the CRE organisation. This 
implies major risks during this phase, that were again strategic and financial 
but also operational, predominated by factors like demand and earning 
shortfalls, asset losses, and a liquidity crisis.  
 
Although not all of the QRIs and factors have to be present at the same time, 
the more there are, the greater the implications for a phase of FI or event of 
FC. Thus the stronger the relationship between the QRI and the potential risks, 
the greater the implications for the organisation.  
 
The upcoming chapter will discuss these research findings and provide the 
answers to the RQs.   
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
 
This phenomenological research used executives’ lived experience to explore 
the corporate meaning of the phenomenon of FI and to discover how they form 
their expectations about it. With these achievements, indicators and 
implications of FI were determined to complement SM. This section discusses 
these findings about the phenomenon with a distinction to the event of FC in 
relation to existing literature in order to answer the RQs and close the research 
gaps. 
 
5.1 The Corporate Meaning of the Phenomenon in the Context of 
Organisational Adaption 
 
The research aimed to explore the meaning of the phenomenon of FI from a 
senior executive perspective at the corporate level in the field of German CRE 
companies and intended to create an extended definition of FI. In the 
hermeneutical means of the study, the analysis was extended to include the 
general CRE context for a more profound understanding of the phenomenon.  	
In pursuit of this objective, the study provided three major findings: First, the 
general corporate in situ context, in which the decision-makers of CRE 
companies operate, already holds specific features that are an inevitable 
prerequisite to the lived experience of the phenomenon of FI while shaping the 
perceptions and interpretations of the executives. Second, the study highlights 
relevant themes that constitute the corporate meaning of FI, and third, this 
study sheds light on the themes that govern the corporate meaning of the 
event of FC.  
 
The Environmental Context and Conditions of CRE Companies 
The research found that the environmental context and conditions of CRE 
companies hold particular characteristics such as complexities and dynamics. 
This means that the executives have to cope with sector-specifics and 
environmental dependencies in their SM decisions, which require them to hold 
specific knowledge and characteristics. At the same time, the business 
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performance and growth of the CRE organisation depends on the 
developments in this corporate environment, which involve manifold strategic 
risks. The study found that executives consider these conditions as usual 
ground and they state that the known environmental stances can generally be 
managed and are calculable. However, the executives were found to 
experience uncontrollability and insecurities when massive changes and 
unusual events occur in the corporate environment. 
 
The findings suggest that the complexities of the corporate environment are 
characterised by a heterogeneous structure of stakeholder demands, 
numerous dependencies on the developments of different structures and 
markets, as well as a great amount of influencing factors in the remote 
environment of the CRE organisation. This is generally in line with previous 
organisational research (Child 1972; Dess and Beard 1984; Keats and Hitt 
1988; Thompson 2017), which mentions that a corporate environment 
becomes complex when it is increasingly heterogeneous and comprises 
multidimensional factors that act upon the organisation. However, existing 
studies often remain inexplicit about particulars that this research now 
specified for CRE. 
 
In the same context, the researcher found that the perception of environmental 
dynamics results from the constantly changing structure of the demands of the 
market participants, due to the ever-shorter life cycles of the business models 
as well as geostrategic and demographic developments. This is consistent with 
extent literature although it is more specific and detailed. The works of Dess 
and Beard (1984) and Aldrich (2008) correlated the dynamism of the 
environment with volatility, turbulence, or instability. In the context of 
organisational theory, dynamism is also referred to as a degree of instability 
(Tushman and Romanelli 1985; Thompson 2017), which was similarly found in 
this study represented by the constant changes and shorter cycles. 
Furthermore, the findings were considered to be in line with Mintzberg (1979) 
who relates the unpredictability and uncertainty of changes to dynamism. The 
determinants of dynamics for the CRE sector are all hardly foreseeable or 
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controllable for the organisation while driven by other market participants or 
developments in the remote environment.  
 
Notably, Dess and Beard (1984) are the ones who consistently also mention 
both complexity and dynamism, and their multidimensional concept of the 
environment can therefore be deemed applicable to the CRE context. In this 
regard, the literature indicates that managing such complexities and dynamics 
lets executives perceive a greater uncertainty (Duncan 1972; Mintzberg 1979; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) and requires a stronger strategic intervention 
(Emery and Trist 1965). As pertains to CRE business, however, executives are 
used to these environmental complexities and feel certain in their known 
setting.  
 
While perceiving the environment as dynamic, executives consider rents and 
the interest rate development as strong parameters for stability in the CRE 
sector, but interestingly also for unpredictability. This seems to be exceptional 
but explainable, because the volatility of the remote environment does not 
directly penetrate the existing lease contracts or financing agreements 
immediately, but only upon renewal. In this regard, CRE is perceived as a late 
bloomer, which brings security, but one usually cannot anticipate when and to 
what extent the change knocks down. These findings are generally compatible 
with Aldrich (2008) or Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who stress the influence 
through interdependence of externalities that are not limited in their 
unpredictability, cause, change, or consequences. Moreover, the findings are 
consistent with previous research which stresses that companies in dynamic 
environments look for such homogenous elements of their environment in 
order to be better capable to cope with uncertainties (March and Simon 1993).  
 
The environmental states become even more important because the 
researcher evidenced the dependency of business performance on the 
developments in the corporate environment. First and foremost, the CRE 
business model has been found to be oriented towards growth by achieving 
market leadership, increasing assets under management, improving 
performance, and enhancing client satisfaction. These sector-specific growth 
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objectives are consistent with SM research which generally mentions strategy 
as a long-term concept that seeks to create a unique valuable position for the 
company (Chandler 1962; Porter 2004; Porter 2006), achieve performance 
(Thompson and Martens 2010), and remain competitive (Donaldson 2001; 
Morgan 2006). In this regard, executives of CRE companies perceive a strong 
dependency of their business model on developments in the task and remote 
environments, which can affect their performance. These findings are in 
harmony with the widely expressed view that organisations are open systems 
(von Bertalanffy 1949; Hatch and Cunliffe 2013; Chikere and Nwoka 2015; 
Mele et al. 2017). They are moreover consistent with previous research about 
the environment-organisation relation pertaining to the necessity to adapt to 
environmental stances (Donaldson 2001; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008; 
Prajogo 2016; Scott and Davis 2016) - so-called CT. In this context, the results 
specifically back up the various assertions of the existing literature in 
organisational theory with regards to RDT, which focuses on the degree of 
organisational dependency on, and uncertainty about resources in its external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Hickson and Pugh 2007; Hillman et al. 
2009). But, the findings counter the criticism in extant research that RDT only 
relates to general relations (Hillman et al. 2009) or is too narrow while 
objective (Clegg and Rura-Polley 1998), because specific relationships that 
influence organisational behaviour and structures in CRE companies were 
found to constitute the socially constructed influences of the executives.  
 
The findings have been found to be consistent with SM research, placing 
environmental determinants in the context of SDM in order to align the 
corporate strategy (Galbraith and Nathanson 1978; Jemison 1981; Thompson 
and Martens 2010) and to implement organisational action (Miller and Friesen 
1983; Hambrick 1988; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990; Wiersema and Bantel 
1993). The results are in line with extant literature about environmental 
munificence, which has been quantified by the environmental resources 
available and sustainable industry growth factors (Starbuck 1976; Dess and 
Beard 1984) and concretise it for CRE. From this perspective, the resources 
are utilisable for a proactive strategy to the environment, to add capabilities 
and become more innovative, which in turn fosters internal structural changes 
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to be ready ahead of time and ahead of competitors (Aragón-Correa and 
Sharma 2003). This means, that the CRE sector seems generally well 
equipped to grow, change, and respond to competition as long as RE is traded 
and funds from investors and banks are available, which obviously maintains a 
reciprocal relation. 
 
With the dependency on the environment, these stances led to a higher 
degree of uncertainty for the executives (Duncan 1972; Mintzberg 1979; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Thompson 2017). While uncertainty is also 
associated with risks, this is well in line with this investigation, which refers to 
the existence of manifold strategic risks in the corporate environment, which 
are suitable for endangering the successful implementation of strategic 
corporate goals. These risks have been found to relate to the development of 
the markets, price increases, a lack of transparency, strong competition, 
interest rate or political developments, as well as regulatory requirements. 
These findings show different specifics that place multi-dimensional pressure 
on the company and its management, which is generally compatible with 
existing research that suggests a wide range of risk factors (airmic et al. 2010; 
Mitchell and Matruglio 2015). In their example, Mitchell and Matruglio (2015) 
found that the majority of value losses are driven by strategic and external 
risks. Even though the risks identified by the participants of this research come 
unstructured, they show consistency with several risks of the strategic, 
financial, operational, and external risk categories suggested in their model 
(Figure 2). Further details are discussed in section 5.3. 
 
Despite the executives having identified numerous risk factors in the corporate 
environment, they generally consider their environment to be predictable due 
to previously determined expectations and assumptions about its 
developments. This was with RE being considered a sustainable asset class 
and therefore usually unsurprising. At the same time, the study found that 
there is a great deal of uncontrollability when changes in the corporate 
environment are more severe. Beside the uncontrollability of the changes, the 
decision-makers can fail to control the consequences for the organisation that 
result from such massive changes in the task environment and the remote 
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environment. In this case, routine decisions are neither useful nor feasible, and 
the accomplishment of external changes is dependent on their solidity. The 
decision-makers therefore only have limited alternatives to respond to epochal 
changes in the corporate environment within the CRE organisation. They are 
at the mercy of such externalities and can only try to mitigate the 
consequences. The literature also distinguishes from changes in the corporate 
environment that are considered as radical and profound (Ginsberg and 
Buchholz 1990; Heugens and Lander 2009). Deroy and Clegg (2011) also 
emphasise that guidance and practices for unanticipated or unexpected events 
are generally missing.  
 
The market participants link such perception of massive or severe changes to 
the unexpected, the non-controllable or the unusual, and their effect may even 
be worse while the unexpectedness fosters the perceived massiveness of the 
change. In relation to the literature, the findings were comparable with 
uncertainty, where uncontrollability and uncertainty are often used 
interchangeably (Peterson et al. 2003; Grupe and Nitschke 2013). When 
relating the above findings to Milliken`s (1987) three types of PEU, they have 
been found to be consistent with the CRE business context: (1) state 
uncertainty, due to the uncontrollability of potential massive changes in the 
corporate environment that cannot be predicted; (2) effect uncertainty, 
because the executives find the consequences of massive changes for the 
CRE organisation uncontrollable; and (3) response uncertainty, where 
executives have limited reaction alternatives to epochal changes or don’t know 
the alternatives or what their efficacies are. 
 
As for the corporate meaning, these major findings and discussions about the 
corporate context show how the decision-makers classify their corporate 
environment in the SM of the CRE company and in terms of respective 
chances and risks for the SRM. It could be shown that the findings are 
generally in line with extant research in organisational and strategic 
management, but comprise those of detailed specifics of the CRE sector. This 
allows for a sensitisation towards the general context to better understand the 
phenomenon of FI and the event of FC within this corporate background. 	
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The Corporate Meaning of a Phase of Financial Instability  
The analysis of the lived experiences provides corporate means of the 
phenomenon of FI. The researcher found that the senior executives of CRE 
companies define the phenomenon of FI as a phase of an unrealistic market 
situation where the actors experience euphoria and expansion pressures. This 
is an episode with an unregulated workload in the organisation, which is also 
characterised by informal and individual intensification of lived relations of the 
executives while ignorance strengthens executives` perceived certainty. 
 
The findings suggest that executives experienced this time of FI as an 
unrealistic situation where usual market mechanisms ceased to be in force. 
This was underpinned with the impression of a lack of transparency pertaining 
to the types of investment, RE products, and the bad quality of acquired 
properties that came along with inexperienced decision-makers. This finding is 
generally in line with Mishkin`s (1999) definition of FI, which stipulates that 
funds are no longer channelled to productive investments and hence the 
financial system ceases to fulfil its actual task. Also, it can be related to various 
studies, which emphasise that the disruptions and imbalances hinder the 
normal functioning of the real economy (Laker 1999; Davis 2003; Schinasi 
2004). 
 
Mishkin`s (1999) definition was also in line with the findings that more and 
more properties were acquired, but at low quality, thus leading to less 
productive investments, which was also emphasised by other researchers 
(Davis 2003; ECB 2014b) and appears as common understanding. This was a 
result of the risk-free availability of capital that was found meaningful during a 
phase of FI. Funds were easily accessible without depositing warranties and a 
high allowance of loan to value. Following, more and more investments were 
directed into the asset class RE and even to properties with a poor quality 
standard. These findings are also consistent with Ferguson (2003) who 
determined FI as a phase where financial asset prices significantly deviate 
from fundamentals, when market operations and credit availability are 
substantially distorted, while aggregate spending noticeably diverges from the 
accessibility of products. However, he remains unspecific about what 
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‘significantly’ means. His is one definition that leaves room for the assumption 
of a positive or negative deviation, whereby others predominantly refer, in their 
definition and choice of words, to negative abnormalities and consequences. 
The results of this study can though be seen approximate to his definition but 
yet contradictory to the majority of extant definitions of researchers and 
institutions that mention the missing liquidity as well as credit unavailability as 
major characteristics of FI (Mishkin 1999; Davis 2003; Ferguson 2003; 
Schinasi 2004), and not the excessive availability of liquidity and financing. 
This is a surprising but momentous finding that is exactly opposite to other 
definitions from a more macroeconomic perspective. 
  
It seems that the above was conducive to the situation, as the researcher 
further found that investors exert investment pressures and banks exert 
financing pressures, which fueled the continuously existing decision and 
success pressures of the executives. Notably, all of them with a positive 
sentiment. Clients focused on RE as a yield providing object, which resulted in 
higher loan to values and riskier investments that provide higher yields, and 
this was supported by the high availability of debt requesting only few or no 
warranties. In this regard, the researcher found that executives` decisions 
under pressure to succeed caused them to fade out potential consequences or 
complexities. With the prospect of success, relating back to the general 
strategic and performance goals, addressees were either not interested in 
information for further assessment of the situation or lacked the relevant 
knowledge to consider it appropriately, which finally culminated in 
consequences such as the commercial principles of a proper due diligence 
being disregarded. The euphoria and success pressures were characteristic 
during this time. While there is hardly any extant literature referring to such 
details, this is at least contradictory to definitions referring to asset sales 
(Adrian et al. 2014), where this research found that acquisitions were fostered 
and there was strong investment pressure. However, the literature does not 
refer to behaviours or moods in any of its definitions but attaches turbulence 
(Laker 1999) or financial stress (Allen and Wood 2006) as situational states, 
which could be considered to only roughly refer to the same thing. Rather, 
these stances could be seen as a consequence to the behaviour of the actors.   
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In the context of organisational research, executives` behaviour could be 
explained by the fact that organisations usually have to adapt to their 
environment to remain competitive (Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008), and 
hence they followed the market that was taking the opportunities but did not 
want to see any potential (future) risk.   
  
This was further reflected in their communication, which was unclear and 
cautious during the phase of FI. Executives realised the changing 
environmental conditions and they talked about the situation with individual 
persons involved while addressing the long-term risks of the situation only 
informally, while almost exclusively internally and in whispers. The executives 
looked for a kind of valve to make their voice heard about their perception of 
the situation, to informally exchange information in their internal network, or to 
cover their back through internal documentation. This finding can partly be 
related to Mishkin`s (1999) definition of FI. He stipulated that, on a more 
macroeconomic level, the phase could be traced back to asymmetric 
information, arising with the disruption in information flows. According to 
Mishkin (1999), this may lead to unfavourable selections, which was also 
found in the acquisition of properties of bad quality and the unregulated 
processing of a large number of projects.  
 
Such overstrain led to resignation and fostered ignorance. In this regard, the 
research evidenced that ignorance and perceived certainty seem to become 
major characteristics of executives` behaviour during a phase of FI. Their 
euphoria and exaggeration was displayed in the overpriced acquisitions and 
lack of problem awareness while they did not recognise the market situation. 
Potential threats were removed or, even worse, ignored, and this was naturally 
followed by little reaction to the warning signs of the market. In their usual habit, 
the actors felt the necessity to strive for their aspired successes and strategic 
goals, and for the most part faded out the concerns they had from gut feelings 
or previous experiences. Hence, they missed an according adaption to the 
actual situational risks and remained uncritical in their acquisitions, on the 
outside.  
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This can be explained by the expressive meaning determinant of perceived 
certainty. The executives had the impression that the corporate environment of 
the CRE organisation was in a stable and apparently harmonious state. Indeed, 
objectively the determinants of the external environment, especially the remote 
one, did not change dramatically during this time and the task environment 
was positively influenced. This therefore did not suggest any kind of 
uncertainty, and the prevailing positive mood was not surprising. This relates 
back to Mishkin`s (1999) abovementioned asymmetric information, but also 
shows that objective measures or single individual perception of environmental 
states are not sufficiently practicable to determine corporate action, which was 
also earlier affirmed by other researchers (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983; 
Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Romano et al. 2001; Michel 2007; Selznick 2011; 
Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). Where the information exchange did not take place 
collectively and openly, it is assumed that market participants had different 
accurate information and while their impression was not confirmed, they 
ignored the signs and followed the dominant market to achieve performance. 
Finally, it could be said that this fuelled the situation instead of calming it down.  
 
In this regard, existing research also found that executives remained optimistic 
about the stability of the economies (Bezemer 2011; Lin and Treichel 2012) 
even though there were seemingly obvious signs in the phase before the 
outbreak of the GFC (Bezemer 2010; Bezemer 2011; Hindmoor and 
McConnell 2013). But extant research does not provide an explanation to this. 
Hence, this study provides evidence that seemingly, over-optimism and 
euphoria contributed to the developments of this situation. Furthermore, 
existing definitions of FI do not refer to perception, behaviour, or interaction of 
the market participants during this phase. Despite mentioning uncertainty 
(Group of Ten 2001) and the effects on the macroeconomy (Allen and Wood 
2006), extant research remains limited to general statements. The findings of 
this study indicate that executives` behaviour during this time had an important 
impact on how they understood the situation. 
 
This relates to a further meaning determinant that the study made explicit: the 
workability of the executives in CRE organisations. With the investment 
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pressures and availability of funds in this phase came increasing numbers of 
investments, which led to an unregulated workload with a lack in processes 
and control systems. The market dynamics resulted in only marginal, pro-
active adjustments in the internal processes. This means that while executives 
were overstrained, also in terms of capacities and caught in the run on assets, 
they were relatively free in their decisions. Guidelines and regulations as well 
as time for diligent management of the projects, for example, were limited. The 
study found that the focus of their analysis on the rental markets and 
macroeconomic developments, as well as the moods in reports and 
discussions, had a modest tendency of change or were in line with the overall 
developments. This led to less comprehensiveness in their analysis, which 
overall left room for oversights and decision errors, bringing risks for the 
business. Any such detailed description of the situation and consequential 
actions could hardly be found in existing research and remains at a general, 
more macroeconomic level. A connection could be assumed with regards to 
the general turbulence in the market (Laker 1999), which can be considered 
expressed in the unregulated workload for CRE.  
 
While the existing literature could only provide several inconsistent macro-level 
definitions of FI for addressees in the financial sector, the corporate meaning 
provides a more detailed and precise definition that covers contextual and 
sector specifics of the CRE companies. While generally existing definitions and 
the corporate meaning share several similarities, a strong controversy, 
however, could be found relating to the availability of liquidity. At the same time, 
existing definitions are extended by practices and habits of executives while	
they define the corporate meaning mainly through the behaviour of the actors 
in the CRE sector. Perceptions of certainty, lived ignorance about parameters 
in the remote and task environment, as well as executives` internal 
communication behaviour and their type of workability become advanced 
characteristics of the thus far implicit corporate meaning of FI. 	
The further specification of the event of FC made clear how executives 
differentiate between these two distinct occasions. 
  
DISCUSSION 		
	 305 
The Corporate Meaning of the Event of Financial Crisis 
The analysis of the lived experiences also provides corporate means of the 
event of FC. The researcher found that the senior executives of CRE 
companies defined the event of FC as an unexpected market standstill, where 
actors behaved irrationally in perceived uncertainty. The event is characterised 
by disillusionment and consolidation of the actors. Without consideration of the 
potential alternatives, executives performed professionally and routinely, 
pertaining to how and what was adequate, when trying to align the 
organisation to the changed corporate environment. The executives used a 
predominantly formal form of communication during this time, while intensifying 
their relation to colleagues, employees, and external interlocutors. 	
The research found the widely expressed view of the event of FC as an 
unexpected market standstill that resulted from the investors` investment 
behaviour which was abandoned within short-notice. At the same time, the 
banks stopped debt financing for RE acquisitions. Such limitations restricted 
the availability of capital and forced the CRE organisations to a radical stop of 
expansion due to a lack of liquidity. The executives stated that this came 
suddenly and surprisingly and they did not have a chance to foresee or predict 
this situation. Executives` perception of the event of FC, from the view of the 
CRE companies, shows several consistencies with the existing literature, 
which mentioned that the event was unanticipated (Deroy and Clegg 2011) or 
unexpected (Allen and Wood 2006; Bezemer 2010; Bezemer 2011; Lin and 
Treichel 2012), which equates to a radical and profound environmental change 
(Ginsberg and Buchholz 1990; Heugens and Lander 2009) or a systemic event 
(Lai 2003). Allen and Wood (2006) exceptionally include aspects of the real 
economy in describing the event of FC, like the sharp and unexpected 
limitation of access to money that forces a company to immediately and 
significantly reduce its spending. The abrupt stop in lending was also earlier 
considered as related to FC by Claessens and Kose (2013), which is widely in 
line with this underlying research. 
  
At the same time, the executives described their experiences about the actors, 
as well as themselves, as irrational when the event occurred. Irrational, in this 
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regard, means that decisions were taken based on gut feelings and were 
influenced by previous experiences. Chances that derived from such a 
situation were not disregarded by the executives, but, to a great extent, the 
changes in the corporate environment made them feel insecure about the 
assessment of the situation as well as in their decision-making. This insecurity, 
together with their uncertainties, meant that the executives perceived a kind of 
panic behaviour in the market, which was expressed by their mixed feelings, 
between fear and motivation, to get the most out of the situation. Existing 
definitions about FC remain indefinite here while seldom referring to the moods 
of the actors. The exceptional definition of Lai (2003) relates to a loss in 
confidence, which may be considered consistent in this context. These 
environmental states resulted not only in uncertainties about the conditions of 
the corporate environment, but also in consequences for the CRE company 
and possible responses to the situation. 
 
Executives realised the changing environmental conditions, but even though, 
or precisely because, the appearance of the FC was new and to some extent 
intangible, the executives were not able to explain the situation and tried to 
manage it routinely, with usual familiar standards not knowing if those can be 
successful. These were considered as the only alternatives to react quickly. 
When referring back to old habits, executives missed the application of 
sensemaking for innovation (Berghman et al. 2013) and learning (Daft and 
Weick 1984) or to reduce uncertainty (Smerek 2011), as it is intended to be. 
Even though they extended their analysis of information, they remained 
uncertain when adjusting the organisation to the situation, which particularly 
included distressed sales to procure liquidity and demand-related behaviour. 
Interestingly, the existing literature especially refers to large-scale balance 
sheet problems that require financial support from governments (Claessens 
and Kose 2013), but CRE companies at least try to manage the situation 
without such detrimental effect while also considering arising chances.  
 
The need to adjust their strategic goals and respective RM to the changes of 
the corporate environment let the decision-makers focus to their core 
competencies, on selling assets, withdrawing from particular countries, or 
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disposing participation interests. Their mood changed from over-optimism to a 
more realistic view on the situation, with doubts that were displayed in their 
considerations about countermeasures, consolidation, and competencies. The 
corporate perspective that was taken in this study could confirm similar 
findings in existing literature with regards to an unexpected market standstill 
and an according disillusionment and consolidation of the actors (Ginsberg 
and Buchholz 1990; Allen and Wood 2006; Heugens and Lander 2009). 
Generally, the adaptation of the organisation to the corporate environment in 
order to remain competitive (Morgan 2006; Daft 2007; Bess and Dee 2008) 
and to achieve better performance (Donaldson 2001), as stated in 
organisational research, was confirmed. 
 
Such perceived situation could be explained because this event and its 
development, were not considered in the strategic planning. The executives 
also claimed that this event could not even have been foreseen, no toolkit or 
obvious indicators were available that could have guided them in their 
forecasting and strategic planning. It sounds like an excuse for their behaviour 
or rather non-behaviour, and their paralysis and overstrains with the situation, 
but it has also been found in existing literature that it indeed could not have 
been predicted by anyone (Bezemer 2010), which can be explained by the 
lack of explicit means about the situation.  
 
Hereto, decision-makers looked for an intensive collaboration and involvement 
of all parties to assess the situation and its consequences in order to create 
more transparency. This now included the whole company as well as the 
external network seeking for transparency and better assessment of the event. 
During the FC, the behaviour was much more determined by formal 
proceedings and finally a coordinated, joined approach of the management in 
communicating the evaluation of the situation and its consequences for the 
company, resulting in the necessary strategic decisions. This allowed for 
socialising, or institutionalising, the enactment and its consequences that result 
from the situation, in a way that they become more transparent and familiar. At 
the same time, this caused more and more actors in the task environment to 
become uncertain about the situation, which can be assumed to partly 
DISCUSSION 		
	 308 
contribute to the downturn in the FC. Existing research lacks a consistent 
approach while providing for fragmented and diverse definitions. Furthermore, 
compared to the extant literature, the behaviour of the actors has so far 
seldom been taken into consideration by researchers or financial institutions 
when defining an event of FC. Specifically, this can be explained by the thus 
far prevailing positivistic tradition and quantitative approaches to such 
definitions.  
 
The FC boosted the already existing complexities and dynamics of the CRE 
environment even more, which provided objective insecurities to the decision-
makers (Hatch and Cunliffe 2013). This was also enforced because the 
determinants of the corporate environment changed so massively during a 
short time. This is supported by Milliken (1987) who pointed out that the PEU 
emerges from a massive change that could not be predicted. Additional 
uncertainty came up with regards to the consequences of the event. The 
decision-makers could also not foresee what impact the event would have on 
the organisation and the CRE business. Not exactly knowing what to do, the 
executives became irrational in their decisions, and also relied on their lived 
feelings.  
 
In the definitions of extant literature, the event of FC is defined as an episode 
or an extreme case of FI (Chant 2003; Lai 2003; Allen and Wood 2006; 
Alawode and Al Sadek 2008). From the themes that were found in this study, it 
must be stated that even though these confirm FC as an even worse situation 
of FI, it cannot be considered an extreme case. This is explained by the 
executives` dissimilar meaning of FI compared to researchers and public 
institutions. At the same time, existing definitions are extended by executives` 
behaviour in this event, while	 the corporate meaning is determined by the 
changed actions and moods of the actors. Irrational behaviour in perceived 
uncertainty, disillusionment, consolidation of the actors, organisational 
alignment without alternatives, as well as executives` formal and social 
communication behaviour, becomes an advanced characteristic of the thus far 
implicit corporate meaning of FC. 
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Hence, despite sharing some similarities, the corporate meaning of FC that 
was made explicit exceeds those of researchers and financial institutions by 
far and includes the particularities of the CRE sector, but moreover those of 
the strategic decision-makers.  	
 
5.2 The Corporate Sensemaking Process of the Phenomenon in the 
Context of Organisational Interpretation 	
The second research objective of the study was to discover the way in which 
executive management board members form their expectations about FI 
based on their meaning and how sensemaking attempts are accomplished in 
CRE.  	
In the pursuit of this objective, the study provided three major findings. First, 
executives do not require all seven properties to form their expectations about 
FI and FC. Second, even though their sensemaking is not applied in Weick`s 
(1995) original means, it is partly characterised by extracted cues and 
following enactment as well as social interaction. But executives are not 
exposed to retrospective sensemaking when facing the situation. Third, the 
researcher found that the process is different in an event of FC, compared to a 
phase of FI, also because executives make use of the additional property of 
‘plausibility’. 
 
For both, FI and FC, the two properties of ‘identity’ and ‘continuation’ could not 
be discovered. Even though Weick (1995) claims that sensemaking is 
continuous and executives are continuously engaged, it can be noted that 
executives have not consciously applied this process. Moreover, they 
unconsciously and only partially made use of the properties of sensemaking as 
proposed by Weick (1995) up until that point in time where the situation 
became more familiar again or they could justify it. Furthermore, the property 
of identity was not found. Interestingly, the role of the executives during this 
time, how they saw themselves, and which role was attributed to them does 
not entail a particular relevance in the corporate sensemaking process during 
FI and FC.  
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The Process of Sensemaking in a Phase of Financial Instability 
The research found that executives, during a phase of FI, applied 
organisational sensemaking in their business actions, but only with 
reservations. The findings show conformity with four of Weick`s (1995) seven 
properties: cues, enactment, as well as social interaction and retrospective 
practices, where the latter was however only affected when they had been 
interviewed in the course of this investigation. It is remarkable that executives 
only apply fragments of sensemaking in its original means and hence could not 
call the situation a FI nor react appropriately. After the fact, the situation was 
deemed a FI and executives` discernment appeared.  
 
The findings show that executives make use of organisational sensemaking in 
a phase of FI where the phases of scanning, interpretation, and action, as 
referred to in existing literature (Fahey and King 1977; Daft and Weick 1984; 
Milliken 1990), are hardly identifiable. It becomes obvious that such 
sensemaking process was apparently disturbed or finally not affected due to 
the specifics of the situation and is assumed to remain implicit.  
 
The study provides evidence that executives scan the environment and they 
extract cues because they noticed a change, or an irregular and uncommon 
situation: market dynamics were stronger than usual, the investment pressures 
and prices increased above what was normal and they had contradictory 
moods towards the situation. Executives needed to make sense of this to gain 
back control of the setting. This is in line with the sensemaking literature that 
associated cues with sudden and unexpected (Weick 1995), or contradictory 
events (Chia 2000), these cues are dependent on context for extraction and 
interpretation. However, the recognised change seems to be only considered 
as an overheated situation, and not an interruption that could put the strategic 
goals and the aspired business performance at risk. Moreover it was a mere 
positive distortion of the situation that promoted organisational performance, 
where quantity was placed over quality.  
 
In combination with noted investment pressures and euphoria, executives 
unconsciously ignored their contradictory moods or their gut feelings as a 
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decent sign that something is going wrong, but were performance-driven while 
pursuing business strategy and goals. Ericson (2001) emphasised that events 
are often ignored or just observed, but here it can be assumed that executives 
did not fully consider these signals in their interpretation and action nor 
interpret it related to FI.  
 
The researcher found that social interaction was used to interpret and evaluate 
these extracted cues in a phase of FI. The inclusion and exchange of internal 
information and social interaction together with the consumption of external 
information helped to look for shared meanings and commonalities in the 
context. Executives seemed to be insecure about the evaluation and used 
different sources of information from other experts and executives to expand 
knowledge, but they relied on the usual ways of perceiving and interpreting. It 
is remarkable that at this senior level, the findings suggest that organisational 
interpretation took place only behind the curtains and therefore presumably 
was not comprehensive. They were also driven by the fact to avoid discussing 
half-baked or being branded as a ‘naysayer’. Consistent with existing literature, 
sensemaking is the social interaction and communication among members of 
organisations (Weick 1995), as applied. Socialisation is considered a primary 
property in sensemaking literature (Weick 1995), but was only implemented 
rudimentarily in the phase of FI. As will be discussed later, the ability to 
interpret such a situation may be a difficulty for executives due to their habitual 
actions and their inability to experience completely. 
 
As a result of such ill-processed interpretation, the market players have 
executed irrational acquisition decisions deduced from the perceived hints. 
The irrationality was also driven by the time pressures under which they had to 
make the decisions in this phase. The resulting actions referred to risk 
prevention and cover mechanisms that were not consequentially implemented. 
This is generally in line with existing literature that sees enactment as 
constructing reality that leads to actions (Weick 1979; Helms Mills 2003). 
However, their irrationality in acquisition decisions as well as their internal 
organisational actions show that they missed the novelty of the situation in 
their interpretation and in corresponding action. The expectations they created 
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about this perceived certain situation did not picture the corporate environment 
to its full extent. Hence, they only enacted some individual risk prevention to 
the situation they extracted, but did not respond to the situation of FI with all its 
facets. Any major changes in strategy or structure as indicated by the literature 
(Dutton and Duncan 1987; Ginsberg 1988) could rarely be found in the phase 
of FI and they hence missed getting prepared. 
 
This also favours another interesting finding of this study. The property 
‘retrospection’ was discovered, but executives did not apply their retrospective 
knowledge, they only had a retrospective view on it when being asked during 
the interviews, far off from the phase of FI that they described. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that executives` retrospective discernment was critical and 
open. They confessed that a lack of risk awareness and criticality in 
acquisitions, together with an underestimation of the complexity of the situation 
and products, was careless during this situation. This was explained by the 
non-predictability of the phenomenon and the perceived uncertainty which also 
favoured the uncritical behaviour and blind faith but also by the lack of 
knowledge about the RE asset class. The complexities of RE products and 
assessment methods have been underestimated by the actors. Even though 
the decision-makers did extract cues in terms of anomalies in the corporate 
environment and within the CRE organisation, they did not analyse those 
consequentially and/or implement according actions. Executives usually talk a 
lot about their experiences but when looking at the retrospection in the 
sensemaking process this was hardly the case. This is contradictory to existing 
literature where retrospection in sensemaking requires reflection by the 
executives and assumes to produce some learnings from their past 
experiences to inform future decisions (Weick 1979; Weick et al. 2005). It also 
supports clarity about the situation and behaviour and the near past, while 
placing things in order and finally allowing for more rationality (Starbuck and 
Milliken 1988; Weick 1995), which was not the case in sensemaking during a 
phase of FI.  
 
At the same time, existing literature emphasises an increasing risk of 
misconception, the shorter the length of time between the situation and the 
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reflection (Weick 1995), while phenomena are better understood backward-
looking. However, the executives` ability to process retrospective experiences 
during a phase of FI just did not exist at all. Moreover, the study found that 
retrospection seemed unimportant to the executives` sensemaking process, 
and was only evoked because they were asked during the interview in the 
context of this study. None of them had retrospective considerations before 
that. As a possible explanation, it may be pointed out that this was also hardly 
possible for the GFC 2007/08 and other major crises during the last decade. 
The phase of FI just led to an event of FC and there was probably no time or 
necessity to reflect on the situation, but to immediately react to it. Furthermore, 
most of the participants have a long history in CRE and in managing those 
companies but they did not experience comparable situations of FI before to 
make use of any retrospectives, and at this the latest phases that turned into 
the FC seemed to be mere exceptions. Because they had not and could not 
make use of retrospective sensemaking, the crisis could not be prevented or 
limited in scale. On the basis of the investigation and the interviews conducted, 
this is now possible where the explicit meaning of the phenomenon from a 
corporate perspective has been explored and shortages in organisational 
sensemaking procedures have been discovered. 
 
Notably, during this phase, executives were very much concerned with 
chances and did not want to see any risks because the situational 
characteristics were just too favourable for their businesses. Where the 
assessment became critical, this was only used for inconsequential action and 
communication. Afterwards, it was found that they lacked respective 
awareness of the situation and were too uncritical, merely naïve, as their 
contradictory moods were dominated by on-going investment and financing 
pressures. Therefore, hints from the organisation and the corporate 
environment had only been recognised selectively, and other signs had even 
been ignored.  
 
This overall process of sensemaking pertaining to the phenomenon of FI, as 
applied by the executives in CRE companies, shows that they form their 
expectations during a phase of FI based on their meaning, but apply 
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organisational sensemaking procedures in parts. Emphasis is on the extracted 
cues of market conduct, but also personal affect that let them engage in the 
process and respective actions. The shared experiences of the executives 
show that during this time, sensemaking was focused on the chances rather 
than potential risks that the phase might bring. Hence, the relevance of 
interpreting the cues right and not being prevented by superimposed behaviour 
or feelings was shown because only then can the sensemaking process be 
applied appropriately to support SM in organisations.  
 
The Process of Sensemaking in an Event of Financial Crisis 
What the study found was that executives use five of seven properties for 
sensemaking in an event of FC. These are the same as the ones for FI, with 
the addition of ‘plausibility’. Nevertheless, surprisingly, in such a massive 
occurrence the cues did not initiate the sensemaking process, neither to 
enable meaningmaking, learning, nor creativity, change or innovation. 
 
During the outbreak of the FC, executives recognised the unexpected and 
non-controllable changes through the extracted cues of market standstill and 
business model malfunctions, as well as in terms of irrational decisions under 
uncertainty. In line with existing research (Maitlis and Christianson 2014), the 
unexpected event was not further processed to make sense of it and regain 
control.  
 
This information, scanned from the corporate perspective, triggered further 
interpretation, diving into more social interaction. Even though the information 
exchange was contemplated as ambitious during this time, because of the 
manifold addresses and individual consideration of information, some shared 
meanings and commonalities could be provided. As mentioned above, the 
interpretation of unusual and unexpected events may be difficult for executives. 
The findings show that for the event of FC, executives leverage their ways of 
socialisation and extend their collaboration and exchange with their external 
network, which is much more in line with existing research (Weick 1995). This 
may lead to their ability to better interpret and recognise the event of FC, while 
during FI their limited socialisation behind the curtains did not allow them to 
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interpret such phase sufficiently. However, even the exchange in the event of 
FC was not mature enough and the habitual ways they applied accentuated 
the problem of missing the novelty of the unexpected FC. At the same time, 
executives seemed overstrained in managing this situation and tried to make 
the best out of it for their business, ensuring to reach the strategic goals of the 
company and the targeted business performance or at least minimising losses. 
It seems that there was no time for considering the sensemaking process and 
they preferred usual business procedures and retain old habits to manage the 
situation.  
 
As a result from such collaborative interpretation, the executives shared stories 
suggesting that they initiated deinvestive actions to handle the realised 
portfolio risks as part of their SM. Beside procedural adjustment, they tended 
to adjust the strategic focus to risks and aligned the RM strategy to the 
situation, to varying degrees. Notably, findings suggest that strategic changes 
were not initiated. This is at odds with existing sensemaking research (Dutton 
and Duncan 1987; Ginsberg 1988) that sees strategic or structural changes as 
a natural reaction to major changes in the organisational context.  
 
As another factor, it was found that, in the event of FC, executives seemed to 
rest their sensemaking on plausibility rather than accuracy. They did not aim 
for an exact reproduction of the results but a plausible justification of the 
experiences to their constructed reality about the event. This is consistent with 
extant sensemaking literature while emphasising that constructing a possible 
explanation let them reduce the perceived uncertainty and facilitated 
sensemaking (Weick 1993; Weick 1995; Maitlis 2005). Due to the unexpected 
situation, however, executives felt that a quick response and action was 
required, while keeping the business running during this challenging time was 
of primary interest for the executives pertaining to their strategic goals. Time 
for longer considerations and big strategic moves was limited, and their 
inability to make sense of the unusual situation mainly prompted a prevalence 
of operative decisions. 
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Only in retrospect did the executives admit discernment about misconduct 
through their irrational management decisions, and also considered the panic 
of the clients and actors as an overreaction. The reflection of people`s past 
experiences as a part of the usual sensemaking process (Weick 1979; Weick 
et al. 2005) was only applied after the event, and only while being asked for it 
in the interview. The executives` ability to make use of retrospective 
experiences during FC just did not exist at all. None of the executives had 
retrospective considerations before being asked about the situation in the 
interview. This step was never actively used in their sensemaking processes, 
neither during the situation nor shortly afterwards to place things in order, as 
suggested in literature (Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Weick 1995). It seemed 
minor relevant for them to superordinate scanning, interpretation, and their 
actions because they could finally make it through the situation, or they just did 
not have the time idleness. Most of them did not experience a FC before, so 
there was no retrospective available in this regard. Furthermore, they did not 
take any time to reconsider; they just wanted to initiate countermeasures to 
limit the severe consequences of this unusual and massive event on their 
business performance. Because they had not and could not make use of 
retrospective sensemaking, conduct and reaction could not be carried out in a 
manner adapted to the situation. 
 
For the SM, this entails executives forming their expectations about FC based 
on their meaning and partially using sensemaking attempts that conform with 
the theoretical concept of Weick (1995). The data indicated that the extracted 
cues of FC were essential to recognise and make sense of the event, but due 
to operational decisions that were considered necessary, and due to the 
limited time, the sensemaking process was almost deliberately repressed to 
make meaning of the situation and react accordingly.  
 
5.3 The Qualitative Indicators and Implications in the Context of Strategic 
Risk Management 
 
The research further intended to develop QRIs of FI based on the corporate 
meaning and awareness of the respective expectations of the phenomenon to 
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adjust and enrich the SRM of a CRE company. This also envisioned to 
investigating how this translates into different implications for SM. 
 
In pursuit of these objectives, the study provided three major findings, which 
cannot yet be found in extant research. First, 11 QRIs and related implications 
about the phenomenon of FI and another nine QRIs and implications about the 
event of FC are presented. Out of these, five clusters (overarching dynamics; 
Table 21) were determined that share category similarities for both, FI and FC, 
and were hence considered as meaningful, comparable QIs to identify either 
situation. Second, the different dimensions of the indicators allow for 
classification whether a phase of FI or an event of FC is occuring and whether 
it is emerging or not. This becomes decisive for SM, because all of the 
indicators imply that the respective potential risks effect the improvement of 
performance of the CRE organisation. As a further general and surprising 
finding, all dynamics relate to the behaviour of the major market participants 
during these times: executives’ investment behaviour, executives’ strategic 
decision behaviour, investors` investment behaviour, as well as the financing 
behaviour of financial institutions.  
 
For the following discussion about the QRIs and respective indicators, the 
researcher first provides a discourse to distinguish a phase of FI and an event 
of FC that are now available, before relating these findings to previous 
literature. The discussion does not dive deep into each single indicator that 
make up the QRI but outlines the characteristics these indicators hold for 
implying either FI or FC. 
 
The researcher found that the executives` investment behaviour provides a 
strong QRI for FI and FC. Executives behave euphorically and in an 
adrenaline-driven manner in a phase of FI, which is expressed in their 
motivation to acquire RE properties of poor quality for high prices, a negligent 
attitude and irrational behaviour that pertains acquisition decisions based on 
objective characteristics, that have been translated to indicators. When the 
event of FC strikes the unstable environment, executives` behaviour suddenly 
changes and the researcher found discontinuance in investments as a QRI 
DISCUSSION 		
	 318 
during this time. Further, the QRI of decreasing portfolio assets for 
procurement of liquidity was characteristic. Interestingly, even though the 
behaviour seems to accelerate throughout the phase of FI, it does not mount in 
FC, but is completely reversed. Furthermore, as this is a solid pattern with 
empirical evidence from this study, the investment behaviour, when exercised 
by the majority of the participants shapes the market and can accalerate 
dynamics even further, in either direction.  
 
Strongly connected to this, the researcher`s analysis shows the relevance of 
executives` market perception expressed in a QRI. During the phase of FI, the 
executives produced strategic risks while ignoring the behaviour of the actors 
in the market and arising warning signals. Their perceived certainty was strong 
enough to fade away information for further assessment of the situation and 
repress problem awareness that became indicators for the phase of FI. Such 
ignorance and suppression stops when the event of FC occurs, which although 
comes suddenly and unexpectedly. This constitutes a QRI during FC. 
Executives` behaviour during the prior phase of FI let them feel prepared and 
the market development in an event of FC could neither be predicted nor 
planned. Due to the non-preparedness and to some extent paralysis, there 
arose operational and strategic risks that affected the SM and the goal of 
achieving performance targets even more harshly.  
 
As a third QRI, the researcher found that executives` strategic decision 
behaviour is another indicator for FI and FC. It is evidenced that executives` 
euphoric behaviour in this regard implies several strategic risks for the CRE 
company because their emotional state lets them disregard important factors 
they should consider in their SDM. However, in the event of FC, the researcher 
found the indicator that executives return to the core competencies of the CRE 
organisation in order to be able to minimise the performance damages from 
earning shortfalls and asset losses. 
 
These QRIs assume that when the aforementioned behavioural patterns of 
executives are linked together in either phase, and are applied simultaneously, 
this set encourages itself and impairs the respective situation from within the 
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organisation. Hence, these QRIs evoke a self-reflection of the executives but 
also of other fellows pertaining to their investment behaviour.  
 
The research further found that other market players, like investors and banks, 
also have an impact on the businesses during these times, and qualify as a 
QRI.  
 
Similar to the executives, the investors` investment behaviour is characterised 
by high investment activity during FI and a low one, if at all, when the event of 
FC occurs. This mirroring of the executives’ behaviour can be explained 
because the CRE companies are, to a great extent, dependent on the cash 
inflows from their clients. If they do not want to invest, CRE companies cannot. 
However, their tactics and aims are different. During FI, investors consider the 
property as a pure yield-providing asset. Totally different, the findings suggest 
that investors ignore the asset class of RE in FC. Moreover, they do not only 
stop investing, but also withdraw funds. As a consequence, the CRE 
companies have to suffer demand shortfalls, respective earning shortfalls, cost 
overruns, asset losses, etc. This pressurises the performance and means that 
targets may not be reached. This indicates that one should keep an eye on 
investors’ behaviour, as changes in this are a strong signal from the market. 
Due to the high dependency on investors` money, severe consequences for 
the CRE company can only be avoided when taking care of their clients.  
 
The same applies to the credit institutions that are moving alongside investors` 
behaviour. The research found that this other market player also has 
significant influence on the CRE companies during these times and also has 
different behaviour during FI and FC. As a further QRI, the researcher found 
that they are uncritical in providing financing during the phase of FI, which is 
characterised by favourable financing terms, high loan to values, and less 
professional expertise at the financing banks. After this relatively random 
financing, banks changed their behaviour after the outbreak of the FC and 
abruptly abandoned their financing or refinancing efforts, which also became a 
QRI. Following this indicator, CRE companies can flip their strategies and will 
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not suddenly be caught off by guard with demand shortfalls, earning shortfalls, 
asset losses, and liquidity crises that squeeze performance. 
 
When looking at the existing research, policymakers and academics have 
focused on several quantitative measures to approach FS (Gadanecz and 
Jayaram 2009), and hence implicitly FI, to prevent systemic risks through 
policy responses (Group of Ten 2001; ECB 2010). Such soundness indicators 
of monitoring variables are used in several works (Davis 1999; Hawkins and 
Klau 2000; Gray et al. 2007; Nelson and Perli 2007), focusing on six main 
sectors that were discussed and determined as commonly used in the 
literature (Table 1). Overall, the indicators that were developed by researchers 
and financial institutions so far are mostly quantitative and signal the systemic 
risk of an economy as pertains to a possible FC breakout. The researcher`s 
findings are to some extent at odds with those of the existing literature, which 
have a strong macroeconomic perspective. Existing indicators and risks mirror 
sectors and key features that were compiled from generally accepted factors 
and data. They do not look at the behaviour of the market participants. 
 
Nevertheless, it could be shown that some of the existing systemic risk 
indicators (Gadanecz and Jayaram 2009) were also inherent for the CRE 
sector during FI and FC. Those that are comparable relate to pricing pressures 
that parallel the financial market factor of house prices, and interest 
development and financing terms as well as resulting risks that confirm the 
financial sector factors of real interest rates as well as the corporate sector`s 
riskiness of earnings to interest. Furthermore, the willingness to finance and 
the related risk of high debt in the market as well as liquidity crises can be 
related to the factor of liquidity ratio of the financial sector, as well as cash 
inflows of investors, and the related risk of liquidity crises to the factor of 
capital flow in the external sector`s conditions. Also, the loan to value ratio for 
bank loans and for RE financing can be found in the leverage ratio in the 
financial sector. Furthermore, it can be concluded that there is a high 
availability of liquidity when banks are uncritical in debt financing and increase 
their number of offers for financing, which equates to the financial sector’s 
factor of monetary aggregates. Due to investments in RE as a yield-providing 
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property, it might be reasonably assumed that bonds are not competitive, and 
this can be equally applied to financial markets that use the factor of corporate 
bond spreads. Finally, there are regulatory requirements in terms of loan to 
value and capital adequacy obligations with the potential risk of debt, and 
therefore investment limitations that parallel the corporate sector`s riskiness of 
total debt to equity.  
 
Hence, a great number of the systemic risk indicators in literature were found 
to be related to the CRE sector’s implications pertaining the banks` financing 
behaviour and investors’ investment behaviour, in terms of providing liquidity 
for CRE. The real economy sector or household sector`s health are not even 
touched by any QI, and external sectors’ conditions are only marginally 
considered. However, it must be said that the overlap is more due to 
contextuality. The extent indicators provided in the literature, their 
charecteristics, signalling properties, frequency, as well as measurements, 
also when combined in composite indicators, do not provide a tailor-made 
quantification. The developed QRIs and implications are much more precise in 
terms of what a change of these indicators implies for the strategic goals and 
their respective SM of the CRE company and depart from the prevailing 
quantitative focus that predominates this field over a long time and still does 
(Scarlat et al. 2012). It follows the claim of extant literature for an enrichment 
with indicators of peoples’ perception and judgement (Church and Rogers 
2011; Raghunath et al. 2017).  
 
In the corporate context, literature has claimed that in a volatile environment, 
corporate risks should be managed proactively and therefore strategically 
(Raghunath et al. 2017). Hence, risk identification should take care about the 
risks with the strongest impact on the organisation, its strategy, and on 
achieving business aims (Frigo and Anderson 2009). The findings of this study 
are therefore compatible with extant research while showing a strong focus on 
risks regarding performance targets and corporate strategy. Also, the findings 
seem to suggest that CRE organisations can better prepare for these situation 
with an anticipatory risk strategy, implementing countermeasures due to 
expected losses (Pezzulo et al. 2008), or even a transformatory one for large-
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scale structural changes to keep up with the times (Taplin 2005; Goto 2007; 
Stulz 2009; Taleb et al. 2009) and to be able to make rigorous, pro-active, and 
prompt risk-based strategic decisions.  
 
Above the QRIs, the study found inherent potential risks for the CRE company 
that potentially effect the SM. Such risks were allocated to broad risk 
categories and strategic, as well as financial, operational and external risks 
could be determined. The researcher discovered that the risks during FI were 
predominately strategic risks related to increasing prices, strong competition, 
and market developments, as well as availability of liquidity. This is not 
surprising when considering the explored corporate meaning of FI: while 
competition leads to increasing prices and both could hinder the euphoria and 
expansion pressures, thus representing a risk. The same applies for a 
limitation in liquidity. For the event of FC, the risks were instead predominated 
by financial risk related to asset losses and operational risk of earning 
shortfalls. This can also be traced back to the explored corporate meaning of 
FC that was characterised by a market standstill. 
 
In general, the QRIs and related risks that were found, can be considered in 
line with existing SRM approaches and broad risk categories as proposed by 
Mitchell and Matruglio (2015; Figure 2). However, their study found that the 
most frequently occurring risks could be related to the broad categories of 
strategic and external risks, where operational and financial risks occur only 
half frequently or less (Mitchell and Matruglio 2015), which is partly 
contradictory to what has been found for FI and FC. During FI, the majority of 
risks for the organisation are related to strategy and only very little to the other 
categories. For FC, the implications are attributed almost equally to strategic, 
financial, and operational risks. For both situations, external risks seem to 
have a subordinate role, which is not surprising from a corporate perspective 
and underpins the subordinate role of the remote environment. 
 
The potential effect on SM is predominated to influence the strategic goals of 
performance improvements of the CRE organisation and enhancing client 
satisfaction, while also the achievement of market leadership and an increase 
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of assets under management may be impeded. These are not further 
discussed here as they relate to the general growth aspirations of the CRE 
companies as laid out previously in section 5.1. 
 
The kind of investing and financing is a compelling indicator, comparable to 
‘systemic risk’ for the economy, during this time, and is deemed the leading 
one where the change in the behaviour of the actors is most significant. 
Interestingly, these findings provide evidence about a predominant influence 
from internally and externally driven determinants and personal facts shown in 
the actors` behaviours above macroeconomic developments in the remote 
environment. Additionally, it should be noted that the behaviour of the 
investors and banks might exert an accelerating effect in the CRE business. 
Where both market participants seem to move alongside each other in their 
behaviour, CRE companies become even more at risk, as there will be no fall-
back position if either of the two fails. 
   
The QIs and implications, compared to existing research, do not only provide 
for additional qualitative factors to be taken into consideration, but as well for a 
more detailed specification of FI and FC in the CRE context. For the SM of a 
CRE company, it has been shown that a clear distinction between a phase of 
FI and the event of FC can be drawn with these QRIs that imply potential risks 
to the performance and strategic aims of the CRE organisation. From the 
discussion of the findings, it is argued for an integrated and holistic strategy 
and SRM taking into account several interdependent sources of 
macroeconomic factors in different environmental stances that are an 
exposure for the organisation together with the internally driven indicators of 
behaviour and emotional states. A departure from the pure rational and 
objectivised factors seems necessary to know the full extent of the potential 
indicators that flag the emergence of a phase of FI or an event of FC from a 
corporate SRM perspective.  
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5.4 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter discussed the findings about the phenomenon of FI and the event 
of FC in relation to extant literature.  
 
For each of the RQs, answers were provided that partly confirm, but also add 
controversial and newfound results to both existing theory and practice. With 
the exploration of the corporate meaning, and the discovery of the underlying 
sensemaking procedures that were compressed in QIs and implications, the 
research provided the theoretical basis for inserting the phenomenon of FI in 
the SM of CRE companies. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 		
 325 
Chapter Six: Conclusion and Contributions 
 
This final chapter provides a conclusion to the empirical findings followed by a 
synthesis of the contributions to theory and implications for practice. The 
limitations of the investigation are addressed and recommendations for future 
avenues in research are proposed. The chapter closes with concluding 
remarks. 
 
6.1 Conclusion  
 
The central research problem addressed in this thesis is that the existing 
definitions of the phenomenon of FI on the economy level are generally 
relevant for the real economy sector, but may not be directly applicable, and 
inappropriate or insufficient for controlling a CRE company prior to, during and 
after an event of a FC as part of SM. Hence, there are only implicit means for 
meaningmaking and consideration in SM. There is, however, a lack of 
empirical knowledge pertaining to the extent to which executives know how to 
react to such situation, and the degree to which established routines or 
sensemaking procedures are significant to their organisational behaviour.  
 
Furthermore, the consequences of FCs on the economy demonstrate that, to 
date, companies have failed to establish appropriate initiatives and manage 
crisis and pre-crisis situations with foresight. Existing definitions of risks and 
particular indicators and implications on the economy level cannot entirely 
substantiate the risk strategy and context for the SRM of a company, and have 
thus far lacked the neccessary sophistication for meaningful application on the 
corporate level to control the potential risks that arise for a CRE company from 
a phase of FI. 
 
Therefore, the thesis pursued four objectives, covered by three RQs, and 
investigated the lived experience of German senior executives in the CRE 
sector to explore the corporate meaning (RQ1), discover the organisational 
sensemaking process (RQ2), and develop resulting QRIs and implications 
(RQ3) about the phenomenon of FI. The hermeneutic phenomenological 
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design substantiated the managerial perspective, and the qualitative approach 
to data contributed towards gaining extensive insights and yielded rigorous 
findings. 
 
Below are the main conclusions which the researcher sees emerging from this 
work.  
 
6.1.1 The Corporate Meaning of the Phenomenon of Financial Instability 
 
The first research objective was to explore the meaning of FI from a senior 
executive perspective (corporate meaning), focusing on CRE companies, and 
to create an extended definition of FI on the corporate level. 
 
In this regard, the study showed that the executives have to manage particular 
sector-specifics and environmental dependencies in their SM decisions, 
however, only massive changes in the environment engage with uncertainties 
or uncontrollability in this regard. This corporate context is essential to the lived 
experience of the phenomenon and shapes the perceptions and interpretations 
of the executives, which substantiate the further findings of the corporate 
meanings of the phase of FI and the event of FC, that were explored. 
 
Hence, the key conclusions suggest that context matters for SM and that the 
personal lived experience of the market participants, inherent in the corporate 
meaning of FI and FC, constitute an antecedent for what researchers and 
public institutions define. A distinction between a phase of FI and the event of 
FC, not only as pertains to the macroeconomic definitions but also on the 
corporate level, is instrumental in recognising either situation. 
 
CRE and the Corporate Environment: The Context Matters  
Although not related to a separate RQ, the research findings provided 
substantive evidence regarding the relative importance of the corporate 
context for organisations and SM, holding particular characteristics. The study 
shows that executives in the CRE sector perceive their corporate environment 
as generally dynamic and complex, especially because of the heterogeneous, 
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and constantly changing, demands and multiplicities. At the same time, there 
exist dependencies of the CRE organisations on the developments in their 
corporate environment, but they have limited control over the developments in 
the task and no control over the remote environment. This results in a great 
deal of uncertainty, deriving from the general environmental stances that 
executives must master in their SM. Hence, companies need to place sufficient 
efforts to understand the context and superordinate relationships; they have to 
identify the determinants of the ascertained environmental dynamics and 
complexities as part of their SM on an on-going basis in order to reduce PEU 
and not be caught off by unexpected and non-controllable events in the 
corporate environment that put their strategic goals or performance at risk. 
  
Even though theoretical models usually attach uncertainties to such 
environments, executives in the CRE sector are aware of sector-specifics, as 
well as the manifold related risks that they are exposed to. For them, these 
uncertain circumstances are customary and can be well managed in their SM 
to ensure greater growth target achievements and performance. However, 
executives still admit that massive changes in the corporate (task and remote) 
environment are unpredictable and incalculable in their SM. 
 
The study further made the sector-specifics of CRE explicit and captured the 
common ground for SM in CRE companies, where the existing theoretical 
models which are assigned certain importance can, in this sense, only serve to 
generally relate the organisation to the environmental context and are also 
dispensable to organisations by providing a sense of guidance and security in 
case of massive changes in the environment.  
 
The uncovered environmental contextual factors shape the personal and social 
presence, which is irrevocably included in the rich and deep account of the 
presented phenomenon, while simultaneously acknowledging the personal 
implicit assumptions about the corporate context that became explicit here 
(Kafle 2011). Hence, context is central to executives’ understanding and to the 
extent to which they proficiently implement sensemaking in dealing with 
environmental changes in FI and FC.   
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The Corporate Meaning of FI: Positive Distortion Is Not Considered as 
Instability  
Based on the lived experiences of CRE executives, the study provides a 
corporate meaning that defines the phenomenon of FI as a phase of an 
unrealistic market situation where the actors experience euphoria and 
expansion pressures. This is an episode with an unregulated workload in the 
organisation, which is also characterised by informal and individual 
intensification of lived relations of the executives while ignorance strengthens 
the executives' perceived certainty. 
 
The executives do not perceive the phase of macroeconomic FI as constituting 
instability. This may be explained through their general expectations of CRE, 
as they do not consider instabilities in their businesses to be immediately 
dependent on environmental stances, but rather see CRE as a ‘late bloomer’. 
Hence, executives feel certain, relaxed, and safe when changes only take 
place in the remote environment or when these changes do not surpass the 
‘usual’ dynamism and are not substantial enough to directly effect their 
business, but only their task environment.  
 
This phase was scarcely considered unstable due to the apparently 
harmonious macroeconomic factors as well as the positive CRE market 
developments, expansion, and increasing performance. None of the 
characteristics related to instability predominated their little concerns regarding 
the situation. Hence, the corporate meaning of FI was found to be different to 
existing macroeconomic definitions because the vast majority of these only 
relate instability to situational stances and adverse changes or consequences. 
This study, however, evidenced that positive distortion can also mean FI when 
there is significant liquidity available and the market deviates above 
fundamentals.  
 
The existing definitions are extended by the perceived market situation and the 
behaviour of the market participants. This behaviour, which is inherent in the 
corporate meaning of FI, reflects the accelerating developments during this 
time. Equity from investors and debt from banks was easily accessible, as 
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were properties. CRE market participants were driven by performance, yields, 
and interest rates, which fostered riskier and overprized investments of lower 
quality with increasing leverage. The executives perceived the phase of FI as 
an unrealistic market situation, and they acknowledged the euphoria and 
expansion pressures as well as the unregulated workload within the 
organisation. Although perceived as being unrealistic, this situation was 
considered to be a positive development for the organisation. This is best 
explained with reference to a stable remote environment and a good to 
booming task environment. Their euphoria and over-optimism prevented them 
from considering the warning signs and listening to their diffuse gut feelings 
while presuming further performance increases. In line with the previously 
explored strategic goals, executives went along with the developments in the 
sector, following clients` demands, and pushing aside any negative feelings 
during FI. Particularly, this is due to the fact of the generally dynamic and 
complex environment in which they are used to handling uncertainties. Hence, 
such unconscious ignorance strengthened executives` perceived certainty and 
they resisted the realistic assessment of the situation. Their strictly internal and 
informal information exchange could not contribute to a meaningful 
assessment of the situation, and was only taken selectively or disregarded.  
 
As a key accomplishment, this perceived behaviour of the market participants 
seems to be the predecessor for what researchers and public institutions 
define as FI. Using the example of Ferguson (2003: 2), it can be said that 
investors’ investment behaviour, driven by yields, resulted in “[…] financial 
asset prices [which] seem to have diverged sharply from fundamentals […]”, 
banks’ uncritical financing behaviour led to a distortion of “[…] credit availability 
[…]”, and executives’ imprudent investment behaviour fueled “[…] aggregate 
spending […] above […] from the economy`s ability to produce”.  
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The macroeconomic situational definitions of FI are a consequence of the 
occurences in the task environment, while the behaviour of the market 
participants, in turn, was a result of what they had perceived as a phase of FI. 
This leads to the further conclusion that the perception and related behaviour 
of the market participants, at least partially, contributes to what is defined as FI 
on a macroeconomic level.  
 
It can be said that their habits also prevented them from experiencing the 
phase to its full extent, following a line of least resistance and ambitiously 
striving to successfully achieve their goals. The complementary finding of the 
emerging existential ‘lived feelings’ adds this underrepresented perspective for 
businesses and executives` lifeworld as pertains to the phenomenon of FI. 
Virtually, every participant acknowledged being emotionally charged to varying 
degrees. Over-optimism and euphoria, were especially characteristic and it is 
tentatively concluded that these, amongst other practices and habits, promoted 
the dynamics of the phase towards a FC.  
 
The Corporate Meaning of FC: An Unexpected Reversal 
Coincidently, the researcher deduced a corporate meaning of the event of FC. 
Senior executives of CRE companies define this event as an unexpected 
market standstill, where actors behave irrationally in perceived uncertainty. 
This is characterised by disillusionment and consolidation of the actors. 
Without consideration of the potential alternatives, executives perform 
professionally and routinely, pertaining to how and what was adequate, when 
trying to align the organisation to the changed corporate environment. The 
executives adopt a predominantly formal form of communication during this 
time, while intensifying their relation to colleagues, employees, and external 
interlocutors. 
 
The data revealed disparate attributes for the corporate meaning of a FC when 
compared to FI. First, the event of FC has been defined as the strongest form 
of FI in extant research, but for the CRE sector this is not the case. Based on 
the behaviour of the market participants, a FC is perceived as a mere reversal 
of the situation. At the same time, the corporate meaning provides an 
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extended perspective to the event of FC, despite widely sharing characteristics 
with existing definitions. 	
Because CRE is considered a ‘late bloomer’, executives did not believe that 
the crisis on the macroeconomic level at that time could hit the CRE sector or 
their organisation severely and with immediate effect. They could not imagine 
a fast crash where banks fail and can no longer provide financing. But the 
executives were proven to be incorrect as banks and investors abruptly 
stopped their financing, which resulted in an unexpected market standstill.  
 
Executives` behaviour is now characterised by a radical investment stop and 
strategic adjustments to reduce risks while refocusing on their core business. 
At the same time, banks abandoned debt financing in the short-term and 
investors turned away from RE as an asset class. Driven by the lack of liquidity, 
executives leveraged the situation with asset sales to arrange for liquidity 
following investors` cash requests. 
 
The event was perceived as an unexpected standstill of the operations in the 
relevant markets in the CRE organisation. Only under such massive changes 
of the relevant parameters in the corporate environment did executives begin 
to perceive the dramatic potential effects of the situation and the gravity of the 
circumstance in which they found themselves. The perceptions of the 
executives about the event of FC resulted in irrational behaviour of the market 
participants because they were overstrained with the situation, which was no 
longer a normal dynamic but a massive change that they were not prepared to 
handle. The situation was not explainable to them, sudden, and unexpected, 
which exposed manifold insecurities in the corporate context during this time 
and had potential resounding effects on their business performance as well as 
resulting in insecurity because they did not know how to handle the situation or 
the consequences.  
 
What followed immediately was disillusionment and consolidation of the actors 
while the radical stop in investments allowed them to adjust their strategic 
focus. Without consideration of the potential alternatives, executives performed 
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professionally but did not know how to resolve the situation, so they relied on 
routines when trying to align the organisation to the changed corporate 
environment with regards to how and what was adequate. Social interaction 
was also used because it was thought to be necessary to overcome the 
situation and now focused on collaborative assessment of the event through 
ambitious information exchange. Their doubts were now corroborated by the 
negative development of the task environment and a disrupted remote 
environment. 
 
Interestingly, it can be concluded that the behaviour of the market participants, 
inherent in the meaning of FC from the concepts and sub-themes, seems to be 
the predecessor to what researchers and public institutions define as FC. 
Using the example of Allen and Wood (2006: 159), it can be said that 
investors` investment behaviour and banks` financing behaviour resulted in a 
situation where “[…] access to money is sharply and unexpectedly reduced 
[…]”, while executives` investment behaviour “[…] reduce […] spending 
abruptly and by a large amount”. This allows the further conclusion that the 
perception of the senior executives and the related behaviour of the market 
participants, at least partially, contributed to what is defined as a FC on a 
macroeconomic level. 
 
Here, the macroeconomic situational definitions of FC can be deduced as a 
consequence of what happens in the task environment, while the behaviour of 
the market participants, in turn, is a result of what executives had perceived as 
the event of FC. This leads to the subsequent conclusion that the event of FC, 
as defined on a macroeconomic level, is at least partially encouraged by the 
perception and related behaviour of the market participants. 
 
Additionally, as pertains to a FC, the complementary finding of the existential 
‘lived feelings’ adds otherwise underrepresented perceptions for the 
businesses and executives` lifeworld regarding the phenomenon of FI. Here 
irrationality and uncertainty, as well as motivation were characteristic and it is 
tentatively concluded that these behaviours contributed towards accelerating 
the dynamics of the event of FC.  
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A key issue here is that all of what was experienced by the executives 
(unexpectedness, unpreparedness) can then be seen as consequential to their 
insufficient deliberation of the preceding phase of FI while engaged with 
business performance, asset runs, and pressures of investors. 
 
6.1.2 The Organisational Sensemaking Process of the Phenomenon 
 
The second objective of the study was to discover the way in which executive 
management board members form their expectations regarding FI, based on 
their meaning of it, and how sensemaking attempts are accomplished in CRE. 
 
In the pursuit of this objective, the study showed that executives` sensemaking 
regarding the phenomenon of FI is largely characterised by extracted cues and 
following enactment as well as social interaction. Executives unconsciously 
and only partially make use of the properties of sensemaking as proposed by 
Weick (1995) to form their expectations about FI and FC. However, the 
properties of ‘identity’ and ‘continuity’ could not be discovered, i.e. 
sensemaking is not considered to be a continuous process for CRE executives 
during FI or FC and thus the role of the executives during this time, their self-
perception, and the role that was attributed to them do not entail a particular 
relevance in the corporate sensemaking process. The research further 
provides evidence that the different situations require different processing 
strategies as sensemaking is applied differently in an event of FC, compared 
to the preliminary phase of FI. 
 
A main conclusion is that the CRE executives only adopt implict and limited 
sensemaking attempts during a phase of FI and the event of FC, and do not 
take advantage of the sensemaking process for a SM with greater foresight 
towards learning or innovation. 
 
Sensemaking in FI: Extracted Cues Unconsciously Ignored  
The research found that, during a phase of FI, executives applied 
organisational sensemaking in their business actions, in conformity with four of 
Weick`s (1995) seven properties: cues, enactment, social interaction, and 
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retrospective practices, where the latter was however only triggered when they 
were being interviewed in the course of this investigation.  
 
It becomes obvious that the phases of sensemaking - scanning, interpretation, 
and action (Fahey and King 1977; Daft and Weick 1984; Milliken 1990) - are 
hardly identifiable. Findings suggest that the sensemaking process was 
apparently disturbed, or finally not affected, due to the specifics of the situation 
and remains tacit. 
 
Their corporate meaning of FI, then implicit, meant that executives did not 
expect any instability and they could not imagine it developing into a crisis. 
With the positive developments in the corporate environment during the phase 
preceding the FC, executives became rather overly optimistic than alerted 
while presuming further performance increases and doing good business. 
Given these expectations, it is not surprising that they did not take any major 
precautionary action but rather followed the market.  
 
These expectations were also reflected in the sensemaking process. Even 
though change was recognised, executives presumably just considered the 
market as overheated but not interrupted. The positive distortion, due to 
increasing business opportunities and acquisitions in the generally dynamic 
environment, simply evoked contradictory moods because it was stronger than 
usual. The sensemaking process was not further initiated because the cues 
had not been strong enough, moreover they had unconsciously been ignored 
due to superimposed euphoria and over-optimism, where larger quantities of 
projects were available and business was moving in the right direction. The 
general positive market developments and strong upward dynamics in the task 
environment of the CRE company pushed the sensemaking process aside 
even further, because performance goals prevailed at the expense of the 
quality of the projects. In their view, the whole market was rushing and 
therefore could not be wrong. Hence, they could not call the situation a FI nor 
react to it appropriately. 
  
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 		
	 335 
With these strong positive developments, however, executives enacted the 
environment with irrational acquisition decisions while only initiating little and 
very reduced risk prevention within their internal organisational actions. At the 
same time, their communication regarding the assessment of the situation 
remained limited to only their closest internal network. Hence, there was no 
social collaboration on the situation and the market participants were finally 
pushed by the positive sentiment of the market. As became obvious, the 
executives shared concerns and perceptions and if they had shared these, 
they could have recognised the situation as an FI. The behaviour of the actors 
and their inappropriate enactment of the phase of FI had significantly shaped 
the task environment instead of preventing an acceleration of the situation. 
While in retrospect it is easy to explain, they now discern their carelessness, 
uncriticality, and underestimation of the situation. 
 
There are two possible reasons that the sensemaking of FI was not applied in 
its original means (Weick 1995) to the CRE sector: organisational expectations 
regarding the warning signs of a crisis were unfulfilled, and the behaviour of 
the market participants was therefore performance-driven, which ultimately 
contributed to unconsciously ignoring the cues. 
 
Sensemaking in FC: Extracted Cues Consciously Faded Out 
For the event of FC, the study discovered that executives applied the 
sensemaking process with partial restrictions, but in general terms using five of 
the seven properties for sensemaking. These are equivalent to the ones for FI, 
with the addition of ‘plausibility’. 
 
Executives` meaning of the event of FC, then implicit, meant that executives 
did not expect a fast crash where banks would fail, investors would no longer 
provide financing, and the market would come to a form of standstill. Given 
their expectations, it is not surprising that the FC was perceived as sudden and 
unexpected. 
 
Hence, the surprise factor as well as the harsh cutback in the quantity of 
business, made the executives recognise the change. It may also be assumed 
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that while sensemaking procedures during FI failed, the event of FC was 
recognised as being more severe and uncontrollable by the executives. The 
insufficient perception and interpretation during the phase of FI meant that the 
exeutives were operating in a casualised environment, which made the 
occurrence of the FC an even greater surprise to the executives who could 
only enact what they perceived, which was reactive rather than proactive. 
However, such cues were consciously faded out because executives were 
busy running their business operations to reduce the impact of the situation on 
the business performance. The executives had then come to, collectively and 
collaboratively, perceive the FC as constituting a crisis which had to be 
resolved, and therefore implemented an ambitious information exchange, and 
social interaction to work on finding solutions together. However, the 
communication regarding their evaluation and concerns about the situation, 
which was envisaged to help them regain certainty, resulted in an even 
stronger negative recognition of the situation.  
 
At the same time, it must be mentioned that operative decisions prevailed in 
the event of FC and decisions at short-notice were deemed necessary. The 
disclosure of emerging emotional powers and a departure to plausibility flowed 
into the process and fostered irrational behaviour in uncertainty. Finally, the 
interruption of the sensemaking process resulted in misconduct and over-
reactions, which the participants only discerned in retrospect.  
 
Hence, even though a massive change occurred, sensemaking was also only 
partially processed in the FC. Neither meaningmaking, learning, creativity nor 
change were fully enabled. This can be explained by self-imposed time 
constraints and unknowingness. Executives` expectations, based on their 
meaning, about the occurrence and consequences of a crisis remained 
unfulfilled also because sensemaking did not widely take place during the 
preceding phase of FI, which both contributed towards consciously fading out 
the cues. 	  
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6.1.3 The Qualitative Indicators and Implications of the Phenomenon 
 
As further objectives, the study sought to develop QRIs of FI based on the 
corporate meaning and awareness of the respective expectations of FI to 
adjust and enrich the SRM of a CRE company and to discover how the 
corporate meaning of FI and awareness of the respective expectations 
translates into different implications (potential risks and risk-related events) for 
SRM behaviour. 
 
The study provided 20 QRIs - 11 about the phenomenon of FI, and 9 about the 
event of FC – as well as respective implications. Five clusters, or dynamics, 
were determined that share category similarities for both, FI and FC, and were 
considered as meaningful and comparable QIs that can enable the 
identification of either situation. Different dimensions of each indicator classify 
whether a phase of FI or an event of FC is occuring and whether it is emerging 
or not.  
 
To this end, the main conclusion is that quantitative indicators alone will not 
enable executives to foresee a phase of FI or an event of FC in their SRM, 
where the decisive dynamics that the research found all pertain to the 
behaviour of the major market participants during these times: executives’ 
investment behaviour, executives’ strategic decision behaviour, investors` 
investment behaviour, as well as the financing behaviour of financial 
institutions. 
 
A Decisive Qualitative Indicator: Market Participants` Behaviour 
The study showed that while the phase of FI was not recognised, as such, and 
the event of FC was not anticipated, organisations continued their operations 
in line with their business aims while striving for high performance without 
appropriate consideration of the situation. Hereto, the findings on corporate 
meaning and sensemaking make obvious the fact that executives did not have 
an adequate repertoire to assess the event appropriately and identify risks or 
chances for their company.  
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From the corporate meaning and awareness of the respective expectations, 
the study developed several indicators and implications for FI as well as for a 
FC that complement an anticipatory approach to risks, as well as SM, and 
allow monitoring and evaluation of the development of the corporate 
environment. Despite the majority of existing research, the study found 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, indicators to be meaningful in signalling 
the emergence of the phase of FI or the event of FC, and these do not wait for 
specific hurdles or scores to be reached.  
 
Each of the QRIs was expressed by individual indicators and these, in turn, 
were expressed with different grades which they may assume while qualifying 
to identify changes in the corporate environment. Together with the potential 
risk that may be imposed, such QIs determine the implications of FI or FC 
respectively.  
 
The QRIs that were identified are allocated to five overarching dynamics that 
compress one key accomplishment of the study. It was discovered that it is not 
the macroeconomic determinants from the remote environment that are 
decisive for indicating a phase of FI or an event of FC, but rather the task 
environment. More particularly, it is the behaviour of the market participants - 
executives, investors, banks – that is assigned with a superordinate role with 
regards to identifying and controlling FI and FC. 
 
The QRIs of FI were determined in order to show a stronger trigger from 
internally driven factors, such as executives` investment behaviour and their 
SDM, as well as their market perception. These are prevailing alerts during FI, 
characterised by ignorance, euphoria, and overpricing. Investors` behaviour to 
treat a real estate asset as a pure yield-providing object, and the banks’ 
uncriticality towards financing seemed to contribute to this behaviour, but were 
not symptomatic. 
 
Instead, in the event of FC, the identified QRIs are more driven by external 
actors. While investors ignore RE as an asset class and withdraw their capital 
during this time, banks abandon financing within the short-term. As a 
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consequence, executives had to discontinue acquisitions, and finally also 
reduce their portfolio assets in order to arrange for liquidity. 
 
From the findings and discussion about the potential implications, it could also 
be seen that CRE organisations only tend to focus on safeguarding their 
business aims and strive for strategic aims (corporate strategy), i.e. reaching 
growth and performance. It is not surprising that many QRIs were related to 
strategic risks, and some to financial risks as well as operational ones, all 
probably closely and indirectly related to strategic goals, but were only minorly 
related to external risks.  
 
The indicators mirror the determinants of the corporate meaning and even 
more obviously call for a departure from determinism and for considering 
dominant indicators of the ‘human factor’. These indicators are appropriate for 
adjusting and enriching the SRM of CRE companies with qualitative means 
and for managing the company during these times with better foresight. 
Executives are required to continuously monitor and control the market 
participants` behaviour, especially their own, in order to prevent adverse 
implications from FI or FC on their organisations. 
 
If it is considered that the behaviour of the market participants and 
predominantly that of the executives` is the major shared pattern for indicating 
a FI and FC, this puts into question whether the behaviour or the situation 
occurred first. The findings led to the conclusion that the phenomenon is to 
some extent being self-created. Their perception of the phenomenon, their 
reaction to it, and the measures that were made explicit within this study 
provide evidence that besides some environmental and macroeconomic 
factors, these people also contributed to the emergence of FI and its 
escalation into a FC through their behaviour.  
 
Moreover, it can be concluded that the behaviours that were found pertinent in 
the corporate perspective, precede the situation, as defined by researchers 
and public institutions. When, finally, not only a small portion, but the majority 
of the CRE market participants act with what has been found as 
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incomprehensive, ignorant, and intransparent conduct, a FC cannot be 
discouraged. The possible explanation led to a tentative notion that the less 
executives learn from their experiences while they strive for greater 
performance and yields, and the more they ignore the market signs, the worse 
the situation ultimatey becomes, especially when they are caught off guard by 
a market standstill and a great deal of money is lost in the downturn of a FC. 
 
Hence, the deduction that the behaviour of the market participants in the CRE 
sector is a decisive indicator for FI and FC which precedes the consequential 
situations in existing definitions also suggests that the phenomenon is to some 
extent self-created. 
 
6.2 Contribution to Theory and Managerial Implications  
 
The study of the phenomenon of FI holds strong significance in its seeking to 
broaden the empirical knowledge and for practitioners to better manage their 
organisations. Hereto, the study makes multiple contributions to knowledge 
through a distinctive view on the inner meaning of the phenomenon, from a 
content and a sensemaking process perspective, by elaborating a distinction 
between the phase of FI and the event of FC underpinned with tangible QIs 
and implications. This also provides some implications for practice. 
 
6.2.1  The Meaning of the Phenomenon: Contributing a Corporate 
Perspective 
 
Contribution to Knowledge  
To date, existing theory about the phenomenon of FI is not comprehensive and 
is limited to a more macroeconomic understanding, leaving the corporate 
perspective aside. Prevailing definitions are flawed and formed by the 
perspective of researchers and public institutions, addressed to financial 
institutions and supposed to assist macroprudential supervision. Hence, SM 
and organisational theory lack a comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
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The present study extends the existing definitions (economy level) of FI and 
FC with a more microeconomic one (corporate level), offering a broader view 
on such a massive, far-reaching incident. Additionally, the study places the 
people who make the decisions in the foreground, while also including the 
angles of relevant market participants and key sectors. This new corporate 
perspective and perception of the phenomenon and its particular context by 
the strategic decision-makers extends existing SM, RM, and organisational 
theory to another level when these specifics are inserted as common ground. 
The additional empirical knowledge gained regarding the complex 
environment-organisation-relationships and the meaning of the phenomenon 
of FI brings transparency about individual characteristics and a refined, more 
holistic description of the phenomenon, which were so far lacking.  
 
As for the corporate context, the major findings show the way in which 
executives comprehend their corporate environment in the SM of the CRE 
company, in terms of respective chances and risks for the SRM. The study 
provided empirical evidence regarding detailed environmental particulars of the 
CRE sector confirming, and specifiying, extant theoretical approaches. 
 
Subsequently, the study contributes to strategic and organisational 
management research by acknowledging the particular circumstances and 
effects for organisations in a CRE environment. The study also highlights the 
relative importance of context and implies that appropriate attention should be 
given to substantiate sector-specific characteristics for the perception and 
understanding of environmental changes and their consequences from a 
corporate perspective. The findings allow for a sensitisation towards the 
general context to better specify the phenomenon of FI and the event of FC 
within this corporate background and add to the (extended) definition of FI that 
was to be achieved. 
 
The study further contributes to empirical knowledge with a more detailed and 
precise definition of the phase of FI, as well as a clear distinction for the event 
of FC. The corporate meaning covers the contextual and sector specifics of the 
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CRE companies while extending existing macroeconomic definitions by 
practices of executives and particularities of CRE. 
 
With this contribution, the study emphasises the importance of a differentiated 
view on the phenomenon, which is also subject to different industries, without 
relying on superior directives at the macroeconomic level. Furthermore, 
instability should not always be associated with negative consequences and 
circumstances, as the study offers suggestive evidence that positively 
perceived distortions and deviations can also lead to a corporate meaning-
making of FI.  
 
Moreover, the clear distinction between FI and FC contributes to a 
differentiated theoretical perspective on the ties between FI and FC, and while 
the thus far prevailing theory suggests that FC is the most severe form of FI, it 
also has an inverse meaning for CRE. 
 
Contribution to Methodology 
A major characteristic of the majority of existing organisational and 
management studies about the phenomenon of FI is their positivistic paradigm. 
This study challenges the prevailing notion and shortcomings of quantitative 
approaches in a positivistic context. It therefore provides for novelty and 
contributes with new deep dived meaning and comprehensive views about the 
phenomenon in context. This alternative perspective reveals rare and valuable 
data from the stories and experiences of the senior executives that would not 
have been available in quantitative measures and which contributed to the 
extensive findings of this study. The study also provides suggestive evidence 
that the hermeneutic phenomenological approach, with its different emphases, 
can enrich and expand theory. Only through the qualitative approach was it 
possible to uncover the emerging importance of feelings and emotions in 
organisational behaviour (Ashkanasy and Humphrey 2011) which is an 
underexposed area in management research (Kim 2012). Hereto, a theoretical 
contribution can also be made to make such method applicable to other 
studies and for other sectors or other phenomena.  
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The study seems to support the argument for a more extensive consideration 
of the ‘human’ factor in research about SM and environmental change, which 
has so far been reserved for more socially-oriented research. Although 
executives are said to act rationally and inherit a strong professional self-
identity as well as long-standing experiences, the results show that they were 
outweighed by feelings and perceptions during FI and FC. SM is peoples’ 
business and executives’ individual perspective, above their organisational one, 
becomes important when only their interpretation and meaning of the 
phenomenon is decisive for recognition and further action.  
 
Implications for Practice 
In a volatile and crisis-affected business world the study highights the 
significance of SM when executives need to be able to identify a phase of FI 
and enact relevant changes in the corporate environment in order to manage 
respective chances and risks resulting from it.  
 
Existing studies leave the organisational view and resulting consequences for 
corporates during this time undetermined. Hence, the investigation explored a 
corporate definition of the phenomenon, which is necessary for executive 
management board members to recognise the status and change of the 
corporate environment towards a phase of FI and the event of FC, in terms of 
SM and SRM in order to control a CRE company. 
 
First and foremost, the investigated context provides practical support because, 
thus far, for most of those who are working in the sector for several years, the 
contextual circumstances are simply accepted as normal. When familiar with 
these, they do not think about any particularities, as the executives do not 
have any comparable situation from other sectors. The findings about the 
context therefore enable executives to better assess, reflect upon, and 
integrate their context in their decision-making as well as recognise potential 
chances and threats which they might not have identified before. Furthermore, 
with the explicitness of the general situation of CRE companies, compared to a 
phase of FI and an event of FC, it is now possible to identify respective 
changes in the corporate environment and make those transparent.  
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Further, the explored corporate meaning enables management to earlier 
identify a phase of FI or movements towards FC. The distinction of a phase of 
FI from an event of FC provides even greater transparency for the decision-
makers to differentiate between these two interconnected circumstances. 
Precautions and countermeasures to resulting risks or consequences can be 
initiated in due time and, when linked with strategy and SM, executives 
become able to control their businesses and fulfil its corporate aims in the 
long-term. The corporate meaning of the event of FC is also beneficial to 
executives, as it now explicitly outlines the specific characteristics of the 
situations for their organisation, which they can take into consideration in the 
SM. Hence, this study contributes to organisational strategy and executives` 
decision-making while linking this to SM. Executives are also enabled to cope 
with the special environmental conditions and are better able to manage the 
company successfully prior to, during, and after an event of FC.  
 
Third, the meaning that derives from executives` experiences during FI and FC 
also allows for objectifying the situations. Executives now have the possibility 
of preparing for a FC, due to these experiences and learnings from which they 
can develop a variety of countermeasures and initiatives. Even though they 
might not have been involved in previous FCs and/or in CRE at all, it is now 
possible to establish a better sense of, and become more familiar with, such 
event in order to avoid irrational actions and panic reactions, as well as limiting 
their feeling of uncertainty to be able to react appropriately to any crisis 
symptoms with more rationality. 
 
6.2.2  The Organisational Sensemaking Process: CRE Excutives` 
Approaches to the Phenomenon  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
Extant organisational and SM research provides little empirical knowledge as 
to how executives make sense of the phenomenon or how they form their 
expectations about it. Hence, the study became significant in enhancing 
sensemaking and organisational theory in order to uncover the thus far implicit 
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and unconscious sensemaking attempts during challenging times of 
environmental change in the remote environment, specifically FI and FC.  
 
While the findings generally conform with the theoretical concept of Weick 
(1995), the study contributes to this knowledge by making details of the 
organisational sensemaking process regarding environmental change in the 
remote environment during a phase of FI and the event of FC explicit. The 
study showed how executives in CRE companies accomplish corporate 
meaningmaking and sensemaking attempts in FI and FC situations that occur 
in the macroeconomic environment, which were yet unexplored. 
 
The overall process of sensemaking pertaining to the phenomenon of FI, as 
applied by the executives in CRE companies, shows that they form their 
expectations during a phase of FI and in the event of FC based on their 
definiton of the phenomenon. However, the study has made explicit that 
executives apply organisational sensemaking procedures only in parts. 
Extracted cues were essential for executives to recognise and make sense of 
the event, but they were still unable to make meaning of the situation and react 
to it accordingly. Their sensemaking was focused on the chances rather than 
the potential risks that the phase might bring. 
 
Organisational sensemaking has been applied in several previous studies in 
the area of strategic and organisational management, but with a more general 
focus or in different areas of research (Maitlis and Christianson 2014; Kudesia 
2017). The process of sensemaking regarding the phenomenon of FI, as 
applied by the executives, contributes to extent knowledge with its specific 
focus on the phenomenon of FI and by establishing an association between 
macroeconomic change and organisational sensemaking. A set of 
characterising themes are referenced back to several of Weick`s (1995) 
properties of organisational sensemaking, extending his acknowledged theory 
in the context of FI. A particular emphasis is placed on the extracted cues that 
trigger the process and respective enactment processes, as well as the 
personal aspects that allow executives to engage in the process and 
respective actions. The study supports the argument that sensemaking cannot 
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only be triggered by an interruption of business processes due to a lack of the 
business basis (in an event of FC), but also by a lack of qualitative adequate 
management of the processes due to increased business activities (in a 
preliminary phase of FI). Apparently, this suggests that the perception and 
interpretation of such cues should be extended by positive distortions which 
promote organisational performance to avoid commencing or interrupting the 
sensemaking process. 
 
Implications for Practice 
The study also contributes practical relevance in understanding what 
happened in organisations in the phase prior to the FC and what executives 
really accomplish when facing that situation. 
 
With the findings pertaining to the organisational sensemaking process of the 
phenomenon, the research provides transparency and supports executive 
management board members while consciously recognising and learning 
about their own skills and behaviour for future consideration. This also 
encourages executives to place greater attention on correctly interpreting the 
cues and not being hindered by superimposed behaviours or feelings. Only 
then can the sensemaking process contribute to their achievement of an 
efficient and orderly decision-making process in terms of SM and SRM to 
control a CRE company prior to, during, or after a phase of FI. 
 
The process of sensemaking regarding the phenomenon of FI, as applied by 
the executives, provides awareness regarding their procedural behaviour and, 
explicitly, their limitations and the resulting potential severe consequences. 
With a particular emphasis on the extracted cues that trigger the process and 
respective actions, executives now have explicit means regarding the practical 
and procedural obstacles in CRE organisations during a phase of FI and the 
event of FC, which allows them to reflect upon the way in which they perceive 
the phenomenon, how they interpret it and behave through it, and how they 
can act with greater foresight. 
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This further implies a continuous scanning and sensemaking of the changes in 
the corporate environment. The study supports the argument for an integrated 
and holistic strategy and SM, taking into account several interdependent 
sources of macroeconomic factors in different environmental stances that are 
an exposure to the organisation, together with the internally driven indicators of 
behaviour and emotional states. When applied appropriately, executives can 
initiate behavioural and procedural changes to circumvent the prevailing lack 
of transparency during this phase and implement a more open communication 
while allowing themselves a greater consciousness of critical situations. For 
the event of FC, uncertainties can be reduced and they are enabled to adjust 
their practices more proactively while also looking for chances in critical times.  
 
Additionally, executives are made aware of their potential emotionality and the 
impact of gut feelings on their decisions, exemplified in the newfound 
existential of ‘lived feelings’. A reflection of these uncommon determinants in 
organisational action can help to manage uncertainties and FI or FC even 
better. Hereto, the findings suggest that executives should consider 
incorporating sensemaking procedures more systematically and allow 
themselves more open and timely discussions to reduce the complexities and 
uncertainties experienced by the individual. Executives can benefit from setting 
their thoughts free and allowing their experiences and feelings to add a 
sensitive basis to their decision-making, and not displace it in favour of 
performance goals. This condition must first be de-stigmatised by executives 
so that social interaction can come more freely and is not too easily 
undermined by positive effects, lack of time, performance targets, or emerging 
critical situations. 
 
6.2.3  Indicators and Implications of the Phenomenon: Inserting 
Qualitative Means  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
Similarly to the definition of the phenomenon, the indicators and implications 
have thus far remained with a macroeconomic perspective to identify systemic 
financial risk on the level of the economy. The extended definition of the 
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phenomenon now requires the adjustment of the specific indicators and 
implications to this corporate level.  
 
The study investigated precise and particular indicators and implications to 
contribute to the knowledge on organisational adaption (SM and SRM) to 
environmental changes in the remote environment. The study developed 
numerous QIs and implications of FI and FC based on its corporate meaning 
and sensemaking for a distinctive identification of a phase of FI and the event 
of FC. These extended, CRE-specific and qualitative findings rebound to the 
benefit of academics as well as researchers in the field of organisational 
management and SM, especially considering the increasing interest in the 
phenomenon in the sciences nowadays. 
 
The study provided enhanced knowledge on an integrated and holistic SM and 
SRM, taking into account several macroeconomic factors in different 
environmental stances that are an exposure for the organisation. This also 
includes internally driven indicators of behaviour and emotional states. A 
departure from the pure rational and objectivised factors was necessary in 
order to capture the full extent of the potential indicators that flag the 
emergence of a phase of FI or the event of FC from a corporate SRM 
perspective. 
 
Earlier studies that have been conducted in the field of FI and systemic risk are 
limited to quantitative indicators and monitoring variables, with the aim of 
seeking an objective view on macroeconomic states of a financial system in an 
economy (Kaminsky et al. 1998; Hawkins and Klau 2000; Geršl and Hermánek 
2007; Gray et al. 2007; Gadanecz and Jayaram 2009). Compared to existing 
research, the QIs and implications do not only provide additional qualitative 
dimensions to be taken into consideration, but also contribute a more detailed 
specification of FI and FC in the CRE context. The indicators provide a 
composition of material factors into a QRI which are considered to potentially 
put the corporate goals and strategies of a CRE organisation at risk. The 
findings adjust and enrich the SRM of CRE companies, while providing 
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empirical evidence about the distinctive indicators and implications for a phase 
of FI and an event of FC on a corporate level. 
 
Implications for Practice 
So far, practitioners could not be equipped with particular indicators and 
implications that support their strategic and operational decision-making 
preparedness in SRM in order to make a proper risk assessment about a 
phase of FI or an event of FC. Together with the increasing complexities in risk 
structure, this study unfolds significance to provide executives with such 
specific indicators and implications to identify, analyse, and evaluate potential 
resulting risks for the CRE company.  
 
Hence, a final, yet important, contribution comes in the form of the several 
QRIs that are beneficial for executives in supporting their decision-making in 
terms of SM and initiating a reconsideration and adjustment, moreover an 
enrichment, of the SRM of CRE companies. The distinctive indicators alert the 
executives and enable them to employ more mature approaches to adjust and 
enrich their SRM with a more continuous and prudent sense regarding the 
potential resulting risks arising from a phase of FI for the CRE company, as 
well as providing them with additional tools to gain extra foresight into the 
likelihood of the emergence of an event of FC. This will ultimately allow 
executives to soften or even prevent the (adverse) impacts of a FC on the 
corporate level while managing to respond to the changes in the corporate 
environment. 
 
The study also supports the relevance of monitoring the behaviour of the 
market participants in the task environment, which precedes a phase of FI or 
an event of FC. This extended risk identification also implies a departure from 
the pure rational and objectivised factors, complemented by profound, 
qualitative, more socially constructed ones to embrace the full extent of 
potential indicators in the specific CRE context. CRE companies can take 
advantage of subjective means by institutionalising the monitoring and control 
of such QRIs in their SRM to become better prepared for, and to professionally 
manage, upcoming phases of FI.   
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6.3 Limitations and Challenges of the Research 
 
The qualitative study explored the lived experiences of senior executives in the 
CRE sector regarding FI. The careful choice of methodology and interview 
participants ensured the rigour of this study. However, some limitations and 
challenges of this research shall be emphasised. 
 
The phenomenon under investigation was limited in terms of its time horizon. 
Even though the results include a differentiation between contexts, the phase 
of FI and the event of FC, the investigation was a temporal view on the most 
recent FCs. It was a retrospective to the decade from 2005 to 2015, covering 
three major crises in the financial system (SCC, GFC, SDC) that affected the 
CRE sector in Germany.  
 
Second, this study was about understanding the lived experience of ten senior 
executives in the German CRE Sector. While originally not a limitation, as 
defended in the methodology section, empiricists may consider this as a small 
sample. Within the research strategy of hermeneutic phenomenology, the 
study was looking for rich and in-depth information of the participants, also 
considering the high complexity of the phenomenon. Hereto, the sample was 
able to provide sound information and it became obvious that a smaller 
number of participants would have been a too insignificant sample. 
Considering the large amount of gathered information, the extensive number of 
extracted themes and broad consensus in the results show that additional 
participants would not have provided any further path-breaking insights. 
 
Third, the research strategy developed over time. Initially, Husserl`s (1970) 
transcendental phenomenological approach was considered to provide a good 
route to investigate the phenomenon. While progressing with the research, this 
approach reached its limits when the context-sensitivity of the study was 
determined, and the researcher adopted the hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach of van Manen (1990) that fulfils this requirement and is in line with 
researcher`s anti-positivistic stance as well. With the “[…] more poetically […]” 
(Valle et al. 1989, cited in Dowling 2007: 132) phenomenological and 
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qualitative approach, based on van Manen (1990), the research utilised 
intuitive practices and thinking processes to uncover in-depth information of 
experiences in a new way. It may be claimed that qualitative approaches are 
not yet fully accepted in management research and these are also early 
attempts of the researcher in this area. But, the criticism of lacking credibility in 
qualitative research is opposed by a diligent research procedure and analysis 
with full transparency about each step pertaining to how data has emerged, as 
well as by the meaningful findings of the approach brought forward.  
 
At the same time, it appeared challenging to approach a positivistic area of 
research with an anti-positivistic stance, especially during data collection. The 
qualitative approach for the study was selected on the basis that little previous 
research has been done on the topic. Relying on information from a series of 
semi-structured interviews with executives of CRE companies produces rich 
data to foster the understanding about the phenomenon of FI, but the 
interviewees seem to be challenged with the open-ended question format as 
well as with talking about their perceptions and feelings. In reflection, the 
researcher had to skilfully reformulate and slightly specify some of the early 
questions in the interview because the executives were lost in answering 
questions that were too open. This improved during the interview but it was 
interesting to see that basically all of them shared this experience. 
 
Limitations arose where the researcher could potentially direct the 
interpretation of the data. As highlighted above, the researcher`s bias was 
acknowledged and respective measures were taken during the whole study to 
mitigate the risk of such an influence. Besides, such limitation is considered 
outweighed with the unfiltered and rich descriptions that could be gained about 
the lived experience regarding the phenomenon where all participants were 
exceptionally open in sharing their experiences with the researcher. The study 
focussed attention to the strategic choice perspective, analysing meaning and 
sensemaking processes of CRE executives about the environmental 
phenomenon of FI. Hence, the role of managerial cognition in SDM in a phase 
of FI has not been part of this study.   
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Sixth, some authors (Helms Mills et al. 2010; Maitlis and Christianson 2014) 
have criticised Weick`s (1995) approach to organisational sensemaking, which 
was used in this study, as not accounting for matters concerned with power 
and emotion, but interpretation and enactment, which could be considered a 
limitation in accounting for all possible influences to sensemaking. Beside the 
critics however, it has been acknowledged that emotions effect sensemaking 
(Weick 1995; Maitlis et al. 2013), cognition, and behaviour (Maitlis and Ozcelik 
2004; Hmieleski and Baron 2009). Where this study also found a material 
effect of managerial behaviour and feelings, it indirectly accounted for the role 
of emotion in SDM during a phase of FI and the event of FC and counters the 
criticism while complying with the call of further research in this regard on the 
organisational level (Maitlis and Christianson 2014). 
 
During the analytical phase of the research, emphasis was placed on 
explaining and interpreting the properties that emerged for both stages, FI and 
FC, and less attention was given to accounting for those of Weick`s seven 
properties of sensemaking, which seem not applicable: ‘identity’ and 
‘continuation’.  
 
The study has addressed the issue of developing indicators and made 
suggestions for their potential specifications. These were not grounded on 
empirical evidence and are subject to further modification, optimisation, and 
verification. In this regard, the RM assessment is considered limited to risk 
identification, and does not include a further risk analysis or evaluation, also 
because this is always in the discretion of the respective organisation and is 
dependent on its risk appetite. The focus here is on establishing indicators as 
a reference to the context of the CRE organisation and identifying risks 
resulting from the corporate meaning and sensemaking of a CRE organisation 
about the phenomenon of FI.  
 
Furthermore, the outcome of this study is not designed for a generalisation to 
any wider population outside the CRE sector in Germany. With this country 
and industry restriction, it has provided a good range of CRE companies, 
including different sizes, business models, and ownership. Other countries, 
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cultures, or industries have not been addressed. In this regard, however, it 
should be noted that the study proved the strong position of the CRE sector in 
the real economy and its particular influence on the financial system of an 
economy in particular. So findings may not be easily transferable to other 
industries but to other countries, as FI is a global phenomenon. 
 
The technical limitations during the analysis became another challenge. NVivo 
software was used to support the efficient handling of the data and speed up 
the coding. However, this systemic support was only useful up to the point of 
extracting significant statements. Due to the great amount of interview data 
and a lack of support in structure, the concepts, sub-themes, and themes in 
relation to the context and also for axial coding, the researcher had to move on 
manually, extracting NVivo data to Microsoft Word. This was slightly frustrating 
because it eliminated the possibility to automate the process as far as possible. 
The MS Word table grew to a bulky summary of data, but it was handy to 
group, link, and manage the data, while moving, adding, and amending was 
certainly possible. Although mentioned as a challenge, the MS Word format 
proved much more convenient for the researcher as he is better accustomed 
to this format than NVivo, which is limited in intuitive handling.  
 
Ultimately, the extensive scope and result of this work, which is owed to the 
researcher`s urge for comprehensiveness, provided a challenge with regards 
to the efficient handling of a lot of data and findings within the limitations of the 
word count. It is defended that the particular interpretation of the context of 
CRE companies is a significant backbone for the research findings. Only the 
clarification of the normality allowed for interpreting the meaning and 
sensemaking of the phenomenon appropriately. Furthermore, the investigation 
about the sensemaking procedures of executives was essential for a 
comprehensive view of the meaning beyond its pure context, while also adding 
to more rigorous complementary advances. The dual approach to meaning 
proved viable while the sensemaking perspective of the phenomenon was 
declared insufficiently applied. Also, the distinction between FI and FC is most 
sensible. Otherwise, the emergence of the event of FC within the phase of FI 
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cannot be recognised. Finally, the resulting QRIs add to a conclusive and 
comprehensive concept about the phenomenon of FI. 
 
6.4 Suggested Avenues for Future Research 
 
The research presents an advance in understanding the phenomenon of FI 
from a corporate perspective out of the CRE sector, using the lived experience 
of senior executives.  
 
However, for future research, it could be of value to investigate beyond the SM 
concepts and look further into the context of SRM. Risk managers may 
contribute additional information on operations from a different perspective. In 
this regard, it would also be interesting to see future RM literature to further 
identify potential cause-related risks and risk-related events to be covered as 
risk indicators in the SRM of a CRE Company. Additionally, further research to 
extend the QRIs into risk analysis and evaluation would be important to see, 
how these qualify in risk assessments in CRE companies. This could also 
include verifying and optimising the proposed grades of the indicators. 
 
Second, this investigation has taken place in Germany, so future research 
might be usefully focused on other countries. This will open up promising 
research avenues on the corporate meaning of FI across different cultural or 
national settings and to look for possible generalisations. 
 
Third, the indicators that have been uncovered show that there might be 
dependencies between some. Hence, the qualitative considerations of this 
study would be useful for conducting some quantitative research about the 
correlation of the individual indicators to further ground these assumptions or 
possibly create composite indicators. Additionally, a quantitative study can 
provide further confirmation about the strength of the effect of the developed 
single indicators in FI and FC for the CRE company. Furthermore, as the study 
did not aim to predict future states or episodes of FI, it would be beneficial to 
know the intensity and spread of the perceived changes to determine when the 
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critical point of FI (from FS) or FC (from FI) is reached from a corporate 
perspective.  
 
Fourth, the phenomenon under investigation is a temporal snapshot. Even 
though the results include a differentiation between the general context, the 
phase of FI prior to the event of FC, and the event itself, the investigation took 
a retrospective view on the most recent FCs during the decade from 2005 to 
2015 covering three crises. Yet, it might be useful to focus on how executives 
would be investigated in a study exactly during a phase of FI in the financial 
system of the economy, or over a longer period of different stages of FI and 
FC (i.e. case study). In this context, it would also be inspiring to see if they are 
then better prepared, to act more retrospectively and with foresight. An 
investigation during, or shortly after, this phase may be beneficial for a 
comparative study over time and might challenge the notion of a learning 
organisation. Hereto, a further elaboration within the behavioural economics 
could provide additional insights about the indicated cognitive courses of 
action of the executives. 
 
Another avenue for further research would be research into the specific 
properties of sensemaking in organisations, which this study did not bring 
forward: ‘identity’ and ‘continuation’. Future investigations on these two 
particulars can gain knowledge whether these play a role in sensemaking for 
CRE companies at all, and seek an explanation for why these have not been 
found for a phase of FI and the event of FC. 
 
Sixth, findings suggest that there is an extensive behavioural influence of the 
executives and other market participants, which enlightens behavioural 
economics and cognition as a related field of interest for this research. Future 
research about the psychological backgrounds of executives meaning and 
sensemaking of the phenomenon of FI would be an interesting opportunity.  
 
Finally, an extension of this study into the specific area of sensegiving in 
organisations would be insightful and could further deepen the findings about 
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executives` influence on fueling the emergence of a phase of FI and/or an 
event of FC. This is how much executives attempt to influence the 
sensemaking process towards a preferred definition of organisational reality 
and how much the recipients (i.e. colleagues, board) can resist this influence 
(Maitlis and Lawrence 2007; Maitlis and Christianson 2014). 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
While unfolding senior executives` lived experience about meaning and 
sensemaking of FI, the investigation gave voice to otherwise unspoken 
aspects and facilitated the understanding of the phenomenon on the level of 
the organisation. 
 
The study uncovered the general context circumstances of a CRE organisation 
while simultaneously acknowledging the executives’ implicit assumptions 
which became explicit. The perception of dependency of the business 
performance on developments in the corporate environment and its 
complexities and dynamics shape the everyday lifeworld of the CRE 
executives. Consequently, only massive changes in the environmental 
conditions of this industry are recognised and perceived as uncontrollable in 
their business lives. Hence, the importance of acknowledging the corporate 
context for the SDM of executives and the degree of proficiency of their 
implementation of sensemaking in relation to environmental changes in their 
SM are emphasised. Thus, it is inevitable to make the sector specifics of these 
context-sensitive organisations explicit and to capture the common ground for 
SM in organisations as a sound basis to understanding the corporate 
environment, its changes, as well as the external dependencies of the firm 
comprehensively.  
 
Using the lived experience of senior executives in their everyday lifeworld 
offers a new perspective and understanding of the phenomenon of FI beyond 
existing macroeconomic definitions. These are extended with the explored 
corporate meaning to a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon. In the 
CRE sector, executives particularly characterise the phase of FI as an 
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unrealistic market situation with expansion pressures, while remaining ignorant 
of the associated risks. This stimulates optimistic behaviours and the 
perceived certainty of the actors, which is assumed to promote dynamics 
towards an event of FC, which then evolves unexpectedly with a complete 
reversal of the situation. Hence, it becomes compulsory for a proper 
organisational adaption of the phenomenon to place the perception of the 
people who make the decisions in the foreground, including the behaviour of 
relevant market participants and key sectors. It is evidenced that a corporate 
perspective on different phases and events of the phenomenon is unavoidable, 
since the defined peculiarities, which are decisive for an efficient and 
appropriate SM, can deviate from those on the economy level. 
 
The research further studied the way in which executives apply their 
understanding and beliefs of the phenomenon of FI to make sense of it. In the 
CRE industry, executives only partially apply the sensemaking process within 
their organisations. The research provides evidence that changes in 
environmental conditions clearly require diverse processing as organisational 
sensemaking is applied differently, or even contradictorily, depending on the 
macroeconomic situation. With preference to achieving the business goals, 
CRE executives unconsciously ignore the extracted cues in the preliminary 
phase of FI, in comparison to the event of FC where these are consciously 
faded out. Hence, it seems that executives do not take advantage of 
sensemaking in their organisation to adopt a SM approach with greater 
foresight. Therefore, the knowledge about how and why executives apply 
sensemaking procedures about a phenomenon is fundamental for 
organisational interpretation and learning about executives` skills and 
behaviour for the benefit of future consideration.  
 
Acknowledging the increasing complexities in risk structure, the study provides 
executives in the CRE sector with specific indicators and implications about 
the phenomenon of FI to contribute to more mature approaches and 
continuous processing in SRM. These decisive QIs all pertain to the behaviour 
of the major market participants namely that of executives`, investors` and 
banks`, and their SDM, investment, and financing behaviour. Hence, the study 
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emphasises that quantitative indicators alone will not enable executives to 
foresee the phenomenon in their SRM. Precise and particular QRIs and 
implications based on the corporate meaning and awareness of the respective 
expectations of a phenomenon on the economy level are essential for 
executives in supporting a better monitoring and decision-making in terms of 
SM to initiating a reconsideration and adjustment, moreover an enrichment, of 
their SRM behaviour.  
 
From the methodological angle, the qualitative approach indicates that 
hermeneutic phenomenology, with its different emphasis on subjective views in 
context, can enrich and expand theory about the phenomenon of FI in the 
corporate environment of a CRE organisation. It brings forth unconsciously 
proceeded habits and thoughts that executives use in their everyday business 
activities, thus developing new knowledge for the industry. 
 
Overall, the study supports the argument for an emerging importance of an 
integrated and holistic strategy in organisational research about SM and 
environmental change, taking into account several interdependent sources of 
macroeconomic factors in different environmental stances that are an 
exposure to the organisation, together with the internally driven indicators of 
behaviour and emotional states, i.e. the ‘human factor’. SM is people`s 
business and executive`s individual perspective, above their organisational 
one, becomes important when their interpretation and meaning of a 
phenomenon is the only decisive for recognition and further action. 
 
* * * 
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Appendix 1  
Information Letter 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Project title:  Inserting Financial Instability in Strategic Management of Commercial 
Real Estate Companies 
 
Investigator: Bernd Sagemann  Contact phone number: +xx 151 xxxxxx 
 Contact Email: x@xx.com 
 
Dear [participant], 
 
I am a business researcher at the University of Bradford – School of Management, UK. 
You are invited to take part in a research study on Financial Instability in the 
Commercial Real Estate (CRE) sector with special focus on strategic (risk) 
management considerations. 
 
You have been chosen due to your extensive professional experience as an executive 
management board member in the CRE sector and I would like you to participate in 
an interview (e.g. face-to-face) at a time and place (e.g. workplace) appropriate for 
you. This will not take more than 60 minutes of your time. The interviews will be held 
in English or German. 
 
By taking part in this study, you may help to contribute to professional practice and 
risk management approaches for awareness on corporate level prior, during, or after 
a phase of financial crises. 
 
Whether or not you take part is your personal choice. If you don’t want to participate, 
you don’t have to give a reason, and it won’t affect the care you receive. If you do 
want to take part now, but change your mind later, you can pull out of the study at any 
time. You can also withdraw consent at any stage up to two weeks after the interview. 
Your decision to stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not 
affect your relationship with the researcher, University of Bradford, or any other group 
associated with this project. In the event you withdraw from the study, all associated 
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data collected will be destroyed immediately. The study is voluntary and you will only 
be included if you provide your permission.  
 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign the attached Consent 
Form. You will be given a copy of both the Participant Information Sheet and the 
Consent Form for your records.  
 
I will keep all data private and secret. This applies to you as the participant and also to 
the company you are with. There is no sponsorship for this study or any influence to 
the researcher. I will keep data in a locked office and only I will have access to the 
data. In compliance with University regulations, I will keep data for ten years after the 
study has finished. After ten years, I will destroy the data. Once I have finished the 
study I will present the results at conferences and publish e.g. in an academic journal. 
When I publish the results, no participant and company will be identifiable by name or 
special features. There are no known risks associated with taking part in this study. If 
you have any concerns please do not hesitate to contact me.  
 
The ethics approval for the study has been granted by the Chair of the Humanities, 
Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 
25th May 2016. Please contact Dr […], chair of the research ethics committee for the 
Humanities, Social and Health Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of 
Bradford, if you have any concerns (Email: y@bradford.ac.uk). Dr […] has no direct 
involvement in the study.  
 
If you would like to participate in this study, please read and sign the informed 
consent form and return it to my Email account (x@xx.com).  
 
If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Many thanks 
in advance. 
 
Kind regards,  
Bernd Sagemann  
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Appendix 2  
Consent Form 
 
 
 
* Status: May 25th, 2016, approval granted by the Chair of the Humanities, Social, and Health Sciences 
Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford  
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Appendix 3  
Interview Guideline 
 
 
A. Introduction  
 
1. Personal background information: person, university 
2. PhD thesis background information: areas of interest 
3. Important information about the interview: anonymity, recording of interview 
 
B. Background Information 
 
4. Please provide some information about yourself and the organisation you 
are working for. 
 
5. Please specify some aspects of the strategic management within your 
organisation.  
 
a) What are the strategic objectives of your organisation?  
b) Could you kindly elaborate, which strategic risks you have identified, in 
consideration of pursuing your organisational strategic objectives. Can you 
please describe these risks briefly? 
 
6. Please describe the relation between the corporate environment and your 
CRE organisation. 
 
a) By what characteristics do you make this assessment? 
b) How do you monitor and control those characteristics?  
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C. Financial Instability – The Lived Experience in an CRE organisation 
 
7. Kindly describe your lived experience in the CRE organisation in the context of 
a financial crisis. What have you experienced in your organisation and who 
was involved? 
 
a) How did you perceive the business environment (externally and internally) 
of your organisation prior to the occurrence of the financial crisis? 
b) Through which event in your business environment did you perceive the 
change to a crisis? 
c) How did you become aware of it? 
d) How did you experience the crisis event from your perspective?  
e) Which decisions were based on the assessment of the event? 
 
D. Concluding Questions 
 
8. Are there any open issues that you would like to add in the context we just 
discussed?  
 
9. Are there and questions that you think I should have addressed but did not?  
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Appendix 4 
Significant Statements from Transcripts (trans.) 
 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Das Umfeld ist komplexer geworden. 
Auf jeden Fall finde ich es nicht mehr 
einfach, nicht mehr simpel, es ist 
komplexer geworden und jeder, der 
anderer Meinung ist, ist entweder nur in 
einem Teil des Geschäftes dabei oder 
noch nicht sehr lange. [...] Ich mach 
meine Einschätzung fest an mehreren 
Merkmalen. Es ist einfach, ich glaube, es 
ist auf einer Seite die Erfahrung, die man 
sammelt übertrifft das [...] und auch an 
eigener Erfahrung auch sammeln kann. 
Und zweitens ist auch durch Erweiterung 
der Geschäftsmodelle oder innerhalb der 
Firma sieht man auch andere Facetten 
des Geschäftes. Nochmal muss ich auf 
das Thema KVG zurückkommen. Mit den 
Regulierungen ist nichts einfacher 
geworden. Von da kommen meine 
Feststellungen, dass es eher komplexer 
geworden ist.” (Olivia #00:12:05#-
#00:13:04#) 
“The environment has become more 
complex. In any case, I don’t think it is 
easy any more, no longer simple, it has 
become more complex and everybody 
who is of a different opinion, is either 
only involved in a part of the business or 
really has not been here that long. […] 
My assessment derives from numerous 
characteristics. It is easy, I mean, on the 
one hand it is experience that one 
gained exceeds that […] and also the 
personal experience that one can gain. 
And second, one sees different aspects 
of the business because of business 
model expansion or internally. Again I 
have to come back to the topic KVG. 
With the regulations nothing has become 
easier. This is where my assessment 
that it has merely become more complex 
derives from.” 
 
„Es ist relativ komplex, weil sehr viele 
Faktoren in so was wie Investment 
Performance mit reinspielen. Es ist 
weniger komplex, weil in die, in viele 
unterschiedliche - aber die Mechanismen 
bleiben sich relativ gleich. Insofern ist, ist 
unser Geschäft noch relativ gut 
vorhersehbar und planbar.” (James 
#00:06:45#-#00:07:10#)  
“It is relatively complex because various 
factors do influence something like 
investment performance. It is less 
complex, because in the, in many 
different – but the mechanisms remain 
relatively the same. Insofar, our business 
is relatively well foreseeable and 
predictable.”  
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(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Da wird sie komplex. Denn hier wird’s 
kompliziert und unübersichtlich, weil wir 
in der Mieternachfrage sehr komplexe 
Strukturen haben, geo-politische 
Sachen. Meine Mieter müssen ja auch 
Geld verdienen und die wiederum sind 
abhängig von Geopolitik/Wirtschaft. Das 
ganze Umfeld ist momentan so ein 
bisschen aus den Fugen geraten und 
dasselbe gilt für die Investment-
nachfrage, das geht einher. Leute, die in 
Immobilien investieren, wollen einen 
sicheren Hafen haben und wenn, wenn 
es nicht mehr gewährleistet ist und wenn 
auf einmal ein Bond wieder sicherer ist, 
als eine Immobilie, dann lässt die 
Nachfrage nach. Damit ist es komplexer. 
[...] Zinsen und GDP Growth.” (Sophia 
#00:05:21#-#00:06:17#) 
“Here it gets complex. Because at this 
point it becomes complicated and 
confusing, because we have very 
complex structures in tenant demand, 
geopolitical issues. My tenants also have 
to earn money and they in turn are 
dependent on geopolicy/economy. The 
whole environment is currently a bit 
unsettled and the same applies for the 
investment demand, this goes hand in 
hand. People who invest in real estate 
want to have a safe haven, and if this 
cannot be secured any longer and a 
bond is again more secure like real 
estate, demands will decrease. 
Therefore it is more complex. […] 
Interest rates and GDP growth.” 
 
„Was uns beeinflusst ist natürlich die 
Zinspolitik der EZB. Wir können lange 
diskutieren, ob sie richtig ist oder nicht. 
[...] Und das ist z.B. wie sich die Margen 
der Banken zusammensetzen. [...] Ich 
glaube, dass wir zu wenig Liquidität 
haben. Das ist die Unsicherheit. Das ist 
die Unsicherheit, die die Banken mit sich 
führen, die auf den ersten Blick für uns 
nicht logisch sind. Also Zinsumfeld, 
Politik, GDP Growth - es kommt darauf 
an wie man sich das anschaut 
[...]“ (Olivia #00:16:27#-#00:18:55#) 
“What affects us is of course the interest 
rate policy of ECB. We could discuss at 
length if it is right or not. […] And this is 
for example the composition of the 
margin of the bank. […] I believe, we 
have too less liquidity. That´s the 
uncertainty. This is the uncertainty, 
which the banks carry with them, and 
that is not logical for us, at first sight. 
Well, interest rate environment, politics, 
GDP growth – it depends how you look 
at it […]”  
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(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Also, sehr, sehr komplex würde ich 
sagen. Es gibt eben halt auf der einen 
Seite, auf der Finanzierungsseite, Zins-
entwicklungsthemen, was wichtig ist für 
die Wirtschaftlichkeit des Objektes. Auf 
der anderen Seite gibt es eben halt den 
institutionellen Investor, der in Deutsch-
land sicherlich keine homogene Gestalt 
ist, sondern es gibt Versicherungen, die 
sehr professionell unterwegs sind, es gibt 
Versorgungsmärkte, die sich im 
Investitionsvolumen zwischen 2 und 10 
Millionen bewegen und eher emotional 
agieren als professionell agieren. Dazu 
gibt es eben hat einen Investment-Markt, 
der sich deutlich schwierig gestaltet, nicht 
nur temporär, sondern in, in Zeiten in 
denen die Nachfrage nicht so groß ist. Es 
sind auch eben weniger Developments 
am Markt erreichbar. Also schon aus den 
vielen exogenen Themen die es gibt, 
eine sehr komplexe Struktur, die es gilt 
eben halt hier auf den Punkt zu bringen 
und zusammenzuführen. Das ist, was 
auch unser Hauptthema ist.” (Harry 
#00:08:16#-#00:09:14#) 
“Well, very, very complex, I would say. 
On the one hand, on the financing side, 
there are interest rate developments, 
that are important for the profitability of 
the property. On the other hand, there is 
the institutional investor, who is certainly 
not presented homogenously in 
Germany, but there are insurance 
companies, who are acting very 
professional, pensions schemes whose 
investment volume is around 2 to 10 
million and who are more emotional than 
professional. Further, the investment 
market is considerably difficult, not only 
temporarily but in, in times when demand 
is not that high. There are also fewer 
developments available in the market. 
That is, because of the manifold 
exogenous topics, a complex structure, 
and you must get to the heart of it and 
bring these together.”  
“Komplex. [...] Zum einen, zum einen 
eben die, die politischen Risiken, in 
denen wir uns momentan bewegen, 
innerhalb eines Umfeldes der regulator-
ischen, nach der Finanzmarkt-krise, sehr 
starken, wo die Regulatur einen sehr 
starken Einfluss ausgeübt, ausgeübt hat. 
Und dann entsprechend daraus folgend 
die Risiken, die sich für die Märkte 
ergeben. Während wir in der Vergangen-
heit auch wirklich Zyklen gesehen haben 
in den jeweiligen, bspw. in den jeweiligen 
Immobilien-märkten weltweit, ist 
festzustellen, dass aus momen-taner 
Sicht diese Zyklen sich einfach ver-
ändern. Und das stellen ja auch Volks-
wirte häufig fest, dass sie, sage ich mal, 
vergangenheitsbezogene Entwicklungen 
sich nicht mehr in die Zukunft fortsetzen  
“Complex. […] On the one hand, the 
political risk in which we operate 
currently, in an environment where 
regulatory encroachments exert great 
influence, after the financial crisis. And, 
as well the resulting risks for the 
markets. While in the past, we have seen 
real cycles in the respective, for example 
global real estate markets, we can 
currently see that the cycles simply 
change. And that is what economists 
determine oftentimes, that, let`s say, 
historic developments cannot be 
extrapolated to the future any more, 
because many, many developments are 
just diametrical illogical.”  
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(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
lassen, weil eben viele, viele Entwick-
lungen sich einfach diametral unlogisch 
entwickeln (Charlie #00:08:38#-
#00:10:02#) 
 
„[...] in allen Dingen in denen wir uns 
bewegen, seien es Mieten oder 
anderseits sind wir ja von unseren 
Kunden, also unseren Mietern abhängig 
und da wir ja nicht selber aktives 
Geschäft betreiben, sondern letztlich 
Flächen zur Verfügung stellen, sind wir 
immer in irgendeiner Weise, beim Retail 
noch sehr deutlich, beim Hotel genauso 
und auch beim Büro müssen die Mieter 
halt letztlich das Geld verdienen und 
letztlich auch ihre Miete, natürlich viel 
mittelbarer dann im Geschäft, als wir das 
sind. Aber das trifft uns genauso.” 
(George #00:11:33#-#00:12:02#) 
“[…] all things that we are engaged in, 
say rent or otherwise we are dependent 
on our clients, thus our tenants, and 
because we are not actively managing 
but ultimately just provide the space, we 
are always also to some extent, lets say 
in retail still very significantly, also hotel 
and same for office, where the tenants 
ultimately have to make their money and 
the rent, much more indirectly involved 
the business than we are. But this also 
applies for us.”  
„Sicherlich neue Objekte kaufen zu 
können, also sprich die, die Verbindung 
zu Asset-Managern, Bestandshaltern, 
Developern um dann Objekte für das 
eigene Fonds- und Asset-Management-
Geschäft erwerben und akquirieren zu 
können [...]“  (Harry #00:27:13-
#00:27:52#) 
“For sure, the possibility to acquire new 
properties, say the connection to the 
asset managers, property managers, 
developers to then purchasing and 
acquiring properties for the own fund and 
asset management […]”  
„Makro ist jetzt wieder, sind ja auch 
Zinssätze, sind ja auch geopolitische 
Sachen, bin ich sehr abhängig davon. 
Und beeinflussen kann ich sie alle nicht, 
ich kann sie nur umsetzen.“ (Sophia 
#00:19:30-#00:19:45#) 
“Now it is macro again, it is also interest 
rates, also geopolitical issues, I am very 
much dependent on that. And I cannot 
influence any of them, I can just 
implement them.” 
 
„Also, wie gesagt, die 
makroökonomischen Themen, 
Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Inflation, 
Zinsentwicklung haben einen, einen 
direkten Einfluss auf unser Asset-
Management und Fonds-Management-
Performance-Themen, also definitiv: Ja.” 
(Harry #00:21:21#-#00:21:40#) 
“Well, as I said, the macroeconomic 
issues, population development, 
inflation, interest rate development have 
a, have a direct influence on our asset 
management and fund management 
performance, therefore definitively: yes.”  
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(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Schon stark. [...] Weil doch die 
einzelnen Faktoren, die dazu führen das 
Leute beispielsweise, ich habe ja nix 
anderes als Immobilien anzubieten, ist 
manchmal fast binär, also entweder 
wollen das ganz toll alle, oder gerade 
keiner, ist gerade nicht en Vogue und 
dass macht die Abhängigkeit so stark. 
[...] Auch hier ist es grotesker Weise, 
also hauptsächlich, das Zinsumfeld, weil 
viel dranhängt.” (James #00:19:39#-
#00:20:37#) 
“Certainly, strong. […] Because the 
individual factors, that make people to, 
for example, I have nothing more to offer 
then real estate, this is sometimes even 
binary, so either everybody wants it and 
likes it, or even no one, it is actually not 
en vogue and this is why the 
dependency is so strong. […] Here also, 
it is grotesque, I mean primarily, the 
interest rate environment, because a lot 
depends on it.”  
 
„Also, Ressourcen sind bei uns ja im 
Wesentlichen Mittelzuflüsse. Ich hatte es 
ja schon gesagt, unser Anleger ist ja 
eher 50 plus und von daher glaube ich, 
ist es schon sehr stark vom Wohlstand in 
Deutschland abhängig. [...] Im Bereich 
Individualkunden sind wir dann natürlich 
ein bisschen breiter aufgestellt, aber 
natürlich stark auf Deutschland 
fokussiert. Also letztlich sind wir stark 
vom deutschen, sozusagen, Kunden 
abhängig, das muss man schon so 
sehen.” (George #00:17:29#-#00:18:09#) 
“Well, resources are essentially the cash 
inflows. As I said before, our investor is 
more a 50+ and this is why I assume it is 
very strongly dependent on the 
prosperity in Germany. […] For individual 
customers we are obviously slightly 
broader positioned, but very much 
focussed on Germany. Finally, we are 
much dependent on the German 
customer, that`s clear.”  
„Risikobereitschaft des Geldes. Und 
Verfügbarkeit eines stabilen Finanz-
marktumfeldes, d.h. Gesetze, also diese 
Sachen. Nicht nur wie der Zinssatz ist, 
sondern auch wie das gesetzliche 
Parameter außen rum ist, wenn auf 
einmal Deutschland oder Europa 
anfängt, sehr schnell Gesetze wieder 
umzuwerfen, dann habe ich ein Problem, 
weil es keine Sicherheit gibt und dass 
würde mein, mein sehr langfristig 
ausgelegtes Modell gefährden.” (Sophia 
#00:18:46#-#00:19:17#) 
“The risk appetite of the money. And 
availability of a stable financial market 
environment, i.e. statutes, all these 
things. Not only how the interest rates 
look like, but also how the legal 
parameters are set, if at once Germany 
or Europe start to change their 
regulation, then I do have a problem, 
because there is no certainty and that 
would put my long-term business model 
at risk.” 
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(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Es könnte - wir sind momentan in einem 
Umfeld, wo Immobilien sehr gefragt ist, 
die Preise natürlich auch sehr hoch sind. 
Es kann aber eine Zeit kommen, wo sich 
plötzlich das Umfeld wesentlich ändert 
und wir dann nicht, nicht die Möglichkeit 
haben werden, mit dem teuer 
eingekauften gut später wegzukommen. 
Das ist, ich glaube, das ist das größte 
Risiko, was wir haben.” (Olivia 
#00:36:35#-#00:37:54#) 
“It could – we are currently in an 
environment, where real estate is much 
in demand, the prices are also very high. 
There may come a time, were the 
environment suddenly materially 
changes and we will not have any 
possibility to exit the dearly bought 
properties well. That is, I believe, that is 
the highest risk that we face.” 
„Also, das ist sicherlich das politische 
Umfeld, auf jeden Fall das politisch 
stabile Umfeld und das, die 
Bereitstellung eben halt von 
Finanzmitteln, Zinsent-wicklung. Das 
sind die zwei Haupteinflussfaktoren. Ich 
würde vielleicht sogar noch ein drittes 
nennen, dass ist das 
Regulierungsumfeld [...]” (Harry 
#00:28:11#-#00:29:04#) 
“Well, certainly that is the political 
environment, in any case the politically 
stable environment and the supply of 
financial resources, interest rate 
development. These are the two primary 
drivers. I would, may be, add a third one, 
that is the regulatory environment […]” 
„Wenn ich die letzten Jahre angesehen 
hätte, hätte ich gesagt, wir sind sehr 
stabil. Ich erwarte aber Turbulenzen, ich 
sehe es förmlich schon vor mir und 
deswegen erwarte ich Turbulenzen, die 
ich nicht, nicht unter Kontrolle habe, ich 
werde aber trotzdem auf die in 
gewohnter Weise reagieren. Mein 
Verhaltens-schema wird sich deswegen 
nicht massiv ändern.” (Sophia 
#00:07:24#-#00:07:51#) 
“If I had looked at the last years, I had 
said, we are very stable. But I expect 
turbulences, I could see it coming 
already, and that’s why I expect 
turbulences that I will not be able to 
control, but I will react in the usual 
manner. I would not materially change 
my behavioural attitude because of that.” 
„Man trifft Annahmen. Wir können zu 
einer Zinsentwicklung falsch liegen, aber 
sicherlich kann man im Rahmen eines 
Researchs und der makroökonomischen 
Betrachtungsweise eines 
Wirtschaftsraumes schon gewisse 
Vorhersagen treffen, wo die 
Zinsentwicklung denn hingehen könnte.” 
(Harry #00:12:56#-#00:13:19#) 
“People make assumptions. We can be 
wrong with the interest rate 
development, but for sure you can make 
certain predictions about the interest rate 
developments in the course of research 
and a macroeconomic consideration for 
a specific economic region.”  
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„[...] für kalkulierbar, weil wir Annahmen 
treffen die nicht ein “Worst-Case-
Szenario” abgreifen. Aber sicherlich 
immer ein “Base Case”, “Best case” und 
“Worst Case”. Und im Rahmen dieser 
Gesamtbetrachtungsweise bilden wir 
eben halt Risiken mit ab. Und insofern, 
wird auch nur dann ein Investment 
erfolgen von unserer Seite, wenn wir mit 
kalkulierbaren Risiken umgehen 
können.” (Harry #00:12:13#-#00:12:41#) 
“[…] calculable, because we are making 
assumptions that do not represent a 
“worst-case-scenario”. But certainly 
alsway a “bade case”, “best case” and 
“worst case”. And in the course of the 
overall view we do also illustrate the 
risks. And insofar, the investment will 
only be done when we can handle the 
calculable risks.” 
„[...] makroökonomisch teilweise kann 
man schon viele Dinge vorsehen, sich 
vorbereiten und man muss die Haus-
aufgaben auch machen, definitiv. Alles 
wird man natürlich nicht sehen, weil dass 
Verhalten der anderen ist abhängig 
wieder von anderen Faktoren. Aber, 
denke ich mir, dass ist die Verpflichtung 
jedes Mitglieds eines Management-
boards darüber nachzudenken, was 
beeinflusst mich, wie will ich darauf 
reagieren, wie bereite ich mich vor.” 
(Olivia #00:22:06#-#00:22:48#) 
“[…] on the macroeconomic level, to 
some extent, one can predict many 
things, prepare oneself and you have to 
do your homework, definitely. You can`t 
see everything, because the behaviour 
of the other is depending on other 
factors. But, I believe, that’s the 
responsibility of every member of the 
management board, to think about what 
influences myself, how do I want to react 
on it, how do I prepare.” 
 
„Einfach gesagt, die Assetklasse 
‚Alternatives‘ ist in den letzten Jahren 
eine echte Assetklasse geworden und 
ich gehe auch davon aus, dass sich das 
nachhaltig weiterentwickeln wird. […] 
Aber es ist einfach festzustellen, dass 
die Globalisierung der Welt dazu geführt 
hat, dass die Assetklasse Immobilie eine 
echte Assetklasse geworden 
ist.“ (Charlie #00:20:15#-#00:21:06#) 
“Simply put, the asset class 
‘alternatives‘ has advanced to a real 
asset class during the last year and I 
expect that this will develop further, 
sustainably. […] But it is easily 
recognisable that the globalization of the 
world has led real estate as an asset 
class to becoming a real asset class.”  
„[…] makroökonomische Situation einer 
Stadt [...]“ (Harry #00:09:35#-
#00:10:09#) 
“[…] macroeconomic situation of a city 
[…]“  
„[…] zunehmend kürzer […] “ (James 
#00:10:36#-#00:10:56#) 
“[…] becoming shorter and shorter […]“ 
„[…] Stabilitätsanker.“ (George 
#00:06:18#-#00:07:16#) 
“[…] anchor of stability.“  
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„[…] unruhig […] geostrategische Umfeld 
[…]“ (George #00:06:18#-#00:07:16#) 
“[…] turbulent geostrategic environment 
[…]“ 
„[…] demografischen Entwicklung 
[…]“ (James #00:11:04#-#00:11:14#) 
“[…] demographic development […]“  
„[…] Dinge zu tun, die sie normalerweise 
nicht getan hätten“ (James #00:11:11#-
#00:11:20#) 
“[…] doing things, they would not have 
done normally.“  
„[…] aus unterschiedlichen Gründen 
nicht mehr so beeinflussbar zu sein 
scheint.“ (Charlie #00:14:50#-
#00:15:30#) 
“[…] seems no longer as influenceable 
due to different reasons.“  
„[…] die Nummer 1 im Markt zu 
sein.“ (Scarlett #00:04:06#-#00:04:37#) 
“[…] being number 1 in the market.” 
„[…] besser zu sein, als die 
Wettbewerber.“ (Charlie #00:04:59#-
#00:05:20#) 
„[…] be better than the competition.“  
„[…] Kunden glücklich zu machen […] 
möglichst sicher und auch durch Krisen 
führen [...]“ (George #00:02:17#-
#00:02:46#) 
“[…] make clients happy […] as securely 
as possible and to lead through crises 
[…] “  
„[…] die Schaffung von 
Mehrwerten.“ (Jake #00:05:27#-
#00:06:20#) 
“[…] creation of added value.“  
„Der zweite Bereich der Risiken, die wir 
da führen, ist, oder die wir gegebenen-
falls haben, ist zuviel zu versprechen 
unseren Investoren, was 
Investitionsvolumina angeht.” (Olivia 
#00:09:01#-#00:10:45#) 
“A second field of risk, that we run is, or 
that we may carry, that we overpromise 
to our investors in terms of investment 
volumes.” 
„[…] viele Leute in diesen gemütlichen 
Core-Sektor jetzt einbrechen, die vorher 
eher Investment Banking oder 
opportunistische Anlage betrieben 
haben.“ (James #00:05:11#-#00:05:56#) 
“[…] many people enter the cosy core 
sector who previously were rather 
involved in investment banking or 
opportunistic asset classes.”  
„[...] Appetite der Investoren [...]“ (Olivia 
#00:27:08#-#00:27:19#) 
“[...] appetite of investors [...]“  
„[...] Verfügbarkeit von Kapital und 
Verfügbarkeit von Objekten.“ (James 
#00:27:27#-#00:27:34#) 
“[...] availability of capital and availability 
of assets.“  
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„[...] availability von Mitarbeitern 
[...]“ (Olivia #00:35:26#-#00:36:21) 
“[...] availability of staff [...]“  
„[...] Objekte anbieten zu können, die im 
Markt dann auch nachgefragt 
werden.“ (Harry #00:19:48#-#00:21:08#). 
“[...] offering assets that are yet also 
demanded in the market.“  
„[...] sicherlich stark abhängig 
[...]“ (Charlie #00:25:09#-#00:25:21#) 
“[...] certainly heavily dependent [...]“  
„[...] welches Produkt wird zu welchem 
Preis gekauft.“ (Sophia #00:21:24#-
#00:22:21#) 
“[...] which product is acquired at what 
price.“  
„[...] was macht mein direktes Umfeld, 
nicht nur mein direkter Mitbewerber 
[...]“ (Sophia #00:21:24#-#00:22:21#) 
“[...] how does my direct environment 
behave, not only my direct competitor 
[...]“  
„[...] nicht so ganz vom Himmel fallen 
[...]“ (George #00:08:00#-#00:08:25#) 
“[...] do not at all fall from the sky [...]”  
„[...] es nicht eine Ausbildung ist wie 
„Euro bricht auseinander“ [...]“ (James 
#00:18:17#-#00:18:25#) 
“[...] it is not an expression like ‘Euro 
bursts’ [...]“  
“Es war aber aus damaliger Sicht alles 
möglich und es war grundsätzlich alles 
okay, ja. Ich glaube was man extrem 
unterschätzt, das war, waren die neuen 
Produkte, die entstanden sind auf dem 
Markt, die man überblickt hat. Das war 
aber auch nicht unser Feld, das war nicht 
unser Bereich. Und die haben wir nur so 
seitlich wahrgenommen, keiner hat sich 
wirklich damit auseinandergesetzt. Ich 
glaube, wir hatten auch nur Fokus auf 
unsere Immobilien und auf die Gelder, 
die zur Verfügung stehen. Und 
wahrscheinlich haben wir zu wenig über 
den Tellerrand geschaut” (Olivia 
#00:43:38#-#00:44:47#) 
“At that time, everything was possible 
and everything was generally okay, you 
know. I believe, what has been 
extremely underestimated were the new 
products that emerged on the market, 
that one surveyed. But this was not our 
playing field, not our sector. And we 
have only recognised this to a limited 
extent, no one really has dealt with this 
that much, actually. I think, we also 
focussed on our real estates and the 
monies that were available. And 
probably, we were shy of looking beyond 
the end of our nose.”   
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“[...] ein voll regulierter und an der Börse 
gelisteter REIT war, der auf seinem 
Heimatmarkt extrem konservativ und mit 
allen Instrumentarien des 
Risikomanagements unterwegs war, sich 
aber dann eben halt auf Forderung der 
Analysten und aus den Banken eben halt 
[...] in einem Risikobereich bewegt hat, 
den man selber kaum überblickt hat 
beziehungsweise nicht überblicken 
konnte” (Harry #00:38:21#-#00:39:56#) 
“[…] a fully regulated and publicly listed 
REIT that was operating extremely 
conservative and with all approaches to 
risk management in its domestic market, 
but had to, by request of analysts and 
banks […], transfer to another risk area 
that one did not oversee moreover was 
not able to survey.” 
„[...] Investmentformen, die man damals 
betrieben hat, wie beispielsweise 
Mezzanine-Finanzierungen, [...] dazu 
braucht man eine Bankenausbildung um 
[...] aktiv an so einem Geschäft 
teilzunehmen. Diese Ausbildung muss 
man mitbringen [...] als dass man sich 
jetzt als reiner Immobilieninvestor in dem 
Bereich tummeln sollte.” (Harry 
#00:57:24#-#00:58:18#) 
“[…] the types of investments that were 
practiced in those days, for example 
mezzanine financing, […] for that you 
need to be trained as a banker […] to 
actively operate in that business. You 
need such an apprenticeship […] these 
days you should not operate like a pure 
real estate investor in that area.” 
„[...] eigentlich davor war es keine echte 
Situation, sondern erst danach war es 
eine richtige Situation, die die 
makroökonomische Situation richtig 
abbildet.” (William #00:43:03#-
#00:44:39#) 
“[…] actually, prior to this there was no 
real situation, it was only afterwards a 
real situation that properly shows the 
macroeconomic circumstances.” 
 
„Und als man dann sah, welche Objekte 
gekauft worden sind, in der Erkenntnis 
des europäischen Marktes, dann ist es 
einem dort schon sofort aufgefallen. [...] 
und dann mit dem Ergebnis einem Recht 
gegeben, weil eben der größte Teil des 
Portfolios komplett abgeschrieben 
werden musste.” (Harry #00:45:26#-
#00:46:15#) 
“And once you notice which properties 
were acquired, in recognition of the 
European market, then this immediately 
attracted your attention. […] with the 
result that this proves right because the 
major part of the portfolio had to be 
written off completely.” 
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„Es war, im Prinzip war ja innerhalb 
kürzester Zeit war ein Investitions-
verhalten, Kreditvergabeverhalten, 
Zustimmung zu Investitionen im 
Immobilienbereich, war ja komplett 
abgebrochen. Also es war ja wie so ein, 
wie so ein Tsunami, der, der irgendwann 
mal über einen hereingebrochen ist, wo 
man gesagt hat: Jetzt steht alles still. 
Keiner wusste wohin es geht, keiner, es 
war eine irre Unsicherheit am Markt – 
kann ich überhaupt noch finanzieren, 
kann ich überhaupt noch kaufen, kann 
ich zu dem Mietniveau kaufen, kann ich 
zu den Cap-Rates überhaupt noch 
kaufen.” (Jake #00:39:58-#00:41:55#) 
“In principle, it was during a very short 
time when investment behaviour, bank 
lending behaviour, consent to 
investments in real estate was 
completely interrupted. Let`s say, it grew 
like a tsunami that irrupted at some point 
and people said: now everything is 
standing still. Nobody knew where it will 
lead to, nobody, it was a crazy 
uncertainty in the market – am I able to 
finance at all, am I able to acquire at that 
rent levels, am I still able to acquire at 
these cap rates.” 
„[...] die Modelle funktionierten dann 
plötzlich nicht mehr als mit zurück-
gehendem Leverageumfang auch die 
Zinskosten stiegen, ja, und bei damit 
einhergehenden Preisrückgang und 
Wertrückgang der Assets, ja, also 
letztlich dann auch problematische 
Situationen in Bezug auf Kredit-
situationen ausgelöst wurden.”  
(Allen #00:06:34#-#00:07:08#) 
“[…] then, the models suddenly did not 
work any longer because decreased 
leverage incurred increasing interest 
rate, well, and at the same time price 
declines as well as the lower value of the 
assets, and, then finally also causing the 
problematic situation with regard to the 
loans.” 
„[...] erst die Publizität der - sozusagen - 
da ist ein System, das vorher leidlich 
funktioniert hat, das Bankensystem dann 
auf einmal doch relativ schnell ja in 
Mitleidenschaft gezogen worden ist, ich 
glaube das war in der Tat etwas, wo wir 
gesagt haben ‚Oh da passiert jetzt 
wirklich massiv eine Veränderung’.” 
(George #00:24:48#-#00:25:46#) 
“[…] first of all the publicity - so to say – 
with the existing system that goodish 
operates, the banking system was then 
however suddenly relatively quickly 
affected, I believe, this was definitely 
something where we thought, ‘well now, 
this will bring a massive change’.” 
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„Das hat sich geändert, als [...] 
Kapitalverfügbarkeiten eingeschränkt 
wurden, obwohl in der Bewertung und 
Beurteilung der Objekte, der Rentabilität, 
der Risikoprofile der Objekte, hierin keine 
Begründung zu finden war. Und das hat 
unser Geschäft in dem Aspekt 
eingeschränkt und hat einfach aufgrund 
mangelnder Kapitalverfügbarkeit zu 
einem gewissen Expansionstop geführt 
[...]” (Scarlett #00:20:01#-#00:21:33#)  
“This has changed when […] capital 
availability became limited, even though 
the valuation and evaluation of the 
properties, the profitability, the risk 
profiles of the assets did not provide for 
any reasons hereto. This has limited our 
business in this regard and it required us 
to stop further expansion due to limited 
capital availability […]” 
 
„[...] horrende Mehrwerte [...], die dann 
teilweise noch zusätzlich finanziert 
worden sind“ (Jake #00:27:45#-
#00:29:16#) 
“[...] horrendeous added values [...], that 
were yet also in part additionally 
financed“  
„[...] dass da auch viele dabei waren, die 
einfach die Situation genutzt haben, aus 
der Unerfahrenheit Dritter Geschäfte zu 
machen [...]“(Harry #00:42:37#-
#00:45:06#) 
“[...] there were also several actors who 
exploited the situation to profit from other 
third parties` inexperience [...]“  
„Ich weiß nicht, wie ich das geschafft 
habe, aber Gott sei Dank haben sie 
zugehört. Also, vielleicht hat sich der 
Eine oder Andere gedacht „Mein Gott, 
die übertreibt“. Aber mir gegenüber hat 
das niemand so wirklich geäußert. Oder, 
wenn geäußert, dann in einem - mit 
gutem Ton, das war nicht abweisend 
oder so irgendwie abwertend. Ich glaube, 
auch weil ich neu war, hat man zugehört. 
Ich hatte nicht das Gefühl, dass mich 
jemand auf die leichte Schulter nimmt, 
aber ich hatte generell das Gefühl 
gehabt, ich komme nicht durch“ (Olivia 
#01:11:45#-#01:19:08#) 
“Actually, I don`t know how I made it, but 
thanks to god they have listened. May be 
one or the other thought ‘goodness, she 
is exaggerating’. But no one really 
expressed that toward me. Or even if 
they said something like that then it was 
– with a nice manner, this was not 
dismissive or somehow pejorative. I 
think, also because I was new, they 
listened. I did not have the feeling, that 
they were casual about me, but I 
generally had the feeling that I cannot 
get away with this.”  
“Abwertend und negierend.“	(Sophia 
#00:44:34#-#00:44:36#) 
“Pejoratively and dismissive.“  
“Sofort vergessen.“ (Sophia #00:44:39#-
#00:44:41#) 
“Immediately forgotten.“  
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„Nein. Da muss man auch sagen, 
manche Leute wollen es gar nicht 
wissen. Das war so. Wenn ich nur schon 
in diese Richtung gesprochen habe, 
habe ich ja schon gemerkt, dass mein 
Gegenüber, sei es jetzt mein 
Gesellschafter oder Investor, die waren 
nicht interessiert an warnenden 
Hinweisen.“ (Sophia #00:38:38#-
#00:39:00#). 
“No. Yet, it must be said that, people 
actually don`t want to know it. That`s it. If 
I talked about things like that, I realised 
that my counterpart, being it shareholder 
or investor, they were not interested in 
warning statements.” 
„Woran ich das gemerkt habe waren die 
Grundlagen auf welchen die Entschei-
dungen getroffen worden sind. In vielen 
oder in manchen Fällen waren die Grund-
lagen einer ordentlichen Due Diligence 
nicht beachtet. Entscheidungen waren so 
getroffen. Sie müssen sich wirklich 
vorstellen, wenn Sie eine Immobilie kaufen 
wollen, dann müssen Sie sich genau 
anschauen, was Sie kaufen. Anschauen  
ist nicht nur die Tür öffnen und reingehen. 
Technisch - guck dir das Gebäude nach 
unterschiedlichen Sachen an. Und wenn 
Sie dann fest-stellen, dass es reicht, einen 
Helikopter zu bestellen, kauf ich, wissen 
Sie, etwas läuft schief.“ (Olivia #00:45:10#-
#00:45:55#) 
“What made me recognising this was the 
basis for the decisions. In many cases 
the commercial principles of a proper 
due diligence have been ignored. 
Decisions have been made like this. 
Imagine, if you acquire a real estate 
asset, you have to carefully look what 
you are buying. This is not only opening 
the door and walk in. Technically – look 
at the property for different things. And if 
you recognise, it`s sufficient to arrange 
for a helicopter, I buy, you now, there is 
something wrong.”  
“Früher hätte man Zins und Tilgung 
bedienen müssen, auf einmal musste 
man nur noch als Covenant IC, also 
Interest Cover Ratio, früher war es Debt 
Coverages, wo Zins und Tilgung dabei 
waren. D.h., die Banken waren sehr 
euphorisch und komisch kam es mir wie 
gesagt vor, wenn dann eine Bank sagt, 
ob ich nicht den Bewerter dazu 
bekommen kann, dass er einen höheren 
Wert macht.“ (Sophia #00:25:35#-
#00:27:57#) 
“In the past you would have had to 
service interest and repayment 
obligations, but suddenly you only had to 
use the covenant IC, i.e. interest cover 
ratio; in the past it was debt coverages, 
which included interest and repayment. 
I.e., the banks were very euphoric and it 
struck me as said, if then a bank says 
whether I can't get the evaluator to make 
it a higher value.” 
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„[…] man sich wenig Gedanken gemacht 
über die Konsequenzen. Und, weil man 
solche Investments zugelassen hat, die 
man zugelassen hat, waren die Entschei-
dungen wahrscheinlich am Ende aus, 
aus Druckgründen getroffen“ (Olivia 
#01:00:09#-#01:00:40#) 
“[…] little thought about the 
consequences. And, because such 
investments were authorised, the 
decisions were finally made by, under 
pressure.”  
„[...] wir hatten dann Sachen gekauft, die 
in der Qualität soviel schlechter waren, 
für einen Preis, der zwar noch sehr 
günstig ausschaut im Umfeld was sonst 
bezahlt worden ist, aber weil die Qualität 
so viel schlechter war, war es dann doch 
viel teurer, wie wenn ich für teureres 
Geld, Qualität gekauft hätte.“ (Sophia 
#00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
“[…] we have acquired assets, that were 
much worse in quality, at a price that 
could be considered favourable in 
comparison what has been paid 
elsewhere in the sector, but because the 
quality was much worse, it was yet much 
more expensive then acquiring quality at 
a higher price.”  
„[…] die unterschiedlichen Produkte 
zusammengebastelt und weiterverkauft, 
was machen die Hedgefonds, was sind 
die Alternativen. […] 
Immobilienwirtschaft einfach isoliert 
gesehen […] “ (Olivia #00:47:02#-
#00:50:39#) 
“[…] the different products were 
compiled and resold, what are the 
hedgefonds doing, what are alternatives. 
[…] real estate economy simply 
considered isolated […] ” 
„[...] in vielen Publikumsfonds viele 
Institutionen und Investoren drin waren  
[...] haben da einfach mal die Gelder 
geparkt. Und die damalige Regulierung 
erlaubte ihnen, dann das Geld jederzeit 
relativ kurzfristig wieder zurückzuziehen.“  
(Olivia #00:47:02#-#00:50:39#). 
“[…] a lot of institutions and investors in 
several retail funds […] just have parked 
their monies there. And the regulation at 
that point of time did permit that they 
could request their money back within 
relatively short notice.” 
„[…] losgeschickt worden, Investments 
weltweit, […] zu betreiben auf der Basis 
eines Spreads zwischen den 
Finanzierungskosten und den 
tatsächlichen Netto-Anfangsrenditen 
eines Objektes, ungeachtet dessen, wo 
es belegen ist, welche Qualität es hatte 
[…] sondern man war nur auf den 
Spread aus von rund 250 Basispunkten 
[…] und führte am Ende dazu, dass der 
Partner YY losgelassen alles kaufte, was 
eben halt 7% Rendite abwarf […]“ (Harry 
#00:42:37#-#00:45:06#) 
“[…] send off, to manager investment 
worldwide […] based on a spread of 
financing costs and the actual net initial 
yields of the property, regardless of 
where the property is located, of its 
quality […] but the target was just the 
spread of around 250 basis points […] 
which finally led the partner, when 
released, acquired everything with a 
yield of more than 7% […].” 
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„[…] jeden Monat ein Closing 
stattgefunden hat. Jeden Monat kam 
eine Immobilie dazu. [...] Und jeden 
Monat eine Immobilie, das ist extrem viel 
Arbeit und da bleibt extrem viel liegen 
und so war das.“ (Olivia #01:01:32#-
#01:05:14#) 
“[…] closing deals every month. Every 
month another property was added. […] 
And every month a further property, that 
means a lot of work and of stuff remains 
behind and that`s what happened.”   
„Governance war nicht vorhanden [...] 
Damals war alles so ein bisschen 
freier.“ (Olivia #01:05:41#-#01:06:55#) 
“Governance was non-existent […] At 
the time, everything was a bit more 
loosely.”  
„[…] operativ vorbereitend, Prozesse und 
Maßnahmen eingeleitet, um für 
möglichst jeden Risikofall schnell agieren 
zu können“ (Charlie #00:55:26#-
#00:56:18#) 
“[…] operationally preparatory, imposing 
processes and measures, in order to 
being able to every possible risk event”  
„[…] reduziert - allein auf ordentliche 
Dokumentation des Prozesses. […] 
absolut zu wenig. Aber das war aus 
damaliger Sicht war es das 
Richtige.“ (Olivia #00:58:25#-#00:59:55#) 
“[…] reduced – to a proper 
documentation of the process […] 
absolutely not sufficient. But at that point 
in time it was the right thing.”  
„[…] man sich Produkten zuwendet, die 
besser kalkulierbar sind [...]“ (James 
#00:47:33#-#00:48:09#) 
“[…] to turn to products that are much 
more predictable [...]”  
„[...] es war ein großer Optimismus 
überall und ich glaube das hat uns blind 
gemacht“ (Olivia #00:42:53#-#00:43:30#) 
“[…] there was great optimism 
everywhere and I believe this made us 
blind.“  
„[...] auch ein Portfolio total überteuert 
gekauft“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
“[...] also acquired a portfolio at an 
exorbitant price.“  
„[...] hohen Preise für 
Immobilien“ (James #00:56:39#-
#00:59:14#) 
“[...] high prices for real estate.“  
„[…] damals nicht die Einzigen waren, 
die so euphorisch, so [...] ungezügelt in 
den Markt gestartet sind“ (Harry 
#00:42:37#-#00:45:06#) 
“[…] not the only ones who were very 
euphoric, at that time, so […] unbridled in 
the market.”  
„[...] selbst überschätzend und nur auf 
Expansion ausgelegt“ (Harry #00:40:06#-
#00:40:26) 
“[…] overestimating oneself and only 
seeking for expansion.” 
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„Übertreibung, Augen schließen, 
Vergessen von Erfahrungen aus der 
Vergangenheit, Nichtbeachtung von 
Zyklen.“ (Charlie #00:40:14#-#00:40:43#) 
“Exaggeration, closing the eyes, 
forgetting past experiences, non-
observance of cycles.”  
„[...] es war ein großer Optimismus 
überall und ich glaube das hat uns blind 
gemacht“ (Olivia #00:42:53#-#00:43:30#) 
“[…] there was great optimism 
everywhere and I believe this made us 
blind.“  
„[...] ein Portfolio total überteuert 
gekauft“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
“[...] acquire a portfolio at an exorbitant 
price.“  
„[…] damals nicht die Einzigen waren, 
die so euphorisch, so [...] ungezügelt in 
den Markt gestartet sind.“ (Harry 
#00:42:37#-#00:45:06#) 
“[…] not the only ones who were very 
euphoric, at that time, so […] unbridled in 
the market.”  
„[...] selbst überschätzend und nur auf 
Expansion ausgelegt“ (Harry #00:40:06#-
#00:40:26#) 
“[…] overestimating oneself and only 
seeking for expansion” 
„[…] Übertreibung, Augen schließen, 
Vergessen von Erfahrungen aus der 
Vergangenheit, Nichtbeachtung von 
Zyklen […]“ (Charlie #00:40:14#-
#00:40:43#) 
“[…] exaggeration, closing the eyes, 
forgetting past experiences, non-
observance of cycles […]”  
„[…] die Entscheidungen waren nicht 
rational - basierten nicht auf einer 
rationalen Analyse, sondern waren aus 
einem Druck getroffen. Investieren, 
schnell machen, schnell Geld platzieren 
ohne nachzudenken.“ (Olivia 
#01:00:50#-#01:01:25#) 
“[...] no rational decisions – not based on 
a rational analysis, but made under 
pressure. Investing, being fast, placing 
money quickly without thinking.”  
„[…] mit dieser doch naiven 
Herangehensweise gescheitert, weil sie 
sich dem ausländischen Markt nicht 
richtig angepasst haben, oder eben halt 
ihre internen Erfahrungen [...] den 
ausländischen Märkten übergestülpt 
haben. Und daran sind eben halt viele 
gescheitert.“ (Harry #00:38:21#-
#00:39:56#) 
“[…] failed with such a naive approach, 
because they did not adjust to the 
foreign market, or placed their internal 
experiences […] onto the foreign market. 
And this is why many failed.”  
„[…] habe ich alles getan, habe ich alles 
gesehen, habe ich die Risiken alle 
entdeckt.“ (Olivia #01:00:50#-
#01:01:25#) 
“[…] did I do everything, did I see 
everything, did I uncover all risks.“  
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„[…] alles nicht mehr gesund […] gehofft, 
dass es den nächsten trifft, dass es ein 
Jahr später ist“ (Sophia #00:34:01#-
#00:35:18#) 
“[…] no longer healthy […] hoping that it 
hits the others, that it comes a year later”  
„[…] dass es zu einem totalen Crash 
kommt.“ (Charlie #00:47:05#-
#00:48:53#) 
“[…] that it comes to a total crash.“  
„[…] Gefühl, ich würde eigentlich mehr 
verkaufen wollen [...], den Kunden das 
Geld zurückgeben, warten bis der Markt 
unten [...] und dann können wir wieder 
neu kaufen.“ (James #00:37:22#-
#00:39:17#) 
“[…] feeling, I would like to sell more […], 
to reward the money back to the clients, 
waiting until the market is down […] and 
then we can start to acquire again.”  
„[...] sie spüren die Entscheidung ist nicht 
richtig. Oder vielleicht ist die 
Entscheidung auch richtig, aber wie ich 
zu der Entscheidung komme, ist nicht 
richtig. Und wenn ihnen dann dieser 
Prozess fehlt, die Schritte fehlen, dann 
ist ganz klar, da läuft was schief.“ (Olivia 
#00:46:11#-#00:46:43#) 
“[…] you feel the decision is not right. Or, 
may be the decision is right, but how I 
derived there is not correct. And then, if 
you don`t know the process, the steps, it 
becomes clear, there is something 
wrong.”  
„[...] dass irgendwann mal keine Musik 
mehr in dem Markt gewesen ist, also 
keine Ideen mehr für Wertsteigerung und 
damit ist irgendwann die Blase 
geplatzt.“ (Jake #00:35:30#-#00:37:23#) 
“[…] at a time where there was no more 
leeway in the market, say, no more ideas 
to add value and this is why the bubble 
burst some day.”  
“[…] einer gewissen Unangreifbarkeits-
illusion […] (James #00:37:22#-
#00:39:17#) 
“[…] a certain illusion of unassailability 
[…]“ 
„[…] alles ist relativ im grünen 
Bereich.“ (Olivia #00:42:53#-#00:43:30#) 
“[…] everything is more or less in the 
green area.“  
„[…] riesige Portfolien im […] 
Immobilienmarkt zu sehen […] und […] 
dass die Größenordnung wichtiger war, 
als die Immobilie.“ (Charlie #00:41:10#-
#00:41:39#) 
“[…] huge portfolios could be seen in […] 
the real estate market […] and […] the 
size was much more important than the 
asset.”  
„[...] eine gute analytische Grundlage 
liefern konnten, für das, was da passiert 
und was da passieren kann.“ (George 
#00:29:08#-#00:29:51#) 
“[…] delivering an appropriate analytical 
basis, for what happens or may happen.” 
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„[…] ein größeres Bild auch gewinnen zu 
können.“ (Jake #01:00:32#-#01:01:06#) 
“[…] to also get a better picture.“ 
„[…] mit den Konsequenzen 
auseinandergesetzt [...]“ (Jake 
#01:03:43#-#01:04:14#) 
“[...] consider the consequences […]“ 
„[…] Zusammenrücken innerhalb des 
Geschäftsführungsbereiches […] 
Muttergesellschaft natürlich an einem 
Strang gezogen.“ (Charlie #01:03:32#-
#01:04:14#) 
“[…] moving closer within the 
management division […] parent 
company has actually pulled in the same 
direction.” 
„[…] Vertrauen zu schaffen […]“ (Charlie 
#00:59:36#-#01:00:54#) 
“[…] creating trust […]“ 
„[…] die Strategie operativ und langfristig 
nachhaltig entsprechend 
umzusetzen.“ (Charlie #00:59:00#-
#00:59:28#), 
“[…] to implementing the strategy over 
the long-term and sustainably.”  
“[…] die Sensibilität für die 
Risikomanagementparameter, die zu 
Grunde gelegt wurden, dass die noch 
mal verschärft, beziehungsweise 
gesteigert werden konnten.“ (Jake 
#01:01:18#-#01:01:28#) 
“[…] the sensitivity for the underlying risk 
management parameters which could be 
further strengthened or enhanced.”  
„[...] Restrukturierungen von Darlehen bei 
Entwicklungen von Exit-
Strategien.“ (Allen #00:07:26#-
#00:07:54#) 
“[…] restructuring of debt financing when 
developing of exit strategies.“ 
„[…] eine oder andere Richtung 
geschärft worden.“ (Allen #00:11:29#-
#00:11:42#) 
“[…] sharpened in one direction or the 
other.“ 
„[…] kompletten Investitionsstopp, also 
Stillstand.“ (Olivia #01:01:32#-
#01:05:14#) 
“[…] full stop of investments, i.e. 
standstill.“ 
„Es war auf der Käufer- wie [...] auf der 
Verkäuferseite, es war Stillstand.“ (Jake 
#00:42:16#-#00:43:15#) 
“On the acquirer – as well as […] on the 
sell side, it was a standstill.”  
„[...] innerhalb kurzer Zeit einen Kapital-
abfluss in den offenen Immobilien-
publikumsfonds von 1,3 Mrd. verkraften 
[...]“ (Charlie, #00:47:05#-#00:48:53#) 
“[…] within short-term suffered a cash 
outflow of 1.3 bn in the open-ended real 
estate retail funds […]” 
	 	
 APPENDIX 4 		
	 438 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„[…] indem einfach auf Bankenseite […] 
keine Investitionsbereitschaft mehr 
bestanden hat, indem Eigenkapital-
verfügbarkeiten eingeschränkt waren 
und einfach keine Investitionsbereitschaft 
mehr bestand.“ (Scarlett #00:21:47#-
#00:22:13#) 
“[…] so that there was no more 
willingness to invest […] on the bank 
side, while limiting availability of equity 
and actually there was simply no more 
propensity to invest.”  
„[…] ein sehr rabiates Vorgehen 
[...]“ (Harry #00:48:38#-#00:49:21#) 
“[…] a very rough behaviour […]”  
„[…] diese Panikmache [...] dazu geführt, 
dass Leute zum Teil entweder gar keine 
Entscheidungen mehr getroffen haben, 
oder irrational aus bestimmten Sicht-
weisen irrationale Entscheidungen 
getroffen haben. Vielleicht sogar die 
irrationale Entscheidung, ich investiere 
gar nicht mehr in Immobilien. […] es jetzt 
gerade mal 10 Jahre her, dass sich der 
Markt eigentlich wieder komplett erholt 
hat.“  (Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#) 
“[…] such scaremongering […] led 
people to either not make any decision 
any longer or irrationally from specific 
perspectives made irrational decisions. 
Potentially also the irrational decision, I 
do not invest in real estate any more. […] 
it is only 10 years ago, that the market 
has more or less recovered completely.“ 
„[…] kompletten Zusammenbruch des 
Neugeschäfts für 2 Jahre erlebt.“ (Sophia 
#00:32:46#-#00:33:48#) 
“[…] experienced a complete breakdown 
of the new business for 2 years.” 
„[…] was das überhaupt für uns 
bedeutet“ (George #00:28:16#-
#00:29:05#) 
“[…] what this actually means for us.“ 
„[…] gewisse Routine […] in der 
Mannschaft […] mit einer gewissen 
Konstanz […] positioniert ist und nicht 
sofort auf jede […] Thematik panisch 
reagiert, sondern erst mal guckt, was 
passiert“ (George #00:35:00#-
#00:35:45#) 
“[…] kind of routine […] in the team […] 
with a certain consistency […] positioned 
and not immediately […] reacting in 
panic to any topic, but first observes 
what happens.” 
„[…] natürlich immer ein bisschen anders 
bewegt und natürlich auch viel 
träger.“ (George #00:29:08#-#00:29:51#) 
“[…] actually moved always a bit different 
and also more sluggish.” 
„[…] in solchen Krisensituationen nur als 
Mannschaft es schafft, da 
durchzukommen […] das 
Zusammenrücken der Mitarbeiter des 
gesamten Unternehmens in der 
Phase.“ (Charlie #01:05:35#-#01:06:29#)  
“[…] can only make it through as a team, 
during such crisis situation […] moving 
together of all employees of the 
company during this phase.” 
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„[…] relativ gut aufgestellt […] bei den 
bestehenden Personen mehr 
Potenzial.“ (Jake #00:56:42#-
#00:57:02#) 
“[…] relatively good positioned  […] 
potential of the existing employees.” 
„[…] veränderte Erfordernisse 
anzupassen.“ (Scarlett #00:39:04#-
#00:39:23#) 
“[…] adjust to changed requirements.” 
„[…] wo sich die Kollegen eben 
Gedanken machen, in welche Richtung 
kann man investieren und wie werden 
Märkte halbjährlich eingeschätzt.“ 
(George #00:33:36#-#00:34:47#) 
“[…] while colleagues well thought about, 
in which direction investments can be 
made and how markets can be 
evaluated on a half-yearly basis.“ 
„[...] so viele Immobilien schon habe, 
also eine kritische Größe erreicht habe, 
und das keine Bank den Stecker zieht 
[...]“ (Sophia #00:36:42#-#00:37:12#) 
“[…] already hold so many assets, say a 
critical volume is reached, and no bank 
would ever pull the plug […]” 
„[…] die entsprechenden 
Risikomanagement-Tools noch nicht in 
der Form vorhanden waren.“ (Harry 
#00:49:21#-#00:50:10#) 
“[…] the respective risk management 
tools were not yet available in that 
configuration.” 
“[…] Handlungsalternativen aufgrund des 
strategischen, des gesamtstrategischen 
Ansatzes gab es da nicht mehr.“ (Harry 
#00:55:26#-#00:56:20#) 
„[…] there were no more action 
alternatives due to the strategic, overall 
strategic approach.” 
„[…] sehr tiefgreifende Anpassungen 
[…]“ (William #00:45:29#-#00:45:47#) 
“[…] very profound adjustments […]” 
„[…] ein bisschen vielschichtiger 
aufzustellen […]“ (George #00:33:36#-
#00:34:47#) 
“[…] a bit more multi-layered positioning 
[…]“ 
„[...] eine Indikation dafür geben zu 
können, ob eine mögliche Krise 
bevorstehen könnte, oder nicht“. (Jake 
#00:45:58#-#00:47:35#). 
“[…] providing an indication if a potential 
crisis is coming up or not.“ 
„[…] aus Panik ihr Geld zu verlieren 
[...]“ (Jake #00:43:28#-#00:45:44#) 
“[…] in panic about loosing their money 
[…]“  	 	
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“[…] keine einzige Immobilie, die wegen 
der Sub-Prime Krise [...] auf einmal 
verschwunden wäre. [...] dieses 
irrationale Verhalten [...] Das hat im 
Endeffekt dazu geführt, dass diese diese 
Krise noch viel verstärkter 
wahrgenommen wurde. Weil dann gab 
es tatsächlich Notverkäufe. Notverkäufe 
hätte es eigentlich nicht geben müssen. 
Aber dadurch, dass jeder sein Geld 
wiederhaben wollte, gab es eben 
Notverkäufe, die das Ganze noch 
verstärkt haben.“ (Jake #00:43:18#-
#00:45:44#) 
“[…] no single asset that […] 
disappeared in due to the subprime crisis 
[…] such irrational behaviour […] This 
finally led to […] perceiving the crisis 
even stronger. […] Because then there 
actually were distressed sales. 
Distressed sales would not have been 
necessary. But because everybody 
wanted to get his money back, this 
resulted in distressed sales that 
strengthened the whole thing even 
more.” 
„[…] aus einem Mix von Bauchgefühl und 
Erfahrung [...]“ (Jake #00:58:00#-
#00:58:46#) 
“[…] out of a mixture of gut feelings and 
experience […]” 
„[…] sehr ungutes Gefühl, wenn Ihr 
Geschäftsmodell in sich zusammenfällt, 
und es fiel zusammen.“ (Sophia 
#00:32:46#-#00:33:48#) 
“[…] a very bad feeling, if your business 
model coincides, and it did.” 
“Keiner wusste wohin es geht, keiner, es 
war eine irre Unsicherheit am Markt 
[...]“ (Jake #00:39:58#-#00:41:55#) 
“Nobody knew what is going to happen, 
nobody, there was a crazy uncertainty in 
the market […]” 
„[…] mit Unsicherheit verbunden, weil 
man ja nicht weiß, ob das ein 
permanentes oder ein vorrübergehendes 
Thema ist. […] eher ein tiefergreifender 
Trend ist und nicht nur ein 
vorrübergehendes Problem ist, weil es 
dann am Ende eine makroökonomische 
Anpassung ist, das realisiert man hier 
natürlich nicht sofort […] Das ist hier 
ganz schwer, weil es ja auch eine Art 
Paradigmenwechsel ist“ (William 
#00:43:03#-#00:44:39#) 
“[…] associated with uncertainty, 
because you don´t know, if this is a 
permanent or temporary issue. […] more 
a profound trend and not a temporary 
problem, because at the end it is a 
macroeconomic adjustment, which you 
actually do not recognise immediately 
[…] This is a bit difficult here because it 
is also a kind of paradigm shift.” 
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„[…] es ist ja am Ende alles eine, eine, 
eine Bewertung, eine Einschätzung der 
Entwicklung der Zukunft. Man kann nie 
mit absoluter Sicherheit sagen, ob man 
damit richtigliegt. Gerade wenn es 
makroökonomisch beeinflusste 
Veränderungen sind, aber letztendlich 
muss man ja in irgendeiner Art und 
Weise handeln.“ (Scarlett #00:34:47#-
#00:35:19#) 
“[…] at the end it is a, a, an assessment, 
an evaluation of the future 
developments. You can never say with 
absolute certainty if you are right here. 
Especially if it relates to 
macroeconomically influenced changes, 
but finally you have to act in any 
manner.” 
„[…] wenn es heißt, irgendetwas ist 
geplatzt“. (Jake #00:43:18#-#00:45:44#) 
“[…] when it is said, something burst.“ 
„[…] vieles aus der damaligen Situation 
heraus [...] entstanden, weil Panik mit 
eine Rolle gespielt hat.“ (Jake 
#00:48:59#-#00:50:03#) 
“[…] a lot emerged out of the situation, 
because panic also played a role.” 
„[…] überrascht, angespannt und 
motiviert.“ (Jake #00:50:17#-#00:50:24#) 
“[…] surprised, tense, motivated […]“ 
„[…] sehr beansprucht, schlecht 
schlafend und gereizt.“ (Allen 
#00:08:00#-#00:08:09#) 
“[…] stressed, bad night sleep and testy.” 
„[…] misslichen Lage […] das Beste 
noch heraus zu holen […] nach vorne zu 
schauen.“ (Jake #00:50:24#-#00:51:15#) 
“[…] make the best out of the unfortunate 
situation […] move forward.” 
“[...] eine der beunruhigendsten Sachen 
war, dass die Verzweiflung, gute Objekte 
in Bestlagen zu finden, so groß war, 
dass man für periphere Objekte, wo 
überhaupt was zu bekommen, fast das 
selbe gezahlt hat. Also die, das, der 
Prime Faktor gegenüber Peripheren, 
sank immer mehr zusammen.“ (James 
#00:40:44#-#00:41:13#) 
“[…] one of the most alarming things was 
that the desperation about finding good 
assets in prime locations was that big, 
that you had to pay more or less the 
same for peripheral properties, if you got 
them. Meaning, the, the prime factor 
versus periphery collapsed more and 
more.” 
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“[...] Und als man dann sah, welche 
Objekte gekauft worden sind, in der 
Erkenntnis des europäischen Marktes, 
dann ist es einem dort schon sofort 
aufgefallen. Und ich habe damals eben 
halt schon mitbegleitet, da die, die 
Stellschrauben deutlich anzuziehen. Ja 
und dann mit dem Ergebnis einem Recht 
gegeben, weil eben der größte Teil des 
Portfolios komplett abgeschrieben 
werden musste [...] (Harry #00:45:26#-
#00:46:15#) 
“[…] and once it was recognised which 
assets were acquired, aware of the 
European market, then it becomes 
immediately apparent. And, at that time, I 
was already involved, to, to tighten the 
set screws significantly. Well, with the 
result to agree with this, because the 
major part of the portfolio had to be 
written off.”  
“[...] das ist pur die Zahlen, die wir, die 
wir dann eben dort gesehen haben im 
Immobilienbereich. Also 
Größenordnungen, Voluminas und, und 
Rendite, Renditeentwicklung in 
Verbindung mit schwächer werdenden 
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen 
[...]“ (Charlie #00:42:07#-#00:42:27#) 
“[…] that`s purely figures, which we that 
we then saw in the real estate sector. 
Meaning,  sizes, volumes and, and 
yields, return developments in 
connection with weakened economic 
developments […]” 
„Das hat man im direkten Kontakt mit 
den entsprechenden Playern am Markt 
wahrgenommen, indem einfach auf 
Bankenseite bestimmte, in bestimmten 
Ländern keine Investitionsbereitschaft 
mehr bestanden hat, indem Eigenkapital-
verfügbarkeiten eingeschränkt waren 
und einfach keine Investitionsbereitschaft 
mehr bestand.“ (Scarlett #00:21:47#-
#00:22:13#) 
“This has been perceived in direct 
contact with the respective market 
players, because on the bank side there 
were specific, specific countries did not 
want to invest any more, while equity 
availability was limited and generally the 
willingness to invest no longer existed.”  
 
“Aber, ich glaube nicht, dass wir uns im 
Vorfeld darüber Gedanken gemacht, 
gemacht haben, dass es zu einem 
totalen Crash kommt. Dass die 
Kreditvergabe komplett eingestellt wird 
beispielsweise. Oder dass es keine 
Marktteilnehmer gab, die überhaupt 
Immobilien nachgefragt haben und 
gleichzeitig, und gleichzeitig eben das 
Kapital dann auch entsprechend 
abgezogen wurde, in dem, in dem 
großen Ausmaß.” (Charlie #00:47:05#-
#00:48:53#) 
“But, I do not believe, that we have 
placed any thoughts in the run-up that it 
comes to a total crash. That the lending 
was fully abandoned for example. Or that 
there were not any market participants 
asking for real estate any more while at 
the same time, at the same time actually 
withdrew the money, in, in that great 
extent.” 
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„Es wurde auf einmal, nun gut, jetzt 
komme ich natürlich aus dem 
Immobilienbereich heraus, es wurde auf 
einmal die Immobilie ignoriert. Keiner 
wollte mehr die Immobilie. Jeder hat 
gedacht, „Oh je, da kaufe ich mir ja 
Risiken ein“ (Jake #00:37:43#-
#00:39:41#) 
“Suddenly, well, I am coming from the 
real estate sector, but suddenly real 
estate was ignored. Nobody was 
interested in real estate any more. 
Everybody thought ‘Goodness, here I do 
acquire risks’.” 
“[...] das waren diese 
Refinanzierungsbemühungen. Es war 
damals üblich, dass man ein 
bestehendes Portfolio refinanziert, 
Eigenkapital rauszieht, quasi die 
Risikoposition der Bank erhöht und die 
eigene reduziert. Immer vor dem 
Hintergrund, dass wenn was passiert, 
der Banker in gewisser Weise abhängig 
ist von seinem Kunden und sagt ‚Was 
machen wir denn jetzt?‘. Und da haben 
auch viele Kunden lernen müssen, weil 
die Bank nämlich dann Pleite gegangen 
ist. Wir hatten die ABN Amro, die Royal 
Bank of Scottland, die Euro Hypo und die 
Hypo Real Estate. Alle weg. Weil die 
Bank Pleite gegangen ist.” (Sophia 
#00:29:43#-#00:31:16#) 
“[…] there were these refinancing efforts. 
At that time, it was customary to 
refinancing existing portfolios, 
withdrawing equity, let´s say, increasing 
the risk position of the bank while 
lowering the own one. Always against 
the background, if something happen, 
the bank is then to some extent 
dependent on the client and says ‘what 
shall we do now?’ At this, many 
customers had to learn, because the 
bank had to file bankruptcy. We had 
ABN Amro, Royal Bank of Scotland, 
Euro Hypo and Hypo Real Estate. All 
gone. Because the bank went bankrupt.” 
„[…] Güte und Qualität der 
Immobilienprodukte.“ (James 
#00:36:22#-#00:36:37#) 
“[…] quality of the real estate products.“ 
„[…] exorbitant zu hoch waren in einer 
Relation zum Kaufpreis.“ (Jake, 
#00:35:30#-#00:37:23#) 
“[…] exorbitantly high in relation to the 
purchase price.“ 
„[…] euphorische Umgebung […] mit 
dem Gefühl: Alles ist möglich […] 
diffuses Gefühl. [...]“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-
#00:25:27#) 
“[…] euphoric environment […] with the 
feeling: everything is possible […] diffuse 
feeling […]“ 
„[..] aktiv von Banken angesprochen 
worden ist [...] ob man was refinanzieren 
kann. […] das passt nicht mehr“ (Sophia 
#00:31:33#-#00:31:55#) 
“[…] actively contacted by the banks […] 
to refinance […] that does not fit any 
more.” 
„[…] aktives Ausgliedern von Risiken 
vom Kunden zur Bank“ (Sophia 
#00:28:08#-#00:28:48#) 
“[…] actively pushing risks from the client 
to the banks.” 
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„[…] dass die Banken […] viel (Liquidität) 
[...] auch leicht zur Verfügung stellen.” 
(Sophia #00:25:35#-#00:27:57#) 
“[…] that the banks provide […] a lot of, 
and also do so easily.” 
„[…] alles gekauft, was eben halt 7% 
Rendite abwarf, weil es eben halt im 
Unterschied zu den damals vorhandenen 
Finanzierungszinsen eben den, den 
besagten Spread abwarf.“ (Harry 
#00:42:37#-#00:45:06#) 
“[…] just acquired everything that 
brought a return of 7%, because 
compared to the debt interest rate at that 
point of time, you could get the so-called 
spread.” 
„[…] ad hoc-Reaktion wichtiger war als 
ordentliche prozessbezogene 
Arbeit.“ (Olivia #01:00:50#-#01:01:25#) 
“[…] ad-hoc reactions were much more 
important than diligent process-oriented 
work.“ 
„[…] kritischer bei Ankäufen zu 
sein.“ (Sophia #00:39:23#-#00:39:30#) 
“[…] being more critical in acquisitions.“ 
„Diskussion innerhalb der 
Geschäftsführung […] im Vorfeld darüber 
schon Gedanken zu machen, wie wir 
darauf reagieren, wenn der Zyklus eben 
nach unten geht“ (Charlie #00:47:05#-
#00:48:53#) 
“Discussions with the management 
board […] considering in the run-up what 
to do if the cycle goes down.” 
„[…] ganz normale Zeitungen 
[…]“ (Sophia #00:37:52#-#00:38:01#) 
“[…] usual newspapers […]” 
„Eigentlich war für uns dieses Thema 
vorher, muss man ehrlich sagen, kaum 
spürbar. Also ich wüsste nicht das 
irgendjemand hier im Hause der 
Meinung war, dass da eine handfeste 
Krise aufzieht, also das glaube ich nicht, 
daran erinnere ich mich zumindest nicht 
mehr.“ (George #00:24:11#-#00:24:42#) 
“Honestly, the topic was not perceptible 
in the run-up. Well, I don´t know anybody 
here who was of the opinion, that a 
substantial crisis is emerging, I don´t 
believe that, I even don´t remember 
that.” 
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“[…] natürlich auch in gewisser Hinsicht 
beunruhigt. […] sehr sicher und auch zu 
sicher gefühlt, dadurch, dass die 
Immobilie ein Spätzykliker ist. […] Also, 
richtig wäre natürlich im Nachhinein 
gewesen ich wollte zu dem Zeitpunkt 
vielmehr Immobilien verkaufen, als das 
Management, das höher Management 
und die Kunden wollten. [...] Mit 
Gewinnmitnahme ist noch keiner arm 
geworden, alte Bauernregel.“ (James 
#00:37:22#-#00:39:17#) 
“[…] also worried to some extent. […] felt 
very secure and also too certain, 
because, the real estate is a late 
bloomer. […] So, in retrospect, it would 
have been right, I wanted to sell more 
assets during that time than the 
management, the higher management 
and the clients. [...] Through profit taking 
no one ever became poor, old folk 
saying.” 
„[...] die richtige Strategie gewesen, 
entweder gar nichts zu kaufen und 
auszuharren, oder richtig teuer, also aber 
die Qualität nicht weg zu tun, sondern 
weiter die teuren Immobilien zu 
kaufen.“ (Sophia #00:24:00#-#00:25:27#) 
“[...] the right strategy to either not 
acquire anything, and hold out, or very 
expensive, but not to fade away the 
quality, rather than further acquire the 
expensive assets.“ 
„Ich glaube, dass wir sehr viel falsch 
gemacht haben über Ratings. Und 
dieses Zusammenwürfeln von Risiken 
und dann “raten” lassen, von jemandem 
der keine Ahnung von Immobilien hat, 
manche Sachen kann man nicht “raten”, 
war ein ganz großer Fehler.“ (Sophia 
#00:44:56#-#00:46:44#) 
“I think, we have done a lot of things 
wrong due to ratings. And such throwing 
together of risks and then let 
someone ’guess’ who did not have any 
knowledge about real estate, some 
things one cannot guess, this was a big 
mistake.“  
„[...] man nicht kaufen darf, was man 
nicht kennt. [...] Man sollte sich wirklich 
dann analysieren, was ist das eigentlich, 
was man da kauft und versuchen über 
die Schwächen eines Produktes, das 
man einnimmt für bestimmte Zwecke 
auch klar zu sein. Und, ich glaube, das 
war eine der Schwachstellen, gerade 
dort, dass man Produkte gewählt hat, bei 
denen man nicht ganz alle Facetten 
verstanden hat.“ (William #00:41:00#-
#00:41:48#) 
“[...] you should not acquire what you 
don`t know. [...] One should really 
analyse, what is it what you want to 
acquire and trying to be clear about the 
weaknesses of the asset that one 
accepts. And I believe that was one of 
the weak points, especially when 
products were chosen where you did not 
understand all facets.“ 
„[...] die Gier der Banken, nach 
zusätzlichen Einnahmequellen komplett 
unterschätzt.“ (Jake #00:29:17#-
#00:31:12#) 
“[...] totally underestimated the greed of 
the banks for additional sources of 
income.“ 
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“Man sendet Signale [...] aber man ist 
nicht penetrant, man ist nicht so klar. 
Und man wird auch dann als wackelig 
wahrgenommen“ (Olivia #00:51:30#-
#00:53:03#) 
“You send signals [...] but you are not 
obtrusive, you are not so clear. And then 
you are perceived as unstable.“ 
„Und daran haben wir das im Endeffekt 
gemerkt, dass eigentlich [...] eine 
durchweg laufende Maschinerie, im 
Prinzip abrupt gestoppt wurde.“ (Jake 
#00:42:16#-#00:43:15#) 
“And this was where we finally 
recognised it, that actually [...] an 
ongoing machinery, was principally 
abruptly stopped.” 
„[...] Preisrückgang und Wertrückgang 
der Assets.“(Allen #00:06:34#- 
#00:07:08#) 
“[...] price decline and depreciation of the 
assets.“ 
„Naja, also das war das Gegenteil von 
„Ich kann das wahrnehmen und 
beherrschen“, sondern es war ja dann 
eigentlich ein, ein Gefühl von etwas 
unerwartet von Links getroffen zu 
werden, etwas womit man nicht 
gerechnet hat das ein Modell nicht 
vorhergesehen hatte.“ (William 
#00:38:10#-#00:38:26#) 
“Well, it was the opposite of ‘I can 
perceive it and control it’, it was more 
actually a, a feeling of being hit by 
something surprisingly, from the left 
hand side, something that you did not 
expect, that a model did not foresee.” 
„[...] einfach Kapitalverfügbarkeiten 
eingeschränkt wurden, obwohl in der 
Bewertung und Beurteilung der Objekte, 
der Rentabilität, der Risikoprofile der 
Objekte, keine Begründung zu finden 
war. Und, das hat unser Geschäft in dem 
Aspekt eingeschränkt und hat aufgrund 
mangelnder Kapitalverfügbarkeit zu 
einem gewissen Expansionstop 
geführt“ (Scarlett #00:20:01#-
#00:21:33#) 
“[...] simply limited capital availability, 
even though the appraisal and 
evaluation of the assets, the profitability, 
risk profiles of the assets, did not provide 
for any explanation on this. And this has 
restricted our business insofar that the 
limited availability of capital led to a 
certain expansion stop.“  
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„[...] fehlender Liquiditätsbereitstellung 
mit zurückgehendem Leverageumfang 
auch die Zinskosten stiegen und bei 
damit einhergehenden Preisrückgang 
und Wertrückgang der Assets letztlich 
eine problematische Situation in Bezug 
auf die Kreditsituation ausgelöst 
wurde“ (Allen #00:06:34#-#00:07:08#) 
“[...] a lack of liquidity together with a 
decrease in leverage also accompanied 
by an increase in interest costs, together 
with lower prices and decreasing values 
of the assets finally triggered a 
problematic situation with regard to the 
loan situation.“ 
“[...] erst mal eine lange Zeit, [...] wenig in 
die USA investiert [...] als fast direkte 
Folge“ (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#) 
“[...] initially a long time [...] only few 
investments in the USA [...] as a more or 
less direct consequence.“ 
„[...] Abverkaufs von Portfolien oder das 
Abwickeln von Geschäftsbereichen so 
sprich strategischen Beteiligungen die 
wir eingegangen haben, die dann 
verkauft worden sind, weil sie nicht mehr 
zum, zum Core-Geschäft des, des 
Unternehmens gehörten.“ (Harry 
#00:52:43#-#00:53:06#) 
“[...] sale of portfolios or liquidation of 
divisions, so to say strategic 
participations that we were involved in, 
which we sold off because they did not fit 
to the core competencies of the 
organisation any longer.“ 
„Bei manchen Objekten hat man 
nachträglich sich die Arbeit gemacht und 
analysiert, was habe ich hier überhaupt 
gekauft. [...] große Debatten und 
Diskussionen mit den Gutachtern, 
inwiefern die Werte noch stimmen, 
inwiefern die Werte erreichbar sind. 
Finanzierungen komplett sich 
angeschaut, wo stehe ich mit all meinen 
Finanzierungen. Bin ich überhaupt in der 
Lage zu liefern.“ (Olivia #01:01:32#-
#01:05:14#) 
“For some assets, we have analysed 
afterwards what we actually acquired [...] 
big debates and discussions with 
appraisers if the values are still correct, 
and if the values are achievable. 
Financing agreement reviewed in full, 
where am I standing with regard to my 
debt. Am I able to deliver in any case.“ 
„[...] die Bewertungsform und 
Herangehensweisen [...] neu aufgesetzt 
[...].“ (Harry #00:54:52#-#00:55:16#) 
“[...] the type of appraisal and 
approaches [...] newly established [...].”  
„[...] mehr Augenmerk daraufgelegt, [...] 
wie das Investitionsverhalten halt der 
Asset Manager dann nochmal 
nachgehalten wird. Also gehen die nach 
wie vor in, in kritische Lagen, gehen die 
Risiken ein, wie gehen sie mit Risiken 
um wenn sie das eingehen.“ (Jake 
#00:55:53#-#00:56:34#) 
“[...] refocused on [...] how the 
investment behaviour of the asset 
managers is monitored. Meaning, do 
they still look for critical locations, do 
they take risks, how do they handle risks 
if they take them.“ 
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Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
“[...] eine Anpassung von Hedging-
Möglichkeiten [...] die Hedging-Strategien 
dann neu angepasst.“ (William, 
#00:42:03# - #00:42:41#) 
“[...] adjustments in the hedging 
alternatives [...] newly customised 
hedging strategies.“ 
„[...] Restrukturierungen von Darlehen 
[...] in einer für die Bank, als auch den 
Eigenkapitalinvestor auskömmlichen 
Weise.“ (Allen #00:07:26#-#00:07:54#) 
“[...] restructuring of loans [...] in an 
adequate way that is acceptable for the 
bank and the equity investor.“ 
„[...] eine Refokussierung auf das 
jeweilige heimische Core-Business. Ein 
komplettes Herausdrehen der nicht Core, 
also der damals definierten Core-
Investments und die Bereinigung des 
Balance Sheets, einschließlich einer 
Bereinigung der damit verbundenen 
Fremdfinanzierungen.“ (Harry 
#00:47:36#-#00:48:32#) 
“[...] a refocus to the domestic core 
business. A full disposal of the non-core 
assets, meaning the ones previously 
defined as core investments and 
optimisation of the balance sheet, 
including the according third party debt 
positions.“ 
„[...] weil sie nicht mehr zum, zum Core-
Geschäft des, des Unternehmens 
gehörten.“ (Harry #00:52:43#-
#00:53:06#) 
“[...] because they did not any longer 
belong to the core business of the 
organisation.“ 
„[...] aus der Erfahrung heraus jetzt von 
Geschäftsfeldern Abstand genommen, 
aus der Erfahrung des Risikos, dass sich 
entwickelt hat.“ (Harry #00:57:24#-
#00:58:18#) 
“[...] from experience, stepped back from 
business divisions, from the risk 
experience, that developed.“ 
„[...] die Risikosysteme in der 
Mittelfristigkeit einfach noch deutlich 
weiter ausgeweitet und versucht dort, 
sozusagen, ein bisschen weiter noch 
solche Themen auch vorher einschätzen 
zu können.“ (George #00:32:16#-
#00:33:07#) 
“[...] significantly enhanced the risk 
systems in the medium-term, and tried 
to, let`s say, to assess such topics also 
beforehand.“ 
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Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Was sich verändert hat, ist der Umgang 
damit. Die Interpretation damit. Man 
kann mit Sicherheit noch weitere 
Kennzahlen oder wird mit Sicherheit 
noch weitere Kennzahlen mit einfließen 
lassen müssen. Am liebsten 
dynamische, weil statische haben wir 
genug. Aber die Interpretation, was 
mache ich daraus, dass ist das, was sich 
tatsächlich verändert hat. Dass man ein 
Bewusstsein geschaffen hat, wenn das 
und das Szenario eintritt, gehe ich so 
und so damit um.“ (Jake #00:47:43#-
#00:48:18#) 
“What has changed is the handling. The 
interpretation of it. Surely, you may add 
further key figures or for certain have to 
include additional key figures. Preferably 
dynamic ones, because we have enough 
static ones. But the interpretation, what 
about this, this is what really changed, 
that there is an awareness of how to 
manage the situation if either scenario 
occurs.” 
„Die Struktur, der Aufbau und so wie wir 
das betreiben, nicht. Lediglich, sage ich 
mal, die Fokussierung und die Auswahl 
der Risiken, unterliegt durchaus 
Veränderungen.“ (Scarlett #00:36:20#-
#00:36:33#) 
“The composition, the structure and how 
we operate, not. Only, let`s say, the 
focus and choice of risks is subject to 
changes.” 
„[...] jetzt gute Leute eingestellt 
[...]“ (Olivia #01:11:45#-#01:12:09#) 
“[...] now hired talented people [...]“ 
„[...] neue Risikobereiche in [...] die 
Gesamtbetrachtung mit aufgenommen 
worden.“ (Harry #00:57:24#-#00:58:18#) 
“[...] new areas of risk [...] included in the 
overall view.“ 
„[...] wir haben es dahingehend geändert, 
dass wir deutlich mehr Risiken bei 
unseren “Risikoarten” genannt, mit 
aufgenommen haben, die wir dann 
beobachten. Also auch die, also ein 
Beispiel war nicht, wie wir das 
Zinsänderungsrisiko betrachten, eine 
Frage war:„ Wie, wie beurteilen wir die 
Verfügbarkeit der Immobilien, wie 
beurteilen wir aktuell die 
Durchführbarkeit der Investment-
Richtlinie in den einzelnen Fonds.” Das 
waren alles Dinge, die vorher nicht drin 
waren, weil wir vielmehr fokussiert haben 
auf „Erreichten wir die 
Managementgebühren, die wir für das 
Jahr prognostiziert haben.“ (James 
#00:50:03#-#00:50:49#) 
“[...] we have changed it with regard to a 
significantly higher number of risks 
included in our ’types of risk’, that we 
monitor. So, also, an example is not, 
how we monitor the interest-change risk, 
a question was how we assess the 
availability of real estate assets, how do 
we evaluate the implementation of the 
investment guideline in the individual 
funds. All of these were aspects which 
were not covered before, because we 
were much more focussed on if we 
achieve the volume of management fees 
that we had forecasted for that year.“  
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Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„[...] bestimmte, vorher vielleicht nicht so 
stark gesehene Risiken doch sehr stark 
in den Vordergrund gerückt“ (Allen 
#00:11:13#-#00:11:24#) 
“[...] particular risks have moved to the 
foreground even though previously not 
considered that strong.“ 
“ […] war wenig Zeit zu 
überlegen.“ (William #00:38:42#-
#00:39:08#) 
“[...] there was little time to think about.“ 
„Also das war, das musste schnell 
gehen, das waren keine langen Berichte 
und langsame Entwicklung, sondern es 
war eine relativ schnelle 
Entwicklung“ (William #00:46:48#-
#00:46:58#) 
“Actually, this was, it had to move 
quickly, there were no long reports or 
slow developments, but it was a 
relatively fast development.” 
“[...] umfassende operative 
Inanspruchnahme, blieb eigentlich wenig 
Zeit um strategisch in der 
Unternehmensorganisation was zu 
ändern, das ist dann, ich sag mal, im 
Nachlauf irgendwo geschehen“ (Allen 
#00:10:06#-#00:10:23#) 
“[...] comprehensive operative utilisation, 
little time remaining to strategically 
change something in the organisation, 
that happened that, let`s say, in 
retrospective.“  
„Aber dadurch, dass man sich 
ausgetauscht hat, hat man relativ rundes 
Bild gehabt.“ (Jake #01:02:09#-
#01:02:54#) 
“But because we have had the exchange 
there existed a well-rounded picture.” 
„[...] alle Know-how-Inhaber hier in einer 
richtigen Runde um einen Tisch zu 
bekommen oder in der richtigen 
Runde.“ (Allen #00:12:46#-#00:13:25#) 
“[...] to get all knowledge carriers in the 
right compilation around the table or in 
the right compilation.“  
„[...] die in den entsprechenden 
Bereichen aktiv und verantwortlich sind 
[...] und dann wird das natürlich auch 
besprochen bei uns im Kreis der 
Geschäftsführung und natürlich auch mit 
unseren weiteren Gremien im Beirat, so 
dass wir dann, in dem Falle dort, auch 
sehr intensiv mit diesen Risikofaktoren 
und daraus resultierenden Reaktions-
möglichkeiten für unser Unternehmen 
beschäftigen.“ (Scarlett #00:26:55#-
#00:27:35#) 
“[...] those who are actively involved in 
the respective departments and who are 
responsible [...] and then this is obviously 
discussed between the board and 
usually also with our other committees in 
the advisory board, so that, for this case, 
we are intensively occupied with all 
these risk factors and the resulting 
response alternatives for our 
organisation.“  
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Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Original) 
Significant Statement from Transcripts 
(Convenience Translation) 
„Strategisch war es vielleicht sogar 
falsch das Eine oder Andere zu 
verkaufen, hätte man im Grunde 
genommen den langen Atem gehabt, 
aber die Strategie war aufgesetzt und wir 
mussten uns dieser Strategie, Strategie 
beugen [...]“ (Harry #00:53:19#-
#00:53:37#) 
“Strategically it may even have been 
wrong to sell the one or the other, if we 
basically would have been able to resist 
longer, but the strategy, strategy was set 
and we had to bow to it […]“  
„[…] Fehleinschätzung der Märkte 
[…]“ (Harry #00:46:38#-#00:46:40#) 
“[...] misjudgement of the market [...]“  
„[...] Schnäppchen jagen können 
[...]“ (George #00:32:16#-#00:33:07#) 
“[...] bargains hunting [...]“  
“[...] wenn man es aus heutiger Sicht 
betrachtet, dann muss man eigentlich 
sagen, es hat sich viel, viel besser 
entwickelt, als dass wir das damals je 
erwartet haben.“ (George #00:26:12#-
#00:27:28#) 
“[...] from today`s view, we have to say, 
that it develops much, much better than 
we have expected at that time.“ 
„[…] insbesondere institutionelle 
Investoren, insgesamt aus Panik ihr Geld 
zu verlieren, eher gesagt haben, ich will 
meine Anteile loswerden.“ (Jake 
#00:43:18#-#00:45:44#) 
“[…] especially institutional investors, 
who were generally in panic to loose 
their money rather said, I want to get rid 
of my shares.”  
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Appendix 5 
Emerging Themes for Explaining the Context of CRE Organisations 
 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Heterogeneous structure of 
demands of the stakeholder 
Heterogene 
Bedürfnisstruktur der 
Stakeholder  
Numerous dependencies on 
the developments of different 
structures and markets 
Vielzahl von Abhängigkeiten 
in der Entwicklung 
unterschiedlicher Strukturen 
und Märkte 
A great amount of influencing 
factors in the remote 
environment Hohe Anzahl 
beeinflussender Faktoren im 
Remote Environment 
Complex external 
environment Komplexes 
externes Umfeld 
A complex and dynamic 
corporate environment Ein 
komplexes und 
dynamisches 
Unternehmensumfeld 
Constantly changing 
structure of demands of the 
market participants Eine sich 
ständig ändernde 
Bedürfnisstruktur der 
Marktteilnehmer 
Life cycle of the business 
models are becoming shorter 
Zunehmend kürzere 
Lebensdauer der 
Geschäftsmodelle 
Rental income as a stable 
cash-flow dimension Miete 
als stabile Cash-Flow-Größe 
Dynamic geostrategic and 
demographic development 
Geostrategische und 
demografische Entwicklung 
dynamisch 
Interest rate development as 
a factor of stability and 
unpredictability 
Zinsentwicklung als Faktor 
für Stabilität und 
Unberechenbarkeit 
Dynamic external 
environment Dynamisches 
externes Umfeld 
 
A complex and dynamic 
corporate environment Ein 
komplexes und 
dynamisches 
Unternehmensumfeld 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Improvement of performance 
Steigerung Performance  
Achieving market leadership 
Erreichen Marktführerschaft 
Increase of assets under 
management Steigerung 
Assets under Management 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung 
Kundenzufriedenheit 
Business model is oriented 
towards growth Auf 
Wachstum ausgerichtetes 
Geschäftsmodell 
Dependency of business 
performance on 
developments in the 
corporate environment 
Abhängigkeit Business-
Performance von 
Entwicklung im Corporate 
Environment 
Reaching performance 
targets Erreichung 
Performance-vorgaben 
Developments of the markets 
Entwicklung der Märkte 
Increasing prices Erhöhte 
Preise 
Lack of transparency 
Fehlende Transparenz 
Strong competition Starker 
Wettbewerb 
Interest rate developments 
Zinsentwicklung 
Regulatory requirements 
Regulatorische 
Anforderungen 
Political developments 
Politische Entwicklung 
Manifold strategic risks in 
the corporate environment 
Vielfältige strategische 
Risiken im Corporate 
Environment 
Dependency of business 
performance on 
developments in the 
corporate environment 
Abhängigkeit Business-
Performance von 
Entwicklung im Corporate 
Environment 
Dependency on interest rate 
development Abhängigkeit 
von Zinsentwicklung 
Dependency on cash inflows 
and willingness to provide 
financing Abhängigkeit von 
Mittelzuflüssen und 
Finanzierungsbereitschaft 
Dependency on 
developments in the remote 
environment Abhängigkeit 
von Entwicklungen im 
Remote Environment 
Dependency on 
developments in the task 
environment Abhängigkeit 
von Entwicklungen im Task 
Environment  
 
Strong dependencies of the 
business model on 
developments in the 
corporate environment 
Starke Abhängigkeit des 
Geschäftsmodells von 
Entwicklungen im 
Corporate Environment 
Dependency of business 
performance on 
developments in the 
corporate environment 
Abhängigkeit Business-
Performance von 
Entwicklung im Corporate 
Environment 
		 	
 APPENDIX 5 		
	 454 
	
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
-continued-  
 
Availability of human 
resources Verfügbarkeit 
Personal 
Availability of projects 
Verfügbarkeit Objekte 
  
Development of the tenant 
market Entwicklung 
Mietermarkt 
Transactions Transaktionen 
Interest rate development 
Zinsentwicklung 
Availability of liquidity 
Verfügbarkeit Liquidität 
Regulatory factors 
Regulatorische Faktoren 
Demographic developments 
Demografische Entwicklung 
Changes in the task 
environment Veränderungen 
im Task Environment 
Changes in the remote 
environment Veränderungen 
im Remote Environment 
Numerous risk factors in the 
external corporate 
environment Vielfältige 
Risikofaktoren im externen 
Unternehmensumfeld 
 
 
 
Uncontrollability of massive 
changes in the corporate 
environment 
Unkontrollierbarkeit von  
massiven Veränderungen 
im Corporate Environment  
Predictable external 
environment due to 
previously determined 
expectations Externes 
Umfeld kalkulierbar aufgrund 
im Vorfeld festgelegter 
Erwartungen 
Assumptions made about the 
developments of the 
corporate environment 
Getroffene Annahmen über 
Entwicklung des 
Unternehmensumfelds  
Predictability due to real 
estate being a sustainable 
asset class Vorhersehbarkeit 
aufgrund Immobilie als 
nachhaltige Assetklasse 
Predictable development of 
the corporate environment 
Kalkulierbare Entwicklung 
des Unternehmensumfelds 
 
Uncontrollability of massive 
changes in the corporate 
environment 
Unkontrollierbarkeit von  
massiven Veränderungen 
im Corporate Environment 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Non-controllable 
consequences for the 
organisation resulting from 
events in the task 
environment Auswirkungen 
von Events im Task 
Environment auf 
Organisation nicht 
kalkulierbar 
Non-controllable 
consequences for the 
organisation resulting from 
changes in the political and 
regulatory environment 
Auswirkungen von 
Veränderungen im 
politischen und 
regulatorischen Umfeld auf 
Organisation nicht 
kalkulierbar 
Impact of changes in the 
macroeconomic environment 
on the organisation are 
controllable Einfluss von 
Veränderungen im 
makroökonomischen Umfeld 
auf Organisation kalkulierbar 
Consequences of epochal 
events in the corporate 
environment are not 
controllable Auswirkungen 
von epochalen Ereignissen 
im Unternehmensumfeld 
nicht kalkulierbar 
Non-controllable effects due 
to massive changes in the 
corporate environment 
Unkalkulierbare Effekte bei 
massiven Veränderungen 
des Unternehmensumfelds 
 
 
Uncontrollability of massive 
changes in the corporate 
environment 
Unkontrollierbarkeit von  
massiven Veränderungen 
im Corporate Environment 
Limited number of available 
responses to react upon 
changes in the corporate 
environment Anzahl 
verfügbarer Alternativen zur 
Reaktion auf Veränderungen 
im Unternehmensumfeld 
begrenzt 
No alternatives to react upon 
epochal events in the 
corporate environment Keine 
verfügbaren Alternativen zur 
Reaktion auf epochale 
Ereignisse im 
Unternehmensumfeld  
Limited alternatives to 
respond to epochal 
changes in the corporate 
environment Begrenzte 
Reaktionsmöglichkeiten bei 
epochalen Veränderungen 
im Unternehmensumfeld 
 
Uncontrollability of massive 
changes in the corporate 
environment 
Unkontrollierbarkeit von  
massiven Veränderungen 
im Corporate Environment 
	 	
 APPENDIX 5 		
	 456 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Ongoing alignment of 
processes Stetige 
Prozessanpassungen 
Routine and non-routine 
transactions are manageable 
Routine- und 
Nichtroutinetransaktionen 
bewältigbar 
Massive epochal changes 
are unmanageable Massive 
epochale Veränderungen 
nicht bewältigbar 
Accomplishment of external 
changes are dependent on 
their solidity Bewältigung 
externer Veränderungen 
abhängig von deren 
Massivität 
Massive changes in the 
external corporate 
environment are not 
manageable with usual 
routines Massive 
Veränderungen im externen 
Unternehmensumfeld nicht 
mit Routinen bewältigbar 
 
Uncontrollability of massive 
changes in the corporate 
environment 
Unkontrollierbarkeit von  
massiven Veränderungen 
im Corporate Environment 
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Appendix 6 
Emerging Themes to Exploring the Corporate Meaning of a Phase of FI 
 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Investments in ambitious and 
intransparent types of 
investment Investitionen in 
anspruchsvolle und 
intransparente 
Investmentformen 
Unrealistic macroeconomic 
situation (market 
mechanisms suspended)  
Unrealistische 
makroökonomische Situation 
(Marktmechanismen außer 
Kraft) 
Bad quality of acquired 
properties Ankauf Objekte 
mit schlechter Qualität  
Inexperienced decision-
makers Unerfahrenheit der 
Entscheider 
Eroded market mechanisms 
and experiences 
Marktmechanismen und 
Erfahrungen außer Kraft 
gesetzt 
 
Unrealistic market situation 
Unrealistische Situation der 
Märkte 
High availability of capital 
without warranties Hohe und 
garantielose Kapital-
verfügbarkeit 
Extremely high ratio of loan 
to value Extrem hohes 
Verhältnis Loan to Value 
Outsourcing of risks to 
financing banks 
Ausgliederung von Risiken 
an finanzierende Banken 
Risk-free availability of 
capital Risikolose Kapital-
verfügbarkeit 
 
Unrealistic market situation 
Unrealistische Situation der 
Märkte 
Multi-layered approach to 
assess the situation 
Mehrschichtige 
Veranstaltung zur 
Beurteilung der Situation 
Informal exchange of 
information to assess the 
situation Informeller 
Informationsaustausch zur 
Beurteilung der Situation  
Interaction with numerous 
parties involved Austausch 
mit verschiedenen 
Beteiligten 
Informal intensification of 
the relations in order to 
assess the situation 
Informelle Intensivierung 
der Beziehungen zur 
Beurteilung der Situation 
 
Informal and individual 
intensification of lived 
relations Informelle und 
individuelle Intensivierung 
der Beziehungen 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Addressing long-term risks 
arising from the situation 
Adressierung langfristiger 
Risiken aus der Situation 
Detailed documentation of 
the situation Detaillierte 
Dokumentation der Situation 
Assessment of the 
investment approach 
Bewertung des 
Investmentansatzes 
 
Individual intensification of 
the relation in order to 
account for potential 
consequences  Individuelle 
Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen zur 
Darstellung möglicher 
Folgen 
 
Informal and individual 
intensification of lived 
relations Informelle und 
individuelle Intensivierung 
der Beziehungen 
Addressees are not 
interested in the information 
for further assessment of the 
situation Adressaten an 
Informationen zur 
Einschätzung der Situation 
nicht interessiert  
No relevant knowledge to 
asses information Nicht 
vorhandene Kenntnisse zur 
Einordnung der 
Informationen 
Commercial principles of due 
diligence ignored 
Kaufmännische Grundsätze 
einer Due Diligence nicht 
beachtet 
Ignorance of the decision-
makers Ignoranz der 
Entscheider 
 
Euphoria and expansion 
pressures of the actors 
Euphorie und 
Expansionsdruck der 
Akteure 
Open approach to clients 
about refinancing 
requirements Offene 
Ansprache des Kunden 
wegen Refinanzierungs-
bedarf 
Feeling of power of the client 
towards the banks Gefühl 
der Macht des Kunden 
gegenüber Banken 
No warranties or securities 
required by banks Keine 
Garantien oder Sicherheiten 
von Banken gefordert 
Financing banks without 
necessary real estate 
expertise Fehlende 
Immobilienexpertise der 
finanzierenden Banken  
Financing pressure of the 
banks Finanzierungsdruck 
der Banken 
 
Euphoria and expansion 
pressures of the actors 
Euphorie und 
Expansionsdruck der 
Akteure 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Little thoughts about 
consequences Wenige 
Gedanken über 
Konsequenzen 
Decisions under pressure 
Entscheidungen unter Druck 
Complexities not detected 
Komplexität nicht erkannt 
Decisions under pressure to 
succeed Entscheidungen 
unter Erfolgsdruck 
Euphoria and expansion 
pressures of the actors 
Euphorie und 
Expansionsdruck der 
Akteure 
Increasing investment 
pressure of clients Erhöhter 
Anlagedruck der Kunden  
Desire of clients for a high 
LTV Wunsch nach hohem 
LTV durch Investor 
Real estate as a yield 
providing object Immobilie 
als Renditeobjekt 
Investment pressures of the 
clients Investitionsdruck der 
Anleger 
 
Euphoria and expansion 
pressures of the actors 
Euphorie und 
Expansionsdruck der 
Akteure 
Increasing number of 
projects and workload 
Erhöhter Projekt- und 
Arbeitsanfall 
Limited guidelines/rules 
Begrenztes Regelwerk 
Unregulated processing of 
a large number of projects 
Unregulierte Abarbeitung 
einer Vielzahl von Projekten 
 
Unregulated workload in 
the organisation 
Unregulierte 
Arbeitsbelastung in der 
Organisation 
Dynamics on the rental 
markets Dynamik an den 
Mietmärkten 
Macroeconomic 
development 
Gesamtwirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung 
Moods in reports and 
discussions Stimmungslage 
in Berichten und Gesprächen 
Unchanged analysis of 
information Unveränderte 
Informationsanalyse 
 
Unregulated workload in 
the organisation 
Unregulierte 
Arbeitsbelastung in der 
Organisation 
Marginal, pro-active changes 
in processes Marginale, 
proaktive Veränderungen in 
den Prozessen  
Proper documentation 
Ordentliche Dokumentation 
Maintenance of the 
strategic focus 
Beibehaltung der 
strategischen Ausrichtung 
 
Unregulated workload in 
the organisation 
Unregulierte 
Arbeitsbelastung in der 
Organisation 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Communication as a 
challenge Kommunikation 
als Herausforderung 
Cautious approach towards 
recipient of the message 
Vorsichtiges Auftreten 
gegenüber Adressaten 
Unclear and unencouraged 
communication Unklare und 
unmutige Kommunikation 
Overstrain leads to 
resignation Überforderung 
führt zu Resignation 
 
Ignorance in perceived 
certainty Ignorantes 
Verhalten bei gefühlter 
Sicherheit 
Euphoria and exaggeration 
Euphorie und Übertreibung 
Overpriced acquisition of real 
estate Überteuerter Einkauf 
von Immobilien 
Lack of problem awareness 
Fehlendes 
Problembewusstsein 
Over-optimism 
Übertriebener Optimismus 
 
Ignorance in perceived 
certainty Ignorantes 
Verhalten bei gefühlter 
Sicherheit 
Little reaction to warning 
signs Geringe Reaktion auf 
mahnende Hinweise 
Lack of adaption to market 
situation Fehlende 
Anpassung an Marktsituation 
Uncritical acquisition of real 
estate Unkritische 
Immobilienankäufe 
Ignorance of experiences 
Erfahrungen ignoriert 
Diffuse gut feeling Diffuses 
Bauchgefühl 
Impression of unhealthy 
market situation or wrong 
decision Gefühlt ungesunde 
Marktsituation bzw. falsche 
Entscheidung 
Ignorance Ignoranz 
 
Ignorance in perceived 
certainty Ignorantes 
Verhalten bei gefühlter 
Sicherheit 
Perceived Certainty Gefühlte 
Sicherheit 
Apparently harmonious 
macroeconomic factors 
Harmonisch wirkende 
makroökonomische 
Parameter 
Certainty Sicherheit 
 
Ignorance in perceived 
certainty Ignorantes 
Verhalten bei gefühlter 
Sicherheit 
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Appendix 7 
Emerging Themes to Exploring the Corporate Meaning of an Event of FC 
 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Within short time 
investments and debt 
financing abandoned 
Innerhalb kürzester Zeit 
Investitionsverhalten und 
Kreditvergabe abgebrochen 
Limited availability of capital 
Kapitalverfügbarkeit 
eingeschränkt 
Stop of expansions 
Expansionsstopp 
Standstill Stillstand 
 
Unexpected market 
standstill Unerwarteter 
Stillstand der Märkte 
Sudden and surprising 
Plötzlich und unerwartet 
Lack of predictability 
Fehlende Vorhersagbarkeit 
Unexpectedness 
Unerwartet 
 
Unexpected market 
standstill Unerwarteter 
Stillstand der Märkte 
Intensive involvement of the 
parties to assess the 
situation Intensive 
Einbindung der Beteiligten 
zur Beurteilung der Situation 
Intensive interaction between 
the participants to provide 
transparency Intensiver 
Austausch zwischen den 
Beteiligten zur Schaffung von 
Transparenz 
Formal intensification of 
relations to assess the 
situation Formelle 
Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen zur 
Beurteilung der Situation 
 
Formal and social 
intensification of lived 
relations Formelle und 
soziale Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen 
Intensification of relations in 
order to determine potential 
impact of the situation 
Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen zur Darstellung 
möglicher Folgen aus der 
Situation 
Joint, coordinated approach 
Gemeinsame, abgestimmte 
Vorgehensweise  
Create trust and keep calm 
Vertrauen schaffen und 
Ruhe bewahren 
Social intensification of 
relations to constitute 
potential consequences and 
proceedings Soziale 
Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen zur 
Darstellung möglicher 
Folgen und 
Vorgehensweisen 
 
Formal and social 
intensification of lived 
relations Formelle und 
soziale Intensivierung der 
Beziehungen 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Restructuring of debt 
financing Restrukturierung 
von Finanzierungen 
Bank lending stopped 
suddenly Kurzfristige 
Einstellung Kreditvergabe 
Bank lending abruptly 
stopped Kreditvergabe 
abrupt gestoppt 
 
Disillusionment and 
consolidation of the actors 
Ernüchterung und 
Konsolidierung seitens der 
Akteure 
Adjustment of strategic focus 
risk management Anpassung 
strategische Ausrichtung 
Risk Management 
Increase of innovative 
abilities Steigerung der 
innovativen Fähigkeiten 
Consideration of arising 
chances Betrachtung 
entstehender Chancen 
Purification and refocusing 
on core competencies 
Entschlackung und 
Refokussierung auf 
Kerngeschäft 
Focus on good asset classes 
Ausrichtung auf gute 
Investmentklassen 
Refocusing on core 
business Refokussierung 
auf Kerngeschäft 
 
Disillusionment and 
consolidation of the actors 
Ernüchterung und 
Konsolidierung seitens der 
Akteure 
Standstill Stillstand 
Lack of liquidity Fehlende 
Liquidität 
Rough approaches Rabiate 
Vorgehensweisen 
Restructuring 
Restrukturierung 
Radical investment stop 
Radikaler Investitionsstopp 
 
Disillusionment and 
consolidation of the actors 
Ernüchterung und 
Konsolidierung seitens der 
Akteure 
Routine and contingency 
Routine und Konstanz 
Stop of expansion and 
standstill Expansionsstopp 
und Stillstand 
Analysis of the situation and 
own investment behaviour 
Analyse der Situation und 
eigenes Investitionsverhalten 
Professional handling of 
involved parties and situation 
Professioneller Umgang mit 
Beteiligten und Situation 
No strategic changes Keine 
strategischen 
Veränderungen 
Professionalism and routine 
during standstill 
Professionalität und 
Routine im Stillstand 
 
Without alternatives, 
alignment of the 
organisation in uncertainty 
Alternativlose 
Anpassungen in der 
Organisation unter 
Unsicherheit  
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Internal reception of 
information and analysis 
Interne Informations-
aufnahme und Analyse 
Extended information from 
external partners Erweiterte 
Informationsaufnahme von 
externen Partnern 
Real estate valuation through 
third parties 
Immobilienbewertung durch 
Externe 
Extended analysis of 
information Erweiterte 
Informationsanalyse 
 
Without alternatives, 
alignment of the 
organisation in uncertainty 
Alternativlose 
Anpassungen in der 
Organisation unter 
Unsicherheit 
Adjustment of the 
organisation to the situation 
and to the demand-related 
behaviour (capacitites, new 
advisory board, strategy 
days) Anpassung 
Unternehmensorganisation 
an Situation und 
Nachfrageverhalten 
(Kapazitätsanpassungen, 
neues Advisory Board, 
Strategietage) 
Procurement of liquidity 
through distressed sales 
Liquiditätsbeschaffung durch 
Notverkäufe 
Development not included in 
strategic planning 
Entwicklung in strategischer 
Planung nicht einkalkuliert 
Impact of the event on the 
organisation hardly 
predictable Auswirkungen 
Event auf Organisation 
überwiegend nicht 
kalkulierbar 
Familiar reactions and 
mechanisms without 
alternatives Bekannte und 
alternativlose 
Reaktionsmechanismen 
Adjustments under 
uncertainty Anpassungen 
unter Unsicherheit 
 
Without alternatives, 
alignment of the 
organisation in uncertainty 
Alternativlose 
Anpassungen in der 
Organisation unter 
Unsicherheit 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Adjustment of the risk 
management strategy by 
qualitative factors 
Anpassung Risk 
Management Strategie um 
qualitative Parameter 
Alignment risk management 
perspective in overall view 
and interpretation 
Anpassung Risk 
Management Perspektive in 
Gesamtbetrachtung und 
Interpretation 
Enhancement of the risk 
awareness Erweiterung des 
Risikobewusstseins 
Acceleration of the 
anticipatory approach 
strengthened in risk manage-
ment strategy Forcierung des 
antizipatorischen Ansatzes in 
Risk Management Strategie 
verstärkt 
Inclusion of new risks (tenant 
credit worthiness, interest-
change risk, availability of 
real estate) Aufnahme neuer 
Risiken (Mieterbonität, 
Zinsänderungsrisiko, 
Verfügbarkeit Immobilien) 
Adjustment of the risk 
awareness Anpassung des 
Risikobewusstseins 
 
Without alternatives, 
alignment of the 
organisation in uncertainty 
Alternativlose 
Anpassungen in der 
Organisation unter 
Unsicherheit 
Irrational behaviour 
Irrationales Verhalten 
Actions based on gut 
feelings and experiences 
Handlungen auf Basis von 
Bauchgefühl und Erfahrung 
Irrationality Irrationalität Irrational behaviour in 
perceived uncertainty 
Irrationales Verhalten bei 
gefühlter Unsicherheit 
Tremendous uncertainty with 
assessing the situation 
Enorme Unsicherheit in der 
Einschätzung der Situation 
Insecurities in strategic 
decision-making Unsicher-
heit bei strategischer 
Entscheidungsfindung 
Panic behaviour on the 
markets Panisches Verhalten 
an den Märkten 
Mixed feelings between 
surprise, fear and motivation 
Gemischte Gefühle zwischen 
Überraschung, Angst und 
Motivation 
Uncertainty Unsicherheit Irrational behaviour in 
perceived uncertainty 
Irrationales Verhalten bei 
gefühlter Unsicherheit 
 APPENDIX 7 		
	 465 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme 
Classification of the crisis as 
a chance Einordnung der 
Krise als Chance 
Motivated, to get the best out 
of it Motiviert, das Beste 
herauszuholen 
Motivation Motivation 
 
Irrational behaviour in 
perceived uncertainty 
Irrationales Verhalten bei 
gefühlter Unsicherheit 
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Appendix 8 
Emerging Properties in Discovering the Process of Sensemaking in a 
Phase of FI 
 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Increasing willingness to pay 
higher prices with negligent 
attitude Erhöhte 
Preisbereitschaft unter 
Sorglosigkeit 
Acquisition at the expense of 
quality standards Erwerb zu 
Lasten der Qualität 
Increasing investment 
pressure Erhöhter 
Anlagedruck 
Extracted cues of FI 
Extrahierte Hinweise der FI 
Difuse gut feeling Diffuses 
Bauchgefühl 
Between euphoria and 
nervousness Zwischen 
Euphorie und Nervosität 
Contradictory moods 
Widersprüchliche 
Gefühlslage 
Extracted cues of FI 
Extrahierte Hinweise der FI 
Pushing risks to banks 
Risikoverlagerung an 
Banken 
High availability of liquidity 
Hohe Verfügbarkeit von 
Liquidität 
High prices for poor quality of 
available property Hohe 
Preise für geringe Qualität 
verfügbarer Immobilien 
Poor letting and low 
occupancy Schlechte 
Vermietung und hoher 
Leerstand 
In general: exaggeration 
Allgemeine Übertreibung 
Strong dynamics of the 
markets Hohe Dynamik der 
Märkte 
Extracted cues of FI 
Extrahierte Hinweise der FI 
Decisions under time 
pressure Entscheidungen 
unter zeitlichem Druck 
ausgeübt 
Irrational decisions of market 
players Irrationale 
Entscheidungen der Akteure 
Irrational acquisition 
decisions Irrationale 
Ankaufsentscheidungen 
Enactment through risk 
prevention Inkraftsetzen 
der Risikoprävention 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Implementation of 
contractual cover 
mechanisms Imple-
mentierung vertraglicher 
Absicherungsmechanismen 
Proper process 
documentation Ordentliche 
Prozessdokumentation 
Critical acquisition policy 
pursued Kritischere 
Ankaufspolitik angestrebt 
Internal organisational 
actions to avoid impending 
risks Interne 
organisatorische 
Handlungen zur 
Vermeidung drohender 
Risiken 
Enactment through risk 
prevention Inkraftsetzen 
der Risikoprävention 
Exchange with other 
shareholders Austausch mit 
anderen Gesellschaftern 
Discussion between the 
board members 
Diskussionen innerhalb der 
Geschäftsführung 
Discussion with internal 
experts and responsible 
persons Austausch mit 
internen Experten und 
Verantwortlichen  
Interpretation through 
inclusion and exchange of 
internal information 
Interpretation durch 
Aufnahme und Austausch 
interner Informationen 
Social interaction for 
preparation Soziale 
Interaktion zur 
Vorbereitung  
Assessment of the situation 
with acquaintances and 
network Beurteilung der 
Situation mit Bekannten und 
Netzwerk 
Assessment through 
newspapers Beurteilung 
durch Zeitungen 
Interpretation through social 
interaction and inclusion of 
external information 
Interpretation durch soziale 
Interaktion und Aufnahme 
externer Informationen 
Social interaction for 
preparation Soziale 
Interaktion zur 
Vorbereitung 
Topic hardly perceptible 
Thema kaum spürbar 
Short-term monies allocated 
to funds Kurzfristige Gelder 
in Fonds geparkt 
Perceived certainty Gefühlte 
Sicherheit 
Lack of risk awareness 
Fehlendes 
Risikobewusstsein 
Retrospective discernment 
of carelessness 
Rückwirkende Einsicht der 
Unachtsamkeit 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Acquisition of properties of 
poor quality Ankauf Objekte 
mit schlechter Qualität 
Lack of knowledge about real 
estate as asset class 
Fehlende Kenntnisse über 
Immobilien als Assetklasse 
Uncritical behaviour and 
blind faith Unkritisches 
Verhalten und blindes 
Vertrauen 
Underestimation of the greed 
of banks Gier der Banken 
unterschätzt 
Uncritical acquisition policy 
Unkritische Ankaufspolitik 
Retrospective discernment 
of carelessness 
Rückwirkende Einsicht der 
Unachtsamkeit 
Lack of understanding for 
new products and methods 
Fehlendes Verständnis für 
neue Produkte und 
Methoden 
Underestimated complexity 
due to isolated view of the 
asset Unterschätzte 
Komplexität aufgrund 
isolierter Betrachtung der 
Immobilie 
Underestimated complexity 
of the products and 
methods Unterschätzte 
Komplexität der Produkte 
und Methoden 
Retrospective discernment 
of carelessness 
Rückwirkende Einsicht der 
Unachtsamkeit 
Value increases have not 
been realised as gains 
Wertsteigerungen nicht als 
Gewinn realisiert 
Inconsequential 
communication of identified 
risks Inkonsequente 
Kommunikation identifizierter 
Risiken 
Inconsequential action and 
communication 
Inkonsequente Handlung 
und Kommunikation 
 
Retrospective discernment 
of carelessness 
Rückwirkende Einsicht der 
Unachtsamkeit 
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Appendix 9 
Emerging Properties in Discovering the Process of Sensemaking in an 
Event of FC 
 
Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Real estate ignored as an 
asset class Immobilien als 
Assetklasse ignoriert 
Lack of refinancing efforts of 
banks Fehlende 
Refinanzierungs-
bemühungen der Banken 
Market standstill Stillstand 
der Märkte 
Extracted cues of FC 
Extrahierte Hinweise der 
Finanzkrise 
Perceived uncertainty 
Wahrgenommene 
Unsicherheit 
Irrational decisions of market 
players Irrationale 
Entscheidungen der Akteure 
Unexpected, non-controllable 
event Unerwartetes, nicht 
beherrschbares Ereignis 
Rough approaches Rabiate 
Vorgehensweisen 
(Irrational) decisions under 
uncertainty (Irrationale) 
Entscheidungen unter 
Unsicherheit 
 
Extracted cues of FC 
Extrahierte Hinweise der 
Finanzkrise 
Malfunction of models due to 
changed parameters 
Fehlende Funktion der 
Modelle aufgrund 
veränderter Parameter 
Withdrawal of liquidity and 
freeze on expansion Abzug 
von Liquidität und 
Expansionsstopp 
Business model 
malfunctions Fehlendes 
Funktionieren des 
Geschäftsmodells 
Extracted cues of FC 
Extrahierte Hinweise der 
Finanzkrise 
Inclusion of specific company 
information Aufnahme 
spezifischer Unternehmens-
informationen 
Processing of general 
information Verarbeitung 
allgemeiner Informationen 
Contentual enriched 
information intake Inhaltlich 
angereicherte 
Informationsaufnahme 
 
Extracted cues of FC 
Extrahierte Hinweise der 
Finanzkrise 
Investment stop Einstellung 
Investitionen 
Decrease of portfolio assets 
Reduzierung Portfoliobestand 
Verification of investment 
approach and portfolio value 
Verifikation Investitionsver-
halten und Portfoliobewertung 
Deinvestive actions to 
handle the realised portfolio 
risks Desinvestive 
Handlungen zur 
Bewältigung eingetretener 
Portfoliorisiken 
Enactment through 
organisational adjustments 
Inkraftsetzen von 
organisatorischen 
Anpassungen 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Analysis of the financing 
situation Analyse 
Finanzierungssituation 
Adjustment of the financing 
strategy Anpassung 
Finanzierungsstrategie 
Analysis and adjustment of 
the financing management 
Analyse und Anpassung 
Finanzierungsmanagement 
Enactment through 
organisational adjustments 
Inkraftsetzen von 
organisatorischen 
Anpassungen 
Innovation of the business 
model Innovationen im 
Geschäftsmodell 
Focus on the core 
competencies Konzentration 
auf Kerngeschäft 
Realisation of information 
and transparency Schaffung 
von Information und 
Transparenz 
Adjustment of the strategic 
goals Anpassung 
strategische Ausrichtung 
Alignment of capacities 
Anpassung von Kapazitäten  
Retention of the 
organisational structure 
Beibehaltung der 
Organisationsstruktur 
Alignment of the business 
model and of strategic 
goals Anpassung 
Geschäftsmodell und 
strategische Ausrichtung 
Enactment through 
organisational adjustments 
Inkraftsetzen von 
organisatorischen 
Anpassungen 
Alignment risk management 
approach Anpassung Risk 
Management Ansatz 
Extension of the risk 
assessment Erweiterung des 
Risk Assessments 
Adjustment of the risk 
management strategy 
Anpassung der 
Risikomanagement-
Strategie 
Enactment through 
organisational adjustments 
Inkraftsetzen von 
organisatorischen 
Anpassungen 
Lack of available time 
Fehlende verfügbare Zeit 
Decisions at short notice 
Kurzfristige Entscheidungen 
Prevalence of operative 
decisions Vorrang 
operativer Entscheidungen 
Operational plausibility 
Operationale Plausibilität 
Individual consideration of 
information Individueller 
Umgang mit Informationen 
Inclusion of manifold 
addressees challenging 
Einbindung einer Vielzahl 
von Adressaten 
anspruchsvoll 
Ambitious information 
exchange Anspruchsvoller 
Informationsaustausch 
Social interaction for 
reaction Soziale Interaktion 
um zu reagieren 
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Concept Sub-Theme Theme / Property 
Assessment of events 
through discussion 
Beurteilung des Events 
durch Gespräche 
Integration of experts 
Einbeziehung von Experten 
Assessment of events 
through social interaction 
Beurteilung der Ereignisse 
durch soziale Interaktion  
 
Social interaction for 
reaction Soziale 
Interaktion um zu 
reagieren 
Irrational behaviour 
Irrationales Verhalten  
Strategic misconduct 
Strategisches Fehlverhalten  
Irrational management 
decisions Irrationale 
Managemententscheidungen 
 
Retrospective 
discernment of 
misconduct and 
overreaction 
Rückwirkende Einsicht 
von Fehlverhalten und 
Überreaktion 
Drawback from the asset 
class real estate in a panic 
Panischer Rückzug aus 
Assetklasse Immobilie 
Irrational fear of investors 
Irrationale Ängste der 
Investoren 
 
Panic reaction of clients 
Panikreaktionen der Kunden 
Retrospective 
discernment of 
misconduct and 
overreaction 
Rückwirkende Einsicht 
von Fehlverhalten und 
Überreaktion 
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Appendix 10 
Open-ended Qualitative Indicators for FI 
 
Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Informal exchange of 
information to assess the 
situation Informeller 
Informationsaustausch zur 
Beurteilung der Situation  
Exchange with other 
shareholders Austausch mit 
anderen Gesellschaftern 
Discussion between the 
board members 
Diskussionen innerhalb der 
Geschäftsführung 
Discussion with internal 
experts and responsible 
persons Austausch mit 
internen Experten und 
Verantwortlichen  
Assessment of the situation 
with acquaintances and 
network Beurteilung der 
Situation mit Bekannten und 
Netzwerk 
Assessment through 
newspapers Beurteilung 
durch Zeitungen 
QRI:  
Decision-makers interpret 
the situation informally and 
individually based on 
internal communication  
 
Indicators: 
Type of information 
exchange (formal, informal) 
Parties involved in the 
information exchange 
(internal, external) 
Type of cues used (internal/ 
external, informal/ formal) 
Risk: 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker   
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM:  
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
 
Cautious approach towards 
recipient of the message 
Vorsichtiges Auftreten 
gegenüber Adressaten 
Unclear and unencouraged 
communication Unklare und 
unmutige Kommunikation 
Inconsequential 
communication of identified 
risks Inkonsequente 
Kommunikation identifizierter 
Risiken 
Communication as a 
challenge Kommunikation 
als Herausforderung 
QRI: 
Decision-makers are 
uncertain when 
communicating their 
interpretation of the 
situation (cautious, 
unencouraged, unclear, 
inconsequent, challenging)  
  
Indicator: 
Perception of own 
communication (cautious/ 
careless, unclear/ clear, 
unencouraged/ courageous, 
inconsequent/ consequent, 
challenging/ easy) 
Risk: 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker  
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Lack of understanding for 
new products and methods 
Fehlendes Verständnis für 
neue Produkte und 
Methoden 
Investments in ambitious and 
intransparent types of 
investment Investitionen in 
anspruchsvolle und 
intransparente 
Investmentformen 
Inexperienced decision-
makers Unerfahrenheit der 
Entscheider  
No relevant knowledge to 
asses information Nicht 
vorhandene Kenntnisse zur 
Einordnung der 
Informationen 
Lack of knowledge about real 
estate as asset class 
Fehlende Kenntnisse über 
Immobilien als Assetklasse  
Underestimated complexity 
due to isolated view of the 
asset Unterschätzte 
Komplexität aufgrund 
isolierter Betrachtung der 
Immobilie 
Complexities not detected 
Komplexität nicht erkannt 
QRI: 
Decision-makers do not 
have sufficient experiences 
and knowledge about real 
estate and RE products 
 
Indicators: 
Professional experience of 
the decision-maker about 
real estate and real estate 
products (long-standing/ 
medium, short) 
Professional expertise of 
the decision-maker about 
real estate and real estate 
products (high/ medium/ 
low) 
Risks: 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker  
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
Increasing prices  
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
High prices for poor quality of 
available property Hohe 
Preise für geringe Qualität 
verfügbarer Immobilien 
Overpriced acquisition of real 
estate Überteuerter Einkauf 
von Immobilien  
Increasing willingness to pay 
higher prices with negligent 
attitude Erhöhte 
Preisbereitschaft unter 
Sorglosigkeit 
Irrational behaviour 
Irrationales Verhalten 
 
QRI: 
Willingness of the decision-
maker to acquire overpriced 
RE properties  
 
Indicators: 
Relation between purchase 
price and characteristics of 
the real estate (high / 
medium / low) 
Availability of real estate 
(high/ medium/ low)  
Traceability of the 
acquisition decision based 
on objective characteristics 
(high/ medium/ low)  
 
Risks: 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker  
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
Strong competition  
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 	 	
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Commercial principles of due 
diligence ignored 
Kaufmännische Grundsätze 
einer Due Diligence nicht 
beachtet 
Acquisition at the expense of 
quality standards Erwerb zu 
Lasten der Qualität 
Poor letting and low 
occupancy Schlechte 
Vermietung und hoher 
Leerstand 
Acquisition of properties of 
poor quality Ankauf Objekte 
mit schlechter Qualität  
Uncritical acquisition of real 
estate Unkritische 
Immobilienankäufe  
Uncritical behaviour and 
blind faith Unkritisches 
Verhalten und blindes 
Vertrauen 
QRI: 
Decision-makers act 
negligent and uncritical in 
real estate acquisitions 
(lack of risk awareness / 
increased risk appetite) 
 
Indicators: 
Diligence of the decision-
makers in acquisitions 
(good/ poor) 
Compliance with the 
principles for a proper due 
diligence (complete, 
partially complete, 
incomplete)  
Available time for 
performing a proper due 
diligence (appropriate, 
inappropriate) 
Risks: 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Addressees are not 
interested in the information 
for further assessment of the 
situation Adressaten an 
Informationen zur 
EInschätzung der Situation 
nicht interessiert  
Lack of problem awareness 
Fehlendes 
Problembewusstsein 
Little reaction to warning 
signs Geringe Reaktion auf 
mahnende Hinweise 
Lack of adaption to market 
situation Fehlende 
Anpassung an Marktsituation 
Perceived Certainty Gefühlte 
Sicherheit 
Apparently harmonious 
macroeconomic factors 
Harmonisch wirkende 
makroökonomische 
Parameter 
Topic hardly perceptible 
Thema kaum spürbar 
 
QRI: 
Decision-makers ignore 
hints from the markets in 
their decisions (perceived 
certainty)  
 
Indicators: 
Handling of information 
about the task environment 
by the decision-maker (no 
reaction, little reaction, 
comprehensive response) 
Handling of information 
about the macroeconomic 
parameters by the decision-
maker (no reaction, little 
reaction, comprehensive 
response) 
Emotional state of the 
decision-maker due the 
perceived task environment 
(certain, uncertain)  
Emotional state of the 
decision-maker due the 
perceived macroeconomic 
parameters (certain, 
uncertain) 
Risks: 
Increasing prices  
Strategic risk: Pricing 
Pressures 
Lack of transparency for 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
Developments of the markets 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Decisions under pressure 
Entscheidungen unter Druck  
Increasing number of 
projects and workload 
Erhöhter Projekt- und 
Arbeitsanfall 
Limited guidelines/rules 
Begrenztes Regelwerk 
Decisions under time 
pressure Entscheidungen 
unter zeitlichem Druck 
ausgeübt 
QRI: 
Managers make decisions 
under time and 
organisational pressure  
 
Indicators: 
Type of decision (strategic/ 
operational, acquisition/ 
disposition of RE, portfolio/ 
CRE organisation) 
Available time for decision 
(appropriate/ inappropriate) 
Available guidelines for 
decision-making (existent/ 
non existent) 
Risks: 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
 
ð  potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Little thoughts about 
consequences Wenige 
Gedanken über 
Konsequenzen 
Euphoria and exaggeration 
Euphorie und Übertreibung 
Ignorance of experiences 
Erfahrungen ignoriert 
Diffuse gut feeling Diffuses 
Bauchgefühl 
Impression of unhealthy 
market situation or wrong 
decision Gefühlt ungesunde 
Marktsituation bzw. falsche 
Entscheidung 
Diffuse gut feeling Diffuses 
Bauchgefühl 
Between euphoria and 
nervousness Zwischen 
Euphorie und Nervosität 
In general: exaggeration 
Allgemeine Übertreibung 
Critical acquisition policy 
pursued Kritischere 
Ankaufspolitik angestrebt 
Value increases have not 
been realised as gains 
Wertsteigerungen nicht als 
Gewinn realisiert 
QRI: 
Decision-makers act 
euphoric in strategic 
decisions and disregard 
experiences  
 
Indicators: 
Emotional perception of the 
own personal decision-
making behaviour 
(euphoric/ neutral/ 
depressed, exaggeration/ 
neutral/ understatement, 
diffuse/ clear, critical/ 
uncritical, secured / risky, 
correct/ false) 
Emotional perception of 
people`s decision-making 
behaviour in this situation 
(euphoric/ neutral/ 
depressed, exaggeration/ 
neutral/ understatement, 
diffuse/ clear, critical/ 
uncritical, secured / risky, 
correct/ false) 
 
Risks: 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
Developments of the markets 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Real estate as a yield 
providing object Immobilie 
als Renditeobjekt 
Desire of clients for a high 
LTV Wunsch nach hohem 
LTV durch Investor 
QRI: 
Investors treat real estate 
as a pure yield-providing 
object  
 
Indicators: 
Ratio: Loan to value for 
bank loans (high/ low) 
Relevance of real estate 
specifics for investors when 
investing in real estate 
(high/ low) 
 
Risks: 
Dependency on cash inflows 
and willingness to provide 
financing  
Financial risk: Liquidity crises 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
Interest development 
Financial risk: High debt and 
interest rates 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
 
Extremely high ratio of loan 
to value Extrem hohes 
Verhältnis Loan to Value 
High availability of capital 
without warranties Hohe und 
garantielose Kapital-
verfügbarkeit 
No warranties or securities 
required by banks Keine 
Garantien oder Sicherheiten 
von Banken gefordert 
Financing banks without 
necessary real estate 
expertise Fehlende 
Immobilienexpertise der 
finanzierungen Banken 
Underestimation of the greed 
of banks Gier der Banken 
unterschätzt  
Pushing risks to banks 
Risikoverlagerung an 
Banken 
 
QRI: 
Credit institutions provide 
real estate financing 
uncritically  
 
Indicators: 
Ratio: Loan to value of real 
estate financing (high/ low) 
Professional expertise of 
banks` decision-makers 
about real estate products 
(high/ medium/ low) 
Professional experience of 
banks` decision-makers 
about real estate products 
(long-term, medium-term, 
short-term) 
Financing terms (interest, 
warranties and guarantees) 
for real estate products 
(favourably/ appropriate/ 
expensive) 
Risks: 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
Interest development  
Financial risk: High debt and 
interest rates 
Regulatory requirements  
Strategic risk: Regulation 
Dependency on cash inflows 
and willingness to provide 
financing  
Financial risk: Liquidity crises 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Open discussion of clients 
about refinancing 
requirements Offene 
Ansprache des Kunden 
wegen Refinanzierungs-
bedarf 
High availability of liquidity 
Hohe Verfügbarkeit von 
Liquidität 
 
QRI: 
Investors and credit 
institutions exert high 
investment and financing 
pressure  
 
Indicators: 
Perceived investment 
behaviour of the investors 
to invest in real estate 
(willing/ neutral/ negative) 
Perceived acquisition 
behaviour of the credit 
institutions to finance real 
estate products 
(aggressive/ neutral/ 
negative) 
Number of financing offers 
from banks for real estate 
products (high/ medium/ 
low) 
 
Risks: 
Increasing prices 
Strategic risk: Pricing 
pressures 
Strong competition 
Strategic risk: Product 
competition 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication  
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
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Appendix 11 
Open-ended Qualitative Indicators for FC 
 
Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Investment stop Einstellung 
Investitionen 
Standstill Stillstand 
 
QRI: 
Decision-makers 
discontinue acquisitions 
and investments  
 
Indicator: 
Investment volume for real 
estate products (high/ 
medium/ low) 
 
Risk: 
Reaching performance 
targets 
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls  
Operational risks: Earnings 
shortfall, cost overruns 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
External risk: Rating impacts 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Decrease of portfolio assets 
Reduzierung 
Portfoliobestand  
Procurement of liquidity 
through distressed sales 
Liquiditätsbeschaffung durch 
Notverkäufe 
QRI: 
Decision-makers reduce 
portfolio assets in order to 
arrange for liquidity  
 
Indicators: 
Disposition volume (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Achieved or achievable exit 
prices for real estate (high/ 
appropriate/ low) 
Duration of sales 
transaction (long/ medium/ 
short) 
 
Risk: 
Reaching performance 
targets 
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls  
Operational risks: Earnings 
shortfall, cost overruns 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
External risk: Rating impacts 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Malfunction of models due to 
changed parameters 
Fehlende Funktion der 
Modelle aufgrund 
veränderter Parameter 
Stop of expansion and 
standstill Expansionsstopp 
und Stillstand 
QRI: 
Decision-makers recognise 
the malfunctioning of the 
business model of their 
CRE organisation  
 
Indicators: 
Internal rate of return of 
(high/ medium/ low) 
Level of bond yields (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Volume of launch/ 
acquisition of real estate 
products (high/ medium/ 
low) 
Cash in- and outflows of 
investors for RE 
investments (high/ medium/ 
low) 
Risk: 
Reaching performance 
targets 
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls 
Operational risks: Earnings 
shortfall, cost overruns 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
External risk: Rating impacts 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
Unexpected, non-controllable 
event Unerwartetes, nicht 
beherrschbares Ereignis 
Sudden and surprising 
Plötzlich und unerwartet 
Lack of predictability 
Fehlende Vorhersagbarkeit 
Development not included in 
strategic planning 
Entwicklung in strategischer 
Planung nicht einkalkuliert 
Impact of the event on the 
organisation hardly 
predictable Auswirkungen 
Event auf Organisation 
überwiegend nicht 
kalkulierbar 
QRI: 
The event is perceived as 
sudden and unexpected by 
the decision-makers  
 
Indicators: 
Development of the event 
included in the strategic 
planning (yes/ partially/ no) 
Consequences of the event 
included in strategic 
planning (yes/ partially/ no)  
Development of 
mechanisms to react to the 
event (yes/ partially/ no)  
Risks: 
Reaching performance 
targets  
Operational risks: Earnings 
shortfall, cost overruns 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-makers 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 	 	
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Adjustment of the 
organisation to the situation 
and to the demand-related 
behaviour (capacitites, new 
advisory board, strategy 
days) Anpassung 
Unternehmensorganisation 
an Situation und 
Nachfrageverhalten 
(Kapazitätsanpassungen, 
neues Advisor Board, 
Strategietage) 
Procurement of liquidity 
through distressed sales 
Liquiditätsbeschaffung durch 
Notverkäufe 
Development not included in 
strategic planning 
Entwicklung in strategischer 
Planung nicht einkalkuliert 
Impact of the event on the 
organisation hardly 
predictable Auswirkungen 
Event auf Organisation 
überwiegend nicht 
kalkulierbar 
Familiar reactions and 
mechanisms without 
alternatives Bekannte und 
alternativlose 
Reaktionsmechanismen 
Tremendous uncertainty with 
assessing the situation  
Enorme Unsicherheit in der 
Einschätzung der Situation 
Insecurities in strategic 
decision-making 
Unsicherheit bei 
strategischer 
Entscheidungsfindung 
Panic behaviour on the 
markets Panisches Verhalten 
an den Märkten 
Mixed feelings between 
surprise, fear and motivation 
Gemischte Gefühle zwischen 
Überraschung, Angst und 
Motivation 
Perceived uncertainty 
Wahrgenommene 
Unsicherheit 
QRI: 
Decisions are made under 
uncertainty during this 
situation  
 
Indicators: 
Perceived certainty by the 
decision-maker (high, 
standard, low) 
Perceived emotions of the 
decision-maker (motivated, 
neutral, anxious/ panic) 
Perceived behaviour of the 
decision-maker (aktive, 
neutral, passive) 
Risks: 
Reaching performance 
targets 
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls  
Operational risk: Earnings 
shortfall 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Irrational decisions of actors 
Irrationale Entscheidungen 
der Akteure 
Actions based on gut 
feelings and experiences 
Handlungen auf Basis von 
Bauchgefühl und Erfahrung 
Irrational decisions of actors 
Irrationale Entscheidungen 
der Akteure 
Rough approaches Rabiate 
Vorgehensweisen  
Irrational behaviour 
Irrationales Verhalten  
Strategic misconduct 
Strategisches Fehlverhalten 
Lack of available time 
Fehlende verfügbare Zeit 
Decisions at short notice 
Kurzfristige Entscheidungen 
QRI: 
Decision-makers act 
irrational and with strategic 
misconduct during this 
situation  
 
Indicators: 
Kind of implementation of 
the decisions (thoughtful/ 
rough) 
Period for decisions (long/ 
medium/ short) 
Plausibility of decisions 
(high/ medium/ low) 
Correctness of decisions 
(correct/ wrong) 
Available time for decisions 
(long/ appropriate/ short) 
Risks: 
Reaching performance 
targets  
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls 
Operational risk: Earnings 
shortfall 
External risk: Rating impacts 
Lack of transparency for the 
decision-maker 
Strategic risks: Corporate 
governance, 
miscommunication 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
 
Focus on the core 
competencies Konzentration 
auf Kerngeschäft 
Purification and refocusing 
on core competencies 
Entschlackung und 
Refokussierung auf 
Kerngeschäft 
QRI: 
Decision-makers focus on 
core competencies of the 
CRE organisation  
 
Indicators: 
Asset under management 
in real estate (increase/ 
decrease) 
Existing business segments 
(increase/ decrease) 
Existing participation 
interests (increase/ 
decrease) 
 
Risk: 
Reaching performance 
targets 
Operational risk: Earnings 
shortfall 
Financial risk: Asset losses  
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy)  	 	
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Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Within short time 
investments and debt 
financing abandoned 
Innerhalb kürzester Zeit 
Investitionsverhalten und 
Kreditvergabe abgebrochen 
Real estate ignored as an 
asset class Immobilien als 
Assetklasse ignoriert 
Drawback from the asset 
class real estate in a panic 
Panischer Rückzug aus 
Assetklasse Immobilie 
Irrational fear of investors 
Irrationale Ängste der 
Investoren 
Limited availability of capital 
Kapitalverfügbarkeit 
eingeschränkt 
Lack of liquidity Fehlende 
Liquidität 
Withdrawal of liquidity and 
freeze on expansion Abzug 
von Liquidität und 
Expansionsstopp 
QRI: 
Investors ignore real estate 
as a form of investment and 
withdraw funds 
 
Indicators: 
Willingness of investors to 
invest in real estate (high/ 
medium/ low) 
Availability of liquidity from 
investors (high/ normal/ 
low) 
Notice periods for return 
claim of funds (long/ 
medium/ short) 
Risks: 
Reaching performance 
targets  
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls 
Operational risks: Earnings 
shortfall, cost overruns 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
External risk: Rating Impacts 
Interest development 
Financial risk: High debt and 
interest rates 
Availability of liquidity  
Financial risk: Liquidity Crises 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Achieving market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 	 	
APPENDIX 11 		
	 485 
Concept QI Potential Risk 
Broad Risk Category: 
Factor 
Bank lending stopped 
suddenly Kurzfristige 
Einstellung Kreditvergabe 
Within short time 
investments and debt 
financing abandoned 
Innerhalb kürzester Zeit 
Investitionsverhalten und 
Kreditvergabe abgebrochen 
Restructuring of debt 
financing Restrukturierung 
von Finanzierungen 
Lack of refinancing efforts of 
banks Fehlende 
Refinanzierungs-
bemühungen der Banken 
QRI: 
Within short notice credit 
institutions abandon lending  
 
Indicators: 
Willingness of banks to 
finance the asset class real 
estate (high/ medium/ low) 
Availability of funds/liquidity 
from credit institutions 
(high/ medium/ low) 
Notice periods to terminate 
loan agreements (long/ 
medium/ short) 
Risks: 
Reaching performance 
targets  
Strategic risk: Demand 
shortfalls 
Operational risk: Earnings 
shortfall 
Financial risk: Asset losses 
External risks: Rating 
impacts, industry crises 
Availability of liquidity 
Financial risk: Liquidity crises 
 
ð potential effect on SM: 
Reaching market leadership 
(corporate strategy) 
Increase of assets under 
management (corporate 
strategy) 
Improvement of performance 
of the CRE organisation 
(corporate strategy) 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
(corporate strategy) 
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Appendix 12 
Potential Broad Risk Categories in the CRE Context 
 
Potential Risk 
(from Appendix 5) 
Potential Risk  
Broad Risk Category: Factor 
Potential effect on SM 
(from Appendix 5) 
Lack of transparency 
(for the decision-
maker) 
 
Strategic risks:  
Corporate governance 
Miscommunication  
 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Increasing prices Strategic risk:  
Pricing pressures 
Increase of assets under 
management Steigerung 
Assets under Management 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Achieving market leadership 
Erreichen Marktführerschaft 
Strong competition Strategic risk:  
Product competition 
Increase of assets under 
management Steigerung 
Assets under Management 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Achieving market leadership 
Erreichen Marktführerschaft 
Developments of the 
markets 
Strategic risks:  
Corporate governance 
Miscommunication  
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Dependency on cash 
inflows and 
willingness to provide 
financing 
Financial risk: 
Liquidity crises 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Interest development Financial risk: 
High debt and interest rates 
 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
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Potential Risk 
(from Appendix 5) 
Potential Risk  
Broad Risk Category: Factor 
Potential effect on SM 
(from Appendix 5) 
Regulatory 
requirements 
Strategic risk:  
Regulation 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Reaching 
performance targets 
Strategic risk:  
Demand shortfalls 
Operational risk: 
Earning shortfall 
Cost overruns 
Financial risk: 
Asset losses 
External risk: 
Rating impacts 
Increase of assets under 
management Steigerung 
Assets under Management 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation) 
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Achieving market leadership 
Erreichen Marktführerschaft 
Availability of 
Liquidity 
Financial risk: 
Liquidity crises 
Increase of assets under 
management Steigerung 
Assets under Management 
Improvement of performance 
(of the CRE organisation)  
Steigerung Performance 
Enhancing client satisfaction 
Erhöhung Kundenzufriedenheit 
Achieving market leadership 
Erreichen Marktführerschaft 		
 
 
 
 
 
